P. K. Musahary, J.- Heard Mr. B. K. Mahajan, learned counsel for the petitioner. Heard also Mr. N. M. Jamir, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing the FIR lodged by the respondent No.2 against the petitoiner which was registered as Dimapur East P.S. Case No.263/2010 under Section 120(B)/409/405/465/1 82/500 of IPC. 3. The petitioner is the Manager (Operation) of Bajaj Allianz Insurance Company, a Company incorported under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 and presently posted at Bajaj Allianz Insurance Company Ltd., NH Centre Point, Oposite Bora Service, GS. Road, Guwahati. 4. The respondent No. 2 was appointed as a Licence Agent of source business and authorised to receive premium from the policy holders and issue money receipt thereof for and on behalf of the aforesaid Company. On expiry of the licence, the Company had extended her licence from time to time till 2007. 5. Mr. B.K. Mahajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, broadly submits that the respondent No. 2 filed the aforesaid FIR against the petitioner as a counterblast, inasmuch as, the petitioner, before filing of the aforesaid FIR by the respondent No. 2, lodged FIR on 6.7.10 against her which was registered as Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 192 of 2010 under Section 467/468 IPC. The second submission is that the FIR in question filed by the respondent No.2 does not disclose any offence under Section 409/406/405 IPC even if the allegation is taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety, inasmuch as, present petitioner at no point of time, was entrusted with the property/money or ever had dominion over the property or the money in the said property has been dishonestly misappropriated or converted by the petitioner to her own use. Similarly, no prima facie case is found to proceed against the petitioner under Section 120(B)/182/500IPC. 6. In support of above submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner would refer to : (1) 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : State of Haryana & Ors Vs Bhajanlal and Ors., (2) (2009) 1 SCC 516 : R. Kalyani Vs Janak C. Mehta & Ors., (3) (1989) 4 SCC 630 : Sham Sunder Vs. State of Haryana, (4) 2010(1) GLT474: Karan Luthra Vs. State of Meghalaya, (5) (2009) 9 SCC 682 : M. N. Ojha & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana, (4) 2010(1) GLT474: Karan Luthra Vs. State of Meghalaya, (5) (2009) 9 SCC 682 : M. N. Ojha & Ors. Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav & Anr. and (6) (2010) 1 SCC 322 : Parminder Kaur Vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 7. Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 questions the maintainability of this petition and the authority of the petitioner to file it inasmuch as, there is no authority or authorisation from the Company authorising her to file the petition. He also submits that the petitioner was not authorised to file FIR against the respondent No. 2 which was registered as Dimapur East PS. Case No. 192/2010. Moreover, the petitioner in the said FIR made certain baseless allegations against respondent No. 2. 8. This Court by order dated 18.11.10 directed the learned P.P. to produce both the case diaries in respect of the Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 263/2010 under Section 120(B)/409/405/465/1 82/500 of IPC (registered on the basis of the FIR lodged by the petitioner) and Dimapur East P.S; Case No. 192/2010 (registered on the basis of FIR lodged by the present petitioner against the respondent No. 2). 9. I have carefully perused the case diary as produced by Mr. N.M. Jamir, learned Public Prosecutor, Nagaland in connection with Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 192/2010. The investigation in the said case has been completed and the charge sheet bearing No. 0015/11 dated 21.2.11 has been submitted against the respondent No. 2, Smt. Lolano John Ngullie and two others, namely, Mrs. Areni John Ngullie and Mr. Rajib Kumar Das. The relevant portion of the aforesaid charge sheet is reproduced hereunder.- "During the course of investigation, the complainant was thoroughly examined and basing on her statement and the produced IRDA regulation 2000 and Bajaj Company guidelines (copy enclosed) it is ascertained that Accd. Lolano an agent of the company holding license No. 2300000276 was supposed to keep her agency license valid and renewed in chain else termination fornon renewal of company stop giving commission, as per the office record and bank statement her last commission was pay on 26th Sept.2008. When Priyanka (Complai­nant) received complaint from policy holder Mr. Lolano an agent of the company holding license No. 2300000276 was supposed to keep her agency license valid and renewed in chain else termination fornon renewal of company stop giving commission, as per the office record and bank statement her last commission was pay on 