Judgment :- Arali Nagaraj, J. 1. This appeal is by the accused in S.C. No.45/2008 on the file of learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-1, Koppal, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’ for short). The appellant-accused has challenged in this appeal legality and correctness of the impugned Judgment and Order of conviction dated 25.11.2009 passed in the said case convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 of I.P.C. 2. Stated in brief, the case of the prosecution as alleged in Ex.P12 complaint, which is in the form of dying declaration made by the deceased Smt. Jyothi, the legally wedded wife of the appellant-accused herein is as under- a) The marriage of the deceased Smt. Jyothi, the daughter of PW6 Smt. Sharadamma, was performed with the accused abut 12 years prior to her death. Of the said marriage, the deceased got two children viz., Pratap aged about 4 years and Manjunath aged about 3 years. b) Since the past three months the accused was ill-treating the deceased by beating and abusing n connection with his demand for Rs.3 to Rs.4 lakhs from the parents of the deceased on the ground that he required the said money for purchasing a tractor. The deceased used to inform her parents about the said ill-treatment. They could not meet the said demand. Therefore, the accused continued to give the ill-treatment and he used to threaten her that he would kill her. c) On 07.05.2008 at about 8.30 p.m. the deceased finished her dinner along with her children. At about 8.45 p.m. on that day the accused, who had gone out of the house, returned to the house and again picked up quarrel with the deceased demanding the said amount from her parents. He pressurized her that she should go to her parental house and bring the said money. But she declined to do so. Then he kicked and abused her saying that she should die. Then he took kerosene, poured it on her head and then lit fire to her person with intent to commit her murder. d) When she was set on fire, she cried. On hearing the cry, the neighbours viz., Tirupati (PW3) and Yamanoorappa (PW4) came there, extinguished the fire and then took her to the hospital. It was about 9 p.m. on that day when the said incident occurred. d) When she was set on fire, she cried. On hearing the cry, the neighbours viz., Tirupati (PW3) and Yamanoorappa (PW4) came there, extinguished the fire and then took her to the hospital. It was about 9 p.m. on that day when the said incident occurred. The deceased was admitted in the Government hospital at Kukanoor. e) After she was admitted in the said hospital, the P.S.I.(PW14) came there and recorded her statement (Ex.P12). Thereafter she was shifted to KIMS Hospital at Hubli for her further treatment. Unfortunately, she succumbed to the said injuries by about 4 a.m. on 08.05.2008. 3. On the basis of the said complaint, PW14, P.S.I. registered a case in Crime No.46/2008 of the said P.S. against the accused for the offences under Sections 498-A and 307 of I.P.C. and issued F.I.R. accordingly and dispatched the same to the jurisdictional Magistrate. After the death of the deceased, the P.S.I. got the accusation against the accused altered from the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. to the one under Section 302 I.P.C. After completion of investigation, the C.P.I. submitted chargesheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 498 and 302 I.P.C. and the accused came to be tried by Trial Court for the same. 4. On appreciation of the oral evidence of PWs1 to 15, the documents at Exs.P1 to 15 and M.O. Nos.1 to 3, the Trial Court, by its impugned Judgment and Order, convicted the appellant-accused for both the said offences. Therefore, the accused has challenged the correctness of the same in this appeal. 5. We have heard the arguments of Sri M.B.Gundawade, the learned counsel for the appellant-accused and Sri V.M.Banakar, the learned Addl. S.P.P. and perused the entire material found in the records obtained from the Trial Court. 6. Sri. M.B. Gundawade, the learned counsel for the appellant-accused strongly contends that the conviction of the appellant-accused is based only on Ex.P12 dying declaration which came to be recorded not by the Taluka Executive magistrate (‘TEM’ for short), but by PW14 P.S.1., and therefore, conviction of the appellant-accused cannot be sustained in law. 6. Sri. M.B. Gundawade, the learned counsel for the appellant-accused strongly contends that the conviction of the appellant-accused is based only on Ex.P12 dying declaration which came to be recorded not by the Taluka Executive magistrate (‘TEM’ for short), but by PW14 P.S.1., and therefore, conviction of the appellant-accused cannot be sustained in law. He further contends that the said dying declaration does not bear the endorsement of PW12, the Doctor who has given evidence before the Court that the deceased was in a fit state of health to give the said statement, the said dying declaration is not in the form of question and answer, but it is in the form of narration; PW12, the Medical Officer, has not made any endorsement on it to the effect that the deceased was in a fit state of health to give her