Judgment :- 1. The State has filed this appeal against acquittal of accused No.1 and 2. Accused No.1 was charged for offences punishable under Sections 376, 417 and 506 of I.P.C. Accused No.2 was charged for offences punishable under Sections 417 r/w 109 I.P.C. 2. The learned trial Judge acquitted the accused of aforesaid offences. Therefore, State is before this Court. 3. We have heard Sri. N.S. Sampangiramaiah, learned Government Advocate for the State and Sri. B.N. Muralidhar, learned counsel for accused. 4. At the outset, we state that accused No.2 was charged for abetting accused No.1 to break the promise to marry PW6. It is not the case of prosecution that accused No.2 had instigated accused No.1 to commit rape on PW.6 or instigated him to held out false promise to marry her. Therefore, we hold that implication of accused No.2 and trial of accused No.2 for the aforestated offences was unwarranted. Now, we will advert to appreciate evidence adduced against accused No.1. 5. The evidence on record discloses that accused No.1 and PW.6 were neighbours. The accused was a married person. During relevant period, accused had sent his wife to her parental house for delivery and confinement. 6. The evidence of PW.6 (victim) is inconsistent. PW.6 has deposed; that on a certain day, one year prior to the date of lodging first information, the wife of first accused had gone to her parental house for delivery and confinement. The accused came to her house and told her that he would marry her and also threatened her and committed rape on her. The accused was frequently visiting the house of PW.6 and committed rape on her for a period of one year, as a result, she conceived. The parents of PW.6 conveyed a panchayat, wherein accused No.1 confessing his guilt, agreed to marry PW.6. Thereafter, accused No.1 ran away from the village. Accused No.2 bluntly told the parents of victim that marriage between PW.6 and accused No.1 is not possible. It is obvious from the evidence of PW.6 that on the date of first incident of rape, PW.6 was aware that accused was a married person. His wife had gone to delivery and confinement. Thereafter, accused No.1 ran away from the village. Accused No.2 bluntly told the parents of victim that marriage between PW.6 and accused No.1 is not possible. It is obvious from the evidence of PW.6 that on the date of first incident of rape, PW.6 was aware that accused was a married person. His wife had gone to delivery and confinement. In the circumstances, PW.6 did not have reasons to believe that the accused would marry her, PW.6 knowing fully well that accused No.1 is a married person and he cannot fulfill the promise of marrying her had given free access to the accused for a period of one year. The matter got complicated only after she conceived. PW.6 has deposed; that the accused had agreed to marry her before the panchayatdars however, he broke the undertaking given by him before the panchayatdars and ran away from the village. 7. The medical evidence discloses that PW.6 was a major on the date of incident. She was aware of the consequences of what was being done to her by the accused. She was also aware that accused No.1 being a married person could not fulfill his promise of marrying her. PW.6 had concealed these facts till she became pregnant and reached the advance stage of pregnancy. The first information was lodged after a period of one year from the date of incident. All these circumstances lead to the conclusion that pW.6 had freely, voluntarily, consciously consented to have sexual intercourse with the accused and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact. The evidence of PW.6 is also inconsistent. PW.6 has deposed; that the accused held out threats to her and committed rape on her. In the next breath, she has deposed that the accused had promised that he would marry her. The evidence of PW.6 that the accused had threatened her and at the same time, he had promised her to marry is self-contradictory. 8. PW.1 Anjanappa is the father of victim. PW.1 has deposed; that when PW.6 was carrying 3 months pregnancy, she informed the incident of rape and accused was responsible for her plight. PW.1 conveyed a panchayat in the presence of elders of the village. The accused confessed that he had sexual intercourse with the victim and also agreed that he would marry her within a period of two months of date of panchayat. PW.1 conveyed a panchayat in the presence of elders of the village. The accused confessed that he had sexual intercourse with the victim and also agreed that he would marry her within a period of two months of date of panchayat. Therefore, the accused did not marry PW.6 and when he questioned, the accused retorted and total PW.1 to do whatever he could do. 9. The evidence of PW.2-Narayanamma (junior aunt of PW.1) is similar to the evidence of PW.1. 10. PWs.3 to 5 have given evidence relating to panchayat held at the instance of PW.1 and they have also deposed that the accused had confessed before them that he had sexual intercourse with PW.6 and agreed to marry her however, he did not marry PW.6. 11. In the discussion made supra, we have held that the evidence of PW.6 is not consistent regarding the circumstances under which she had consented and allowed the accused to have sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the consent given by PW.6 was under misconception of fact. 12. In a decision reported in AIR 2003 SC 1639 in the case of Uday v. State of Karnataka the Supreme Court has held: “21. It, therefore, appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weight the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.” 13. On consideration of entire evidence and surrounding circumstances of the instant case, we are of the opinion that, the evidence of PW.6 that accused had promised her to marry and therefore, she gave her consent does not inspire confidence. 14. The learned trial Judge on proper appreciation of evidence has acquitted the accused. Therefore, we do not find any grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.