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2011 DIGILAW 731 (RAJ)

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan

2011-04-08

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2011
JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner- Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited against the assessment order dated 7/2/1998 (Ann.8) by which land and building tax was levied, the order dated 9/3/1999 (Ann.9) by which appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the order dated 21/6/1999 (Ann.10) by which revision petition filed assailing the aforesaid order was also dismissed. 2. Petitioner has filed writ petition with a prayer to declare that petitioner is not owner of the subject land and building and is thus not liable to be assessed under the provisions of Rajasthan Land and Building Tax Act, 1964 (for short, the "Act"). 3. Petitioner Is a Government of India Undertaking engaged in refining and distribution of petroleum and petroleum products throughout the country. Petitioner is holding a petrol pump at Mile No.4/1, Tonk Road, Jaipur through its dealer Sharma Brothers, Jaipur on a land measuring 13860 square feet. This land belongs to one Kunwar Bhawani Singh, who leased it out to Burma shell Oil Storage & Distributing Company of India Limited for a period of 25 years commencing from 1/1/1964. Lease-deed was executed and registered on 18/12/1964 on monthly rent of Rs. 250/- wherein, an option for renewal for a further period of 20 years was provided. Lessee installed petrol pump on the aforesaid land and appointed M/s.Sharma Brothers as its dealers. Before however alleged period of 25 years was completed, Kunwar Bhawani Singh expired and his widow Smt.Lekha Kumari succeeded him as owner of the aforesaid property along with his minor sons and mother. Smt.Lekha Kumari initiated eviction proceedings by filing civil suit against the petitioner under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, which is said to be still pending In the civil court. However, lease-deed was neither renewed nor lease-deed was executed in favour of the petitioner afresh but petitioner retained possession of the land In dispute. Petitioner continued to deposit the rent in accordance with the orders of the court. The assessing authority of the Rajasthan Land and Building Tax Department vide order dated 27/6/1985 framed the order of assessment. Smt.Lekha Kumari, owner of the property deposited One Time tax amounting to Rs. 19,680/- on 29/3/1989 and a certificate to that effect was issued to her by the competent authority on 12/12/1991. The assessing authority of the Rajasthan Land and Building Tax Department vide order dated 27/6/1985 framed the order of assessment. Smt.Lekha Kumari, owner of the property deposited One Time tax amounting to Rs. 19,680/- on 29/3/1989 and a certificate to that effect was issued to her by the competent authority on 12/12/1991. When the petitioner came to learn about this fact, he brought the same to the notice of Assistant Director of LBT Department vide letter dated 25/8/1999. Even then, he insisted for recovery of tax from the petitioner and initiated proceedings for assessment of the said land and building tax in the hands of petitioner. 4. Shri Anant Kasliwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the assessing authority erred in law in subjecting petitioner to assessment of the land and building tax even though it was State and was exempted from such taxation by virtue of Section 6 of the Rajasthan Land and Building Tax Act, 1964 (for short, "Act of 1964"). Moreover, land being on lease for a maximum period of 25 years and lease having not been extended thereafter, petitioner would neither be considered owner nor as a deemed owner. Even then, the assessing authority passed an assessment order on 18/3/1982 determining value of the land in dispute to the tune of Rs. 2,22,000/- as on 1/4/1973. The assessing authority issued a notice under Section 22 of the Act of 1964 calling upon petitioner to file Return and relevant documents latest by 18/3/1995. Petitioner submitted reply to the notice on 6/2/1998 and requested to treat the notice as withdrawn and drop proceedings of the assessment. The assessing authority vide order dated 7/2/1998 passed the assessment order. Petitioner filed appeal, which was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 9/3/1999. Thereafter, petitioner filed revision petition assailing the order of the appellate authority dated 7/2/1998 but the revisional authority too dismissed the revision petition vide order dated 21/6/1999. Hence, this writ petition. 