JUDGMENT 1. RULE. Mr. Janak Raval, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondent in each of these applications. 2. BY these applications under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code), the applicants have challenged the orders passed by the respondent ? Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Narmada Yojna, Ahmedabad-1 and pray to grant reasonable time of about one month from the date of passing of the order for payment of deficit court fees by the applicants on reference applications made by the applicants to the respondent under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act), with a further direction to the respondent to proceed further in accordance with law in respect of the reference applications of the applicants. Since common facts and contentions are involved in all these applications, the same were taken up for hearing together and are disposed of by this common judgement. For the sake of convenience, reference is made to the facts of the case as stated in Civil Revision Application No.182 of 2011. 3. THE applicants are agriculturists whose lands have been acquired for the public purpose of Narmada Canal. Pursuant to the award made by the Collector under section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the applicants had submitted reference applications to the respondent within the prescribed time limit under section 18 of the Act. It is the case of the applicants that they were under the bonafide impression that ad-valorem court fee was not required to be paid. However, subsequently pursuant to an order dated 29.6.2010 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No.3493 of 2010, the Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. issued a Circular dated 21.8.2010 to all the Special Land Acquisition Officers (Narmada Yojna) for levying ad-valorem court fees on applications for references under section 18 of the Act as per Item No.15 of Schedule I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. Thereupon, the respondent called upon the applicants to pay ad-valorem court fees on the applications made by them. It is the case of the applicants that at the relevant time, they were unable to pay the court fees and therefore, had not paid the court fees within the time granted by the respondent. Thereupon, the respondent called upon the applicants to pay ad-valorem court fees on the applications made by them. It is the case of the applicants that at the relevant time, they were unable to pay the court fees and therefore, had not paid the court fees within the time granted by the respondent. However, thereafter, the applicants submitted applications dated 4.7.2011 to the respondent stating that they are ready and willing to pay the requisite court fees on the reference applications submitted by them and request for grant of time for making payment of such court fees. However, by the impugned communication/order dated 7.7.2011, which have been received by the learned advocate for the applicants on 19.7.2011, the applications made by the applicants came to be rejected. Being aggrieved, the applicants have filed the present revisions under section 115 of the Code. 4. MR. K. B. Pujara, learned advocate for the applicants in each of these matters has submitted that the impugned orders passed by the respondent are patently incorrect, unjust and contrary to law. It was submitted that the respondent has failed to appreciate that section 149 of the Code specifically empowers the Court to grant time for payment of deficient court fees. The power to grant time would also necessarily include the power to extend the time and as such, the respondent ought to have granted further time to the applicants to make payment of deficient court fees on their reference applications. It was further submitted that the respondent has also failed to appreciate the specific provisions made in section 148 of the Code whereby the Court is empowered to enlarge the time which is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. It is also stated in section 148 that such enlargement of time may be granted by the Court even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. It was, accordingly, urged that the respondent has failed to properly exercise the discretion and power vested in him by the statutory provisions. It is also stated in section 148 that such enlargement of time may be granted by the Court even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. It was, accordingly, urged that the respondent has failed to properly exercise the discretion and power vested in him by the statutory provisions. The learned advocate further submitted that the respondent has also failed to appreciate the provisions of the amended Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 which was brought to the notice of the respondent vide circular dated 21.8.2010 pursuant to which, even the respondent was not insisting for payment of ad-valorem court fees on reference applications, and it is only after the above referred circular came to be issued that the respondent started insisting for payment of ad-valorem court fees on reference applications. In the circumstances, the respondent ought to have granted/extended time to the applicants for payment of requisite court fees on their reference applications. It was, accordingly, urged that the impugned order suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in the respondent and as such, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5. ON the other hand, Mr. Janak Raval, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent placed