Judgment :- 1. These appeals are presented against the learned Single Judge’s order, dated 17.3.2011 passed in W.P. Nos.6549-6550/2011 (LA-KIADB). 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the appellant owned the lands standing at Sy.Nos.44 and 45 measuring 32 acres 37 guntas of Puttenhalli village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. Those lands were compulsorily acquired and the compensation was awarded to the appellant. With the award-amount, the appellant purchased the land measuring 8 acres 18 guntas including 26 guntas of kharab land at Sy.No.46 of Puttenahalli village on 5.8.1985. However, those lands also came to be acquired vide preliminary notification, dated 25.11.1986 and final notification, dated 8.1.1987 for the purpose of maintaining the open space and greenery to control the effects of noise pollution and smoke emission and also to meet the standards laid by the Pollution Control Board. The acquisition was resisted by the appellant by filing W.P.No.15583/1988, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, by his order, dated 22.2.1990. Thereafter, the appellant approached the Division Bench by filing W.A.No.1694/1991, but without any rate of success. However, the Division Bench, by its order, dated 29.7.1991 reserved the liberty to the appellant to approach the Government and seek the denotification of the lands. The Government has not acceded to the request o the appellant for the withdrawal of the lands from acquisition. 3. On noticing that the well-grown eucalyptus trees standing on the lands in question were being cut and the earth leveling was being done, compound was being constructed, the appellant filed W.P.Nos.6549-6550/2011. The sum and substance of the appellant’s case before the learned Single Judge was that in view of the non-utilization of the lands in question for the purpose for which they were acquired, the entire acquisition proceedings have become infructuous; the acquisition proceedings have ended in nullity. The learned Single Judge, by her order, dated 17.3.2011 rejected the writ petitions by holding that there is no diversification of the lands from the industrial purpose and that the State Government cannot be directed to denotify any land, whose possession is already taken by the Government. It is this order of the learned Single Judge, which is under challenge in these appeals. 4. Sri Jayakumar S.Patil, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the lands in question are not being used for the purpose for which they are acquired. It is this order of the learned Single Judge, which is under challenge in these appeals. 4. Sri Jayakumar S.Patil, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the lands in question are not being used for the purpose for which they are acquired. He submits that the lands in question were acquired for maintaining the greenery to control the effect of noise pollution and smoke emission, which are common in diesel power plants. Now that the eucalyptus trees are cut and the civil construction is being raised, it can be safely concluded that the lands are not required for the purpose of the respondent No.5. Urging these contentions, the learned Senior Counsel would pray for the quashing of the acquisition proceedings and for the restoration of the possession of the lands to the appellant. 5. Sri B. Veerappa, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submits that this is the second round of litigation. Earlier, the appellant had filed W.P.No.15583/1988 and W.A.No.1694/1991. As the orders of the dismissal passed in these cases have attained finality, the appellant cannot file one more writ petition. He submits that the second writ petition is hit by the doctrine of res-judicata. 6. Sri. Veerappa submits that W.P.Nos.6549-6550/2011 ought to have been rejected on the ground of delay and laches only, as the petitions are presented after 24 years of the issuance of the acquisition notifications. 7. The learned AGA relying on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of GOVT. OF A.P. AND ANOTHER v. SYED AKBAR reported in AIR 2005 SC 492 submits that once the land is vested in the Government, it cannot be reconveyed or re-assigned to the erstwhile owner, even if a part of it remains unutilized. He also brings to our notice, the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS v. R. HANUMAIAH AND OTHERS reported in ILR 2005 KAR 5533. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow: “38. There is no provision on the Act and the Rules framed thereunder enabling the BDA to reconvey the land acquired to implement a scheme for forming of sites and their allotment as per rules. The rules do not provide for re-conveyance. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow: “38. There is no provision on the Act and the Rules framed thereunder enabling the BDA to reconvey the land acquired to implement a scheme for forming of sites and their allotment as per rules. The rules do not provide for re-conveyance. In the absence of any provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder authorizing the BDA to reconvey the land direction cannot be issued to the BDA to reconvey part of the land on the ground that it had promised to do so. The rule of promissory estoppel cannot be availed to permit or condone a breach of law. It cannot be invoked to compel the Government to do an act prohibited by law. It would be going against the statute. The principle of promissory estoppel would under the circumstances be not applicable to the case in hand.” 8. In the course of rejoinder, the learned Senior Counsel, Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil submits that the doctrine of res-judicata is not attracted to this case, as the writ petition is filed on a separate cause of action, which has arisen subsequently and has accrued to the appellant. He submits that it is the felling of eucalyptus trees and the raising of the civil construction work on the lands in question, which have given a fresh cause of action to the appellant. 