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2011 DIGILAW 723 (GAU)

Bikash Ghosh v. State of Tripura

2011-08-30

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2011
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 15.12.2005, passed by the Judge, Fast Track Court (Additional Sessions Judge), North Tripura, Kailashahar in S.T. 113 (NT/K)/02 whereby and whereunder, while the accused appellants, namely, Bikash Ghosh and Smt. Sikha Ghosh, got acquitted from the charge under Section 304B , IPC, were convicted under Section 498(A), IPC and sentenced to suffer R.I. for 21/2 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000 each, i.e. to suffer R.I. for six months. Fine money if realized shall be paid to Sri Abinash Paul, (P. W-1) the father of the deceased Shilpi, as compensation. Heard Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State. 2. The prosecution case as unfolded with the FIR lodged on 19.7.2002 by the father of the decease (P.W.1) with the Officer Incharge, Kailashahar Police Station is that the deceased Shilpi was given marriage with the accused Bikash Ghosh, the accused appellant No. 1 herein, on 21st January, 2002 as per Hindu rites and customs and after few days, when the informant went to see her daughter in her matrimonial house, the accused persons did not allow him to meet his daughter and even they did not allow the informant to take his daughter to his home on "Niyar" (a visit of the married daughter at the parental house) and they demanded for payment of Rs. 50,000 and threatened him that unless the said amount is paid, they will kill his daughter Shilpi. 3. On 11.7.2002, the informant and his son, Sri Amrit Pal (PW4) again went to meet Shilpi at her matrimonial home and on that day also, the accused persons did not allow them to see Shilpi on the same plea. It has also been stated that the deceased Shilpi used to inform the PW 1 about torture caused on her in her matrimonial house. 4. It has also been stated that the deceased Shilpi used to inform the PW 1 about torture caused on her in her matrimonial house. 4. On 19.7.2002 at about 1.00 p.m. the P.W. 1 received a telephonic information from the matrimonial house of his daughter, that his daughter, Shilpi committed suicide and from one Bikash Chatterjee of Boulapassa, he came to know that on the previous day of death of Shilpi, the husband of the deceased Shilpi, and her elder sister Smt. Sikha Ghosh (Nag), the appellant No. 2 herein and the mother in-law of Shilpi, Smt. Pramila Ghosh assaulted Shilpi when she wanted to go to the house of the informant. 5. On receipt of the said information, Kailashahar P.S. Case No. 66 of 2002 was registered under Section304(B) read with Section 34, IPC and the investigation of the case was set in motion and on completion thereof, the police submitted charge-sheet against all the accused persons under Section 304(B) read with Section 34, IPC. 6. As the offence alleged against the accused persons is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, North Tripura, Kailashahar committed the case to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar. 7. Before transferring the case record, the learned Sessions Judge, North Tripura framed the following charge against the accused persons to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The same are reproduced hereunder: I, Shri M.C. Roy, Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar, do hereby charge you, namely-- 1. Shri Bikash Ghosh. 2. Smt. Sikha Ghosh (Nag). 3. Smt. Pramila Ghosh @ Gope as follows-- That on 21st January, 2002 the marriage ceremony between Smt. Silpi Paul (Ghosh), the victim and Shri Bikash Ghosh was held as per Hindu Rites and Customs and after such marriage the victim Smt. Silpi Paul (Ghosh) was living with the family of her husband Shri Bikash Ghosh at village Boulapassa under P.S. Kailashahar. After a month of such living as husband and wife in the said house she was subjected to cruelty or harassment, both mentally and physically by her husband Shri Bikash Ghosh and her relative, namely, Smt. Pramila Ghosh (Gope) and Smt. Sikha Ghosh (Nag) in connection with demand for dowry and consequent upon such continuous torture till her death attributed to her which led her to end her life by strangulation during any time in the morning hours on 19.7.2002 at village Boulapassa under P.S. Kailashahar and as such you have committed the offence punishable under Section 304-B of I.P.C. and within my cognizance. 8. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 24 witnesses including three doctors and other official witnesses and also produced some documents. The accused persons adduced three witnesses, namely, Smt. Milan Rani Das as D.W. 1, Shri Bikash Ghosh, the accused appellant No. 1 as D. W.2 and one Sri Kalyan Deb as D.W.3. The accused persons were also examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. 9. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court acquitted all the accused persons, namely, Bikash Ghosh, Smt. Sikha Ghosh (Nag) and Smt. Pramila Ghosh from the charge under Section 304B, IPC and also acquitted the accused Smt. Pramila, mother in-law of the deceased Shilpi, from the charge under Section498A, IPC due to non-availability of the incriminating evidence against her, but convicted the present accused appellants under Section 498A, IPC. Hence the appeal. 10. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the appellants, while urging for setting aside the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence, would contend that it would he evident from the evidence of P.W.19, Aayanesh Datta Roy, the scribe of the complaint, lodged by the informant (P.W.1), who has stated in his depostion that on 19.7.2002, he wrote one complaint (Exht. 9) sitting in the room of O.C. Kailashahar P.S. as dictated by a police officer and thereafter, while he was leaving the said police station, he saw all the accused persons in the police lockup and Darogababu collected the father's name of the informant from the accused Bikash Ghosh. He also stated that he did not know the Informant and when he was leaving the police station, the signature of the informant was not in the complaint petition written by him 11. Referring to the evidence of the said witnesses, Mr. He also stated that he did not know the Informant and when he was leaving the police station, the signature of the informant was not in the complaint petition written by him 11. Referring to the evidence of the said witnesses, Mr. Chakraborty contended that before lodging the FIR by the P.W. 1, the accused persons were taken into custody at the instance of PW 24, Arjun Debbarma, I.O. of the case, with whom the accused persons have had enmity who is the next door neighbour of the accused persons. 12. He again referred to the evidence of P.W. 24, particularly, the statement of his cross-examination wherein he stated that he served as SDPO, Kailashahar for three years and before getting promotion as SDPO, he served as Sub-Inspector, Inspector of Police and was also posted at Kailashahar. The distance between SDPO Office and the Kailashahar P.S. is about half K.M. and his residential house situates adjacent to the house of the accused Bikash Ghosh at Boulapassa and he did not disclose such information to his superior before taking up the investigation of the case. 13. He again contended that it would be evident from the cross-examination of P.W.1 that before he reached to the Police Station, SDPO i.e. the I.O. of the case, (P.W.24) was already present in the P.S. and I.O. also extended some financial help to the informant for cremation of the dead body of the daughter of the informant. 14. Referring to the aforesaid evidence of P.W.24, Mr. Chakraborty further contended that the SDPO (P.W.24), I.O. of the case being inimical to the family of the accused who arrived at Kailashahar P.S. even before lodging the FIR and made arrangement for lodging written complaint with the aid of P.W. 19, scribe of the complaint. Thus, the whole investigation is one sided and the accused and his family members were implicated falsely by P.W.24, I.O. of the case. 15. His another contention is that it would be evident from the evidence of P.W. 4, Amrit Pal, brother of the deceased, that he went to the house of the accused Bikash to bring his sister Shilpi and his sister was not allowed to come with him. But on the next day, the accused Bikash came to his in-law's house at Kumarghat with Shilpi and keeping her in Kumarghat, he returned to Kailashahar. But on the next day, the accused Bikash came to his in-law's house at Kumarghat with Shilpi and keeping her in Kumarghat, he returned to Kailashahar. Shilpi stayed in her parental house for about 21 days. He again contended that for non-allowing Shilpi to go with her brother to Kumarghat itself cannot be a ground for presumption that the deceased was either mentally or physically tortured by the accused persons while she was in their family. 16. He also referred to the cross-examination of this witness, wherein this witness stated that at the time of marriage of the deceased Shilpi, the accused Bikash and his family members did not demand for any thing, rather Bikash and his family members offered some money to them for meeting expenses of the marriage, but they refused to accept the same. So, at the time of marriage, there was no demand for dowry, rather accused family tried to help the family of the informant. Therefore, the allegation of making a demand for payment of Rs. 50,000 is nothing but after thought, the learned Counsel further contended. He again contended that PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4-all are blood relations of the deceased Shilpi who made statement before the Court relying upon the statements of the deceased, who is no more in the world and her those statements even if admitted to be true cannot be considered as statement under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, on the basis of such evidence on record, the accused appellants cannot be convicted. 