Judgment :- 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader. 2. The learned Government Pleader has filed stated of objections to contest the petition. Hence, pleadings being complete, the petition is considered for final disposal having regard to the facts and circumstances, out of turn. 3. The father of the petitioner one S.M. Nanjundaiah was working as a driver with the third respondent. Apart from the petitioner, Nanjundaiah had two other daughters all of whom were married. The petitioner is the youngest of the children. She was married as on 31-3-2002. However, the petitioner’s marriage had broken down and by virtue of divorce proceedings having been initiated before the Court of Principal Civil Judge, Kolar, the marriage stood dissolved. The petitioner thereafter has returned to her maternal home and was residing along with her father. She also has a child by her marriage who is a boy aged 3 years. Apart from the amount received at the settlement in divorce proceedings in a sum of Rs.75,000/-, she has no other source of livelihood. The petitioner’s father having died in harness as on 24-10-2010 leaving behind his widow, the petitioner and her child, the petitioner had made and application on 26-11-2010 seeking appointment on compassionate grounds while also specifically declaring that she has no other source of livelihood. The third respondent on receipt of the application, has issued an endorsement to state that petitioner cannot be appointed on compassionate grounds as she was the married daughter of S M Nanjundaiah and since the Rule does not contemplate a married daughter as being enabled to seek appointment on compassionate grounds. That the petitioner’s case could not be considered in spite of the petitioner having sought to claim that she was entirely dependent on her father for her livelihood along with her child and therefore was still in a position to claim as an unmarried daughter has been rejected. It is in that background, that the petitioner is before this Court. 4. It is in that background, that the petitioner is before this Court. 4. The learned Government Pleader would point out that it is true that the petitioner’s father died in harness, it is equally true that petitioner was the married daughter of late Nanjundaiah and since the petitioner admittedly claims as having been divorced from her husband and having received a substantial sum by way of settlement, the question of the petitioner claiming dependency as a part of the family of Nanjundaiah and as defined under the rule is not available to the petitioner. He would point out that according to the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996, Rule 3(1) would provide for appointment on compassionate grounds, which shall not be claimed as a matter of right, and would not be given as a matter of course, it would be restricted to the dependent of the deceased Government Servant in the following order: namely (a) widow (b) son (c) unmarried daughter or widowed daughter and therefore, he would submit that there is no illegality in the rejection of the petitioner’s claim. 5. In the above circumstances, the question would be whether the petitioner could claim as an unmarried daughter, being a divorced woman and in the face of the fact that she had received Rs.75,000/- as a settlement from her erstwhile husband, whether she could claim dependency and therefore seek appointment on compassionate grounds on her father’s death since the respondents have rejected the claim of the petitioner only on the ground that she was not an unmarried daughter or a widowed daughter of the deceased. The question would be whether she can be considered as one defined under the Rules because she is no longer married as she is a divorced woman. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on a judgment of this Court in Manjula vs State of Karnataka By its Secretary, Department of Co-operation, Bangalore & Another (ILR 2004 KAR 4881) wherein this Court, in the case of a woman whose marriage was subsisting, has held that a married woman cannot be denied entry into service on compassionate employment only because she is married. There may be cases where the married woman may be living with her parents notwithstanding her marriage for various reasons and there may be cases in which the married woman would be dependent on her parents on account of her husband having deserted her and therefore this Court read down the Rule thereby providing employment to a dependent married daughter subject of course to the satisfaction of the management of the dependency of the said married daughter and held that this also would also support the case in terms of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it was held that dependency should be yardstick and not the marital status a woman which would be the criteria. 7. In the above facts and circumstances, the rule employing the expression “unmarried” or “widowed” would take within its ken a married woman who is no longer married by virtue of her divorce or the death of her husband. The question did come up before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Minarani Majumdar vs Dasarath Majumdar (AIR 1963 Calcutta 428). While addressing the expression “unmarried”, the Court has answered with reference to, the issue pertaining in that case, in terms of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act and with reference to phrase ‘while the applicant is not married’ in the following words: “(2) On behalf of the opposite party husband it is urged that since the payment of maintenance under Sec.25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 must be limited to the period “while the applicant remains unmarried”, the appellant under the section must satisfy the condition that she or he is ‘unmarried and as the petitioner has not obtained a decree of divorce or nullity, she is not unmarried, being still the married wife of the opposite party, and consequently her application under Sec.25 is not maintainable. I am unable to accept this contention. An order for separate maintenance under Sec.25 may be passed in favour of a married woman living apart from her husband, e.g., on the passing of a decree of judicial separation or of the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in the event of the decree not being complied with, the expression “any decree” in Sec.25 is broad enough to cover any decree of divorce or nullity or of judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights. The heading and the body of the section refer to “maintenance”, “permanent alimony” and “payment of periodical sums” which under the English practice are respectively the names of allowances granted after the passing of a decree of divorce of nullity, a decree of judicial separation and