5. Shrl Anant Kasliwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the assessing authority has erred in law In making assessment of the land and building question in the hands of the petitioner treating it to be the owner. Such assessment could not be made because original owner Smt.Lekha Kumarl had already paid One Time tax pursuant to assessment order dated 27/6/1985 amounting to Rs. Such assessment could not be made because original owner Smt.Lekha Kumarl had already paid One Time tax pursuant to assessment order dated 27/6/1985 amounting to Rs. 19,680/- on 29/3/1989 and a certificate to that effect was Issued to her by the competent authority on 12/12/1991. All the authorities have erred in confirming the assessed liability after a long period of eighteen years. Though there is no time limit prescribed `,)r makkng assessment, nevertheless, lapse of as many as eighteen years has -;uded the authorities of their power to make such assessment. Jternatively, learned counsel argued that assessing authority erred in raising exorbitant rate of rent of Rs. 12,000/- per square meter w.e.f. 1/4/1995 without any basis. The assessing authority further erred in law in valuing the subject building to tax in a lump sump of Rs. 1,55,71,900/- as on 1/4/1995 and at Rs. 1,58,37,400/- as on 1/4/1996. Learned counsel argued that all the authorities below have failed to appreciate the fact that after expiry of the lease period on 1/1/1989, the lessor did not renew the lease nor any fresh lease-deed was ever executed. Rather, before expiry of the lease period, the owners filed a civil suit for eviction before the civil court, which was pending at the relevant date. Petitioner could neither be treated as owner of the land nor deemed owner within the definition of 'owner' as defined in Section 2(10) of the Act of 1964. Moreover, learned counsel argued that petitioner is entitled to a rebate of 30% on the land value of subject property after construction of building. In support of his arguments, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Sawai Bhawani Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, (1996) 3 SCC 105 and Division Bench judgment of this Court in East India Co.Ltd. and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, 2001 WLC (Raj.) 62 . It is, therefore, prayed that writ petition be allowed. 6. Per contra, Shri B.C. Chirania, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State has argued that land was taken on lease by the petitioner initially for a period of 25 years which continued upto 31/12/1998. The said lease deed contained a stipulation for renewal. It is, therefore, prayed that writ petition be allowed. 6. Per contra, Shri B.C. Chirania, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State has argued that land was taken on lease by the petitioner initially for a period of 25 years which continued upto 31/12/1998. The said lease deed contained a stipulation for renewal. The land was still in possession of the petitioner and lease should thus be taken to have been extended beyond the period of 30 years and therefore, petitioner should be treated owner with reference to definition clause 2(10) of the Act of 1964. It is contended that one time tax was deposited by Smt.Lekha Kumari as owner of the property because this prop':ty consisted of shops and remaining part was in possession of the petitioner-company. As per relevant clause, if 50% of the land is being used for the commercial purpose, the facility of One Time tax is not applicable. It is argued that one time scheme was admissible only on the residential plots and buildings upto the year 1989. It is denied that petitioner-company is a State and it is entitled to exemption under Section 6 of the Act of 1964. In fact, it was not entitled to be exempted as this is a company under the provisions of the Companies Act. It has its own bye-laws and source of income. All the authorities have concurrently held against the petitioner that It being owner by virtue of second proviso of Section 2(10) of the Act of 1964, is liable to pay the tax. The assessing authority has rightly taken the rate of rent of @ Rs. 12,000/- per square meter w.e.f. 1/4/1995 considering the relevant market DLC rates of the area. Interest was allowed as per the provisions of the Act of 1964. It is, therefore, prayed that writ petition be dismissed. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions of the parties and perused the material on record. 8. The question that falls for consideration in the present case is whether petitioner - Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited can be treated to be owner or deemed owner under Section 2(10)(b) of the Act. It is not disputed that petitioner is not owner of the disputed property. 8. The question that falls for consideration in the present case is whether petitioner - Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited can be treated to be owner or deemed owner under Section 2(10)(b) of the Act. It is not disputed that petitioner is not owner of the disputed property. Stand of the' respondent is that petitioner may be treated as deemed owner by reason the fact it has continued to be in possession of the disputed property for a period of more than 30 years. In order to appreciate the true meaning of second proviso to Section 2(10) of the Act, it would be apposite to reproduce definition of the word "deemed owner" herein below: "2(10). Owner in respect of any land or building or portion thereof, Includes the person, who for the time being receives, or who would be entitled to receive, the rent thereof, if the same were let, and includes - (a) An agent or trustee who receives such rent on account of the owner (b) An agent or trustee who receives the rent of, or is entrusted with the