JUDGMENT : 1. The present revision is directed against the order dated 03.11.2010 of the learned II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court made in I.A.No.16723 of 2010 in O.S.No.4750 of 2007. 2. The plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit are the petitioners herein and the first defendant thereon is the respondent herein. 3. The petitioners have filed the said suit against the respondent and few others for declaration that the public auction held on 27.06.2007 in respect of the first petitioner's property at Chennai is not binding on the first petitioner and for granting consequential injunction restraining the respondent and other defendants from claiming rights through them, from in anyway acting in furtherance of the alleged public action said to have been conducted on 27.06.2007 and declaring that the sale deed dated 09.11.2007 in favour of the defendants 4 and 5 in the said suit executed by the third defendant as void. In the said suit, the respondent herein has taken out an application in I.A.No.16723 of 2010 to defer the cross-examination of PW-1 till the first petitioner is examined in full as a witness. The said application was allowed by the Court below by its fair and final order dated 03.11.2010. The said order is under challenge in the present Civil Revision Petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the second petitioner is the second plaintiff in the said suit and hence, even after his evidence, the first petitioner can examine himself later. Only if a third party witness enters into the witness box before the plaintiffs could examine themselves, permission has to be sought for from the Court as required under Order XVIII Rule 3A of the Civil Procedure Code. While so, the respondent's application to defer the cross-examination of PW-1, viz., the second plaintiff, till the first plaintiff is examined in full as a witness on the side of the plaintiffs in the said suit is untenable. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the entire claim in the plaint is that the suit property is owned by the first plaintiff and hence, even though the second plaintiff has been added as one of the plaintiff in the said suit, the first plaintiff alone in effect is the real plaintiff in the suit and hence, he should have been examined at the first instance. That apart it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the second plaintiff viz., the second petitioner in this revision is only a guarantor and hence, he shall be considered only as a third party in the suit. Hence, he should not have been examined as PW-1. Even then, permission should have been sought for, for examining the second petitioner viz., the second plaintiff before examining the first plaintiff/first petitioner as required under Order XVIII Rule 3A of the Civil Procedure Code. Learned counsel relied on the following decisions Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576 , Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen and others (1997) 5 SCC 76 and Ouseph Mathai and others v M.Abdul Khadir (2002) 1 SCC 319 . 6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned counsel for the respondent. 7. The admitted facts are that the petitioners have filed the suit against the respondent herein and few others for various reliefs including that of a declaration that the public auction held on 27.06.2007 in respect of the property of the first petitioner, by the second defendant is not binding on the first petitioner and for other incidental reliefs. In the said suit, the second plaintiff viz., the second petitioner herein has examined himself as PW-1. He was also cross-examined on behalf of the respondent herein though for a limited while. Thereafter, the respondent has filed the application to defer the cross-examination of PW-1 till the first plaintiff is examined in full as a witness for the plaintiffs. 8. Before adverting to the contentions raised by both the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondent, it would be desirable to extract Order XVIII Rule 3A of the Civil Procedure Code: "3A. Party to appear before other witnesses.- Where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage." 9. The said provision contemplates that if a party to a suit wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before the other witnesses on his behalf is examined. The said provision contemplates that if a party to a suit wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before the other witnesses on his behalf is examined. But, however, he can seek permission of the Court to examine the other witnesses at the first instance and the Court can grant such permission recording the reasons thereof. This provision can be employed only if the parties to the suit seek to examine any third party as a witness. In the case on hand, PW-1 is none else than the second plaintiff. When he is a party to the suit, he need not seek permission from the Court to examine him at the first instance. Even assuming that in the entire pleadings it is stated that the property in question belongs to the first petitioner and that the second petitioner is only a guarantor, nevertheless, the second petitioner/second plaintiff being a party to the suit can examine himself as a witness at the first instance before the first plaintiff/first petitioner goes to the witness box. When such is the position, there is no rhyme or reason to contend that the first plaintiff/first petitioner ought to have examined himself at the first instance and thereafter the second petitioner/second plaintiff should go to the witness box. If we look at the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, the respondent has stated that PW-1 is a second plaintiff and stranger to the relief claimed in the suit and hence, the first petitioner being the owner of the property in question should have gone to the witness box at the first instance. The above discussion made by me will amply establish that the claim made by the respondent herein is totally on misconception and against the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code referred to above. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on certain decisions set out hereunder. 11. In Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576 , paragraph 9, which was emphasized by the learned counsel for the respondent is reproduced hereunder: “9. Before parting with this judgment we would like to say that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The act is a special legislation governing landlord-tenant relationship and disputes. Before parting with this judgment we would like to say that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The act is a special legislation governing landlord-tenant relationship and disputes. The legislature has, in its wisdom, not provided second appeal or revision to the High Court. The object is to give finality to the decision of the appellate authority. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes." 12. In Achutananda Baidya v Prafullya Kumar Gayen and others (1997) 5 SCC 76 , paragraph 10, which was emphasized by the learned counsel for the respondent is reproduced hereunder: “10. The power of superintendence of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but such power includes within its sweep the power of judicial review. The power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 is essentially to ensure that the courts and tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they were required to do. Law is well settled by various decisions of this Court that the High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or resulting in manifest injustice. As regards finding of fact of the inferior court, the High Court should not quash the judgment of the subordinate court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 227 to interfere with the finding of the fact if the subordinate court came to the conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse.” 13. Yet another decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is Ouseph Mathai and others v M.Abdul Khadir (2002) 1 SCC 319 . Learned counsel more particularly relied on paragraph 7 of the said judgment and it is extracted hereunder: “7. In the present appeals, the High Court appears to have assumed the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution without referring to the facts of the case warranting the exercise of such a jurisdiction. Extraordinary powers appear to have been exercised in a routine manner as if the power under Article 227 of the Constitution was the extension of powers conferred upon a litigant under a specified statute. Such an approach and interpretation is unwarranted. By adopting such an approach some High Courts have assumed jurisdiction even in matters to which the legislature had assigned finality under the specified statutes. Liberal assumption of powers without reference to the facts of the case and the corresponding hardship to be suffered by a litigant has unnecessarily burdened the courts resulting in accumulation of arrears adversely affecting the attention of the court to the deserving cases pending before it.” 14. By citing those judgments, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is essentially to ensure that the Courts and Tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they were required to do and the High Court should not quash the judgment of the Sub-ordinate Court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was erroneous. 15. I am of the considered view that those judgments may not be applicable to the facts of the present case. The reason was set out earlier by me. At the risk of repetition, I am constrained to state that the respondent on wrong presumption contends that the first plaintiff/first petitioner alone should have gone into the witness box before the second plaintiff/second petitioner could go. When there is a specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code that only if a third party to the suit is to be examined at first, permission has to be sought for from the Court, the respondent cannot contend that the second plaintiff/second petitioner being a guarantor to the loan obtained by the first plaintiff/first petitioner, should not have gone to the witness box at the first instance. The second plaintiff/second petitioner being a party to the suit, he is at liberty to let in evidence at first. That apart, the present application is filed after the second petitioner/second plaintiff was examined in chief and after cross-examination in part. 16. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the Court below has erroneously allowed the application preferred by the respondent viz., I.A.No.16723 of 2010 in O.S.No.4750 of 2007, by an order dated 03.11.2010. 17. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition stands allowed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.