26th Sept.2008. When Priyanka (Complai­nant) received complaint from policy holder Mr. Sentitemsu Longkumer about the lapsed of his 2nd premium money which was deposited at Lolaz Enterprise, Dmr and on production of the money receipt issued to him, she checked the office records about the agent and learnt that M/s Lolano, having its office at 1 Style Jmm Complex, Circular Road, Dimapur : Nagaland (Photograph enclosed), agency license has expired on 28th August 2008, the money receipt produced by the victimized customer (Sentite­msu) proved that the money was received on 13th January 2009 by Mrs. Areni. On such findings she ascertained that on expiry of the agency license M/s Lolano was not authorised to collect premium money, used company name or issue money receipts on behalf of the company, some of the customers' premium money received by her during the license expiry period was not deposited into the Bajaj Life Insurance Company, Guwahati. Besides victimized customer Mr. Sentitemsu Longkumer, other victim persons namely, (2) Mr. Moanungsang (3) Mrs. Limatola (4) Mrs. Lily Lotha and (5) Mrs. Ayangla Jamir also came forward and stated that their premium money was also found lapsed which were already deposited at Lolaz Enterprise. Drawing (Written statement along with necessary documents and money receipts enclosed). The money receipts produced by them proved that their premium money was received by both M/s Lolano and her elder sister Mrs. Areni as its contains their signature. (1) Mrs. Limatola 2nd and 3rd premium money was received by M/s Lolano on 28th Dec.2008 and 25th Jan.2010 (2) Mrs. Lily Lotha 3rd premium money received by Mrs. Areni on 15th Dec.2008, (3) Mr. Moanungsang 2nd and 3rd premium money by M/s Lolano on 18th Feb.2009, (4) Mrs. Ayangla Jamir 2nd premium was received by M/s Lolano on 16th Sept.2009. On 17.07.10 Accd. M/s Lolano John Ngullie produced an extract copy of the Court, for releasing her on anticipatory bail, accordingly she was released on P.R./Bail Bond as per Court direction. On 20.07.2010 an order was received from the court granting anticipatory bail for a period of 30 days and thereafter it was regularized on 28.11.10. On 17.07.10 Accd. M/s Lolano John Ngullie produced an extract copy of the Court, for releasing her on anticipatory bail, accordingly she was released on P.R./Bail Bond as per Court direction. On 20.07.2010 an order was received from the court granting anticipatory bail for a period of 30 days and thereafter it was regularized on 28.11.10. (Extract copy of Court ordres enclosed). Accused M/s Lolano and Co-accused Mrs. Areni were examined thoroughly and they admitted that they had received the customers' premium money even during the agency license expiry period by issuing money receipts (seizure memo of counterfoil money receipt booklets enclosed) but deny of cheating the customers by taking their money. Further they started even though Accd. Areni has no relation with the compay on good faith she was helping her sister and did not everything what Accd. Lolano was supposed to do so as an agent, they also stated that the customres' premium money was always deposited to the Bajaj Company, Guwahati. Through (1) Bank draft at Axis Bank, Dmr (2) Personally went to deposit the cash at Guwahati. And (3) sometimes sent to Mr. Tapash SBI account (20017843921), who was working at the cash counter, Bajaj Allianz Company Guwahati. During such period. The money receipt of the customers sent by the company through courier was received at the office (Lolaz Enterprise). It is also ascertained from the company and Mr. Taposh that its mandatory to issue money receipts on the spot to the agents or those who personally came to made the deposit at the cash counter, Guwahati". 10. From the aforesaid contents of the charge sheet the submission of Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 that the allegation made against her in the FIR (Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 1927 2010) are baseless is not found correct, inasmuch as, the charge sheet has been submitted after completing the investigation against the respondent No.2 and others. It has been found prima facie that the allegations made against her found correct and the respondent No. 2 is required to prove her innocence in the trial. 11. As regard the question of maintainability it is to be noted that there is no denial to the fact that the petitioner is a responsible employee of the Company holding apost like Manager (Operation). 