R.K. GUPTA.:— Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Bank is heard. This is an appeal preferred by the Appellant-Bank under section 20 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 challenging the order passed by the Tribunal on 23rd January, 2012 in M.A. No. 44/2010. By this order, the Tribunal has rejected the application of execution filed by the Appellant-Bank under section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. 2. The relevant facts leading to the present case are that the Appellant-Bank earlier filed a Civil Suit before the Additional District Judge, Gohad, District-Bhind, which was registered as Civil Suit No. 26-A of 2000, against the Respondents to recover a sum of Rs. 7,27,984/- together with interest @ 16.50% per annum with quarterly rests plus 2% penal interest from the date of filing of Suit till realization along with other reliefs. The said Suit was decreed by the Civil Court on 2nd August, 2003. For a period of 9 years, the Appellant-Bank has not moved any application for execution of the said decree before the Civil Court, but an application for execution of such judgment and decree was moved in the year 2010 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has rejected the said application on the ground that the Appellant has not shown any reason for not proceeding with the execution of the said judgment and decree with the Civil Court, when the decree was passed for a sum of Rs. 7,27,984/-, which was under the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 3. The Tribunal was also of the view that by virtue of section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, it is specifically provided that where a decree or order has been passed by any Court before the commencement of RDDBFI Amendment Act 2000 and has not yet been executed, then the decree holder may apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of the amount. The Tribunal held that since the decree was passed after commencement of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, therefore the provision as contained under section 33-A has no application in the present case. Before adverting to the same, it would be appropriate to mention here that section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 was inserted by amending the Act 1 of 2000 and was brought into force w.e.f. 17th January, 2000. 4. Before adverting to the same, it would be appropriate to mention here that section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 was inserted by amending the Act 1 of 2000 and was brought into force w.e.f. 17th January, 2000. 4. Reading of section 31-A itself indicates that where a decree or order was passed by any Court before the commencement of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Amendment Act, 2000) and if such decree is not executed, then under those circumstances, the decree holder may apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of the amount. 5. In the present case, admittedly, the decree was passed on 2nd August, 2003 i.e. after when section 31-A was already brought into the statute book by amending the RDDBFI Act, 1993 and the said section was brought into force w.e.f. 17th January, 2000. Under these circumstances, the provision as contained under section 31-A would have no application because in the present case, the Civil Court passed the decree after when section 31-A was 'already mvogue i.e. on 17th January, 2000. Section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 does not deal with the situation that decree passed by the Civil Court even after insertion of Section 31-A can also be executed by DRT. Such eventuality is absent from section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. The decree if any passed by the Civil Court prior to insertion of section 31-A w.e.f. 17th January, 2000, then such decree can always be executed by the Tribunal subject to the condition that the amount of decree is Rs. 10.00 lacs and above, but in the present case as it is held earlier that the decree itself was passed after insertion of section 31-A, which was brought into force w.e.f. 17th January, 2000, then such decree cannot be executed by the Tribunal under section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. 6. 10.00 lacs and above, but in the present case as it is held earlier that the decree itself was passed after insertion of section 31-A, which was brought into force w.e.f. 17th January, 2000, then such decree cannot be executed by the Tribunal under section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. 6. In this reference, it would be appropriate to refer herein Section 31 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, which provides that every Suit or other proceeding pending before any Court immediately before the date of the establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a Suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal. 7. There is no dispute that under the RDDBFI Act, 1993 the recovery of debt would only be made by filing the Original Application under section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, if the debt is of Rs. 10.00 lacs or more than that. 8. In the present case, by virtue of Section 31, the proceedings were liable to be transferred from the Civil Court to the Tribunal, if the decree was put to execution and proceedings were initiated before the Civil Court prior to the commencement of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. Yet, it was for the Bank to have moved before the Civil Court and applied for transfer of the same by virtue of Section 31 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, but unfortunately, the Appellant-Bank had not chosen to file any execution before the Civil Court, which could have been transferred to the Tribunal for its execution. Thus, under these circumstances, section 31 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 would also have no application. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank v. Chajju Ram 2000 (40) ALR 648. Thus, under these circumstances, section 31 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 would also have no application. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank v. Chajju Ram 2000 (40) ALR 648. The said judgment is relied for the preposition that the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken into account section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 and the Apex Court has held that the decree has been passed prior to the insertion of section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 and the same yet can be executed by the RDDBFI Act, 1993 and section 31 and section 31-A would be enabling the provision of RDDBFI Act, 1993 to proceed with the execution, if the amount as per decree exceeds of Rs. 10.00 lacs. 10. Reading of the judgment itself indicates that the decree was passed by the Civil Court for an amount of more than Rs. 6.00 lacs and the said decree was passed on 16th February, 1994 and the said decree was put to execution on 21st December, 1994, that means much before the insertion of section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. In the said case the amount, when the proceedings were transferred to the DRT, was of more than Rs. 10.00 lacs. 11. But the facts of the present case are entirely different because in the present case even assuming that the decree was not at all transferred for execution under section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 it was passed after insertion of the said section, which was brought into force w.e.f. 17th January, 2000. 12. Apart from the aforesaid, a decree, which was passed prior to the insertion of section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, was already put to execution in the said case, therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court on the basis of the facts of the said case and also placing reliance on section 31 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 along with section 31-A held that execution of such decree on transfer to the DRT, the DRT will have the jurisdiction. But the facts of the case in hand are that none of the circumstances are available, which were available in the case decided by the Apex Court, therefore, the judgment passed by the Apex Court is of no help to the Appellant. The decree in the present case was not put to execution before Civil Court. 13. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further placed reliance ort another judgment passed by the Hon'ble Kerala High Court in V.D. Mathew v. State Bank of Travancore, 2008 (2) D.R.T.C. 695 (Ker.). The said judgment has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellant to substantiate his submission that even in an eventuality the decree is passed for less than ? 10.00 lacs, after passing of decree, the decretal debt grew to be beyond Rs. 10.00 lacs, therefore, he submits that as per the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, by virtue of section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, such decree can still be executed. 14. Reading of the said judgment itself indicates that the entire aspects have been ignored completely by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Paragraph No. 1 of the said judgment itself indicates that the Bank lodged an Original Application under section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 for recovery of its dues even after the decree by Civil Court and the same was done when the debt grew beyond Rs. 10.00 lacs. It was open for the Appellant to have applied by filing the application under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, but in the present case the Appellant had not chosen to move the Original Application before the Tribunal under section 19, but the Appellant has chosen to file the application for execution of the decree under section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. Under these circumstances, in the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Kerala High Court nowhere has considered the impact of section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, wherein it is provided that the judgment and decree passed prior to the insertion of section 31-A would be the subject-matter for execution by the DRT, but in the present case, the decree itself was passed after insertion of section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. Therefore, according to this Tribunal judgment passed by the Hon'ble Kerala High Court does not decide the law correctly and more so said judgment itself indicates in its para No. 5, which is an under:— "5. At any rate, the decree against the Petitioner was passed only after the coming into force of Act 1 of 2000. It was passed only on 10th December, 2004. The question would be whether that decree could be the foundation of proceedings under section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. Firstly, that decree has become final. Secondly that decree is not challenged as one issued without jurisdiction, on the ground that the decree had exceeded the limit of rupees ten. lacs which would have disabled the Civil Court to pass a decree. If that be so, after the decree was passed, that debt under it remains a decree debt and when the outstanding under that decree grew to be beyond rupees ten lacs, it was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as a cause of action, against the debtor." 15. Thus even after decree is passed by the Civil Court for less than Rs 10.00 lacs and if on the date of filing the Original Application the decretal amount has increased to Rs. 10.00 lacs, then the Bank is within its right to prefer the application under section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 for recovery of its dues, but in the present case, it is held earlier that the Bank has not at all moved any application under section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 for recovery of it's debt. There is no quarrel to the preposition that under the definition of word 'debt' as defined under section 2(g) of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, the decretal debt is also a debt and therefore, by virtue of section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, proceedings could have been initiated by lodging the Original Application before the Tribunal under section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 but unfortunately, the Bank has not chosen to file application under section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 and it has chosen to file application for execution under section 31-A of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. Under these circumstances, I do not find any illegality into the order passed by the Tribunal below and the present Appeal is dismissed. Under these circumstances, I do not find any illegality into the order passed by the Tribunal below and the present Appeal is dismissed. Appeal Dismissed. _____________