17. Mr. Chakraborty further submits that P.W.1 stated that he attended the telephone of his daughter from the house of one Dibyundu Malakar, but the said Dibyundu Malakar was neither examined by the I.O. of the case nor produced before the Court, though Sri Malakar is still alive whose house is at a distance of about 11/2 furlong from the house of the P.W.1. Non-production of the said witness also creates some doubt regarding the telephonic call received by P.W.1. In his statement, he also stated that while he visited the house of his daughter about 6/7 days before her death for the first time, on that day his son was with him and on that date, the accused persons demanded for Rs. 50,000-from him and at that time, no other outsider was present. In his statement, he also stated that while he visited the house of his daughter about 6/7 days before her death for the first time, on that day his son was with him and on that date, the accused persons demanded for Rs. 50,000-from him and at that time, no other outsider was present. But on that date, he brought it to the notice of one Kalyanbabu and Bidhanbabu who were also not examined and such statements are also not available to his 161 statement and thus those statements made by him for the first time in the trial. Therefore, such statements are approved version and on the basis of those statements, an order of conviction cannot be passed, Mr. Chakraborty contended. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has again taken this Court to the evidence of P.W.24, Arjun Debbarma, wherein he stated that while giving statement, Abinash Pal, the informant, (P.W.1) did not state to him that after demanding for Rs. 50,000 by the accused, he informed it to the mediator of the marriage, namely, Bidhanbabu and Kalyanbabu. Similarly, Amrit Pal (P.W. 4) also did not state to him that after demanding Rs. 50,000 by the accused, he informed it to the mediator of the marriage. So, P.W.1 also did not state to him that his daughter was kept unfed by the accused. 18. He also takes this Court to the evidence of P.W. 24 wherein P.W. 24, the I.O. of the case, stated, inter alia, that at the time of filing charge-sheet in the Court, he came to a conclusion that before and during marriage, there was no demand of dowry neither from the accused Bikash nor from his family members. And during his investigation, it was also revealed that the family of Abinash was not financially sound. None of the witnesses stated to him that they ever seen the accused persons to assault Shilpi in her matrimonial house. None of the witnesses also stated to him that the informant or his family members ever informed any neighbour of Shilpi about torture on her by the accused. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the appellants stated that the I.O. of the case without examining the people of the locality where the appellant Bikash resides examined his own brother in-law, Ardhendu Bikash Das and sister in-law Smt. Sampa Das, P.Ws. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the appellants stated that the I.O. of the case without examining the people of the locality where the appellant Bikash resides examined his own brother in-law, Ardhendu Bikash Das and sister in-law Smt. Sampa Das, P.Ws. 5 and 6 respectively and also his maid servant Smt. Jyotsna Malakar, (PW 17) for corroboration of the evidences of P.Ws. 1 to 4, as those witnesses are also inimical to the present appellants, as there was a dispute over the boundary of the residential house of the I.O. of the case and the appellants. 19. He further contended that as per the alleged statement of P.Ws. 1 to 4, the family of the accused declined to send her (Shilpi) on 'Niyar' unless Rs. 50,000 is paid, but it is evident on record that on the following day, the accused Bikash took the deceased Shilpi to the house of P.W.1 and she stayed there for about 21 days and after 21 days, it was the accused appellant Bikas who went there and brought her again and such statement were not made to the I.O. of the case. Therefore, the fact relating to the demand of dowry is in no way proved by the prosecution. More so, when the accused persons were acquitted from the allegations of dowry death, in that circumstances, the conviction of the accused appellants under Section498A passed by the Trial Court is not proper, the learned Counsel further submits. 20. His another contention is that P.Ws. 1 to 4 are admittedly the blood relations of the deceased Shilpi as well as the interested witnesses who were examined after long delay from the date of occurrence but no explanation has been given by the prosecution for such delayed examination of those witnesses which also creates doubt about the prosecution case. 21. Further contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that though the P.Ws. 1 to 4 referred to the names of Kalyan Deb, Bikash Chatterjee and Bidhan Das, but none of them were examined by the prosecution as prosecution witnesses whereas the defence to disapprove the case of the prosecution examined one Milan Rani Das, Bikash Ghosh and Kalyan Deb as D.W.1, D.W. 2 and D.W.3. 