reliance upon the affidavit in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent wherein it is stated that the applicants were informed on 15.10.2010 that ad-valorem court fee is required to be paid on the reference applications and that the same should be paid on or before 7.12.2010, failing which the reference will not be accepted as per the provisions of law and the reference applications would be rejected. A copy of the letter dated 15.11.2010 has been annexed along with the affidavit. It is further averred in the affidavit in-reply that despite the letter dated 15.11.2010 having been sent to the learned advocate for the applicants, the applicants have not paid the ad-valorem fees and therefore, it cannot be said that they were not given any opportunity to pay the requisite ad-valorem fees. It is further averred in the affidavit in-reply that despite the letter dated 15.11.2010 having been sent to the learned advocate for the applicants, the applicants have not paid the ad-valorem fees and therefore, it cannot be said that they were not given any opportunity to pay the requisite ad-valorem fees. It is further averred that on 1.9.2010, a "public notice" was affixed in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer, Unit 1,2 and 3 on the notice board, wherein it was informed that reference applications will be accepted if the court fee is paid as per the Court Fees Act, 2004 and the decision of the High Court dated 29.6.2010 in Special Civil Application No.3493 of 2010. It is further averred that though the applicants were informed to pay the ad-valorem fees within the time fixed, they have not paid the same within the time fixed, and therefore, the reference applications were rejected. It is further stated that as per the provisions of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, reference is required to be submitted by affixing the deficient court fees. References, in which the deficit stamps are affixed, cannot be sent to the Reference Court and therefore, the reference applications given by the applicants were rejected on 7.7.2011. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has, accordingly, urged that the applicants were given sufficient time for paying the deficient court fees and they have not paid the same within the stipulated time limit and therefore, the respondent was justified in rejecting the reference applications. 6. THE learned Assistant Government Pleader further submitted that in Civil Revision Applications No.204 and 205 of 2011, no order has been made rejecting the applications for extension of time and that in case of the applicant in Civil Revision Application No.206 of 2011, the brother of the applicant has already paid the requisite court fees and as such, it is not permissible for the respondent to recover further amount of court fees. The impugned orders dated 7.7.2011 passed by the Deputy Collector, as translated into English reads thus: "Subject: Application for accepting the stamp in relation to references which are being filed. The impugned orders dated 7.7.2011 passed by the Deputy Collector, as translated into English reads thus: "Subject: Application for accepting the stamp in relation to references which are being filed. Reference: Application dated 4.7.2011 In the context of the aforesaid subject, it is stated that the references stated in the application (village-wise) at the first instance would be considered to be illegal on account of non-payment of deficit court fees as provided under the provisions of the New Court Fees Act, 2004 in respect of which, you had been informed to pay the court fees within the stipulated time limit. However, you have not paid the court fees stamp in the said references and hence, the said references have been filed. In view of the above, your application cannot be accepted, which may be taken note of." 7. ON a plain reading of the aforesaid orders, it is apparent that according to the respondent, the references made by the applicant have been filed (disposed of) on account of non-payment of deficit court fees. It is for this reason that the respondent has rejected the applications made by the applicants for extension of time limit for payment of court fees. Thus, it is apparent that the reference applications filed by the applicants have not been rejected by the orders dated 7.7.2011, as stated in the affidavit in-reply filed by the respondent. However, the same have been filed (disposed of) prior thereto and that by the orders dated 7.7.2011, it is only the application for extension of time limit for payment of court fees that has been rejected. n the circumstances, it appears that no specific order whereby reference applications made by the applicants have been rejected for non-payment of court fees. ON a specific query put to the learned Assistant Government Pleader as to whether any orders have been passed rejecting the reference applications for non-payment of court fees, the learned Assistant Government Pleader after perusing the record of the case and taking instructions from the officer who was present and briefing him, was not in a position to produce any such order, nor is it the case of the respondent that any such orders have ever been passed. . At this juncture, it may be pertinent to refer to section 149 of the Code, which makes provision for power to make up deficiency of court fees, and reads thus: "149. . At this juncture, it may be pertinent to refer to section 149 of the Code, which makes provision for power to make up deficiency of court fees, and reads thus: "149. Power to make up deficiency of Court-fees. ? Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee, and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance." 8. A careful reading of section 149 of the Code shows that where if the court fee due on the plaint, when instituted, is not paid wholly or partly by the person instituting the suit, the court in its discretion, may allow him to pay the court fee or deficit court fee within the period fixed by it. The section further raises a legal fiction in terms whereof as and when such deficit court fee is paid, the same would be deemed to have been paid in the first instance. Thus, merely because court fees have not been paid at the first instance is no ground for rejecting the reference applications, inasmuch as by virtue of the provisions of section 149 of the Code, there is a discretion vested in the court to allow the applicants to pay such court fees. In the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that at the time when the reference applications were submitted to the respondent, both the respective parties were under the impression that no court fees are payable thereon. Subsequently that the Government, pursuant to a decision of this High Court issued a Circular instructing all the Land Acquisition Officers to levy ad-valorem court fees on applications for references under section 18 of the Act as per Item No.15 of Schedule I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. It is only thereafter, that the respondent called upon the applicants to pay the court fees. It is only thereafter, that the respondent called upon the applicants to pay the court fees. it is the case of the respondent that the applicants had not paid the court fees within the time stipulated by him. However, as noted hereinabove, no order had been made by the respondent rejecting the applications made by the applicants on the ground of non-payment of court fees. In fact it appears that before any such order could be made by the respondent, the applicants had moved applications praying for extension of the time for payment of the court fees. In the circumstances, it was always permissible for the respondent to extend the time limit by resorting to the provisions of section 149 of the Code. However, the respondent, has taken a very hyper technical view of the matter and without assigning any reasons whatsoever as to why the request made by the applicants should not be accepted, has turned down the application for extension of the time limit merely on the ground that the references have been filed (disposed of), without adverting to any orders having been made whereby the applications of the applicants have in fact been rejected. 9. IN Special Civil Application No.3493 of 2010, the Division Bench was dealing with a case where the application under section 18 of the Act was refused on the ground that the petitioner had not paid necessary court fees, as required under the provisions of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. IN the facts of the said case, the petitioner therein had refused to pay the court fees under the impression and legal advice to the effect that the earlier judgement of the apex court and the judgment of this court rendered before the coming into force the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, would apply in the facts of the case and that the petitioner was in fact not required to pay any court fees on the application for making the reference. The petitioner therein submitted that he would pay the necessary court fees. The Division Bench, therefore, set aside the order impugned in the said petition whereby the reference application made by the petitioner therein had been rejected, on condition that the petitioner shall affix necessary court fees within a period of 15 days and his application for making the reference may be reconsidered on that basis for making a reference. 10. The Division Bench, therefore, set aside the order impugned in the said petition whereby the reference application made by the petitioner therein had been rejected, on condition that the petitioner shall affix necessary court fees within a period of 15 days and his application for making the reference may be reconsidered on that basis for making a reference. 10. IN the facts of the present case, as noted hereinabove, no specific order rejecting the applications made by the applicants for non-payment of court-fees has been made by the respondent. According to the respondent, the reference applications have been rejected by the impugned order dated 7.7.2011. However, on a plain reading of the impugned order, it is apparent that the said order is an order rejecting the application made by the applicants for seeking extension of time for payment of court fees and not an order rejecting the reference applications. IN the circumstances, the say of the respondent that the reference applications made by the applicants have been rejected by the impugned orders dated 7.7.2011, is contrary to the language of the said orders as there is nothing in the said orders whereby one can arrive at the conclusion that the reference applications have been rejected by the said order. IN fact, as noticed earlier, from the tenor of the impugned orders it appears as if the reference applications had been filed for non-payment of court fees prior to the passing of the impugned order. However, at the cost of repetition it may be stated that there are no earlier orders filing/disposing of/rejecting the reference applications made by the applicants. Had the respondent made any orders rejecting the reference applications, the applicants would have been in a position