Judgment : 1. “Bangalore was a beautiful city – once. It was a city with magic and charm, with elegant avenues, gorgeous flowers, lovely gardens and plentiful spaces. Not now. That was before the invasion of concrete and steel of soot and smoke, of high-rise and the fast buck. Gone are the flowers, gone are the trees, gone are the avenues, gone are the spaces. We are now greeted with tall puffing chimneys and monstrous high-rise buildings, both designed to hurt the eye, the environment and the man. But they are thought by many as symbols of progress and modernity. They have come to stay. Perhaps they are necessary. Nostalgic sentiments, we suppose, must yield to modern societal requirements. Smoking chimneys produce much needed goods. High-rise buildings save much scarce space. They have a place in the scheme of things. But where, how, to what extent, at what cost, are the questions raised by some aggrieved citizens of Bangalore. They want congestion to be prevented, population density to be controlled, lung spaces to be provided where people can breathe, existing recreational facilities to be preserved and improved, pollution and health hazards to be removed, civic and social amenities to be provided etc. All these require a balanced use of available land. It is with that object that the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act was enacted in 1961 and it is with the interpretation of some of the provisions of that Act that we are concerned in these appeals. 2. The problem and the pain have been well-brought out by the Chairman of the Bangalore Urban Arts Commission (4th respondent before the High Court) in the Chairman’s response to an editorial in a local newspaper. It is extracted in the Additional statement filed in the High Court by the writ petitioners. He says.- “When we speak of saving Bangalore’s skyline and its cherished character, we are apt to be misunderstood even by some well-meaning citizens. Vested interests and busy bodies with an easy conscience would in any case rubber wall any consideration of argument because the present time with the skyrocketing property value, is a great opportunity for them to “make hay”. They would rather sell the city than dwell on its future. Vested interests and busy bodies with an easy conscience would in any case rubber wall any consideration of argument because the present time with the skyrocketing property value, is a great opportunity for them to “make hay”. They would rather sell the city than dwell on its future. We are not speaking only of the central areas of the city – even when we regard them, understandably enough as more precious than the rest of the city. Nor are we trying to guard the City’s supposed “colonial solitude” which, we know, vanished many decades ago. We are not afflicted with irrational nostalgia and have no fetish about bungalows and Courtyards. We are aware of the dynamics of a modern city. All that we want – and it was ably summed up in your editorial is that we must prevent any more ugliness and haphazardness, of which we had more than what Bangalore can take if it is to stay as the City Beautiful, with its planned spaciousness and (still) largely unclustered skyline. We also want without any further delay, a vigilant, clearly spelt out and scrupulously honest system to ensure an orderly growth of the city, in “Keeping with the capacity of its services, like water supply, drainage and roads”. I entirely agree that for new areas we must provide for more density of population if we are to get adequate mileage from per capital expenditure, and if we are to release sufficient lung-spaces for recreational and community activities. In fact, we have long back suggested to city planners to plan for self-contained and self-sufficient clusters of multiple-storey blocks, with their own plazas, shopping and recreational centres, in carefully selected locations and in keeping with the available services. Again, there is no doubt that coverage per plot must be systematically reduced through imaginatively formulated bye-laws, if we are to continue the garden-city character of the City’s new areas. It is utterly mystifying however, that such obviously valid thoughts and suggestions should end with the plea for “concentrated growth”- presumably in the central area of the city and preferably with high-rise buildings. Such growth which is bound to obliterate what we have still left of this beautiful city and put further strains on its traffic, water supply and drainage, is certainly not going to help the proletarian office-goer or house seeker. Such growth which is bound to obliterate what we have still left of this beautiful city and put further strains on its traffic, water supply and drainage, is certainly not going to help the proletarian office-goer or house seeker. It will serve only the big-time builder, the high spending rich and last but not least the fast-buck chasing wheeler dealers and busy bodies mentioned above”. Now that the State Government has announced a clear policy in this behalf, there is no reason why we should not expect the best. This commission had made its own contribution to the formulation of a new set of building bye-laws which aim at the much needed regulation – on fully modern lines of this City’s future growth, and which leave minimum scope for corruption. We hope that these will be adopted soon. We look forward to a new approach and a new era – free from the stench of corruption. We hope that these will be adopted soon. We look forward to a new approach and a new era – free from the stench of corruption, innuendoes and loose talk of “motives”, and characterised by future thinking. After all, we have the City Beautiful because of the future thinking and hard work of the planners and administrators”. so went on the response of the then Chairman of Bangalore Urban Arts Commission extracted in the judgment of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court rendered by justice Chinnappa Reddy in the case of B.K. Srinivasan and Another v State of Karnataka and Others (ILR 1987 Kar.1867 (SC): AIR 1987 SC 1059 : (1987) 1 SCC 658 ). 2. Though ultimately the judgment was to dismiss the appeals, the high-rise buildings had their rebirth nay, in fact, never died and continue to mock the peace loving, law abiding, well-meaning citizens of Bangalore, not only in Sadashivanagar area where it reared its ugly head for the first time, but all over the city as of now. 2. Though ultimately the judgment was to dismiss the appeals, the high-rise buildings had their rebirth nay, in fact, never died and continue to mock the peace loving, law abiding, well-meaning citizens of Bangalore, not only in Sadashivanagar area where it reared its ugly head for the first time, but all over the city as of now. The last nail in the coffin of peace, serenity, tranquility and all nice feelings and sentiments accompanying the city with a magic and charm, elegant avenues lined with trees of gorgeous flowers, lovely gardens and plentiful places was hit, in all situations through the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bathkawar Trust and Others v M.D. Narayan and Others ( AIR 2003 SC 2236 : (2003) 5 SCC 298 ), when validating legislation with amendment was brought about to Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 (11 of 1963) by way of Bangalore City Planning Area Zonal Regulations (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1996 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1996), to get over the consequences of the affirming judgment of the Supreme Court in B.K. Srinivasan’s case got resurrected through this judgment when the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court declaring the validating legislation to be invalid and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and order dated 8-9-1997 rendered in W.P.No.10500 of 1996 in M.D. Narayan v State of Karnataka and Others (1999 (4) Kar.L.J.413 (DB)) and it is now virtually a free for all in the city of Bangalore as builders and developers have realised that it is now their era and it is their writ that rules roost. 3. The Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (for short, ‘BDA Act’) is the successor to City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 and aims at achieving a planned development of City of Bangalore. The preamble of the BDA Act reads: “An Act to provide for the establishment of the Development Authority for the development of City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for matters connected therewith”. 4. The preamble of the BDA Act reads: “An Act to provide for the establishment of the Development Authority for the development of City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for matters connected therewith”. 4. The question in these petitions is as to whether such an object has been achieved during the past thirty-five years of the existence of the Bangalore Development Authority (for short, ‘the BDA’) and if one were to tag on the period during which its predecessor was in force, it will be virtually sixty-six years, as the style and manner of functioning of the BDA is not much different from its predecessor and if at all, it has gone from bad to worse, but the activities and the operations of the BDA are now on a much larger scale and therefore naturally the consequence of its malfunctioning are also on a bigger scale! 5. 5. A very belated charge on a scheme with the nomenclature ‘Jayaprakash Narayan Nagar VIII Phase’ and one or two original landowners and many other persons who have purchased bits and parcels of lands either from the original owners or from persons who in turn have acquired such interest from their owners, even during the course of acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1988 to be precise through a preliminary notification dated 23-3-1988 published in the Official Gazette by the BDA under Section 17(3) of the BDA Act and in fact much later to this date, having purchased bits and pieces of lands, but who claim to have put up structures as of now and also some who have purchased built up structures on small parcels of lands notified for acquisition, have all joined together to constitute with petitioners in the batch of writ petitions questioning the legality of the acquisition proceedings and sustainability of acquisition proceedings being continued even now as it is complained that the BDA, which is in a state of slumber most of the time, gets into some frenzied activity during lucid intervals when it suddenly remembers a scheme that it had begun in the year 1988 and goes about using heavy earth moving machinery for indulging in inhuman, demonic, demolishing activity, wrath of which was faced by man other similarly situated persons and petitioners claiming that they have acquired valid and good title to the subject properties which is in their possession in the wake of the developments that took place during the period when there was a lull in the activity of the BDA for implementation of the scheme, virtually creating an impression that the BDA has abandoned the scheme in its original form and if at all it is taking steps now, it is only for a truncated manner of implementation of the scheme and not even as originally propounded, but in a markedly deviant manner and even has started outsourcing its functions in favour of private builders and developers and to the detriment of the bona fide buyers of land who have purchased bits and pieces of land for their residential purpose and have invested their savings of their lifetime to get a shelter over their head; that they will all be adversely affected if the BDA should be allowed to continue its wayward, erratic manner of functioning and in such background have approached this Court seeking the following reliefs.- “i. to declare that the acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents 1 and 2 as per preliminary notification bearing No. BDA/SLAO/A6/PR/229/87-88, dated 23-3-1988 (published in the Karnataka Gazette on 2-6-1988) i.e., Annexure-P and the final Notification No.UDD 457 MNX 98, dated 5-4-1999 (published in the Karnataka Gazette on 8-4-1999) i.e., Annexure-Q in relation to the sites of the petitioners comprised in the converted lands in Sy.No.30, measuring 3 acres 06 guntas of Kothanur Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, as having lapsed and/or abandoned on account of non-utilisation of the lands by the BDA for more than a decade and being null and void; ii. to award costs and grant such other relief(s) as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and expedient in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity”. 6. To appreciate the developments hitherto, a look at the interim orders passed by this Court on earlier occasion, particularly, as reflected in the order dated 6-10-2010 will be very informative and useful which reads as under: “Every acquisition proceeding by the Government reeks of foul smell and is a breeding ground for corruption and it the Bangalore Development Authority is also involved in the process, the corrupt ways of the officials of the Government and the authority – an agency of the Government have joined together it spell disaster to hapless citizens of the State and the city. 2. In the name of acquisition for a public purpose, legitimate, rightful owners are deprived of their lands, many a times, are not even paid any compensation leave alone a compensation at the market value, but the authority i.e., the officials of the authority, embark on a journey of arbitrary and highhanded actions and indulge in nepotism and favouritism to the benefit of a few and to the chagrin of many. 3. The story is not different in the present case of petitioners, who claim to be purchasers of some sites formed in some lands which were though covered under a preliminary notification issued under Section 17(1) of the BDA Act, issued way back on 23-3-1988, but a declaration thereafter being followed only as per notification dated 5-4-1999, but developments in between have made this Court to sit up and take a deeper look into the record and the proceedings. 4. It is for this reason, these writ petitions have been admitted. What was noticed by this Court on the earlier occasions is reflected in the following orders passed on 23-9-2010 and 29-9-2010. Order dated 23-9-2010: ORDER Writ petitioners are as many as ten in nos. who claim to have purchased certain parcels of agricultural land which had been notified for acquisition for being developed as house sites etc., by the BDA in the year 1988 and having purchased some sites or parcels of this land through registered sale deeds in or around year 2004. Petitioners as such purchasers are seeking further following relief before this Court. Petitioners as such purchasers are seeking further following relief before this Court. Petitioners are complaining that they are likely to be dispossessed unless their interest is protected and have sought for quashing of the acquisition notification vis-a-vis. The sites which they claim to have purchased and comprised in land bearing Survey No.30 of Kothanur Village, Uttarhalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, on certain legal grounds. 2. Mr. Venkatesh Dodderi, Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the first respondent, State of Karnataka submits that petitioners being subsequent purchasers of land notified for acquisition way back in the year 1988, have no locus to present this writ petition nor have any legal rights which they can claim said to have accrued in their favour under the sale deeds executed by are or the year 2004 being purchasers, long after the land was notified for acquisition. 3. However, petitioners have also averred that subject land in Sy.No.30 measuring in the extent of 3 acres 6 guntas had been permitted for non-agricultural use on an application made by the original owners, one Sri Amase Gowda, S/o Javare Gowda and Smt. Maria Gren D/o M. Manivel under the provisions of Sections 295, 294, 297 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, in terms of order dated 22-2-2004 (copy produced at Annexure-G1 to the writ petition). 4. While it may be true that petitioners being purchasers of the land subsequent to notification issued by the BDA under Sections 17 and 19 of BDA Act way back in the year 1988 but it is rather puzzling as to how the Special Deputy Commissioner, Revenue, Bangalore District, one by name Sri Krishne Gowda,, could have ventured to grant conversion of such notified land for acquisition by BDA, to be used for nonagricultural purposes by order passed in the year 2004. An application for such purpose given in 2004, has been processed for permitting non-agricultural use of the land by the applicants within a span of 17 days, which, if is to be believed that State Government should be complimented for its super efficiency and break neck speed of allowing such applications for conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural uses. 5. The second respondent-Commissioner and third respondent-Special Land Acquisition Officer have been modified by issue of emergent notices on 16-9-2010. 5. The second respondent-Commissioner and third respondent-Special Land Acquisition Officer have been modified by issue of emergent notices on 16-9-2010. Under these circumstances this Court in terms of interim order passed on 9-9-2010, directed the learned Government Advocate to take notice for the first respondent-State and respondents were directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of land. It is thereafter that the petitioners have come up with an application seeking for rising additional grounds through Misc.W.No.8747 of 2010. 6. It is rather strange that the interim order granted by this Court on 9-9-2010 is not yet made aware of to the second and third respondents. Though petitioners have expressed apprehension of the buildings that they had put up in the subjected land are likely to be demolished for illegal and unauthorised construction etc. 7. The present application is without effecting service of notice on the learned Government Advocate who had been earlier directed to take notice for the 1st respondent-State. Therefore, the application for rising additional grounds can be filed afresh after proper service on parties who are represented through their Counsel. The present application stands dismissed. 8. List the matter for further orders on 29-9-2010. 9. Learned Government Advocate is directed to secure the Special Deputy Commissioner, who passed in order at Annexure-G1 and also the presence of the Commissioner, BDA. The presence of Commissioner of BDA on 29-9-2010 is to apprise the Court as to whether the acquisition proceedings have been concluded earlier and possession of the land had been taken earlier in terms of the records of the BDA. 10. Registry is directed to furnish a copy of this order to the learned Government Advocate and also directly to the respondents 2 and 3. Order dated 29-9-2010: Mr. Bharath Lal Meena, Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority is present before the Court. 