statement and PW15, the Police Constable, who wrote the said statement has not made his endorsement thereon for having written it, and therefore, for these reasons also Ex.P12 dying declaration ought not to have been accepted by the Trial Court for basing conviction of the accused. He also contends that if it is the say of PW12 Medical Officer that the deceased affixed her left thumb impression on Ex.P12 statement, the say of PWs.14 and 15 respectively the P.S.I. and the Constable, who prepared the said statement, that since the left thumb of the deceased was burnt, her right thumb impression was taken on the said statement. This discrepancy goes to the very root of the case of the prosecution and casts serious doubt on the genuineness of Ex.P12 statement, and therefore, the Trial Court should not have relied upon it to base the conviction. He also contends that except the allegations in Ex.P12 dying declaration, absolutely no evidence is there on record to base the conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. inasmuch as, PW6 Smt. Sharadamma and PW7 Chandrashekar, who are respectively the mother and elder brother of the deceased, have not spoken anything about the alleged ill-treatment by the accused. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused further contends that though Ex.P12 dying declaration discloses that when the deceased was caught with fire, PW3 Tirupati and PW4 Yamanoorappa both came there and extinguished the fire and then they took the deceased to the hospital, the said PWs.3 and 4 have not deposed as to those facts and therefore the contends of Ex.P12 dying declaration ought not to have been relied upon. While contending so, he prays for acquittal of the appellant-accused, of both the said offences. 8. Per contra, the learned Addl. S.P.P. strongly contends that, law is well settled that the dying declaration need not always be in the form of question and answer and it may be in the form of narration; if the Doctor, in whose presence dying declaration is recorded, gives evidence that the deceased was in a fit state of health to give her statement, absence of his endorsement in specific words on the declaration as to that fact, would not be fatal to the prosecution. He further contends that PW15, the writer constable, who reduced to writing the statement of the deceased in the presence of PW14 P.S.I. and PW12 Medical Officer, has specifically stated in his evidence that he recorded the said statement as stated by the deceased in the presence of the said witnesses, and therefore, the dying declaration cannot be doubted. He further contends that the discrepancy as to the thumb impression found on Ex.P12 does not affect the validity of dying declaration, and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly ignored the said discrepancy as the minor one and rightly relied upon the said document for convicting the accused for both the said offences. He further contends that though there is no other evidence on record as to the alleged ill-treatment by the accused to the deceased in connection with his demand for money, the recitals in Ex.P12 establish the same, which itself was motive for the accused to commit murder of the deceased. 9. The learned Addl. S.P.P. strongly contends further that though the evidence of Pws. 9. The learned Addl. S.P.P. strongly contends further that though the evidence of Pws. 3 and 4 viz., Tirupati and Yamanur does not disclose that they extinguished the fire, nevertheless, their evidence clearly establishes that immediately after the deceased was caught with fire, they rushed to the house of the accused and then took the deceased to the hospital, and therefore, it could not be held that they did not support the prosecution case, as made out in Ex.P12 dying declaration. 10. Having heard the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant and learned Addl. S.P.P. the point that arises for our consideration is as under: “Whether the Trial Court committed any illegality or error in law in basing conviction of the appellant-accused on Ex.P12 – the dying declaration?” 11. The facts that the deceased Smt. Jyothi had been the legally wedded wife of the accused; their marriage was performed about 12 years prior to the incident; of the said marriage, they got two children and also that they were staying together in the house of the accused, as on the date of the said incident as alleged in Ex.P12 dying declaration, are not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that as alleged in the said dying declaration the deceased was caught with fire, consequently she sustained severe burn injuries and immediately thereafter, PW5 Shivappa, who is none other than the father of the accused (father-in-law of the deceased), along with others, took the deceased to the Government hospital and admitted her for treatment. 