22. 1 to 4 referred to the names of Kalyan Deb, Bikash Chatterjee and Bidhan Das, but none of them were examined by the prosecution as prosecution witnesses whereas the defence to disapprove the case of the prosecution examined one Milan Rani Das, Bikash Ghosh and Kalyan Deb as D.W.1, D.W. 2 and D.W.3. 22. The learned Counsel further submits that D.W.3 Kalyan Deb, the mediator of the marriage, in his statement specifically stated that he proposed for the marriage of Shilpi with the accused Bikash and the father of the deceased Shilpi stated to him that he had no financial means to give marriage of his daughter, knowing which, he informed it to the accused and, in return, the accused told him to proceed with the discussion with an assurance to bear the expenses of the marriage. Thereafter, negotiation started between the two families wherein he was also present and during the said discussion, accused Bikash agreed to bear the expenditure regarding hospitality of bride party. Accordingly, marriage was settled on 10.12.2001 and after settlement of marriage, he received one telephone call from one unanimous person who asked to cancel the marriage between Shilpi and Bikash. Such type of telephone call was also received in the house of Bikash. Then we went to Sonaimuri and stated to the father of Shilpi regarding the receipt of such telephone call from one unanimous person who claimed to be the paramour of Shilpi when the brother of Shilpi told them that everything will be sorted out and nothing to be worried. 23. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants that this witness in his evidence further stated that while deceased Shilpi stayed in her in-law's house, at that time, her father and brother used to come to Kailashahar in connection with their business and at that time he had also discussion with them and during that discussion, they never informed to him that Shilpi was unhappy in her in-laws' house and she was being maltreated by the accused persons. In his cross-examination, this witness also stated that on being asked, Shilpi told him that she is happy in her in-laws' house. This witness also denied the suggestion of the prosecution that he did never receive any telephone call from any unanimous person who disclosed him as a paramour of Shilpi. 24. Therefore, Mr. In his cross-examination, this witness also stated that on being asked, Shilpi told him that she is happy in her in-laws' house. This witness also denied the suggestion of the prosecution that he did never receive any telephone call from any unanimous person who disclosed him as a paramour of Shilpi. 24. Therefore, Mr. Chakraborty further contended that even if the evidence of PW1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 recorded by the Trial Court in Para-42 of the judgment is taken in toto, then also the same does not come within the purview of cruelty as defined in Section 498A. He finally contended that for establishing a case under Clause (a) of Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution has to establish that the conduct of the husband appellant or his family member has any wilful conduct and of such a nature as is likely to drive the wife to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of her, in this case, the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused husband wilfully conducted either torture upon the wife deceased to drive her for committing suicide or causing grave injury either bodily or mentally or torture to life, limb or health and when a person is acquitted from the charge of Section 304B, then the Court ought not to have convicted him under Section 498A, the learned Counsel further submits. 25. Mr. Chakraborty also contended that every quarrel between the husband and the wife and in-laws cannot be treated as a cruelty unless the activities of those persons covered the explanation clause to Section 498A where the Legislature defines the meaning of cruelty. In the instant case, there is no such evidence that the accused caused any cruelty upon the deceased Shilpi which forced her to commit suicide or causes heinous injury or torture to her to life. Thus, Section 498A is in no way attracted and the accused appellants are liable to be acquitted. 26. He further submitted that admittedly, there is no direct evidence relating to the alleged cruelty from the evidence on record. Thus, Section 498A is in no way attracted and the accused appellants are liable to be acquitted. 26. He further submitted that admittedly, there is no direct evidence relating to the alleged cruelty from the evidence on record. From the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and FW 4, it would prove that whole allegations is based on communication with the deceased and those evidences are, in fact, weak piece of evidence and is also hearsay evidence which is inadmissible. 