a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, see Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, Secs. 19, 20 and 22 and Rayden on Divorce, 8th Edition. Page 707. The scheme of Secs.24 25 and 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 appears to be that the Court is vested with the power of passing orders for maintenance of a spouse and for the custody, maintenance and education of minor children of the marriage, during the pendency of any proceeding as also on the passing of any decree under Secs. 9 to 14 of the Act. In a proper case the Court has, therefore, the power under Sec.25 to pass an order for maintenance in favour of an applicant who is a married woman. The condition that the maintenance is to be paid “while the applicant remains unmarried” is attached to every order for maintenance passed under Sec.25. In the context of Sec.25(1) the condition means “while the applicant is not remarried”. This condition recalls to our mind the clause “dum sola of casta vixerit” which means “while she remains chaste and unmarried”. Under the English practice, formerly, it was usual to attach those conditions to an order for maintenance of the wife after a decree of divorce or nullity, see Fisher v. Fisher (1861) 2 Sw, and Tr.410 but now the insertion of either condition has become the exception rather than the rule, Halsbury’s laws of England, Arts.983, 984 and Rayden on Divorce, 8th Edition pages 742-43. The rigid policy of Sec.25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, however, is that a party in whose favour an order for maintenance is passed cannot claim any maintenance under the order if subsequently the party has re-married or has become guilty of sexual immorality; the Court has no discretion in the matter, upon the party’s re-marriage the maintenance ceases and the Court must rescind the order. The Court is also bound to rescind the order on the party becoming guilty of sexual immorality as mentioned in the Section. The word “unmarried” has several meanings. The Court is also bound to rescind the order on the party becoming guilty of sexual immorality as mentioned in the Section. The word “unmarried” has several meanings. An interesting discussion of its meaning will be found in the case of Soleman Bibi v East Indian Railway, 37 Cal WN 453: (AIR 1933 Cal 358(2)). The popular meaning of the word is ‘never having been married’. Its dictionary meaning is “not married”. Now the word “unmarried” in Sec. 25(1) cannot mean “never having been married”, because the applicant must have been a husband or a wife and therefore must have been married: nor can it mean “not married”; for an order under Sec.25 may be passed in favour of a married woman on the passing of a decree of judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights. In the context of Sec.25(1) the word means “not remarried” for this reason Sec.25(3) provides interalia for rescission of the order if she has re-married, the reason for attaching the condition “while the applicant remains unmarried” to an order for maintenance passed in favour of a married woman after a decree of judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights may be that the order will remain effective though she subsequently obtains a decree of divorce or nullity and becomes free to marry again. The petitioner not having re-married was for purposes of Sec.25 “unmarried” and her application cannot be dismissed on the ground that she was not unmarried”. A companion Judge expounded thus: “16. It was contended on behalf of the opposite party that in Sec. 25(1) of the Act there is a pre-condition that the applicant must remain “unmarried” at the time of the application as the payment of maintenance under this Section is limited to the period “while the applicant remains unmarried”; but the petitioner being still the married wife of the opposite party she was not “unmarried” and as such her application was not maintainable. I must at once say, there is no substance or merit in this contention. The word “unmarried” cannot possibly mean “not married” because the Act only deals with husband and wife. The word “unmarried” in the context must necessarily mean “not remarried”. I must at once say, there is no substance or merit in this contention. The word “unmarried” cannot possibly mean “not married” because the Act only deals with husband and wife. The word “unmarried” in the context must necessarily mean “not remarried”. This again is made abundantly clear by sub-sec.(3) of Sec.25 which provides “if the Court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has re-married…it shall rescind the order”. Therefore it seems reasonable to hold that the word “unmarried” as used in sub-sec.(1) of Sec.25 really means “not remarried”. 17. This conclusion is further supported, as under the Act the Court can grant maintenance to either party to a marriage in cases of judicial separation and also where there is a decree for restitution of conjugal rights when the marriage still subsists. The words “while the applicant remains unmarried” cannot also mean that the applicant must be in a position to remarry at the time of the application because in that event these words could only operate where there is a divorce or a decree for nullity thus limiting the scope of the section. In my opinion the word “unmarried” in sub-sec.(1) of Sec.25 means “not re-married”. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner being still the married wife of the opposite party her application under Sec.25 is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. In my opinion the position is that the petitioner not having remarried must be deemed to be “unmarried” within the meaning of Sec.25(1) of the Act. 8. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner being still the married wife of the opposite party her application under Sec.25 is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. In my opinion the position is that the petitioner not having remarried must be deemed to be “unmarried” within the meaning of Sec.25(1) of the Act. 8. Further, the decision reported in AIR 1933 Calcutta 358 (SOLEMAN BIBI vs E.I.Ry) in answering the question whether an “unmarried daughter” would include a “widowed daughter” for purposes of a claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it was held thus: “I would therefore prefer to state the result of the authorities as to the meaning of the word as follows: (1) That the dictionary or grammatical sense of the word more usual sense is never having been married: (3) that the word is commonly used in either sense and is therefore a “flexible” or equivocal term: (4) that for this reason the meaning must in all cases be discovered from the context: (5) that in the case of deeds and wills where there is no context, where the document is completely colourless, the popular sense will usually be adopted. In other