2. The Special Deputy Commissioner who had passed orders in favour of the petitioners for permission to use the notified agricultural lands notified for acquisition by the BDA for developmental purpose and which they had purchased subsequent to the notification, for non-agricultural use passed in terms of an order on an application, is disposing it within 17 days has not responded through Sri G.S. Kannur, learned Counsel appearing for BDA submits that the Commissioner, BDA had conveyed the Court order to the Special Deputy Commissioner for compliance. The Special Deputy Commissioner has not responded inspite of the special invitation extended to the Special Deputy Commissioner, by this Court! 3. Mr. Venkatesh Dodderi, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State of Karnataka who perhaps has some authority and control over the Special Deputy Commissioner pleads his helplessness as the Special Deputy Commissioner has not responded; that special request had been made to the first respondent-State of Karnataka represented by its Secretary, Urban Development Department to communicate the Court order to ensure the presence of the Special Deputy Commissioner before this Court, but the Special Deputy Commissioner has not responded notwithstanding the order being in turn communicated to him through the first respondent-the State of Karnataka. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners seeks permission to file in the Court hall certain application for urging additional grounds. 5. The application may be filed in the Registry. 6. Mr. G.S. Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent, the Commissioner, BDA requests a week’s time to respond to the order passed by this Court on 23-9-2010. 7. Response if any by the State of Karnataka represented by its Secretary-R1; Commissioner of BDA-R2 and the Special Land Acquisition Officer-R3 by then. 8. It is open to the learned Additional Government Advocate to secure the presence of the Special Deputy Commissioner before this Court on 6-10-2010. List this matter for further orders on 6-10-2010. Furnish a copy of this order to learned Additional Government Advocate. necessitating of issue of directions for the personal presence of Special Deputy Commissioner, who had embarked upon grant of permission for conversion of agricultural land already notified by the authority and declared to be for a public purpose by the State Government, but not having been concluded for want of passing of an award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to be converted for non-agricultural use, in terms of the order dated 20-2-2004 passed under the provisions of Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. 5. The dates i.e., the filing of application for such conversion and the passing of orders permitting having very short in interval of only 17 days, has really shocked and surprised this Court at the breakneck speed with which the Special Deputy Commissioner has acted for doing the impossible i.e., granting permission of notified lands for non-agricultural purpose, in favour of the original landowners. 6. 6. Sri C. Krishne Gowda, who is the architect of the order granting such permission for non-agricultural use, is present before the Court today, states that as the law compels such application being disposed of within a period of 45 days, as otherwise, the deemed provision will operate, it had become necessary for the officer to pass orders at the earliest. 7. May be or may not be, but fact is that the Special Deputy Commissioner could not have embarked on this breakneck speed action in respect of a land already notified for acquisition. 8. Sri Krishne Gowda pleads lack of memory, as he is now functioning as Joint Commissioner, Bangalore metropolitan task force and unless has an opportunity to look into the records, he cannot make any further submissions on this issue. 9. Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-authority, seeks some more time to make further submissions in the matter and also to file an additional statement on behalf of the BDA. 10. List the matter on 21-10-2010 for further hearing. The officer to be present before this Court on 21-10-2010 after familiarizing himself with the record of the case”. 7. The above illustrated incident is only a symptom of the growing tendency on the part of public authorities themselves to fall in line with law and procedure! Widespread taste for taxes promises to be a thing of slow growth” so lamented Nani A. Palkhivala, one amongst the most outstanding Jurists of our times and in the country who had the reputation of an accomplished expert in Tax laws and the Constitution, a lawyer of great oratory skills, inside the outside Courts, a man of letters and erudition apart from his familiarity with tax laws and the Constitution in his introduction to the ‘Magnum Opus on Income Tax Law and Practice of Income Tax Law’ by Sir Jamshedji B. Kanga and Nani A. Palkhivala. 8. This was a lament sandwiched between quotations from Justice Holmes whom the author said had valiantly tried to make taxes less arduous by means of a felicitous definition such as ‘taxes are what we pay for civilised society. I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilisation’. 8. This was a lament sandwiched between quotations from Justice Holmes whom the author said had valiantly tried to make taxes less arduous by means of a felicitous definition such as ‘taxes are what we pay for civilised society. I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilisation’. A further quotation from Sir Leo Money who had stated before the Royal Commission on Income Tax that his taxation was the best expenditure he made and he got more satisfaction from it than from any other expenditure laid out by him, about which author’s own reaction was: “…….The State is very intangible to the average man. Besides, although it may be conceded that taxes are an inevitable overhead of civilisation, public dissatisfaction becomes equally inevitable when the overhead is excessive or not fairly distributed. To the man who, after years of honest and useful work, is left by income tax without means of providing for his old age or his family, Justice Holmes’ dictum would be more quotable than convincing”. 9. The celebrated author writing an introduction to his work “The law and practice of Income Tax” was content to express his views about the conduct and functioning of tax payers in the context of levy of taxes on citizens and had noticed that the taste for taxes was not one palatable to one and all people are wary and slow to develop a taste for paying taxes. 10. One can now easily understand, this lack of taste for paying taxes in only a manifestation of the ways and conduct of people in general and in particular vis-a-vis tax laws as had been noticed by Nani A. Palkhivala. A culture for obedience and adherence to laws tends to be a thing of slow growth, a commitment to abide by law is not a quality widespread amongst the citizens and tendency to violate laws, to flout laws, to avoid or evade laws, on the other hand, appear to be a thing of widespread taste whether among private citizens or amongst public authorities and officials! While citizens have their own share of violations and confrontations with the law and the excuses and explanation if any is that it is due to the tyranny of law; that it is due to the oppressive nature of law as was perhaps noticed by Nani A. Palkhivala in the case of a person who pays his taxes promptly being left in penury in the evening of his life. The violations and transgressions of law on the part of public authorities with power and authority is, more often than not, in the name of public good and public interest and purporting to perform their duties. But, unfortunately, slackness, letharginess, tardiness in performing the duties, lack of commitment and many a times even lack of bona fides on the part of public authorities, allowing grass to grow under their feet by getting into bouts of slumber even before completion of a task or project or a scheme, misuse and abuse of power and authority and many a times acting on irrelevant considerations and even for graft, all vitiate the exercise of power by public authorities, whether it is administrative power or statutory power. 11. 11. Examination in the present writ petitions is virtually one such as the petitioners are contending that the long and inordinate interval from the date of issue of the preliminary notification apprising the general public the scheme of the BDA to develop the subject lands figuring in the notification as a metropolitan residential extension by name ‘Jayaprakash Narayan Nagar VIII Phase’, the tardy manner in which the scheme is pursued, the haphazard manner in which large extents of lands from the originally planned extent for implementation of the scheme are left out from the purview of the scheme, the pick and choose manner of retaining some chunks of land intermittently for the working of the scheme while consciously permitting larger extents to get out of the operation of the scheme on considerations other than what is contemplated under the BDA Act and Rules and the knee jerk manner in which the scheme is sought to be implemented in respect of small extents of land, particularly, parcels of land which most of the petitioners have acquired after long lapse of the publication of the final notification under section 19(1) of the BDA Act, namely, on and after the year 2004 and after they have constructed houses and are living as in the case of one or two petitioners being the original landowners who have also put up structure for their dwelling purpose and a threat of demolition and dispossession at this point of time after having given an impression that the BDA had abandoned the scheme in respect of the areas where the scheme is not implemented nor had even begun, are all factors sufficient to invalidate the scheme. More so, when the interval between the date of issue of the final notification by the State Government under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act and even as on today when the scheme is not at all implemented, leave alone being in a substantial manner getting caught in the vice of the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act resulting in denuding the State and the BDA from exercising the power of taking possession of the rest of the land which had not been taken possession of by the acquiring authority hitherto, are all urged to be circumstances, factors and justifiable legal grounds for eliciting the relief sought for by writ petitioners in their petitions. 12. 12. It is also urged that issue of award notices dated 12-4-2010 under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘LA Act’), calling upon the landowners to be present at the subject land on 20-4-2010 for the purpose of handing over possession of the land, failing which the land along with the structures on it will be taken possession of by the Land Acquisition Officer in terms of Section 16 of the LA Act etc., are also sought for being quashed on the premise that it is without authority of law, without jurisdiction as in the wake of the operation of Section 27 of the BDA Act on and after the expiry of period of five years from the date of issue of final notification and even as admittedly the BDA had not implemented the scheme in a substantial manner within a period of five years from the date of issue of final notification and in fact in respect of subject lands wherein petitioners have claimed interest, the BDA having not even taken possession of the land, there is no way of the Land Acquisition Officer calling in aid the provisions of LA Act for either making an award or for issuing notices under Section 12(2) of the LA Act and therefore the award as well as the notices for handing over possession are all sought to be quashed as one without the authority of law. 13. Petition pleadings were permitted to be amended though towards the fag end of the hearing on 5-7-2011 orders were passed in Misc.W.No.9570 of 2011 for amendment as it was submitted at the Bar that it is only to seek additional prayer in the wake of certain developments such as the respondents passing award in respect of the land in which petitioners have interest, only in the year 2010 as indicated in the award notice dated 12-4-2010 and though copy of the same has already been produced as Annexure-U to the main writ petitions, petitioners not having sought for corresponding prayer to quash this award notice, it has become necessary for the petitioners to seek additional prayer through the amendment. 14. 14. The first respondent-State has neither filed any statement of objections nor evinced much interest in defending the proceedings though is the architect of the final notification, but being content with the respondents 2 and 3 defending the petition through their Counsel, particularly, as the third respondent-the Special Land Acquisition Officer though an official of the State Government, his services being exclusively placed at the disposal of the Bangalore Development Authority even while he was conferred with the powers of the State under the BDA Act by delegating such powers on him. 15. Statement of objections have been filed on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 on the main petitions and even on the application for amendment. 16. Respondents 2 and 3 have firstly urged that the writ petitions are to be dismissed at the threshold as they have no locus standi to question the acquisition proceedings, particularly, being persons who claim to be purchasers during the acquisition proceedings and being not landowners in whose name had been issued the preliminary notification. 17. Respondents have also urged that the writ petitions are to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as the acquisition proceedings initiated in terms of the preliminary notification dated 23-3-1988 and final notification dated 19-10-1994 are sought to be challenged in the writ petitions filed twenty-two years thereafter and therefore also writ petitions should be dismissed on the ground of delay. 18. It is urged that some of the landowners had approached this Court earlier by filing Writ Petition No.4810 of 1995 and this Court though allowed such petitions as per order dated 22-9-1997 insofar as it related to final notification issued under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act is concerned, nevertheless, having reserved liberty to continue the acquisition proceedings after seeking sanction from the Government and the Government having approved such sanction under Section 19(3) of the BDA Act as per Government Order No. UDD 434 MNH 1997, dated 12-9-1997, the second final notification came to be issue on 5-4-1999 and thereafter notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the LA Act had been issued on 8-6-1999. 19. 19. It is also urged that another writ petition filed by one of the landowners in W.P.No.3334 of 2000 came to be ordered on 8-7-2002 with this Court quashing the group housing scheme which had been permitting in respect of the extent of 1 acre 37 guntas in Sy.No.30 which was amongst the lands notified for acquisition by the BDA and thereafter the Land Acquisition Officer had passed an award on 25-1-2010 in respect of the entire extent of Sy.No.30 measuring 8 acres 20 guntas and while copy of this award is produced along with the statement of objections as Annexure-R1, the notices issued under Section 12(2) of the LA Act apprising the landowners of making of award and fixing date for taking possession produced as Annexure-U to the writ petitions was followed up by action under Section 16 of the LA Act and taking of possession of the land is evidenced as per mahazar dated 20-4-2010 drawn in the presence of witnesses, is claimed to be the proof of the land being in possession of the BDA and copy of the spot mahazar is annexed to the statement of objections as Annexure-R2. 20. It is also claimed that in view of the disputes relating to the distribution of compensation and with no one responding to the notice issued under Section 12(2) of the LA Act for proving their title and claiming possession, the BDA has decided to deposit the compensation amount before the Civil Court for distribution to the landowners after claims are adjudicated under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the LA Act. It is therefore claimed that the entire acquisition proceedings having been completed in respect of the extent of 8 acres 20 guntas in Sy.No.30 of Kothanur Village as per Annexure-R2 and the land in turn having been handed over to the Engineering section of the BDA for formation of the layout, the writ petitions filed the year 2010 after all such events and on the basis of the sale deeds said to have been executed during the years 2004 and 2005 cannot fetch any relief to the petitioners in these petitions; that lack of diligence and letharginess cannot be ground for seeking relief in the writ petitions and therefore writ petitions only deserve to be dismissed. 21. 21. The version of the writ petitioners that the scheme had lapsed or understood to have been abandoned is countered as not correct as the respondents have been quite prompt in not only initiating the proceedings for acquisition, but taking it to its logical end and the delay if any being only due to the pendency of the cases before the Courts and interference through stay orders passed by the Court; there cannot be any adverse order against the BDA as the BDA was bona fide implementing the scheme and therefore the relief in the writ petitions cannot be granted and the writ petitions to be dismissed. 22. In the objections to the amended prayer, it is urged that there was no deliberate or intentional delay caused in passing the award; that the circumstances why the award came to be passed only on 25-1-2010 is mentioned in the award itself; that the acquisition proceedings has not lapsed, but even prima facie they are not entitled to either prayer in the main petitions or prayer sought for through amendment to the writ petitions, particularly, for quashing of the award and therefore has urged for dismissal of the writ petitions. 23. In the background of such pleadings, writ petitions were heard for disposal and I have heard Sri K. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri R. Omkumar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for first respondent-State and Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3. 24. Arguments are spread over several days and have been quite elaborate. 