27. He also contended that though Dr. Pradip Kr. Bardhan (PW 11), Dr. Sunirmal Nath (P.W. 12) and Dr. D.P. Chakraborty (P.W. 13) in their statement have stated that the cause of death of the deceased Shilpi is homicidal in nature, but the Trial Court on proper scrutiny of the evidence came to a conclusion that the cause of death of the deceased is suicidal in nature and ultimately acquitted all the accused from the charge levelled against them under Section 304B. 28. Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. in his usual fairness submits that except the evidence of PW1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4, no other witnesses of the prosecution has stated against the present appellants. According to him, if this Court believes the evidence of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses, then the order of conviction and sentence will remain. He also submitted that P.W. 24 in his statement stated that none of these witnesses made any statement to him relating to demand of Rs. 50,000 by the sister-in-law of the deceased i.e. the appellant No. 2 for to make demand by the appellant No. 1. Thus, the learned Trial Court committed error relying upon that portion of evidence being those are approved version i.e. first time stated in the Court. 29. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Counsel in support of his aforesaid contention placed reliance in the case of Inderpal v. State of M.P., 2002 Crl. L.J. 926, particularly in para-7 of the said Report, wherein the Apex Court noted, inter alia-- Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the purview of Section 32(1)of the Indian Evidence Act, there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence. L.J. 926, particularly in para-7 of the said Report, wherein the Apex Court noted, inter alia-- Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the purview of Section 32(1)of the Indian Evidence Act, there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence. In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law (written or verbal) the statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstance of the transactions which resulted in her death, in cases in which the cause of death comes into question.... 30. He also placed reliance on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in GM. Ravi @ G. Purushotham v. State of A.P., 2004 Crl. L.J 1861, wherein the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court while discussing cruelty to woman and allegations against the accused, husband of the deceased to the witnesses taking note of Inderpal (supra), held, inter alia-- All the witnesses in the present case, who have deposed, have only stated what according to them, was told by the deceased to them with respect to the harassment meted out to her by her husband. None of these statements comes within the purview of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, these statements in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above are not at all admissible in evidence. There is not a single witness who has stated that he/she had personal knowledge of the harassment of the deceased by the appellant. Even the father of the deceased, who stated that the accused had demanded Rs. 10,000 for the purpose of filing an appeal in the High Court, did not state that a demand for money was made to him by the accused. He stated that the demand was made on telephone by his own daughter, the deceased. According to him the accused had asked his wife, that is the deceased, to demand money from him. Again this evidence is not admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, conviction under Section 498A, IPC also cannot sustain and is set aside. 31. The learned Counsel for the appellants on the point of withholding of material witnesses that some of the witnesses to whom the PW1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 disclosed the story of alleged demand of Rs. Therefore, conviction under Section 498A, IPC also cannot sustain and is set aside. 31. The learned Counsel for the appellants on the point of withholding of material witnesses that some of the witnesses to whom the PW1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 disclosed the story of alleged demand of Rs. 50,000 were not examined, also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Bhanda Garh v. State of Assam, 1984 Crl. L.J. 217, wherein this Court considered the point relating to withholding material witnesses, particularly, in Para-10, held: In our opinion, the most material lapse of the prosecution which has shaken the substratum of the case is that it has withheld the two charge-sheeted witnesses, Giridhari and Yudhistir, and has given no explanation for non-examination of these two witnesses. It cannot be denied that in the