12. PW14 P.S.I. has stated in his examination –in-chief that on 07.05.2008 at about 10.45 p.m. he received written intimation from the Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Kukanoor, that the deceased Smt. Jyothi W/o. Ramappa Baligeri, R/o. Kakkihalli Tanda was admitted in the said hospital with burn injuries and that immediately thereafter he went to the said hospital, inquired with PW12 Medical Officer, who was on duty, whether the said deceased was in a fit state of health to give her state of health to give her statement, he recorded her statement as per Ex.P12 in the presence of PW12 Medical Officer, by getting the said statement written by his police constable. Nothing is brought in the cross-examination of this PW14 to disbelieve this evidence. Nothing is brought in the cross-examination of this PW14 to disbelieve this evidence. On the other hand the suggestion put to him by the learned counsel for the accused that this PW14, with the assistance of his writer P.C., falsely created Ex.P12, dying declaration goes to show that recording of Ex.P12 statement by PW14 on the said date and time in the presence of PW12 Medical Officer by getting it written by PW15 PC is not in dispute. 13. PW12 Medical Officer, Dr. Giridhar, has stated in his evidence that on 07.05.2008 at about 10.30 p.m. the injured Smt. Jyothi was brought to his hospital by P.C. 42 of Kukanoor P.S. having sustained burn injuries and that when he enquired with the said Smt. Jyothi, she informed him that her husband poured kerosene on her person and lit fire. He has further deposed that she was conscious and was in a fit state of health to give statement, and therefore, PW14 P.S.I. recorded her statement in his presence as per Ex.P12 and, after writing of the said statement was over, it was read over and explained to the deceased and then left thumb impression of the deceased was taken on the said document at Ex.P12 (a), he also signed it at Ex.P12 (b) and that the signature of the said P.S.I. on it is at Ex.P12 (c). On careful reading of the cross-examination of this PW12 Medical Officer it could be seen that nothing is brought on record to disbelieve this evidence in his examination – in – chief. 14. Ex.P13 is the case sheet pertaining to the admission of the deceased in the Government Hospital, Kukanoor. This document is also marked through this PW12 Medical Officer. On careful reading of the contents of Ex.P13 it could be seen that history is written as “burnt by husband around 9.00 p.m., kerosene smell from body present”. This endorsement in Ex.P13 clearly goes to show that the deceased was admitted in the hospital with a history that she was burnt by her husband i.e., the accused. On careful reading of the contents of Ex.P13 it could be seen that history is written as “burnt by husband around 9.00 p.m., kerosene smell from body present”. This endorsement in Ex.P13 clearly goes to show that the deceased was admitted in the hospital with a history that she was burnt by her husband i.e., the accused. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused, referring to the contents of Ex.P13 case sheet insofar as they relate to the history of the patient, contends that as could be seen from the said contents, the said history was given, not by the deceased, but by the Police Constable, who brought the deceased to the hospital, and therefore, since the prosecution has not examined the said Police Constable, it could not be held that the said history was given by the deceased herself. This submission does not deserve acceptance for the reason that, though it mentioned in the case sheet that the deceased was brought to the hospital by P.C. No.42 of Kukanoor P.S., it cannot be said that the history was given by the said Constable. Besides this, P.W.12 Doctor has stated in his evidence that when he enquired with the deceased, she told him that her husband poured kerosene on her person and lit fire. This piece of evidence has remained totally unchallenged inasmuch as no specific suggestions are made to this PW12 Medical Officer in this regard. No material is brought on record to suspect that the deceased could be prompted to give the said history or that some one either having interest in the deceased or having an axe to grind against the accused could get the said history mentioned in the case sheet falsely. Even if it is assumed that the said Constable might have given the said history, since the Constable was not related to the deceased, he could have given the said history only on the basis of the information that could have been given to him by the deceased herself. 15. It is quite natural that the Doctor, who admits a patient for treatment, would enquire the patient himself/herself as to the history of the patient unless the patient is accompanied by his/her relative or a person having knowledge of the history. 15. It is quite natural that the Doctor, who admits a patient for treatment, would enquire the patient himself/herself as to the history of the patient unless the patient is accompanied by his/her relative or a person having knowledge of the history. It is not the case of the accused that any of the relatives of the deceased was present there when the deceased was admitted in the hospital so as to give to the Doctor the said history falsely. 