management of, any land or building devoted to religious or charitable purpose (c) A receiver, sequestrator or manager appointed by any court of, competent jurisdiction to have the change, or to exercise the rights of the owner, of the land or building or portion thereof; and (d) The mortgagees in possession thereof Provided that in the case of land or building owned by the State Government, the lessee or grantee thereof from the State Government shall for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the owner of the land or building as the case may be Provided further that in the case of land or building held on lease for a term not less than thirty years, the lessee shall for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the owner of such land or building". Examination of the aforesaid definition would go to show that a tenant/lessee can be treated to be deemed owner only if lease deed exceeds the period of thirty years and the lessee continues to be in possession of the land for more than thirty years. Examination of the aforesaid definition would go to show that a tenant/lessee can be treated to be deemed owner only if lease deed exceeds the period of thirty years and the lessee continues to be in possession of the land for more than thirty years. In the present case, the lease deed that was executed in favour of the petitioner by Kunwar Bhawani Singh was for a maximum period of twenty five years commencing from 1/1/1964, though there was an option for renewal of the lease deed for a further period of twenty years. Before however first period of 25 years was completed, Kunwar Bhawani Singh expired and his widow Smt.Lekha Kumari succeeded him as owner of the aforesaid property along with his minor sons and mother. Smt.Lekha Kumari initiated eviction proceedings by filing civil suit against the petitioner under the provisions of the Act of 1950, which is said to be still pending in the civil court. 9. It is trite that a taxation statute has to be strictly construed, which requires interpretation of what has been said in the enactment without raising any presumption or employing anything more. Supreme Court in para 36 of Ajmera Housing Corpn. v. CIT, (2010) 8 SCC 739 held as under:- "36. It is trite law that a taxing statute Is to be construed strictly. In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is said in the relevant provision. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing Is to be implied. There is no room for any intendment. There Is no equity about a tax. (See Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC and Federation of A.P. Chambers of Commerce & Industry v. State of A.P. In interpreting a taxing statute, the court must look squarely at the words of the statute and Interpret them. Considerations of hardship, Injustice and equity are entirely out of place in interpreting a taxing statute". 10. It Is also cardinal principle of law that If two Interpretation of a taxing statute are possible, in that case, Interpretation in favour of the tax payer and against the revenue has to be preferred. Supreme Court in Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, (2006) 7 SCC 714 in para 24 has held, as under:- "24. While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of "strict interpretation" should be applied. Supreme Court in Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, (2006) 7 SCC 714 in para 24 has held, as under:- "24. While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of "strict interpretation" should be applied. The court shall not interpret the statutory provision in such a manner which would create an additional fiscal burden on a person. It wold never be done by invoking the provisions of another Act, which are not attracted. It is also trite that while two interpretations are possible, the court ordinarily would interpret the provisions in favour of a taxpayer and against the Revenue". 11. This very view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Pradip J. Mehta v. Commissioner of Income tax, Ahmedabad, (2008) 14 SCC 283 , In view of the settled proposition of law, this Court cannot over stretch provisions of Section 2(10)(d) regarding "deemed owner" to hold that petitioner is a deemed owner even though there is no lease deed in his favour after a period of twenty five years, viz - more than thirty years and cannot hold so on the strength of mere possession. Indisputably, the landlord has filed a suit for eviction of the petitioner and petitioner is presently continuing in possession of the suit land in its capacity of statutorily protected tenant and depositing the rent with the court. That would not however, make petitioner as owner or deemed owner in the meaning of Section 2(10) (d) of the Act. 12. The next contention that is raised by the petitioner is that it is the property, which is subject-matter of taxation and not owner of the property and that property has been assessed only under Sections 3 and 13 of the Act. In order to appreciate, it i, apposite to reproduce Sections 3 and 13 as under:- "Section 3.