peculiar circumstances of the case these witnesses were the most material witnesses inasmuch as Giridhari was the only man who had given information to P.W.1 on the basis of which the FIR in this case was loged. Yudhistir would also have been an equally important witness inasmuch as he was the person who was in the group which attended the Kirtan and according to the evidence of both P.Ws 3 and 5 he was also an eye-witness of the occurrence. We have, therefore, no hesitation in this case to draw inference against the prosecution under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act for non-examination of not only these two witnesses but also Bikhahari who, if examined, in our opinion, would have given life to the prosecution case. 32. It is also settled by the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, III (2000) SET 614 : 11 (2000) CCR 75 (SC) : (2000) 4 SCC 515 , wherein in para 23 of the said Report, it was held that-- 23. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as Court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case and hence the scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a Court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses. 33. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a Court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses. 33. In the instant case also, it would be the duty of the Court to examine the prosecution witnesses and defence witnesses on the basis of the same yardsticks and when I.O. of the case himself admitted that the prosecution witnesses, particularly PW1, PW 2 and PW 3 did never state to him regarding the demand of Rs. 50,000 as well as D.W.3 who also did not admit the story that PW 1 and PW 2 informed him regarding the demand of Rs. 50,000, then on the basis of what the learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that there was demand of dowry, particularly, when he also did not rely on the story of the prosecution regarding the dowry death and acquitted all the accused persons from the charge under Section 304B, IPC and where is the scope for convicting present appellants under Section 498A, IPC unless the prosecution proved the requirement as mentioned in the explanation of the said section. 34. In the instant case, the story regarding the demand of dowry of Rs. 50,000 is nothing but an afterthought. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal & Anr., IV (1993) CCR 392 (SC) : I (1994) DMC 138 (SC) : (1994) 1 SCC 73 , the Apex Court held that : In a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceeding. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498A, IPC and Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498A, IPC and Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the Court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidence adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater, (1950) 2 ALL ER 458, has observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject-matter. 35. On scrutiny of the evidence as adduced by the prosecution and defence, it appears that there is no direct evidence regarding the involvement of the present accused appellants in the alleged offence either regarding the physical torture or mental torture upon the victim Shilpi except the statement made by the deceased Shilpi to PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 which are not admissible evidence in view of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 relating to the demand of Rs. 50,000 by the in-laws of the deceased Shilpi, particularly, the appellant No. 2, as alleged, is also not corroborated by the I.O. of the case (P.W.24), rather who denied that those prosecution witnesses did not make any statement to him regarding that aspect, which creates a doubt on the prosecution story, particularly, when the I.O. of the case even did not examine other relations of the deceased or any of the nearby people except his (I.O.) brother-in-law and sister-in-law, P.W 5 and PW 6 respectively and P.W. 17, his maid servant, when admittedly there was a boundary dispute with him in one side and appellants on the other side. Regarding investigation also, a doubt creates in the mind of this Court as P.W. 19 very specifically stated that he has written complaint as a scribe as dictated by one police officer sitting in the office room of the Officer Incharge of Kailashahar Police Station in absence of the informant (PW1) while the accused persons had already been taken into custody prior to lodging of the FIR. Therefore, there is no other option before this Court except to set aside the judgment and order as impugned in the instant appeal, as the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 36. Ordered accordingly. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The appellants are acquitted from the charge levelled against them. As the appellants are on bail, their bail bonds stand discharged. Send down the L.C. records forthwith. Appeal allowed.