23. In the background of such pleadings, writ petitions were heard for disposal and I have heard Sri K. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri R. Omkumar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for first respondent-State and Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3. 24. Arguments are spread over several days and have been quite elaborate. Primary contentions urged on behalf of the writ petitioners is that the writ petitioners have sufficient locus to question the legality of the acquisition proceedings insofar as it relates to the subject land in Sy.No.30 and in respect of the extent or parcels of land which the writ petitioners have purchased from the erstwhile owners or their successors during the years 2004 and 2005 when there was absolute inaction on the part of the BDA in the matter of implementation of the scheme; that a lull of this nature in the wake of some writ petitions at the instance of the owners having been allowed by the High Court and the final notification having come to be quashed, only gave an impression to the writ petitioners that the BDA had abandoned the scheme, more so, when the BDA had remained inactive for a long interval when large number of private residential units mushroomed in the area and with the Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue District granting permission to such purchasers for using the land to construct residential units i.e., for non-agricultural purposes and in the wake of such factual developments, petitioners bona fides have purchased subject lands and have put up construction and some of them are living there and the BDA coming up with an award in the year 2010 and award notices being issued during April 2010 (copy at Annexure-U) is nothing short of an illegal action without bona fides and without jurisdiction and therefore it can neither be stated that the petitioners have no locus standi to question the acquisition proceedings nor to contend that the petitioners are not entitled to seek for relief consequential to the operation of the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act which imposes an outer limit of five years from the date of issue of the final notification for substantial implementation of the scheme. 25. Mr. 25. Mr. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners has very vehemently urged that if one should look at the progress of the acquisition proceedings which began way back in the year 1988 and which is still not completed and with the acquisition proceedings which had begun with a scheme covering an extent of 1009 acres 14 guntas and even an extent 55 acres 5 guntas of land being given up/deleted as per order dated 15-11-2000 (copy at Annexure-S) and with further deletion of an extent of 3 acres 32 guntas on 17-3-2007 (copy at Annexure-W) and ultimately the award having been passed only in respect of Sy.No.30 of Kothanur Village (copy at Annexure-U) the acquisition proceedings and even taking of possession of the land can never be characterised as substantial implementation of the scheme within a period of five years from the date of issue of final notification as is required under Section 27 of the BDA Act and therefore obviously the scheme lapses and the petitioners who had without any hassle purchased the land under the bona fide impression that it was available to the landowners for sale in view of the abandonment of the scheme by the BDA and when they were never objected to or obstructed by anyone from constructing residential units and are peaceful occupying the land and the buildings hitherto, as no semblance of any resistance was experienced by the petitioners hitherto, but an adverse action came to the notice of the petitioners for the first time only when the BDA sought to dispossess petitioners from their land and buildings, by use of force as on 20-8-2010 even without the possession of the land having been actually taken over on the spot from the petitioners and it was in this background petitioners having approached this Court for relief, when they are facing threat of demolition of their dwelling units, it can never be said that the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, but on the other hand, petitioners are fully entitled for relief in accordance with law and at any rate, have sufficient locus to question the illegal activities of the respondent-BDA and for invoking certiorari jurisdiction of this Court against such illegalities. 26. 26. It is also urged that the local Panchayat authorities approving the layout formed in Sy.No.30 of Kothanur Village on 12-3-2004 following the permission for conversion to non-agricultural use on 20-2-2004 issued by the revenue authorities and the receipt of betterment charges by the City Municipal Council, Bommanahalli in the year 2005 as per Annexure-A24, A49, A65, etc., and with some of the petitioners purchasing sites formed in the layout after the land had been converted and with the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike also having issued khatas in favour of some of the petitioners during the year 2008, petitioners have acquired sufficient rights to seek for protection from the illegal activities on the part of the respondent-BDA to prevent it from trampling upon their property rights and therefore submits that examination of the actions on the part of the respondents for the legality and sustainability of the same cannot be declined on the ground of writ petitioners being persons who have acquired interest during the acquisition proceedings. 27. In support of the submission that a scheme of this nature lapses due to non-implementation of the scheme in a substantial manner within the time stipulation of five years from the date of publication in the Official Gazette of declaration under subsection (1) of Section 19 of the BDA Act, Mr. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Private Limited v Bangalore Development Authority and Others ( (2011)3 SCC 139 ), which in turn is a decision following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Girnar Traders v State of Maharashtra ( (2011) 3 SCC 1 ), which was a decision involving interpretation of the provisions of Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and particular reference and reliance is placed on the contents of paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings case, reading as under: “26. The next relevant provision for our purpose, which is of significance, is Section 27 of the BDA Act which reads as under: “27. The next relevant provision for our purpose, which is of significance, is Section 27 of the BDA Act which reads as under: “27. Authority to execute the scheme within five years.- Where within a period of five years from the date of the publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19, the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative”. It places an obligation upon the authority to complete the scheme within a period of five years and if the scheme is not substantially carried out within that period, it shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative i.e., this is a provision which provides for serious consequences in the event the requisite steps are not taken within the specified time. 27. Section 30 of the BDA Act provides that the streets, which are completed under the scheme, shall vest in the Corporation as well as the open spaces as per Section 30(2). The disputes, if any, between the authority and the Corporation in respect of Section 30 (1) and 30(2) are to be referred for determination to the Government whose decision shall be final. Section 31 of the BDA Act puts a rider on the right of the authority to sell or otherwise dispose of sites”. The disputes, if any, between the authority and the Corporation in respect of Section 30 (1) and 30(2) are to be referred for determination to the Government whose decision shall be final. Section 31 of the BDA Act puts a rider on the right of the authority to sell or otherwise dispose of sites”. and submission is that the scheme as stipulated in Section 27 of the BDA Act should not only be implemented within a period of five years, but it should also be an implementation which is in substantial compliance with the scheme as originally framed by the BDA or as modified or amended after examining the objections/opposition to the proposal to acquire in terms of the preliminary notification and also draws attention to the provisions of Section 27 of the erstwhile City Improvement Trust Board Act which is a provision corresponding to the present Section 36 of the BDA Act which provision of law is referred to in Section 27 of the BDA Act to submit that a compulsory acquisition of land even under the BDA Act cannot be achieved by availment of the provisions of the BDA Act alone, but it has to be necessarily supplemented by the provisions of the LA Act insofar as they are necessary, particularly, for taking further action under the BDA Act once stage of publication of the declaration about the satisfaction of the State Government for acquiring the land for the purpose of the scheme proposed by the BDA is over as per the provisions of Section 19 of the BDA Act and therefore submits that even assuming for argument sake that the provisions of Section 11-A of the LA Act is not per se attracted for invalidating the awards made in the year 2010, non-implementation of the scheme substantially within the period mentioned in Section 27 of the City Improvement Trust Board Act, then the provision of law operates and with the provisions of Section 36 of the BDA Act springing into action after the period of five years from the date of issue of the publication of the declaration by the State Government made under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act and the State Government and the BDA being denuded of the power to act further for acquisition of land by calling in aid, the powers available under the LA Act on and after the stage of publication under Section 6 of the LA Act is reached and with the lapsing of the scheme, all things revert to their original status as prevailed prior to the acquisition proceedings i.e., prior to the issue of the preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act and therefore submits that neither the State Government nor the BDA has any power to take possession of the subject land and the building in the occupation of the petitioners and if the respondents are permitted to take such adverse action against the petitioners, it will virtually amount to encouraging lawlessness and to prevent respondents from indulging in such exercise, acquisition proceedings have to be inevitably quashed by this Court. 28. Mr. Suman also submits that non-implementation of the original scheme in a substantial manner within a period of five years from the date of issue of the final notification as contemplated under Section 27 of the BDA Act is very obvious as even in the year 2010, the respondents were busy making awards which meant they have not yet taken possession of the land and if the BDA had not even taken possession of the land, the question of implementation of the scheme in nay manner or to any extent is more imaginary and hypothetical than real and therefore there is in fact no substantial implementation of the scheme within the permitted statutory period. 29. Further submission of Sri Suman, learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners is that any power vested in the BDA is for proper exercise of power within the reasonable time and on the relevant considerations, but passing of awards after lapse of ten years and seven months from the date of issue of the final notification under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act is nothing but an unreasonable, arbitrary exercise of power and in support of such submission has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mansaram v S.P. Pathak and Others ( AIR 1983 SC 1239 : (1984)1 SCC 125 ) and has referred to paragraph 12 of this judgment following in the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v Patel Raghav Natha and Others ( AIR 1969 SC 1297 : (1969) 2 SCC 187 ). 30. 30. In Mansaram’s case, the Supreme Court found fault with an order passed by the House Allotment Officer to act adverse to the interest of a tenant whose initial entry though was not under an order of allotment and was therefore illegal but to act after lapse of 22 years of the initial entry being characterised as an unreasonable exercise of power, being a power not exercised within a reasonable time but being called in aid after the nexus and relevance for the exercise of power had been long lost due to the intervening period of about 22 years during which the status of the person whose initial entry was per se illegal, having been recognised and accepted as that of a tenant by the landlord, not merely permitting him to remain in possession and so also the House Allotment Officer, but the landlord also accepting rent from the occupant as a tenant and seeking periodic enhancement and even permitting legal heirs to be in occupation after the death of the initial occupation etc. 31. The Supreme Court relying upon Patel Reghav Natha’s case to buttress its view in Mansaram’s case by pointing out that as to how Court viewed the exercise of suo motu revisional power by the Commissioner under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1897 after expiry of one year was held to be an unreasonable exercise of the revisional power even in the absence of any prescribed period of limitation and therefore submits on same analogy the Special Land Acquisition Officer acting to pass award in the year 2010 and for taking up follow up action to possess the land are all actions which are instances of unreasonable exercise of power, power being exercised after long lapse of time and delay. 32. 32. The view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chand and Others v Union of India and Others and Ved Prakash and Others v Union of India and Others ( (1994) 1 SCC 44 ), expressed in the context of the awards being not passed within a reasonable time after issue of the final notification under Section 6 of the LA Act being characterised as exercise of power beyond reasonable time even prior to introduction of Section 11-A of the LA Act in the statute book as instance to submit that passing of awards at different points of time in respect of same preliminary notification will virtually lead to an act of discrimination on the part of the public authority as owners of land sought to be acquired while are not compensated within a reasonable time on payment/compensation being forthcoming only after passing of the award and if compensation is not paid within a reasonable time, with the compensation amount being pegged down in the market value on the date of preliminary notification under Section 4 of the LA Act, it is a clear case of arbitrary exercise of power and therefore also submits that in the present case, the acquisition proceedings are to be quashed with the lapse of the scheme. 33. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chand and in particular to paragraph 6 and 7 of this judgment which reads as under: “6. In the case of State of Gujarat v Patel Reghav Natha, AIR 1969 SC 1267 , it was considered whether in a statute, if for exercise of the power, no time-limit has been fixed, the authority, who has to exercise such power, can exercise the same at any time. It was said: (SCC p. 193, para 11) “The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised”. Same view was reiterated in the case of Mansaram v S.P. Pathak, AIR 1983 SC 1239 . Same view was reiterated in the case of Mansaram v S.P. Pathak, AIR 1983 SC 1239 . It was said: (SCC p. 136, para 12) “But as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time”. 7. In connection with a land acquisition proceeding itself, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v Vishnu Prasad Sharma and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1593 , where a grievance had been made in respect of delay in issuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, after issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, it was pointed out: “It is clear from this intimate connection between Sections 4, 5-A and 6 that as soon as the Government has made up its mind what particular land out of the locality it require, it has to issue a declaration under Section 6 to that effect””. 34. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of BEML Employees House Building Co-operative Society Limited v State of Karnataka (2005(1) Kar.L.J.37 (SC): AIR 2004 SC 5054 : (2005)9 SCC 248 ) and special attention is drawn to contents of paragraph 7 of this judgment which reads as under: “7. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that whatever be the recommendations of the Land Acquisition Officer in his report under Section 5-A, they were merely recommendations and the State Government was not bound to accept them. The State Government had wide discretion to accept or reject the said report under Section 5-A of the Act and take independent decision to continue or discontinue the acquisition proceedings in respect of any particular land proposed to be acquired. Wide, the discretion may be; but, not wild. All exercise of statutory discretion must be based on reasonable grounds and cannot lapse into arbitrariness or caprice which is anathema to the Rule of law envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution. The facts placed on record do not indicate that the case of the fifth respondent was similar, if not identical, to that of the other landowners, whose lands were dropped from the acquisition proceedings. The facts placed on record do not indicate that the case of the fifth respondent was similar, if not identical, to that of the other landowners, whose lands were dropped from the acquisition proceedings. Neither the appellant, nor the State Government has been able to show us any rational distinction between the case of the fifth respondent and the cases of the other landowners, whose lands were excluded from the acquisition. When this is so, it appears to us that the vice of hostile discrimination infects and vitiates the decision taken by the State Government to continue with the acquisition against the fifth respondent’s land”. yetagain to indicate that any power including discretionary power should be exercised in a reasonable manner and not in an arbitrary manner which per se violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 35. Mr. yetagain to indicate that any power including discretionary power should be exercised in a reasonable manner and not in an arbitrary manner which per se violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 35. Mr. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners would draw attention on the manner of the progress of acquisition proceedings by submitting that the act of the State Government in issuing notification under Section 48 of the L.A. Act, withdrawing the very acquisition proceedings in respect of an extent of 3 acres 32 guntas of land as per Notification dated 17-3-2007 and further incompatible action of the State Government/BDA in handing over large extent of 55 acres 5 guntas to private landowners and their common general power of attorney holder/developer to develop this large extent of land in a manner at variance with the scheme as noted by the BDA originally and thereafter leaving only an extent of 64 acres for implementation of the scheme from out of large extent of 1009 acres 14 guntas of land in respect of which extent of land the scheme was formulated and the final notification under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act being a mockery of the scheme as per the preliminary notification and the scheme envisaged therein but restricting the notification of the land to 123 acres 29 guntas and further deletion/withdrawal from this extent of land, but passing an award only in respect of certain extent of land in Sy.No.30 of Kothanur Village is nothing short of gross arbitrary exercise of statutory power and also a mockery of the original scheme and even assuming for argument sake some action has been taken in respect of this extent of land located in Sy.No.30 or if it is so asserted by the BDA, it is of no consequence in law; that the inordinate delay of eleven years even to pass awards after the issue of the final notification has not only totally vitiated the acquisition proceedings, but also has paved the way for operation of Section 27 of the BDA Act and with the scheme lapsing, things reverting to the status ante, petitioners are as a matter of right entitled to seek protection from this Court invoking writ jurisdiction and relief necessarily be granted if not as sought for in the prayer in the writ petition, but as available in law to the writ petitioners and therefore urges the writ petitions should be allowed. 36. Mr. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners also submits that while there are instances of Courts not interfering with the acquisition proceedings where the delay had been properly explained as in the cases of M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v District Board, Bhojpur and Others ( AIR 1993 SC 802 : (1992) 2 SCC 598 ) and Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative Society v V. Chandrappa and Others (2007 (2) Kar.L.J.541 (SC): ILR 2007 Kar.1810 (SC): AIR 2007 SC 1151 : (2007) 9 SCC 304 ), where delay of 12 years and 11 years respectively had been properly explained by the acquiring authority, submission in the present case is that no explanation leave alone worthwhile explanation is forthcoming; that exercise of power being most unreasonable and the manner of implementation of the original scheme being an apology to the scheme as propounded initially, it should necessarily be taken as entire scheme has lapsed and necessary relief extended to the writ petitioners. 37. Countering such submissions, Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 has as noticed earlier raised preliminary objections about the maintainability of the very writ petitions on the ground that the writ petitioners being persons who admittedly are purchasers of land subsequent to the issue of the acquisition notifications; that they have no locus standi to question the acquisition proceedings and therefore the writ petitions should be dismissed in limine. 38. In support of such submission, Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 has placed strong reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Poornaprajna House Building Co-operative Society, Bangalore v Bailamma alias Doda Bailamma and Others (1998(3) Kar.L.J.304 (FB): ILR 1998 Kar.1441 (FB)) (paragraph 28) and also the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy and Others v Bangalore Development Authority and Others (2010 (5) Kar.L.J.177(SC): (2010) 7 SCC 129 ), particularly, observations as contained in paragraph 144 of this judgment to meet the argument regarding the manner of exercise of power by the State and the BDA virtually amounts to public authorities indulging in discrimination. 39. 39. It is also the submission of Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 that substantial extent of land in the area belongs to the State Government and therefore there was no need to pass awards or go in for separate acquisition proceedings; that the implementation of the scheme is not merely in a small extent of 9 acres of land in which petitioners have claimed ownership of interest, but actual land available to the BDA for implementation of the scheme is a much larger extent and therefore it will be in the larger public interest to permit the BDA to implement the scheme even in a truncated manner, particularly, as the BDA has already invested time, effort and also in terms of the resources and developmental work having already been undertaken in some parts of the land notified for acquisition and implementation of the scheme. 40. It is also the submission of Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 that with the BDA being prepared to examine suitable alternatives for alleviating the sufferings of the landowners, particularly, by the BDA taking cue from the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 144 and 145 of the Bondu Ramaswamy’s case and in this regard placing reliance on the Single Bench decision of this Court dated 4-3-2011 rendered in batch of Writ Petitions No.32652 of 2010 connected with W.P.No.26849 of 2010 and connected cases in the case of H.A. Balaji and Others v State of Karnataka and Others (2011(4) Kar.L.J.525), whereunder this Court had ensured a better compensation being paid to the landowners because of the delay in implementation of project by declaring that the writ petitioners are entitled for additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value as determined, submission on behalf of the BDA is that such possibilities can be examined and ordered in the case of present writ petitioners also, particularly, as it can serve the larger public interest as against the private interest of the writ petitioners. 41. 41. It is also the submissions of Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 that the delay in the present cases being not intentional or deliberate on the part of the BDA in implementation and completion of the scheme, it is a fit case for overlooking the delay as had been done in Poornaprajna’s case not only by this Court but also by the Supreme Court in similar cases and for this reason also urges that the delay in implementation of the scheme should not be made a ground for either quashing the acquisition proceedings or for concluding that the scheme has lapsed in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act. 42. However, Mr. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the ratio or any principle of law, if any, as is to be traced in either Poornaprajna’s case or Bondu Ramaswamy’s case are based on facts, particularly, of those cases; that no general principle of law had emerged and at any rate, the ratio if any in these cases are not applicable to the present situation, particularly, as the subject land of the petitioners which was in fact been built up substantially and are being used for residential accommodation by the writ petitioners being surrounded by land developed not by the BDA, but by other private builders, land developers and societies, permitting the BDA to implement the scheme in a totally truncated manner only in respect of subject land wherein petitioners have interest will be nothing short of permitting the BDA to indulge in gross discriminatory act and therefore the acquisition proceedings necessarily be quashed with the lapse of the scheme. 43. 43. By drawing attention to paragraph 128 of Bondu Ramaswamy’s case, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that if such is the declaration of law by the Supreme Court as contained in this paragraph, the entire acquisition proceedings will have to be quashed by this Court as per ratio that emerges from a reading of this paragraph in the judgment of the Supreme Court which according to the learned Counsel for the petitioners is in consonance with paragraphs 26 and 27 of Offshore Holdings case and submits that the petitioners being persons who, in fact, got into possession of the land and acquired interest after the lapse of the scheme in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act, neither any delay or laches can be put against them nor the preliminary objection of maintainability of the writ petitions can be pressed into service in such facts and circumstances to non-suit the petitioners from claiming reliefs and submits that the writ petitioners have sufficient locus and interest in the subject-matter and therefore writ petitions should necessarily be allowed. 44. It is also submitted that Section 27 being a part of the BDA Act and with a definite purpose and time stipulation being statutory, there is no scope for extending or relaxing the upper time-limit of five years prescribed for substantial implementation of a scheme and when even admittedly there is no substantial execution of the scheme, even after a long lapse of 23 years from the date of issue of preliminary notification and 11 years after the date of publication of the final notification, the scheme is one which has inevitably lapsed due to non-implementation of the scheme in a substantial manner as is required under Section 27 of the BDA Act and therefore has urged for allowing the writ petitions to pass suitable orders to protect the interest of the writ petitioners from the tyrannical manner of exercise of power and authority by the respondents. 45. It is in the light of such pleadings, submissions made at the Bar, factual and legal contentions raised in the background of developments hitherto, these writ petitions present themselves for examination and decision. 46. 45. It is in the light of such pleadings, submissions made at the Bar, factual and legal contentions raised in the background of developments hitherto, these writ petitions present themselves for examination and decision. 46. One preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents is about the maintainability of the writ petitions with the writ petitioners being persons who admittedly claim to have acquired interest in the subject land which was already subject-matter of acquisition proceedings as initiated in the year 1988, to be precise as per preliminary notification dated 23-3-1988, published under Section 17(1) of the BDA Act and admittedly most of them barring a few who claim interest as landowners having purchased bits and pieces of subject lands. 47. If this argument is to be examined seriously, petitioners should be categorised to be belonging to different categories, one category wherein figures original landowners who have also questioned the action on the part of the respondents and the petitioners who are subsequent purchasers in respect of whom the preliminary objection is raised. 48. Let me first examine a formidable legal impediment for the consideration of these petitions by Sri Shankarnarayana Rao, which is a preliminary objection regarding want of locus on the part of the petitioners to present/maintain these petitions. 49. The preamble to the Constitution of India proclaims.- “We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens: Justice, social, economic and political; Libertyof thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all. Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation; In our constituent assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution”. 50. There has been considerable debate even about the preamble and the object and scope of the preamble. But, the debate got enlarged when the words “Socialist’ and ‘Secular’ were inserted in between the words ‘sovereign…… Democratic Republic’ and the debate revolved around the discussion as to what meaning and what purpose should be attributed to the word ‘socialist’ and in what manner it impacts the understanding and the interpretation of the rest of the provisions of the Constitution of India. 51. 51. These words found expression as part of the preamble in the Constitution through the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution given effect of from 3-1-1977. But, a more elaborate expression of the concept of socialism was already available in Part IV of the Constitution of India with the heading ‘directive principles of State policy’. Any policy unless translated into action through an appropriate mechanism or instrumentality is of no sue or no good! So also Part IV of the Constitution. 52. A policy can be effectuated or realised either through administrative orders as part of exercise of executive power of the State or in a more durable and lasting manner by enacting suitable legislation by the Competent Legislature as is expressed in Article 37 of the Constitution of India. 53. Our country being a welfare State and therefore required to promote a social order in which justice, social, economic and political should permeate the functioning of all institutions owned, governed, controlled or financed by the State, has found expression in clause (1) of Article 38 of the Constitution of India which has found its place in the Constitution by way of 44th Amendment Act to the Constitution of the year 1978. A facet of this Article is also embedded into clause (2) of Article 38 of the Constitution of India. 54. One aspect of Article 39 of the Constitution of India is to ensure that ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub-serve the common good. 55. If one should look into the provisions of Parts III and IV of the Constitution in a comprehensive manner, it becomes clear that functioning of the State, governance and the functioning of all institutions which are lesser forms of State like statutory corporations, statutory authorities, statutory boards, municipal bodies and other public institutions, owned, controlled and financed by the State are also ‘State’ for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution as is provided in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 56. In the context of the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, expression ‘State’ assume considerable significance where the rights conferred on citizens and others under Part III of the Constitution of India and the directions contained in Part IV oriented towards the ‘State’, come in for examination. 57. In the context of the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, expression ‘State’ assume considerable significance where the rights conferred on citizens and others under Part III of the Constitution of India and the directions contained in Part IV oriented towards the ‘State’, come in for examination. 57. While Article 14 of the Constitution of India mandates the ‘State’ to extend a like treatment and to provide like opportunities and protections to all persons who are similarly situated, the concept of equality and equal protection before laws as, over a period of time and with some judicial activism on the part of the superior Courts in the country has got expanded and one of the administrative law principles as evolved in England, other European Countries, United States of America and other commonwealth legal systems have all contributed in understanding the ‘fairness’ concept in State action, non-arbitrariness in State action also as a facet of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 58. A combined operation of the preamble to the Constitution of India, Articles in Parts III and IV of the Constitution of India and the interpretation given to Article 14 in Part III will necessarily take one to the situation where one can easily infer that governance by the State whether through its executive functioning or legislative functioning is always for public good for achieving the purpose and object of the Constitution as envisaged in not only the preamble, but also Parts III and IV and to attain the ultimate goal of the country transforming itself into a welfare State. Governance is to provide service to the citizens of the country. 59. State is the biggest service organisation/institution meant for the service of the people of the country and it is a fortiori so in the case of the lesser forms of State though is on par for the purpose of Article 12 and Part III with the ‘State’ such as the statutory bodies, municipal bodies and other organisations and are therefore governed and controlled by the very constitutional provisions to which a State Government or the Central Government is amenable. As expressed by the Supreme Court, the brooding omnipotence of Article 14 is all pervasive and oversees all State actions whether by the Government per se or by the lesser forms of governance in the form of statutory bodies, all have to answer the test of equality and all its actions and orders have to necessarily pass the test of fairness and non-arbitrariness in State action. 60. In this background, it can be readily inferred that any power, any authority conferred on the State and any institution akin to ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is for public good, to sub-serve a public cause and should always be exercised, utilised or enforced in the larger public interest and for ensuring that ultimately our country becomes a welfare state i.e., it becomes a Ramarajya as was visualised by the Father of the Nation. 