16. On careful reading of Ex. P12 dying declaration it could be seen that, at the foot of the statement, the Doctor has endorsed that the said statement came to be recorded in his presence. Below the said endorsement he has put his signature and he has identified his signature before the Court. Referring to this endorsement, learned counsel for the appellant-accused contends that this endorsement does not disclose that the deceased was in a fit state of health so as to give the said statement, and therefore, the Trial Court ought to have rejected the said statement. It is well settled that such an endorsement by the Doctor has to be taken on the dying declaration as a matter of caution to see that the statement was voluntary and truthful. The Doctor has made entry in the case sheet Ex.P13 as to the history that the husband of the deceased burnt her and kerosene smell was present on her body. He has deposed in his evidence before the Court that the deceased disclosed before him that she was set on fire by her husband. Besides this, he has made endorsement on Ex.P12 – dying declaration that the said statement was recorded in his presence. Further, he has put his signature just below the said endorsement and he has identified the thumb impression of the deceased and the signature of PW14 P.S.I. also on the said statement. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that absence of specific endorsement in clear words on Ex.P12 that the deceased was in a fit state of her health to give the said statement is not fatal to the case of the prosecution and the dying declaration could not be rejected on that ground. 17. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that absence of specific endorsement in clear words on Ex.P12 that the deceased was in a fit state of her health to give the said statement is not fatal to the case of the prosecution and the dying declaration could not be rejected on that ground. 17. Further, the absence of endorsement of PW15 writer constable, who wrote the said dying declaration is also not fatal to the case of the prosecution inasmuch as PW14 P.S.I. has stated in his evidence in clear terms that he got the said statement written by P.C. in the presence of the Doctor and that after the same was written, its contents were read over and explained to the deceased and then he obtained her thumb impression. Added to this, PW15- the writer constable has also deposed the same. Besides this, as observed by us supra, recording of the said statement by PW14 P.S.I. as deposed by him in his evidence is not in dispute. 18. There is discrepancy as to the thumb impression found on Ex.P12 dying declaration. It is the specific say of PW12 Medical Officer that the said impression is of left thumb of the deceased. But it is the specific say of PWs 14 & 15 respectively the P.S.I. and writer constable, that the said impression is of right thumb of the deceased. It is their further evidence that since her left thumb was injured, they took right thumb impression on Ex.P12. It is endorsed on Ex.P12 that it is right thumb impression. Ex.P7 Examination Report reveals that the Medical Officer, who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased, noticed ink mark on left thumb of the deceased. Thus, it is clear that the thumb impression, which is found on Ex.P12 must be of left thumb of the deceased, but not the right thumb of the deceased, but not the right thumb of the deceased as endorsed on it or as deposed by PWs, 14 and 15 in their evidence. Post Mortem Examination Report discloses that the deceased had sustained deep burn injuries all over her body except outer aspect of left leg, both soles, both palms and both axilla. Post Mortem Examination Report discloses that the deceased had sustained deep burn injuries all over her body except outer aspect of left leg, both soles, both palms and both axilla. The very fact that P.M. Report, which is not in dispute, discloses that ink mark was seen on the left thumb of the deceased goes to show that there was no burn injury to the left thumb of the deceased. Thus, it is clear from these contents of P.M. report that, as rightly observed by the Trial Court in its Judgment, the left thumb of the deceased was not injured so as to make it impossible for her to affix her left thumb impression on Ex.P12 dying declaration. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the submission of learned counsel for the appellant-accused that in view of the said discrepancy the Trial Court ought to have rejected Ex.P12 statement, cannot be accepted. 19. Law is well settled that conviction can be based solely on the dying declaration of the deceased, if it is found to be voluntary and truthful. It is pertinent to note that the deceased sustained burn injuries at about 9 p.m. She was admitted in the hospital by about 10.30 p.m. The information as to the admission of the deceased in the hospital was given to PW 14 P.S.I. by the Medical Officer concerned and the said P.S.I. received the same by about 10.45 p.m. and, in response thereto he immediately rushed to the hospital for recording the statement of the deceased. It is also pertinent to note that the Ex.P12 statement came to be recorded immediately after the P.S.I. arrived at the hospital and, soon after the same was recorded, the deceased was shifted to KIMS Hospital, Hubli, for further treatment and that within 4 hours thereafter she succumbed to the burn injuries. Further, immediately after recording the dying declaration, PW14 P.S.I. returned to his P.S., registered the case against the accused on the basis of the said statement for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 of I.P.C. and issued F.I.R. as per Ex.P10. The records further disclose that the said F.I.R. was dispatched to the residence of jurisdictional Magistrate without any delay and the same was received by the learned Magistrate at 3.30 a.m. on 8.05.2008. 