- There shall be levied and collected with effect on and from 1st April, 1973; for each year a tax on lands and buildings situate in an urban area, (hereinafter referred to as Lands and Buildings Tax) from the owner of such Lands and Buildings at such rate not exceeding 2% of the market value thereof as State Government may, by notification In the official Gazette, declare in this behalf". Section 13.(1) If any land or building:- (a) ceases to enjoy the character on account of which It was entitled to exemption under Section 6 or 21, or (b) is acquired, by transfer or otherwise, or any buildings Is built, rebuilt or enlarged. During any year after the commencement of the Rajasthan Urban Land Tax (Amendment) Act, 1973, the owner, If not already liable to pay tax shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, be liable to pay tax from the year following the year during which the land or building ceases to enjoy the character on account of which it was entitled to exemption Is acquired or during which any building, re-building or enlargement is completed or such building or enlarged portion is occupied, whichever is earlier". 13. A conjoint reading of both the provisions would go to show that assessment carried out In the hands of the petitioner-Corporation neither falls under Section 3 or Section 13 of the Act. Suffice It to say that Land and Building Tax Is a tax on the property and not on the owner of the property and therefore If a property has to be assessed to tax, that can only be done either under Section 3 or Section 13 of the Act. Since petitioner- Corporation did not fall in any of these provisions, the assessing authority cannot assess the tax on the Corporation treating it to be deemed owner. In this connection, reference may be made to the observation of the Supreme Court In Lt. Col.Sawai Sawal Bhawani Singh supra in para 7 of which, Supreme Court observed as under:- "It is now well-settled that as per entry 49 of List II, the State Legislature Is competent to Impose tax either on lands or on buildings or on both. In this connection, reference may be made to the observation of the Supreme Court In Lt. Col.Sawai Sawal Bhawani Singh supra in para 7 of which, Supreme Court observed as under:- "It is now well-settled that as per entry 49 of List II, the State Legislature Is competent to Impose tax either on lands or on buildings or on both. A land or building or both of a person may be subjected to direct tax by the State Legislature under Entry 49 of List II and may also be the subject-matter of direct tax as a component of his total assets, like wealth tax by the Union Legislature as mentioned in Entry 86 of List I. These two taxes are separate and distinct in nature and It cannot be said that there was any overlapping, or that the State Legislature was not competent to levy such tax on lands and buildings merely on the ground that they have been subjected to another tax as a component of the total assets of the person concerned. See in this connection, a seven-member Bench decision of this Court in Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon . This Court clearly said that for a tax to be under Entry 49 of List II, three conditions must be satisfied, i.e. (i) it must be a tax on units, i.e., land and buildings separately as units; (ii) the tax cannot be a tax on totality, I.e., it is not a composite tax on the value of all lands and buildings; and (iii) the tax is not concerned with the division of interest in the building or land; in other words, the tax was not concerned whether one person owned or occupied the land or building or two or more persons occupy or own it. In pith and substance, it was a tax on property and not a personal tax". 14. Contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that since one time assessment was wrongly allowed on the subject property, which being on commercial property was not entitled to one time assessment, has to be rejected because not only the owner Smt.Lekha Kumari has on 29/3/1989 deposited a sum of Rs. 19,680/- as one time tax pursuant to the assessment order dated 27/6/1985 but a certificate to that effect was also issued to her by the competent authority on 12/12/1991. 19,680/- as one time tax pursuant to the assessment order dated 27/6/1985 but a certificate to that effect was also issued to her by the competent authority on 12/12/1991. Even though, learned counsel appearing for the respondent orally asserted that one time assessment was admissible only for a residential building but he could not show any such circular in support of his this argument that one time assessment was erroneously granted on the land and building in question. That apart, one time tax certificate Issued to the petitioner has never been cancelled nor any such material has been produced on record. 15. In view of what has been discussed above, the impugned-orders dated 7/2/1998, 9/3/1999 and 21/6/1999 cannot be sustained in law. 16. In the result, writ petition succeeds. The impugned-orders dated 7/2/1998, 9/3/1999 and 21/6/1999 are quashed and set-aside. The respondents are directed to refund the amount recovered from the petitioner within a period of three months from the date copy of this order is produced before them. Writ petition is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Allowed. *******