words I think it is putting it too high to say that in all cases there is a primary meaning and a secondary meaning or that the first is the rule and the second is the exception. With regard to the special rules for the construction of Statutes one rule is that words may and normally should be construed in their popular sense: see Maxwell, Edn. 7, p. 47. There is however another rule that words should be construed so as to advance the remedy provided by the Act: see P.59 and the following. The two cases illustrative of this rule which have some topical connexion with the present case are Jones v. Davis (9) where in a Statute, relating to another matter altogether, “single woman” was construed so as to include as a married woman living apart from her husband. In King v. Inhabitants of Wymandham (10), a case which arose out of the Poor Law Statute I have referred to, “single and unmarried” in an “examination” was interpreted as “never having been married,” the converse case. In King v. Inhabitants of Wymandham (10), a case which arose out of the Poor Law Statute I have referred to, “single and unmarried” in an “examination” was interpreted as “never having been married,” the converse case. With regard to the context of the word in the present case the view taken by the Commissioner is expressed on the last page of the letter of reference as follows in the following manner: “The words in the definition constitute an inclusive list of all the nearer relatives; on marriage of a daughter acquires a new relationship *** and I see nothing in the definition of dependants to warrant a supposition that on the death of her husband she resumes the original relationship.” The comment which occurs to me is as follows a daughter undoubtedly acquires a new relationship on marriage. She does not however lose the old relationship; she remains a daughter. Once a daughter always a daughter; quo relationship she is a daughter before, during and after marriage. On the other hand the legislature has attached a qualification or condition that in order to participate a female child must not only be a daughter, but she must be an “unmarried daughter”. The question is what is the meaning of that qualification. Does it exclude daughters once, but no longer, married? I think not. It appears to me that the important portion of the context to read in connexion with the definition is the operate part of S.8 which provides for one payment to be distributed at a special time or period ---- the death of the employee ---- among particular persons. According to the English authorities and also I think in common conversation, when “unmarried” forms a qualification in the description of a person who is to receive a sum of money at a definite time or period, the meaning “not married” appears to be appropriate: see Leshingham Trust 24 Ch.D. 703 and Jarman on Wills in particular at 1252. For these reasons 1 agree with the decision in 13 Lah. 228(1) and construe the expression “unmarried daughter” in S.2.1(d) of the Act as including widowed daughter. For these reasons 1 agree with the decision in 13 Lah. 228(1) and construe the expression “unmarried daughter” in S.2.1(d) of the Act as including widowed daughter. Rankin, C.J. – I agree and I would only add that, in my judgment, while is quite true that the definition of dependency is made by the statute by a list of certain relatives, it is quite clear that in the case of a daughter the mere relationship to the workman was not regarded as itself a sufficient test. The statute has by speaking of “unmarried daughter” introduced an element extraneous to the mere question of relationship to the workman and I think it is legitimate in considering the effect of the word “unmarried” in such a case as that to consider it as a factor chosen by the legislature because in many cases at least it has a certain bearing upon the question of dependency in fact. I think, therefore, that there is no reason to dissent from the decision of the High Court of Lahore in Moti Bal’s case (1); and with all respect to the Commissioner who has put before us a very well reasoned opinion, I am not prepared to depart from the principle laid down in that case. The applicant will have her costs before the Commissioner and before us from the employers. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at three gold mohurs.” 9. In the case on hand, the fact that the petitioner was divorced would indicate that she was no longer married and as long as she is not remarked, she remains unmarried and if a widowed daughter can be treated as one who could seek employment on compassionate grounds, for all purposes the petitioner who is no longer with her husband and therefore can be treated on par with a widowed daughter in considering whether she can be provided employment. The fact that the petitioner has received Rs.75,000/- as settlement in the divorce proceedings would not go a long way in ensuring the petitioner’s comfortable living and livelihood. The fact that she has a child whose interest is also to be protected would be a consideration. Further, it is not unusual where a family receives the benefit from an employer of an erstwhile bread winner but is yet considered for compassionate appointment notwithstanding any such settlement. The fact that she has a child whose interest is also to be protected would be a consideration. Further, it is not unusual where a family receives the benefit from an employer of an erstwhile bread winner but is yet considered for compassionate appointment notwithstanding any such settlement. By the same token of reasoning, even if the petitioner has received some benefit in the divorce proceedings that would not be a ground to reject her application for employment on compassionate grounds holding that she has been well provided for. Accordingly, rejection of employment on compassionate ground on the ground that petitioner was a divorced woman is not tenable. 10. The writ petition stands allowed. The impugned endorsement stands quashed. The respondents are directed to reconsider the case of the petitioner for employment. 11. The learned Government Pleader at this stage raises a concern, which is an extreme view, of a possible situation of an unscrupulous person claiming compassionate appointment on the ground that she is a person who is no longer a married daughter by obtaining divorce from her husband after her father’s death in similar circumstances. Any such circumstances would be a matter of enquiry in respect of which the employer would take in appropriate proceedings. 12. Since it is possible that respondents may deny the employment on the ground that much time has elapsed from the date of death of the father of the petitioner, the petitioner’s case shall be considered forthwith, in any event, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.