20. The records further disclose that the said F.I.R. was dispatched to the residence of jurisdictional Magistrate without any delay and the same was received by the learned Magistrate at 3.30 a.m. on 8.05.2008. 20. Thus, it is clear that within a period of about 6 hours after the occurrence of the incident, the deceased was taken to the hospital, she was admitted there, intimation was sent by the Medical Officer to the concerned police, the police rushed to the hospital, the statement of the deceased came to be recorded, crime came to registered on the basis thereof, F.I.R. came to be issued and dispatched, and the F.I.R was received by the learned jurisdictional Magistrate. These chain of facts and circumstances clearly show that there could be no occasion for anyone declaration, with the assistance of his sub-ordinate i.e., writer P.C. (PW15) as suggested to PW14 by the learned counsel for the accused. Further, no material is brought on record to probablise tutoring of the deceased by anyone to give the said statement falsely against the accused. 21. Furthermore, on careful reading of the contents of Ex.P12 dying declaration, it could be seen that the facts pertaining to the marriage of the accused with the deceased, the names of parents of the deceased and the accused, the names of two children of the deceased with their respective age, the fact that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused in connection with his demand for money to the extent of Rs.3 to 4 lakhs and the circumstances under which the deceased sustained the burn injuries, are all stated in it in clear terms. All these facts could be known only to the deceased, accused and the members of their respective families but not to either PW14 P.S.I or PW15 writer constable, who were totally strangers to the accused and also the deceased. This being so, all the facts and circumstances contained in Ex.P12 dying declaration which were within the exclusive knowledge of the deceased and the accused, clearly go to show that the PW14 P.S.I. or PW15 writer P.C. or even P.W.12-the Medical Officer, could not have had knowledge of any of the said facts. This being so, all the facts and circumstances contained in Ex.P12 dying declaration which were within the exclusive knowledge of the deceased and the accused, clearly go to show that the PW14 P.S.I. or PW15 writer P.C. or even P.W.12-the Medical Officer, could not have had knowledge of any of the said facts. Therefore, in the absence of any material brought on record in the cross-examination of any of the prosecution witnesses as to who could possibly give all such information to PW14 P.S.I. for falsely creating Ex.P12 dying declaration, it cannot be held that the said statement could be created falsely against the accused. 22. Further, at the time when the said statement was recorded by PW14 P.S.I. he had no time to get the presence of Taluk Executive Magistrate for recording the said statement inasmuch as, the condition of the patient was such as, she was required to be sent to KIMS Hospital, Hubli, for her further treatment. Besides this, crime was not yet registered against either the accused or any other person in respect of the said incident. This being so, the said statement was not recorded by the P.S.I. during the course of investigation. It came to be recorded as the first information given by the deceased herself. Therefore, this Ex.P12 statement assumes its own importance and credit worthiness. 23. Though the dying declaration is in the form of narration, it could not be rejected only on that ground. Law is well settled that though it is advisable to record the dying declaration in question and answer form, recording of dying declaration in narration form does not make it either inadmissible in evidence or unworthy of acceptance, if circumstances under which it came to be recorded are not doubtful and it is found to be voluntary and truthful. It is also settled that such dying declaration can be accepted even without corroboration as to the facts stated therein. In the instant case, as already observed by us supra, circumstances under which Ex.P12 dying declaration came to be recorded were beyond any doubt. Therefore the said statement is rightly relied upon by the Trial Court. 24. Though it has come in the dying declaration that when the deceased cried, PWs 3 and 4 rushed to her house, extinguished fire and then she was taken to the hospital. Therefore the said statement is rightly relied upon by the Trial Court. 