to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. However, in the absence of any specific orders rejecting the reference applications having been made, merely because there is a passing reference in the orders dated 7.7.2011 to the effect that the references have been filed, the same would not amount to an order rejecting the reference applications. IN the circumstances, in the absence of any specific order having been made rejecting the reference applications, it cannot be said that the reference applications have been rejected and as such the same are required to be treated as still standing in the file of the respondent. IN the circumstances, in the absence of any specific order having been made rejecting the reference applications, it cannot be said that the reference applications have been rejected and as such the same are required to be treated as still standing in the file of the respondent. The impugned orders dated 7.7.2011, in effect and substance are orders rejecting the applications for extension of time for payment of court fees. While considering such applications, it was incumbent upon the respondent to keep in mind the provisions of section 149 of the Code. IN Mannan Lal v. Mst. Chhotaka Bibi, 1970 (1) SCC 769 , the Supreme Court held that section 4 of the Court Fees Act is not the last word on the subject and the court must consider the provisions of both the Act and the Code to harmonise the two sets of provisions which can only be done by reading section 149 as a proviso to section 4 of the Court Fees Act by allowing the deficiency to be made good within the period fixed by it. The respondent, therefore, ought to have considered the applications for grant of time for payment of court fees in the light of the provisions of section 149 of the Code. Besides rejecting of the reference applications has far reaching civil consequences inasmuch as the applicants lose their right to higher amount of compensation than that awarded by the Collector. Under the circumstances, the respondent was required to supplement his order with reasons as to why the applications made by the applicants did not deserve to be granted. Thus, the impugned order also suffers from the vice of being a non-reasoned order and for this reason also cannot be sustained. By the applications dated 4.7.2011, the applicants have prayed for extension of time for payment of court fees showing willingness to pay the same. In the circumstances, in the light of the provisions of section 149 of the Code read with section 4 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, the respondent ought to have extended the time limit for payment of court fees and was not justified in turning down the said applications. The impugned orders dated 7.7.2011, therefore, cannot be sustained. 11. In the circumstances, in the light of the provisions of section 149 of the Code read with section 4 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, the respondent ought to have extended the time limit for payment of court fees and was not justified in turning down the said applications. The impugned orders dated 7.7.2011, therefore, cannot be sustained. 11. HOWEVER, as noted hereinabove, in Civil Revision Applications No.204 and 205 of 2011, no order rejecting the applications has been passed by the respondent and in Civil Revision Application No.206 of 2011, the court fees stamp already having been paid, in the circumstances, no orders have been passed thereon. Therefore, Civil Revision Applications No.204 and 205 of 2011 are required to be disposed of as being premature. Insofar as Civil Revision Application No.206 of 2011 is concerned, since the court fee already stands paid no question would arise for rejecting the reference on the ground of non-payment of court fees, hence the same is required to be disposed of as having become infructuous. 12. FOR the foregoing reasons, the applications succeed and are, accordingly allowed. The impugned orders dated 7.7.2011 passed by the respondent ? Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Narmada Yojna, Ahmedabad-1, whereby he has rejected the applications made by the applicants praying for extension of time limit for payment of court fees, are hereby quashed and set aside. The applications dated 4.7.2011 for grant of time for payment of court fees, are hereby allowed. The applicants shall pay the requisite court fees within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Rule is made absolute accordingly in each of these applications, with no order as to costs. Civil Revision Applications No.204 and 205 of 2011 are disposed of as being premature whereas Civil Revision Application No.206 of 2011 is disposed of as having become infructuous. Rule is discharge in each of the three applications with no order as to costs. It is clarified that the court while passing this order has made reference to the facts of Civil Revision Application No.182 of 2011 wherein the date of the application for grant of time is 4.7.2011 and the date of the impugned order is 7.7.2011. Rule is discharge in each of the three applications with no order as to costs. It is clarified that the court while passing this order has made reference to the facts of Civil Revision Application No.182 of 2011 wherein the date of the application for grant of time is 4.7.2011 and the date of the impugned order is 7.7.2011. However, in case, in any of the revision applications the dates are different, the reference to the date of the application and the impugned order shall be construed accordingly in respect of such revision application. Direct Service is permitted.