61. The Bangalore Development Authority – a statutory planning and development authority created under the State Law – Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 is a public institution fitting into the expression ‘State’ and therefore it is imperative that all its actions and orders should be not only fair and non-arbitrary, but also in conformity with the provisions of the BDA Act and the provisions of the Constitution of India, particularly, Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 62. This yardstick is the golden thread that runs through the fabric of judicial review of administrative action and legislative action, when the High Court is exercising writ jurisdiction. The State and all other lesser forms of ‘State’, who are on par with this phrase for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India should all pass this test for coming out unscathed whenever any of their actions, any of their proceedings, any of the orders passed by them are called in question before the High Court in a writ petition, at the instance of an interested person and a proceeding of this nature is more akin to a relator action than resembling an adversary judicial proceedings, as is the case in a dispute between two private persons which may end up in the form of a suit before a Civil Court, for resolution. In an adversary proceedings, while relief is given only to the affected person who alone can come up before the Court, in an action for issue of a writ through the process of judicial review of administrative action or legislative action, focus is more on the manner of functioning of the respondent-State and its authorities, whether it is statute conforming and constitution conforming action or otherwise and not so much in the context of relief being given to the petitioner, at whose instance the examination takes place, but perhaps as a sequel to the examination, such a person may also get some relief, if some action already taken by the public authority is found wanting on applying the test as indicated above or even when a public or a statutory authority is activated into its statutory performance, if have remained inactive, insensitive and irresponsible to the rights of the citizens and even to restrain a public authority from embarking on misadventures and if is about to indulge in an arbitrary, irrational, mindless act by transgressing the limits of law or by assuming power, authority or jurisdiction not so conferred on the authority by the statute itself. 63. In any such proceedings, focus and emphasis is not so much on what perhaps a writ petitioner can get, but more on the manner of functioning of a public authority. 64. The concept of locus for bringing a cause before the Court for scrutiny within the scope of judicial review of administrative action which was a conservative and narrow concept, in the sense, the scrutiny will be only at the instance of the affected person, but here again exception being in a situation warranting issue of writs in the nature of habeas corpus and qua warranto has brought a little more liberal, a little more wider, a little more pervasive approach to the concept of locus and at any rate it was understood in legal and judicial parlance that the concept of public interest litigation paved the way for widening the scope of the expression ‘locus’ for the purpose of either maintaining a writ petition or for seeking relief in writ jurisdiction. 65. 65. Over a period of time, Courts have refrained from throwing out writ petitions at the threshold without examining the merits of a petition, without evaluating the tenability and legality of State action on the touchstone of the statutory and constitutional provisions, but by and large whenever a suspect State action is brought to the notice of the superior Courts, examination of State action within the parameters of judicial review is becoming the norm as a development in the constitutional law in judicial proceedings and writ petition being thrown out at the threshold on the ground of want of sufficient locus on the part of the writ petitioner, is becoming an exception. 66. Courts now perceive that the State, and a public authority should not come up with a defence of want of locus on the part of a writ petitioner to avoid scrutiny by the Courts within the scope of judicial review, but on the other than, the State and the public authority should not feel shy, about the same and should readily answer/meet the allegations and grievances aired in a writ petition and to ultimately satisfy the conscience of the Court about the existence of fairness and non-arbitrariness in its actions and orders. 67. It is in the background of this evolution of the judicial process in writ jurisdiction, not much attention is focussed on the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent-BDA, on the ground of want of locus on the part of the present writ petitioners to examine the actions and orders of the State and the BDA in these writ petitions, but on the other hand, inspite of such preliminary objections, writ petitions were admitted for examination and the State and the BDA were called upon not only to place their versions in answer to the writ petition averments, but also were directed to place before the Court the relevant records to support their respective versions as indicated in the statements. 68. While to press home the preliminary objection, Mr. 68. While to press home the preliminary objection, Mr. Shankaranarayan Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA has placed reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Poornaprajna’s case and this judgment has been rendered following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v Shivkumar Bhargava and Others ( AIR 1995 SC 812 : (1995) 2 SCC 427 : JT 1995(6) SC 274) and based on the principle that it is only a person who was the owner of the subject land at the time of issue of preliminary notification who can either question the legality of the acquisition proceedings or put forth a claim for an alternative land or site if so enabled. The subsequent purchaser will have to be rest content with receiving compensation and even cannot question the acquisition proceedings. 69. This argument is countered by Sri Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners that firstly the conduct of the BDA in allowing the period of lull or complacency during long intervals even while there was lot of construction activity going on around subject survey number and the construction being not in consonance with the scheme propounded by the BDA at variance and even developers of the area being individual private developers and constructors and therefore creating an impression in one and all that the BDA has virtually abandoned its scheme for implementation of ‘Jayaprakash Narayan Nagar VIII Phase’. In the factual plane, the legal position in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act also operate against the BDA as even long after publishing the final notification under Section 29(1) of the BDA Act, the scheme had not been implemented, i.e., much more than five years having elapsed from the date of issue of final notification, by the time the petitioners purchased the sites and therefore the possibility in law being lapsing of the scheme as had been propounded by the BDA, the situation factually and legally being quite different from what was examined and found in Poornaprajna’s case, the ratio of this case is not applicable and on an examination of these rival contentions and on the touchstone of the statutory provisions, I do find the present situation is undoubtedly one where the ratio of the decision as culled out in Poornaprajna’s case or the ratio if any found in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivkumar Bhargava’s case is not attracted and therefore the preliminary objection does not come in the way of examination of the action and orders of the BDA and the State at the instance of the petitioners. 70. One another ground for overruling the preliminary objection is that when admittedly some petitioners are original landowners and vis-a-vis preliminary objection cannot be pressed into service, there is no point in non-suiting other petitioners on the basis of a ratio which is not even attracted in the present facts and circumstances. Therefore, the preliminary objection regarding maintainability is overruled. 71. One another preliminary objection raised on behalf of the BDA is that inordinate delay on the part of the writ petitioners seeking relief before this Court. In this regard, contention of the petitions being hit by delay and laches is not acceptable nor tenable for more than one reason. 72. In the first instance, the writ petitioners have pleaded a live cause of action of the year 2010 when for the first time they faced threat of dispossession from the land and demolition of the constructed dwelling units. 72. In the first instance, the writ petitioners have pleaded a live cause of action of the year 2010 when for the first time they faced threat of dispossession from the land and demolition of the constructed dwelling units. Preliminary objection is not tenable for yet another reason, namely, the challenge per se in these petitions is not so much to the acquisition proceedings but one for seeking relief as a sequel to the operation of the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act to the scheme propounded by the BDA and on related grounds and not per se by way of challenge to the initial acquisition proceedings upto the point of issue of declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act. 73. For the very reason, even the objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the writ petitions are hit by delay and laches is not tenable one as in fact there is no delay, particularly, as the State and the BDA having issued award noticed only during April 2010. 74. Coming to the merits of the contentions urged on behalf of the wit petitioners and to appreciate the same, a reference to the sequence of developments upto now in the form of dates and events will be really useful to understand and appreciate the facts. 75. While preliminary notification dated 23-3-1988 covered an extent of 1009 acres 14 guntas for the purpose of implementation of the scheme propounded by the BDA, the manner in which the final notifications under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act have been issued in phases and in installments and first of such notifications being dated 19-10-1994, second dated 17-9-1997 and third one dated 5-4-1999 and the last declaration being virtually eleven years after the issue of preliminary notification and even after adding the extent of land covered under these three notifications, the area being not even one-fifth of the area of the land originally proposed under the scheme of the BDA, is undoubtedly a give away as to how the scheme of the BDA has gone away if it has to be scaled down to one-fifth of the area originally proposed for implementation. 76. 76. Even after issue of the final declaration, taking out an extent of 55 acres 5 guntas of land from out of 123 acres 29 guntas of land covered by the notification dated 5-4-1999 and issuing a work order in favour of a private developer is yet another blow to the propounded scheme of the BDA and while this was perhaps done by the BDA within its own domain, even the State Government intervening for publishing the notification dated 17-3-2007 invoking the power under Section 48 of the LA Act for withdrawing from the acquisition in respect of an extent of 3 acres 32 guntas of land which had been initially notified in the name of one Badiga son of Muniya, in respect of 2 acres 20 guntas in Sy.No.37/2 and in the name of Giddiga, son of Muniya in Sy.No.38/3, but the notification dated 17-3-2007 making it patent that the notification and the benefit of withdrawal under this in respect of 3 acres 32 guntas of land (copy at Annexure-W to the writ petition) was in favour of one T.N. Subramanya and for whose benefit the State Government is acting to the detriment of not only the BDA required to implement the scheme in a substantial way within five years from the date of the declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act, but also to the chagrin and dismay of other landowners who are left to languish and wonder as to why they are not treated alike or given a like treatment as extended in favour of T.N. Subramanya. A notification under Section 48 of the L.A. Act being issued in the year 2007 in respect of part of the land covered under the acquisition proceedings and needed for implementation of the scheme propounded by the BDA is also a clear indication that the scheme is not yet implemented and at any rate tinkering with the same, mutilating and maligning the scheme and the scheme being torn apart by the pressures extended all round is an inevitable inference to be drawn when one looks at the lethargic and tardy manner in which the State and the BDA have gone about for the purpose of implementation of the scheme propounded by the BDA. 77. 77. Even the periodic diversion of the already depleted extent of land covered under the final declaration and to compound the same, issue of notification under Section 48 of the LA Act which are all developments not merely acting at cross purposes with the scheme for development, but in fact has seriously affected the implementation of the scheme and has virtually damaged the substantial implementation of the scheme as is required under Section 27 of the BDA Act. 78. While Mr. Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings case following its earlier judgment in Girnar Traders case, the only ratio or law as declared in Offshore Holdings case, is to the effect that the BDA Act being a self-contained Code and providing for time stipulations only in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act, neither the provisions of Section 11-A of the LA Act or limiting factors therein are applicable to the acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act nor the examination can be on the touchstone of delay and laches in completing the acquisition proceedings using the time stipulations provided in Section 11-A of the LA Act as a yardstick, the said ratio of the judgment is in no way attracted to the present writ petitions as examination of the validity and legality of the actions of the State and the BDA is not by applying the provisions of Section 11-A of the LA Act, but even as indicated by the Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings case, it is only on the touchstone of the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act, which does prescribe periods of limitation for substantial implementation of the scheme to be within the period of five years from the date of issue of final declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act. 79. In fact, if it is to be examined further and as contended by Sri Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners, the present situation is one which is squarely covered within the scope of law as declared by the Supreme Court in respect of Section 27 of the BDA Act as indicated in paragraphs 26 and 27 in Offshore Holdings case. 80. 80. In fact, reliance placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bondu Ramaswamy’s case on behalf of the respondent-BDA by Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel also does not in any way save the situation for the respondents, particularly, the BDA in the present case as in the first instance there is neither any ratio nor law declared in Bondu Ramaswamy’s case which is to be applied by this Court in the present context for deciding these writ petitions nor constitutes a binding ratio emerging from Bondu Ramaswamy’s case, but on the other hand, the Supreme Court having noticed the anomalies that result due to the improper and irrational manner of working the enactments for compulsory acquisition of private lands for public purposes and the Supreme Court only declining to issue writ of mandamus to the BDA or to grant relief to the petitioners who had sought for like treatment from the State Government as had been meted out to favoured persons even at variance with the scheme and the project and in contravention of the statutory provisions and therefore writ of mandamus was declined. 81. Examination in the present writ petitions is more in the context of the action and orders passed by the State and the BDA whether are one in contravention of the statutory provisions necessitating the exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court for issue of a writ of certiorari. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bondu Ramaswamy’s case, in no way advances the prayer of the respondents for dismissal of the writ petitions. 82. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bondu Ramaswamy’s case, in no way advances the prayer of the respondents for dismissal of the writ petitions. 82. Single Bench decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court H.A. Balaji’s case also is not one containing any ratio and therefore not a precedent, required to be followed or applied, but suffice to observe that the decision does not commend for acceptance for a like action in the wake of statutory provisions governing the provisions and also for the reason that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not enabled to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, even by way of emulating an action taken by the Supreme Court or for passing like orders as was passed by the Supreme Court in exercise of its constitutional power, as it is a power exclusively conferred on the Supreme Court, but High Courts cannot in any manner exercise that power or call in aid such orders of the Supreme Court and pass orders on the analogy of the Supreme Court exercising such powers and passing orders. 83. The High Court can only and should apply law as declared by the Supreme Court, within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and also to apply the ratio of a judgment, if it is found that facts of any particular case does attract such ratio, as the judgment of the Supreme Court constitutes a binding precedent on the High Court, but nothing more. 84. While the fact situation relating to the acquisition proceedings such as preliminary notification being dated 23-3-1988 and final notifications being in terms of two notifications dated 19-10-1994 and 5-4-1999 are not in dispute and at any rate insofar as the subject land located in Sy.No.30 measuring an extent of 3 acres 6 guntas of land in Kothanur Village, Uttarhalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk is not in doubt or dispute and with the further development, namely, issue of making of the award on 25-1-2010 and the subsequent issue of notice under Section 12(2) of the LA Act dated 12-4-2010 are also not in dispute. These undisputed factual position inevitably leads to an inference that the substantial implementation of the scheme within a period of five years from the date of issue of final notification i.e., even from 5-4-1999, inevitably the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act apply to the fact situation and in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act, the scheme lapses. The factual position with the two final notifications put together covering only an extent of 123 acres 29 guntas of land as against the extent of 1009 acres 14 guntas proposed for acquisition for implementation of the scheme as had been published under the preliminary notification of the year 1988 and with the further fact that even after lapse of five years from the date of issue of the final notification in the year 1999, nothing had happened towards implementation of the scheme and combined understanding of such factual position inevitably leads to legal inference of not merely a failure of the implementation of the scheme but a failure of implementation of the scheme in a substantial manner. 85. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that a scheme which originally contemplated an extent of 1009 acres of land for its implementation if is left with far lesser extent of 123 acres 29 guntas of land and even assuming that in the entire extent of this land, the scheme is sought to be implemented, such implementation definitely is no substantial implementation of the scheme. To compound this failure, even from out of 123 acres 29 guntas of land if further extent of 55 acres 5 guntas is taken out and handed over to a private developer for formation of a layout at variance with the initial scheme, the Government also aggravates the situation by issuing a notification under Section 48 of the LA Act to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings in respect of an extent of 3 acres 32 guntas of land (copy at Annexure-W) even while the respondents in the present writ petition have been clambering that the scheme can be implemented in a truncated manner or it amounts to substantial implementation of the scheme to avoid the applicability of Section 27 of the BDA Act. 86. 86. It is nothing but an illusion on the part of the State and the BDA either to contend that the scheme has been substantially implemented or that Section 27 of the BDA Act is not attracted, but on the other hand, even to this day, the BDA has not placed before this Court any material to indicate as to in what manner the scheme had been redrafted or revised to implement the original scheme even in a truncated manner and as to what developments have taken place in this direction until now. 87. Perhaps taking possession and handing over possession to the Engineering Department of the BDA could have been contended to be a development to understand as substantial implementation of the scheme, if in fact, the extent of land handed over in favour of the Engineering Department for further development was a substantial extent of land area-wise vis-a-vis extent of lands as was proposed in the scheme and for execution of the scheme in terms of the preliminary notification, but this factual position also being not made good in the present writ petitions, the arguments to sustain the scheme on the basis of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bondu Ramaswamy’s case cannot be pressed into service but even the so-called handing over possession of some extent of land to the Engineering department of the BDA for further development being not a substantial extent of land as had been originally planned for implementation of the scheme, but a poor fraction of the extent of land as had been originally indicated in the preliminary notification, reliance on the said judgment is of no avail to save the scheme from the vice of the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act. 88. It is only because learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA is also acutely aware of the legal position, Mr. Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA has very strongly urged that the writ petitioners have no locus to maintain the petitions and therefore the writ petitions should be dismissed in limine without going into the manner of implementation of the scheme or record of the BDA which have already been noticed and rejected. 89. Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA has very strongly urged that the writ petitioners have no locus to maintain the petitions and therefore the writ petitions should be dismissed in limine without going into the manner of implementation of the scheme or record of the BDA which have already been noticed and rejected. 89. Even the argument of there being no deliberate or negligent conduct on the part of the BDA for implementation of the scheme, but on the other hand, the delay if any in the implementation of the scheme being not only due to the pendency of a good number of writ petitions before this Court and related stay orders granted by the Courts at the instance of some of the landowners, but also due to the various practical difficulties encountered by the BDA and the acquiring authority in taking possession of the subject lands, on the basis of the observations as contained in Bondu Ramasawamy’s case and to save the larger public interest there is no need for quashing the acquisition proceedings even assuming that the scheme has lapsed due to the operation of Section 27 of the BDA but on the other hand the BDA should be permitted to implement the scheme even in a truncated manner etc., is not an argument made good either on law or in facts and circumstances of the case by placing commensurate material before this Court and therefore this argument is not tenable and only deserves to be rejected. 90. 90. Insofar as the acquisition proceedings are concerned, even on admitted facts and by the operation of Section 27 of the BDA Act, if the scheme has lapsed even before the stage of the lands notified for acquisition vesting in the State and taking possession of the subject land after the passing of the award had not been reached, it is obvious that the acquisition proceedings get aborted due to the scheme lapsing and if the subject land notified for acquisition had not vested in the State within a period of five years from the date of issue of the final notification a period within which the scheme is required to be implemented substantially to avoid the scheme lapsing in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act, in law even assuming for argument sake, award is passed, possession is taken after expiry of this period as a matter of fact under the enabling provisions of Section 11 of the LA Act to pass an award and the further enabling provision of Section 16 of the LA Act for taking possession of the subject land also, but these statutory provisions being not available to the state and the BDA any more due to Section 27 of the Act whereafter alone the land vests absolutely in the Government in the wake of Section 36 of the BDA Act and if there is no way in law to take the acquisition proceedings also to its logical conclusion as the original purpose of acquisition itself is lost, it is obvious this is a situation attracting legal consequence of not only the scheme lapsing but also the acquisition proceedings lapsing. 91. 91. It is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the acquisition proceedings being quashed at any stage of the acquisition proceeding due to non-adherence of the statutory provisions and the procedure and a situation of the acquisition proceedings per se lapsing due to the scheme lapsing in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act and by that time if the acquisition proceedings having not been completed and therefore the acquisition proceedings being left midway without completion and when the matter is before the Court for examination at the instance of persons claiming interest in the subject lands, by a sense of fairness, by a duty to act in a constitutional manner, a duty to ensure that the State and public bodies which is the ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India abide by the constitutional provisions and statutory provisions and do not give scope for discriminatory act in respect of some persons who are situated in a like position as others, this Court is compelled to exercise its constitutional writ jurisdiction for quashing the proceedings and the orders of the State and the authorities akin to the State which are left incomplete, and which do not serve any purpose any more leave alone serving a public purpose and therefore writ of certiorari should be issued to put an end to this ‘Trishanku’ stage of acquisition proceedings by quashing the incomplete acquisition proceedings. 92. 92. In the present situation, on an overall examination of the fact situation and the legal consequences, I am of the clear view that the ratio as is to be inferred in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings case and Girnar Traders case and to apply that ratio in this case does not arise, as the present case is not one which is requires to be decided on the application of the provisions of Section 11-A of the LA Act nor have the petitioners based their case for examination on such premise or contentions, but on the other hand, petitioners are only canvassing for the consequence that should ensure in the wake of the operation of Section 27 of the BDA Act and even the ratio of Girnar Traders case being to the effect that on the lapsing of a scheme the lands which had already vested in the State does not automatically get divested, also being not applicable as vesting in the State had not taken place at all in the case of subject lands involved in the writ petitions, due to the scheme lapsing even before vesting had taken place. There is no way for saving the acquisition proceedings either on the fact situation or on the possibilities as exists in law and therefore the writ petitions have to be inevitably allowed. 93. Hearing of the case was concluded on 6-7-2011, as reflected in the following order passed by this Court on that date: Sri Diwakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed before the Court the amendment writ petition, and submits that copies of amended petition have been furnished to all other Counsel. Sri Shivakumar, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA submits that statement of objections filed on 24-5-2011 is good enough in respect of the amended petition also. Matter has been fully heard as submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the petitioner. However, Sri R. Omkumar, learned AGA, adds that factually speaking, the transaction under which writ petitioner claims to have acquired right, title and interest in the subject land under acquisition is after a period of four years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act. However, Sri R. Omkumar, learned AGA, adds that factually speaking, the transaction under which writ petitioner claims to have acquired right, title and interest in the subject land under acquisition is after a period of four years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act. Also submits that even conversion order that had been granted in favour of vendor of petitioner was a conditional one, subject to the condition that conversion will enure to the benefit of the person seeking for only if any acquisition proceedings are not in vogue and further subject to the condition that the applicant should obtain sanction for the layout plan from the BDA in respect of the land permitted for non-agricultural use. Therefore, learned AGA submits that the writ petitioner having not adhered to the conditions and in fact having indulged in violations of statutory provisions and also in circumvention of the conditions imposed on the vendor of petitioner at the time of granting permission and therefore there is no need to examine the cause of the petitioner in these writ petitions for the purpose of acquisition proceedings and urges for dismissal; of the writ petitions. Reserved for consideration and passing order”. 94. However, while the matter was being considered subsequent to reserving for orders, as it was noticed that neither the State Government nor the BDA had placed any original records of the respective proceedings before the Court, the mater was directed to be listed for further hearing before the Court and for production of records. 95. It was so listed for further hearing before the Court on 14-7-2011 and the development on the day is recorded in the order as under: Sri B.V. Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA, places before the Court two files viz.- 1. File No.IPages 1 to 484 2. File No.II Pages 1 to 238 andsubmits that particulars of record and significance will be apprised to the Court tomorrow. Sri R. Omkumar, learned AGA, submits that records from the State Government had already been placed before the Court through registry. If so, registry is directed to put up records along with case papers and to list the matter on 15-7-2011 for elucidation and clarification, if any, on the part of the learned Counsel for BDA and the State Government and for further hearing. If so, registry is directed to put up records along with case papers and to list the matter on 15-7-2011 for elucidation and clarification, if any, on the part of the learned Counsel for BDA and the State Government and for further hearing. Further developments recorded on 15-7-2011 are as under: Sri B.V. Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA, has placed before the Court an additional statement of objections on behalf of BDA, supported by an affidavit of Sri P.S. Kantharaja, Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA. With reference to the statement, learned Counsel submits that an extent of 201 acres 29 guntas of land out of the lands notified for acquisition has been utilised by the BDA for formation of the layout and a total number of 2110 sites have been formed with 1843 sites being intermediate sites, 267 corner sites and 3 CA sites in this extent of land. However, no details of such formation and from out of which particular survey number and in which part of the originally proposed lands for acquisition for the implementation of the scheme and related information is not forthcoming in the statement. Submission of learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA is that the petitioners, who, admittedly claim to have acquired interest in some part of Sy.No.30 of Kothanur Village, adding upto about 3 acres 6 guntas, have no manner of right or locus to question the acquisition proceedings or even the award dated 25-1-2010 passed in respect of this land in Sy.No.30 or subsequent action and therefore writ petitions only deserve to be dismissed. Learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA also submits that to save the larger public interest, particularly as the BDA has been able to implement the scheme at least in respect of the remaining extent of 201 acres 29 guntas, over which extent of land they have been able to lay their hands and also form sites, as noticed above; that the BDA should be permitted to distribute such sites, to the waiting applicants for allotment of sites, as there are large number of applicants waiting before the authority. However, Shanakaranarayana Rao is neither aware of any further developments in this regard about the allotment or distribution of the sites is, to any applicant as of now, nor any information placed before the Court either through the statement as earlier filed or placed before the Court today through the additional statement on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 nor any record in this regard is placed before this Court. Sri R. Omkumar, learned AGA, places before the Court two original records containing file number viz.- 1. HUD 341 MNX 95 2. UDD 457 MNX 98 However, with respect to placing of records relating to issue of notifications under Section 48 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Acquisition Act’) is concerned, submission of learned AGA is that details of issue of such a notification are already placed before the Court and is contained in the records of the BDA placed before this Court and available at pages 459 to 462, which is a printed tabulated details of land, survey number-wise, LAC number-wise and in respect of as many as 43 cases, giving the extent of land released from acquisition in each case and in all making a total extent of 216 acres 33 guntas. Sri K. Suman, learned Counsel for the petitioners, points out that the record does not necessarily appear to be the original record, as there are good number of pages inserted into the record and even the details of issue of Section 48 notifications, are not part of any of the original records, but a tabulated column inserted into the record, purporting to be containing details of notifications issued by the State Government under Section 48 of the Act and therefore submits that while no reliance can be placed on the accuracy of the record placed before the Court, non-production of original records not only reflects on the bona fides of the State Government about it’s actions in exercising statutory powers under the Acquisition Act but also leads to an inevitable necessity to draw an adverse inference against the respondents. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also submits that even from out of the extent of 8 acres of land in Sy.No.30, in respect of which respondents assert to have passed the award and handed over possession of this extent of land in favour of the Engineering section of the authority, it is not an acceptable statement, for the reason that the petitioners have remained in physical possession and some of them have also constructed houses and are living, but the fact remains that the subject land is in the physical possession of the petitioners and even here, the very version of the authority is that in respect of an extent of 1 acre 37 guntas of land in this survey number is handed over to a private developer for development of a layout along with lands in the adjoining survey numbers, in all measuring an area of 55 acres 5 guntas and if so, it is a circumstance to infer that if at all the authority has taken possession of only this extent of 1 acre 37 guntas in Sy.No.30 of Kothanur Village. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that a cursory place at Annexure-R1 and R2, purporting to be copies of mahazars drawn at the spot, reveals that it can never be a valid mahazar drawn on the spot, in the presence of any witnesses indicating physical taking over of possession of subject land, but is a record created at the office of BDA just to indicate that BDA has taken possession and it is not an acceptable document, in the absence of original record being placed before the Court. However, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA, pleads inability to produce the original mahazar from out of the records relating to the same, as is placed today before this Court, and submits that there appears to be something radically wrong, not only in the maintenance of the record in the present case but also in the manner in which things have developed over a period of time and this case may be a fit matter for ordering an appropriate enquiry by a competent inquiring agency etc., to go into such aspects and for further action etc. This matter had already been reserved for orders, after hearing arguments extensively on both sides, but was directed to be listed for further hearing, only because it was noticed that no original records had been placed before the Court, though both the State and the BDA had been directed to place their respective records before the Court. With the placing of whatever records as is done today by the learned AGA on behalf of the State and Sri B.V. Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA, and all learned Counsel having been heard further on the same, hearing is concluded and the matter is reserved for consideration and for passing orders. 96. It is in the background of these developments and facts and circumstances as revealed from the pleadings of the respective parties, records placed before the Court and the submissions made at the Bar, the matter is further examined. 97. 96. It is in the background of these developments and facts and circumstances as revealed from the pleadings of the respective parties, records placed before the Court and the submissions made at the Bar, the matter is further examined. 97. Submission of Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 is that while in the first statement of objections placed before the Court on behalf of the authority as on 28-9-2010 not only the stand of the authority is made clear with regard to the nature of the petitions, but also the locus of the petitioners to seek examination of the acquisition proceedings is raised, keeping in view the factual position regarding developments that have taken place during the last more than 22 years after the publication of the preliminary notification, the additional statement dated 1-7-2011 supported by affidavit of Sri P.S. Kantharaj, Special LAO, BDA, placed before the Court on 15-7-2011 makes the entire picture clear with regard to the extent of land acquired, extent of land covered by the preliminary notification issued under Section 17, extent of land covered under different final notifications issued under Section 19 of the BDA Act, are all given in a tabulated column as contained in para 5 of the additional statement, reading as under: and further information relating to the actual manner of utilisation of this extent of land is provided in another tabulated column which is part of para 6 of the Additional statement of objections, reading as under: andsuch information/date completes the picture insofar as the land acquired under the notifications, land taken possession of by the State Government, extent of land in turn handed over to BDA and utilisation of the land by the authority etc. Submissions on such premise are already noticed in the order dated 15-7-2011 extracted above. 98. Submissions on such premise are already noticed in the order dated 15-7-2011 extracted above. 98. Even after a combined perusal of such facts and figures as furnished in the original statement and the additional statement filed before the Court on behalf of BDA and even after looking into the records of the State Government produced along with a memo dated 15-7-2011 filed by Sri R. Omkumar, learned AGA before the Court and also records of the BDA comprised in two files placed before the Court under memo dated 14-7-2011, no clear picture emerges so far as the factual position is concerned, as to what precise extent of land came into the possession of the BDA, at what point of time and in what manner and in turn the manner in which this extent of land has been put into use by BDA, for the implementation of its scheme. 99. However, Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-BDA has submitted that the authority has not revised its scheme or plan nor has the BDA reduced the size of the scheme vis-a-vis reduced extent of land that was said to have been handed over to the authority, but is content to submit that a good number of sites, both corner and intermediate sites as well as three civic amenity sites have been formed to fit into the original scheme and though it is also claimed it had allotted and distributed the sites, information relating to these developments is also not placed before the Court either in the statement or through records. 100. 100. While the first statement and the later developments as per statement of objections filed on behalf of the BDA and its Land Acquisition Officer do not give full facts and figures and no clear picture emerges, nor have the respondents taken care to present the precise factual position before the Court as on the date, even not all relevant records have been placed before the Court and if at all what is placed before the Court does not correlate to the statements filed on behalf of the respondents and the records that could have perhaps buttressed the contents of the statements are not placed before the Court, which perhaps, could have bailed out the BDA by producing corresponding original records and this also having not been attempted, but only a hazy, unclear, incomplete picture being presented before the Court, the impression which this Court is left with, is that the respondents are while not keen on placing the precise picture before the Court and on the other hand may be deliberately withholding information and avoiding/evading scrutiny into the relevant records, but would rather prefer to rely upon by raising technical objections with regard to the maintainability of the petitions and want of locus on the part of the petitioners to question the legality of the scheme or acquisition proceedings. 101. 101. While learned AGA and the learned Counsel for the BDA have made a spirited effort to save and retain the lands already acquired under the acquisition proceedings and put to use for the implementation of the scheme, though not in a substantial manner but upto whatever extent the land had come to be utilised and the manner in which the scheme should be implemented in respect of the lands already acquired is sustained and should not be disturbed or quashed by this Court on the basis of certain observations contained in the judgments of the Supreme Court, as noticed above, or even a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, by submitting such is the legal position, no sincere effort is made at all to attract and seek for applying such legal position that would emerge on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court and of this Court referred to and relied upon by the learned AGA and the Counsel for BDA, is not at all being made use of by linking it to the factual position that prevails in the present case, but on the other hand, whether by design or by deliberate act or by sheer carelessness or negligence or even being in a State of helplessness, such legal position is allowed to remain independent of the factual position that obtains in the present case. 102. Even by accepting the version of the BDA without going into further scrutiny and even with the help of supporting record, BDA, if at all, has been able to make use of an extent of 201 acres 29 guntas of land for the implementation of the scheme as propounded originally, which position is also not supported in the record, the implementation even to this extent if at all constitutes an implementation of the scheme in respect of 20% of the land as was originally proposed for the implementation of the scheme and even assuming for argument’s sake, it is done so, it can never answer the test of substantial implementation of the scheme within the outer time frame of five years from the date of issue of final notification i.e., declaration. 103. 103. Apart from the extent of implementation, even this limited extent is claimed to be an implementation only in the year 2010, long after the expiry of five years time stipulated in Section 27 of the BDA Act and factually so in respect of subject land over which the petitioners have claimed interest and are before this Court seeking for judicial review of administrative and statutory functions. 104. In the wake of such factual position, the following legal questions inevitably present themselves for examination and answer: 1. Can a scheme proposed by the BDA by permitted to be implemented even when there is a failure to execute the scheme in a substantial manner well-beyond the statutory period and can a scheme survive for implementation in a very truncated manner? 2. Can there be any other consequence of a scheme lapsing due to non-execution of a scheme in a substantial manner within the period of five years as per Section 27 of the BDA Act, other than the acquisition proceedings also automatically lapsing on the lapse of the scheme? 105. To appreciate the role of BDA, one should necessarily have a clear concept of the word ‘development’. Simplest meaning and understanding of the word ‘development’ can be to bring about improvement. An improvement is something better than what is existing. If there should be a real improvement and development, it has to be by itself and for the benefit of at least some persons, if not for all, but never at the cost or to the detriment of others. 106. Unfortunately, the word ‘development’ has been understood and examined in a very myopic form and never in a comprehensive manner and more so when the word occurs in the context of a particular enactment. Focus is only in the context in a particular enactment and for example when the word is used in the context of BDA Act, the focus is only of development, if any, achieved by the authority by implementation of its schemes, but never in a comprehensive manner and by totally ignoring or keeping aside the deleterious effect or even hardship or destruction caused to others in the course of implementation of the scheme, such as to the original landowners or persons claiming under them and also negative effect caused to their avocations and activities. 107. 107. In the present case, the development being by BDA, development is one for the benefit of city of Bangalore, the Urban agglomeration of Bangalore and the scheme being one to expand the urban area at the cost of surrounding rural area and in our country avocation and the activities in rural areas being primarily agricultural activities, it is inevitably at the cost of such agricultural operations. More often than not, for people living in rural areas, agricultural lands not only constitute their source of livelihood but agricultural operation is their avocation and the subject land also serving the purpose of providing them accommodation for residence. Quite obviously and quite naturally, a development authority like the BDA may not pay any attention to the travails and difficulties that the owners of land, essentially rural population with agriculture as their avocation, may have to face and the focus is definitely not their problem, but the scheme for the so-called development, which, in other words, only means a project for providing residential accommodation for urbanites or city dwellers. Over a period of time, the ever expanding Bangalore City has swallowed a good number of villages in and around it, has caused untold hardship and misery to the rural population, with agriculture as their main avocation and source of living and has also been systematically contributing to the depletion of available agricultural lands for food production. There is obviously a conflict between urban development and the rural destruction. 108. While it is not so much the concern of the development authority like BDA about such consequence and its only concern may be to come up with a new scheme and examine the scope for implementation, the State Government, which is required to take care of the interest of all sections of the community including the rural population, is given power, authority and the responsibility to weigh the pros and cons and then pronounce upon as to whether acquiring private lands for implementation of scheme propounded by BDA is in the large public interest. This is a very onerous and solemn responsibility thrust on the State Government under the provisions of BDA Act to issue a declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act. 109. Courts and through judicial process have seldom interfered in this part of the functioning of the administrative or statutory authority, due to many assumptions and presumptions. This is a very onerous and solemn responsibility thrust on the State Government under the provisions of BDA Act to issue a declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act. 109. Courts and through judicial process have seldom interfered in this part of the functioning of the administrative or statutory authority, due to many assumptions and presumptions. Firstly, the assumption of it is essentially it is in the nature of a policy matter. It is secondly assumed that the elected Government always acts in the interest of people and they can understand and appreciate the needs and aspirations of the people, being in close proximity to the populace. It is thirdly assumed that the State Government having regard to its responsibilities and accountability towards people, would have always taken into consideration all relevant factors before arriving at a decision. 110. A judicial system steeped and drenched in the adversary legal system, a legal and judicial system which functioned as part and representative of the emperor or empress, as the case may be, under the English legal system and a legal system even at the highest level as it obtained hitherto in England being only to humbly advise or render its opinion to His or her majesty and which advice or opinion was not necessarily to bind the King or the Queen and wherein even a thought of confronting or challenging the authority of the King or the Queen is nothing short of blasphemy, it is not easy to change overnight, just because of our country got independence and became a republic and just because superior Courts are exercising constitutional jurisdiction conferred upon them under the Constitution, but the examination continues to remain more or less on the same conventional lines and an attempt to change over to the era of constitutionally governed republic to usher in judicial methods and judicial process in consonance with the philosophy of our constitution, the tendency to change over. To quote again the celebrated tax and constitutional expert Sri Nani Palkhivala ‘tends to be a thing to slow growth’! 111. To quote again the celebrated tax and constitutional expert Sri Nani Palkhivala ‘tends to be a thing to slow growth’! 111. Conservative approach of the Court, an approach to retain and sustain what has happened, a tendency to protect and to sustain whatever has developed hitherto, that is a tendency to maintain status quo, has been very deeply ingrained into our legal and judicial system and this again has stilted the growth of legal and judicial process, as perhaps is needed for the realisation of aspirations of our people, for attaining the goals set for us by our forefathers, who gave us the constitution. 112. Yet again to quote Sri Palkhivala, whose observations in the context of the approach to tax laws by Courts and judiciary, which is very conservative approach, having stilted the growth of taxation law in this country in turn affecting the economic growth, summed up very succinctly in the following words.- “The wise have said that the problem of judicial interpretation is to hold a just middle way between excess of valour and excess of caution. In income tax cases, there is too often an unfortunate tendency to incline towards excess of caution, to hold a principle in fetters and stunt its development. There is need in our time and land to recall the words of Sri Frederick Pollock, “Those who make no mistakes will never make anything, and the Judge who is afraid of committing himself may be called sound and safe in his own generation, but will leave to mark on the law”. The concepts of capital and revenue are dynamic, not static, concepts; the test may have to be changed with the changing circumstances. The law and levy of income tax are directly related to economic factors, and are conditioned by social and political forces, by industrial and commercial considerations. The interpretation of such a law must necessarily be inspired by the principle of growth. Such a law cannot stand still. It must vitalize and refresh itself from extrinsic sources; it is always approaching and never reaching logical consistency because it is always in the process of growth”. which his aptly applicable to our present situation also and the result is not any different. 113. Such a law cannot stand still. It must vitalize and refresh itself from extrinsic sources; it is always approaching and never reaching logical consistency because it is always in the process of growth”. which his aptly applicable to our present situation also and the result is not any different. 113. While there are a few brave attempts in expending the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India or the concept of life and liberty as is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India through some of the innovative, proactive judgments of the Superior Courts, particularly Supreme Court of India, such efforts remained isolated islands of oasis in the otherwise vast desert of judicial and legal system of this country, remaining faithful to the adversary English legal system and doggedly adhering to the conservative and no change attitude that is the hallmark of English legal system. 114. If one should get liberated from such conservative and narrow approach, if one should expand the horizon of judicial review to be a little more comprehensive, to be more on the touchstone of the scheme of the Constitution, which is the role envisaged to the judicial wing of the State under the Constitution and if the questions as posed above are to be applied to the present fact situation, the answers that emerge are nothing short of a disaster for the State, a disaster to the development authority and will be a very poor reflection on their levels of performance, particularly in the manner of statutory functioning, manner in which statutory powers are exercised, how larger public interest is never the focal point of their actions, as to how, myopic, shortsighted, opportunistic ways of dealing the matters and using rather misusing, power and authority for purposes other than public purpose, even for promoting private interest, even for personal gains, all come tumbling out of the wardrobes and ultimately present a very pathetic picture of the State and its governance before the Court. 115. 115. The long duration of time taken by BDA i.e., as many as 23 years upto now, and even after this there being no clear picture, the scheme being not implemented and if at all it being possible to implement the scheme only to an extent of 20% of the land as originally proposed under the scheme made available to the BDA, is nothing short of an admission that the authority has miserably failed in the substantial implementation of the scheme and to compound this felony, lack of commitment and will power to implement the scheme, not only on the part of BDA but also the imposing manner in which the State Government has acted all along, to exercise the statutory power and control at cross-purposes for the implementation of the scheme and above all, the State Government embarking on issue of notifications under Section 48 of the LA Act, such notifications being issued periodically to take out large chunks of land initially proposed for acquisition from out of acquisition proceedings and the scheme being, all make a mockery of the presumption arising in favour of the state once a notification under Section 19 is published in the Official Gazette indicating satisfaction of the State Government that the scheme propounded by the authority is in the large public interest, that the subject lands notified for acquisition is required for a public purpose (not private!) 