11. As regard the question of maintainability it is to be noted that there is no denial to the fact that the petitioner is a responsible employee of the Company holding apost like Manager (Operation). It is not necessary that the Manager should be specifically authorised to file FIR/Complaint against an Agent under the Company against whom commission of some irregularities or offence have been brought. The case diary maintained in Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 192/2010 contains receipt of such complaints from various customers/members of the public against the respondent No.2 and their statements made before the I.O. concerned complaining collection of money from them and not depositing the amount. For making complaint before the police or before a competent judicial forum against such alleged offence, in my considered view, no authorisation from the company is required. It is on record that the company received several complaints from the customers on the basis of which the petitioner had to lodge the aforesaid FIR against the respondent No. 2. 12. From record it is found that it was the present petitioner who first lodged FIR on 6.7.10 against the respondent No. 2 which was registered as Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 192/2010. After lodging of the said FIR, the respondent No. 2 filed the FIR against the present petitioner which was registered as Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 263/2010. From the above sequence, I find that the allegation of the present petitioner that the respondent No. 2 filed the ejahar as a counterblast can not be rejected lightly, inasmuch as, the Apex Court in Parminder Kaur case (supra), had considered the circumstances under which the Court can hold that a party has filed FIR or complaint or fighting litigation for wreaking vengeance. 13. As regard the quashing of the FIR, law is well settled by now. The principles of law as settled by the Apex Court in Bhajanlal's case (supra), which is followed till now, is to be applied in the present case. 13. As regard the quashing of the FIR, law is well settled by now. The principles of law as settled by the Apex Court in Bhajanlal's case (supra), which is followed till now, is to be applied in the present case. In the said case it has been held that inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised in certain categories of cases to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice and they are as follows :- "(a) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (b) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officer under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (c) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (d) * * * (e) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (f)*** (g) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 14. The FIR or the complaint must prima facie disclose cognizable offence justifying investigation by police under Section 156(1) of the CrPC except an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) CrPC. Whether such offence has been disclosed against the petitioner, is to be verified and ascertained from the FIR in question lodged by the respondent No. 2. While narrating the facts in the FIR, the respondent No. 2 as informant, presented how she was performing her duties as a resource agent and collecting the amounts from the customers for the benefit and interest of the company. While narrating the facts in the FIR, the respondent No. 2 as informant, presented how she was performing her duties as a resource agent and collecting the amounts from the customers for the benefit and interest of the company. Only in the last portion of the FIR she made allegation as under:- "That subsequently FIR bearing No. 0192/2010 was filed before DMR P.S. East under Section 467/468 IPC when a perusal revealed that non of the accurate facts were placed before the I.O. by the complainant in the said FIR which alleged occurrence of the offence allegedly took place since 2008. Crime committed by accused Smt. Priyanka Parashar, W/o B. Kashyap, Mgr. & Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. That on perusal of the records it may be seen that the complainant Smt. Priyanka Parashar, W/o. B. Kashyap, Mgr. Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd., does not appear to have a duly filed authorization from Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. NH Centre Point, 4th Floor, Opp. Boruah Service, G.S. Road, Guwahati & Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. 3rd Floor, Dandi Tower, Opp. Dispur Secretariat, Near French Motor Co. Ltd., Dispur, GS. Road, Guwahati 781006 to act for Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd., Pune & also has never ever intimated the present complainant by enquiry or otherwise as per terms & conditions of agreement between complainant & Company, while Smt. Priyanka Parashar has perpetuated a criminal conspiracy against the sttae fabrication of & suppression of material evidence, criminal breach of trust, misappropriation of property, fraud while attempting to create a libel & defamation on the character & business dealing of the present complainant with the company." 