24. Though it has come in the dying declaration that when the deceased cried, PWs 3 and 4 rushed to her house, extinguished fire and then she was taken to the hospital. PWs 3 and 4 have not stated these facts in their evidence. They have turned hostile to the prosecution as to these facts. However, they have fully supported the case of prosecution that immediately after the deceased was caught with fire, they heard her cry, went there, saw the deceased on fire and then they took the deceased to the hospital. 25. These two witnesses (PW. 3 and 4) have stated in their cross-examination that immediately after they came to the house, they asked the deceased as too what had happened; she disclosed before them that since she could not tolerate the stomach ache, herself poured kerosene on her person and lit fire. Referring to this portion of their evidence, learned counsel for the appellant-accused strongly contends that this is not the case of homicide, but it is a case of suicide and therefore the Trial Court should not have convicted the accused. Though it is the say of PWS 3 and 4 that the deceased disclosed before them that she was suffering from severe stomach ache and therefore she set herself on fire to commit suicide, PW6 Sharadamma, who is none other than the mother of the deceased, has stated in her cross-examination that the deceased was not suffering from any stomach ache. Besides this, PW5 Shivappa, the father-in-law of the deceased, has stated in his evidence that the deceased was suffering from blood pressure and fits. But PW6 mother has not stated so. Added to this, the accused has not given any explanation in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. as to how the deceased sustained the burn injuries. He has not stated anything about the deceased suffering from any disease, much less stomach ache or fits and blood pressure. Therefore, it could not be held, on the basis of the above evidence of PWs 3 and 4, that it was a case of suicide, but not homicide. 26. He has not stated anything about the deceased suffering from any disease, much less stomach ache or fits and blood pressure. Therefore, it could not be held, on the basis of the above evidence of PWs 3 and 4, that it was a case of suicide, but not homicide. 26. Further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant accused is that except the allegations in Ex.P12 statement, no other evidence is placed on record by the prosecution to substantiate the charge for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C., and therefore, conviction of the accused for the said offence cannot be sustained. No doubt PW6, the mother of the deceased, PW7, the elder brother of the deceased, have not stated in their evidence as to the alleged ill-treatment of the deceased by the accused in connection with his demand for money. When once we accept Ex.P12 dying declaration as voluntary and truthful, nothing more would be required than to see the contents thereof for arriving at the conclusion that the deceased was subjected to cruel treatment by the accused in connection with his unlawful demand for money as defined Under Section 498-A of I.P.C. The allegations made against the accused in the said statement clearly establish a case of cruel treatment by the accused in connection with his unlawful demand for money i.e., Rs.3 to Rs.4 lakhs, for purchasing the tractor. Further, the very motive for the accused to pour kerosene on her person and set her on fire is non-satisfaction of the said demand for money by the parents of the deceased. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant-accused that the conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. cannot be sustained, does not deserve acceptance. 27. In support of his contentions that the Trial Court committed serious error in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. learned counsel for the appellant-accused has placed strong reliance on the decision of Honorable Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Ashfaq Ahmed, reported in (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) page 158 = (2009) 11 SCC 720 . In the said case before the Honorable Supreme Court there was no evidence to show that the deceased was in a fit condition to make her declaration inasmuch as one of the Doctors, who was a member of Medical Board and who had examined the deceased, had stated that condition of the patient was so critical that it was even impossible to examine her injuries medically. But the facts in the present case are totally different from those facts. As we have observed supra, the deceased was in a fit state of health to give her statement as per Ex.P12 and therefore, the proposition laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the above said case is not helpful to the appellant-accused. 28. Since the dying declaration of the deceased is found to be voluntary and truthful, the Trial Court rightly upon the same and convicted the accused for both the offences under Sections 498-A and 302 of I.P.C. As such, the impugned Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence does not call for any interference in the present appeal. 29. In the result, the present appeal is hereby dismissed as being devoid of merits. The impugned Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence is confirmed.