9. The submissions of the learned counsel have received our thoughtful consideration. As the writ petition is filed on a cause of action, which has arisen subsequently, we overrule the preliminary objections of res-judicata, delay and laches, raised by Sri Veerappa. 10. It would not be proper to insist upon the Government to particularize the use to which each and every bit of the land so notified would be put to. In taking this view, we are fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of STATE OF T.N. AND OTHERS v. L.KRISHNAN AND OTHERS reported in (1996) 1 SCC 250 . The cutting of the eucalyptus trees and raising of the civil construction works, even if true, do not constitute adequate ground to annul the acquisition. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that it is not the case of the appellant that the lands acquired for industrial purpose are being used for the agricultural purpose or residential purpose. 11. The cutting of the eucalyptus trees and raising of the civil construction works, even if true, do not constitute adequate ground to annul the acquisition. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that it is not the case of the appellant that the lands acquired for industrial purpose are being used for the agricultural purpose or residential purpose. 11. It would also be beneficial to refer to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY v. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CO. PVT. LTD., AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1997 SC 482 . The relevant portions of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow: “22. It is thus well settled legal position that the land acquired for a public purpose may be used for another public purpose on account of change or surplus thereof. The acquisition validly made does not become invalid by change of the approved plan. It is seen that the land in Block ‘H’ which was intended to be acquired for original public purpose, namely, the construction of Sewage Purification Plant, though was shifted to Block ‘A’, the land was earmarked for residential, commercial-cum-residential purposes or partly for residential purpose etc. It is the case of the appellant that the Corporation intends to use the land acquired for construction of the staff quarters for its employees. It is true that there was no specific plan as such placed on the record, but so long as the land is used by the Corporation for any designated public purpose, namely, residential-cum-commercial purpose for its employees, the later public purpose remains to be valid purpose in the light of the change of the user of the land as per the revised approved plan. It is true that in the original scheme the residential quarters for the staff working in Sewage Purification Plant were intended to be constructed and the same purpose is sought to be served by the acquisition of the land by using the land in Block ‘A’. Nonetheless the acquired land could be used by the Corporation for residential-cum-commercial purpose for its employees other than those working in the Sewage Purification Plant. It would not, therefore, be necessary that the original public purpose should continue to exist till the award was made and possession taken. Nor is it the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to see whether the public purpose continues to subsist. It would not, therefore, be necessary that the original public purpose should continue to exist till the award was made and possession taken. Nor is it the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to see whether the public purpose continues to subsist. The award and possession taken do not become invalid or ultra vires the power of Land Acquisition Officer. On taking possession, it became vested in BMC free from all encumbrances including tenancy rights alleged to be held by the respondents. Possession and the validly vesting in the State, become absolute under Section 10 of the Act and thereafter the proceedings under the Act do not become illegal and the land cannot be revested in the owner…..” 12. It is also profitable to refer to the latest judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SULOCHANA CHANDRAKANT GALANDE v. PUNE MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT AND OTHERS reported in ( 2010 8 SCC 467 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted herein below: “18. So far as the change of user is concerned, it is a settled legal proposition that once land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, there cannot be any rider on the power of the State Government to change user of the land in the manner it chooses. 20. Reiterating a similar view in C.Padma V. Govt. of T.N., this Court held that if by virtue of a valid acquisition of land, the land stands vested in the State, thereafter, the claimants are not entitled to restoration of possession on the grounds that either the original public purpose has ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for any other purposes. 22. In view of the above, the law can be summarized that once the land is acquired, it vests in the State free from all encumbrances. It is not the concern of the landowner how his land is used and whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to get compensation only for the same. The person interested cannot claim the right of restoration of land on any ground, whatsoever.” 13. He becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to get compensation only for the same. The person interested cannot claim the right of restoration of land on any ground, whatsoever.” 13. Based on the aforementioned authorities, to which elaborate references are made hereinabove, we reach the unescapable conclusion that the land once vested in the State cannot be divested. Once the land is vested in the State, it has a right to change the user. 14. Thus, not finding any merit in these appeals, we dismiss them. No order as to costs. 15. In view of the dismissal of the main matters, nothing survives for any consideration of Misc.W.7843/2011 for the condonation of delay. It is therefore dismissed as having become unnecessary.