15. If the above allegations are examined carefully, any prudent man would be able to understand that no ingredient of offence under Section 120(8)406/409/405/465/182/500 IPC are found present or prima facie appears available against the petitioner. Some strong words like 'Criminal conspiracy' against the State, fabrication of & suppression of material evidence, criminal breach of trust, misappropriation of property, fraud while attempting to create a libel & defamation on the character & business dealing have been used in the FIR without any basis and material. Some strong words like 'Criminal conspiracy' against the State, fabrication of & suppression of material evidence, criminal breach of trust, misappropriation of property, fraud while attempting to create a libel & defamation on the character & business dealing have been used in the FIR without any basis and material. Such use of strong words in the FIR would not by themselves justify proceeding against the accused person, unless they have any bearing with the wrong doings of the accused attracting the offence as defined under the IPC. 16. In M.N. Ojha's case (supra), this aspect of the matter has been discussed by the Apex Court and held that free use of expression such as fraud, collusion, conspiracy and cheating etc. would not help the informant/complainant to have the criminal proceeding proceeded unless the averments made in the FIR/Complaint disclose prima facie case at the face value. The manner in which the respondent No. 2 filed the FIR against the present petitioner with sequence of events, in my considered view, undoubtly suggests that the respondent No. 2 lodged the FIR maliciously as a counter blast to the FIR lodged by the petitioner against her (respondent No. 2). The submission of charge sheet against the respondent No. 2 as stated earlier, speaks volume against her. 17. Even if the above proceeding is allowed to continue, looking at the contents and nature of allegations in the FIR in question, it appears that the chance of filing charge sheet, not to speak of ending in conviction, is unconceivable. The chance of conviction is absent or bleak in the present case and, therefore, the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed or set aside as the same does not reveal any offence against the present petitioner. In this regard this court in Smti. Swabera Saleh Vs. Rajib Saleh & Ors., reported in (1995) 2 GLT 335 held that if there is no chance of ultimate conviction inasmuch as even if the entire prosecution including deposition of witness were accepted, no conviction and penalty can be imposed, such FIR is liable to be set aside and quashed. 18. As against the main alleged offence under Section 406/409, there is no statement in the FIR in question that the petitioner was ever entrusted with property or any dominion over the property. 18. As against the main alleged offence under Section 406/409, there is no statement in the FIR in question that the petitioner was ever entrusted with property or any dominion over the property. Nor is there any statement that the petitioner dishonestly misappropriated or converted to her own use or she has used or disposed of the property within the meaning of Section 405 IPC constituting criminal breach of trust. The offence of criminal breach of trust is defined under Section 405 IPC as under: "Whoever, being in my manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust". For constituting the offence of criminal breach of trust, entrustment of property is the main pre requisite. There is no need to refer to case laws to clarify this settled position. However, I would say that the learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly referred to our High Court decision in Karan Luthra Vs. State of Meghalaya, reported in 2010(1) GLT474, wherein, relying on Supreme Court decisions, held that an FIR can be quashed if the entrustment with property or dominion over property is not alleged. 19. As regard alleged offence under Section 465IPC, the FIR in question contains no statement on material particulars how the petitioner committed 'forgery' within the meaning of Section 463 IPC. Similar is the case with alleged offence of defamation under Section 500 IPC and offence under Section 182 IPC relating to false information with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person. Such FIR should not be allowed to be acted upon for prosecution. 20. Similar is the case with alleged offence of defamation under Section 500 IPC and offence under Section 182 IPC relating to false information with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person. Such FIR should not be allowed to be acted upon for prosecution. 20. After taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by way of quashing a malicious criminal proceeding against the petitioner to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice. Accordingly, the FIR in question lodged by the respondent No. 2. corresponding to Dimapur East P.S. Case No. 263/2010 is hereby quashed and set aside. This petition stands allowed. No costs.