116. Such assumption or presumption had vanished into thin air, due to the quixotic manner of exercise of power by the State Government and issue of notifications under Section 48 of LA Act on numerous occasions, as is found in the tabulation column which is part of the original records of BDA placed before the Court. 117. Such assumption or presumption had vanished into thin air, due to the quixotic manner of exercise of power by the State Government and issue of notifications under Section 48 of LA Act on numerous occasions, as is found in the tabulation column which is part of the original records of BDA placed before the Court. 117. When the matter is examined from this background, submission and appeal on the part of the authority by Sri Shankaranarayana Rao, learned Counsel for BDA and Sri R. Omkumar, learned AGA that the scheme should be permitted to be implemented even in its truncated form, notwithstanding the failure on the part of the authority to implement the scheme in a substantial manner within the scope of Section 27 of the BDA Act and on the other hand to absolve the authority and the scheme from the consequences of non-implementation as provided under Section 27 of the BDA Act, nosedives with a loud thud and nothing can save such a consequence. 118. It is here the question as to whether it is necessary for the Courts to save something from the operation of law and the consequences of legal position, as was the approach under the conventional traditional English legal system or should Court themselves liberate from this narrow approach and start examining matters from a constitutional law angle by acting as a liberated judiciary, arises and not to be executive conforming, but laws and constitution conforming concept assumes significance and importance. 119. The sum and substance of submissions on behalf of the respondents, appear to be grant relief to the respondents and deny everything to the petitioners! irrespective of the possibilities in law, irrespective of legal consequences of operation of Section 27 of the BDA Act. 120. On the other hand, in this case, on the admitted fact situation. The scheme as initially formulated by the BDA was to develop the land to the extent of 1009 acres as indicated in the preliminary notification dated 23-3-1988 published under Section 17(1) of the BDA Act. 120. On the other hand, in this case, on the admitted fact situation. The scheme as initially formulated by the BDA was to develop the land to the extent of 1009 acres as indicated in the preliminary notification dated 23-3-1988 published under Section 17(1) of the BDA Act. As against this extent, an extent of land covered under three different notifications issued under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act are dated 19-10-1994, 17-9-1997 as per the Karnataka Gazette, notification dated 18-9-1997 found in the records of the BDA at page 455 (in ink comprising of three separate printed pages) or pages 510, 511 and 512 (numbering by franking machine) and as indicated in column (1) in this notification. This notification having been issued as a result of the first final notification dated 19-10-1994 came to be quashed by the High Court as per order dated 26-9-1996 in Writ Petition No.32881 of 1994 and other connected petitions but reserving liberty to the BDA to come up with a fresh final notification after obtaining the sanction of the Government for the scheme in terms of Section 18(3) of the BDA Act and followed by another final notification dated 5-4-1999 which though is also sought to be in furtherance of the preliminary notification dated 23-3-1988, published on 2-6-1988 in the Gazette and though the contents of the notification dated 5-4-1999 and 17-9-1997 are identical, the later notification does not mention anything about the earlier like notification. While, the final notification dated 17-9-1997 does not appear to be converted the subject Sy.No.30 of Kothanur Village, it is covered in the later final notification dated 5-4-1999 at Sl.No.9 and purports to be in respect of the extent of 8 acres 20 guntas in this survey number. 121. While the earlier final notification does not indicate the total extent of land covered under the notification, the later final notification indicates total extent of land covered by that notification to be 123 acres 29 guntas. 121. While the earlier final notification does not indicate the total extent of land covered under the notification, the later final notification indicates total extent of land covered by that notification to be 123 acres 29 guntas. However, it is not as though the two notifications are mutually exclusive in respect of the lands covered by them as for example the subject land at item No.23 of the earlier final notification in the name of B.A. Wahab, V. Kannan, son of Venkateshalu Mudaliar in Sy.No.39 of Kothanur Village in respect of the extent of 7 acres 13 guntas is again repeated in the later final notification dated 5-4-1999 at Sl.No.35 of this notification and in respect of same extent of land in the same survey number. Neither the record discloses as to the need or necessity of second final notification nor the statements filed on behalf of the BDA give any explanation about the same and as a sequel to Section 36 of the BDA Act also coming into picture and therefore the provisions of the LA Act on and after such proceedings after Section 19 of the BDA Act or corresponding statutory provisions of Section 6 of the LA Act, being not available any more and therefore if the acquisition proceedings had not crossed the stage of taking of actual possession of the land by the time the scheme lapsed, can anything be saved at all? 122. I am of the clear and definite opinion that it is not the normal functioning of the Courts and the judiciary to render opinions being guided more from the consequences angle, but in the first instance has to examine any fact situation on the touchstone of relevant statutory and constitutional provisions, answer the questions on the basis of such a test and if at all any situation warrants or needs and if the law so enables to examine the possibilities for mitigating adverse impact, if any, due to the consequential legal position, do so for mitigating an adverse impact. 123. 123. If it is in such a haphazard manner the acquisition proceedings have gone on, insofar as the subject land in Sy.No.30 is concerned, even as per the record of the BDA, possession of an extent of 8 acres 20 guntas of land in this survey number is said to be taken only on 20-4-2010 or 20-7-2010 as per the mahazar said to be evidencing this factum and the details about the land which are to be found at pages 113 and 114 of the file No.9/1999-2000 which is placed before the Court by the BDA. This is said to be following the issue of award notice dated 12-4-2010 to apprise the landowner of the award passed under Section 12(2) of the L.A. Act, which is said to be for a total amount of Rs.36,03,195/-, but even the award notice being not served on any individual holder/khatedar of the land but only indicating that as it was not possible to sere the landowners personally, notice is served on the land! 124. The factual position sought to be depicted on the basis of such record obviously is a made up case for the BDA as it is even otherwise admitted that the BDA itself had diverted some part of the land in this survey number for formation of a private layout by a private developer. 125. Though no clear picture emerges from the perusal of the preliminary notification and the two final notifications as to the exact extent of land covered by it, the two final notifications put together, even on the admitted case on behalf of the BDA as per the additional statement of objection placed before the Court is only that it has been able to get possession of a total extent of 201 acres 29 guntas and the details of the different final notification as indicated in paragraph 5 of the additional statement of objections dated 1-7-2011 and as per the details of the manner of utilisation of the land as indicated in paragraph 6 of the additional statement of objections as extracted earlier. 126. It is also further averred that the BDA has formed a layout with 2,110 sites out of which 1,840 are intermediary, 267 are corner sites and 3 c.a. sites. 126. It is also further averred that the BDA has formed a layout with 2,110 sites out of which 1,840 are intermediary, 267 are corner sites and 3 c.a. sites. Here again, actual extent of land covering these number of sites while is not indicated as per the information at Sl.No.2 of the table in paragraph 6 it has to be inferred that this is covering an extent of 201 acres 29 guntas! 127. While the BDA has placed the two final notifications dated 17-9-1997 and 5-4-1999 along with the records in the two files, the record relating to third final notification dated 17-10-1999 purporting to cover an extent of 92 acres of land and said to be contained in file No.UDD 485 MNX 99, no record is placed before the Court. 128. Be that as it may, even on the admitted factual position and as per the record, the claim of the BDA if at all is one of its ability to implement the scheme in respect of an extent of 201 acres 29 guntas as against the initial plan covering an extent of 1009 acres, this again being only a claim and not based on any material placed before the Court for examination or for confirmation and on the contrary, it is the admitted fact that in respect of 216 acres 33 guntas, the Government has gone on issuing notifications under Section 48 of LA Act withdrawing from the acquisition proceedings in respect of lands covered under these notifications. 129. It is also admitted that an extent of 80 acres 28 guntas have in fact been given for group housing schemes. It is also a further fact stated in the additional statement that an extent of 145 acres 30 guntas of Government land has not been handed over to the BDA. It is also admitted that in respect of an extent of 117 acres 10 guntas, while no award has been passed at all, such lands are said to be covered by unauthorised layouts, comprising of built up area, some parts under litigation before the Court and impracticality of utilisation of lands etc. 130. It is also admitted that in respect of an extent of 117 acres 10 guntas, while no award has been passed at all, such lands are said to be covered by unauthorised layouts, comprising of built up area, some parts under litigation before the Court and impracticality of utilisation of lands etc. 130. In this state of chaos and confusion prevailing about the manner of implementation of the scheme, insofar as the subject land in Sy.No.30 is concerned, it is admitted that the award is passed only on 25-1-2010 and possession is sought to be taken only during April 2010. From this state of affairs, it is clear that the scheme is definitely not implemented in respect of the subject land in Sy.No.30. While it is not clear in which other land and to what extent the scheme has been implemented and even as to the meaning of the implementation of the scheme, things are in a state of confusion, petitioners assert that they continue to remain in possession of this survey numbers as purchasers in the year 2004-05 and to the extent of land indicated in their conveyance deeds. 131. From the above admitted facts, it becomes crystal clear that even after the expiry of a period of five years from the date of last final notification i.e., on 17-10-1999, the scheme is not implemented in any manner or to any extent and if at all an implementation even as per the BDA in the year 2010-11 is only in respect of the extent of 201 acres 29 guntas which is by no stretch of imagination, an implementation of the substantial nature or a substantial implementation of the scheme as is contemplated under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Section 27 of the BDA Act is inevitably attracted as implementation in respect of the extent which is slightly a little more than one-fifth of the original extent of land in respect of which scheme had been prepared and proposed and sent to the Government for approval, is never a substantial implementation of the scheme and with the scheme having lapsed after five years from the year 1999, there is absolutely no scope or possibility in law for the BDA to implement the scheme any more as of now, and at any rate, not by utilising such of the statutory provisions which are no more available to the BDA in terms of Section 36 of the BDA Act as a consequence of the operation of Section 27 of the BDA Act. 132. The implication is that the passing of the award in the year 2010 is an action without the support of Section 12 of the LA Act and likewise taking of possession thereafter also in April 2010 under Section 16 of the LA Act are both actions without support of law and cannot be sustained. Therefore, there is no more possibility in law for the BDA to take any coercive action as against persons found to be in possession of this survey number for the purpose of taking possession of this land whether by the State Government or by the BDA for the further implementation of the scheme as the scheme itself has lapsed and the very acquisition was only for the purpose of implementation of the scheme. 133. 133. With the admitted position being that subject land had not yet been taken possession of before the scheme lapsed in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act, the land has never vested in the State Government and in respect of such lands which have not vested in the State Government prior to lapsing of the scheme and there being no possibility of implementation of the scheme thereafter and also there being no possibility to continue the acquisition proceedings on and after the stage of issue of declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act, it is inevitable that even the preliminary and final notifications under Sections 17(1) and 19 of the BDA Act have also to be quashed inevitably in respect of such lands which had not vested in the State Government before the lapsing of the scheme and it is as though no acquisition proceedings had ever taken place in respect of such lands. 134. Though the question may arise as to the consequence that befalls on such of those lands which had already been taken possession of and had vested in the State Government, prior to the lapsing of the scheme, such a situation not siring in the present writ petitions, it is not necessary to discuss that legal position for deciding these writ petitions as insofar as the present writ petitions are concerned, it will become an exercise in academics. 135. While certain additional prayers are sought in terms of the amendment sought to the writ petitions and serious objections have also been raised on behalf of the BDA, objections have been overruled as noticed earlier, but nevertheless, insofar as the prayer for declaration regarding lapsing of the scheme is concerned, it is made clear that the lapsing of the scheme is by the operation of the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act i.e., due to the operation of law in any fact situation where the scheme is not implemented in a substantial manner within a period of five years from the date of issue of the final notification and not because of a declaration to be made by this Court. 136. 136. Though there is considerable divergence of judicial opinion in understanding the phrase ‘substantial implementation of the scheme’, by no stretch of imagination or by no stretch of elongation of the limits of law, an implementation of the scheme in respect of only about one-fifth of the original land area and that too 23 years after the issue of the preliminary notification can ever be taken as a substantial implementation of the scheme as in the present case. Whether this Court expressly issues a declaration in this regard or not, it has already happened due to the operation of law and if at all it is only in recognition of this legal position, the further consequence are to be noticed and appropriate orders passed in the context. Petitioners claiming that they have acquired interest in the subject lands subsequent to lapsing of the scheme or in the vicinity thereabout, it cannot also be said that they have no locus to maintain the present writ petitions as discussed earlier and cannot be denied an appropriate order by merely throwing out the petition by this Court shutting eyes to the operation of law. 137. The situation in the present writ petitions are not much different to the situation as was noticed by this Court in W.P.No.1739 of 2008 disposed of by this Court on 13-7-2011 (B. Krishnappa v Bangalore Development Authority, Bangalore and Others (2011 (5) Kar.L.J.515)) and at any rate the legal consequence are the same. However, as in the present case, in view of the stand put forth by the BDA that it has implemented the scheme to some extent and if in fact subject land had also vested in the State Government and had been handed over to the BDA before the lapsing of the scheme and if there is no other impediment for the BDA to deal with the subject land, perhaps even otherwise the BDA can continue to work in respect of that extent of land even though the scheme as of now has lapsed as any land that comes into the possession of the BDA has necessarily to be utilised for a development scheme and in consonance with the master plan that it has prepared as the BDA happens to be not only the development authority for the Bangalore Metropolitan area, but also the planning authority for this area. This perhaps is the only possibility in law insofar as the aspect of mitigation of consequence of operation of law is concerned as that is not to the detriment or peril of the petitioners who are before this Court complaining of high handed action on the part of the officials of the BDA. 138. It also follows as a consequence, that the State Government or the BDA or its officials or agents acting on their behalf cannot disturb peaceful possession and enjoyment of the subject land in which the petitioners claim to be in possession forming part of Sy.No.30 of the Kothanur Village and therefore the respondents are hereby restrained from taking any adverse action otherwise not permitted in law as against the petitioners in respect of the subject land. 139. It is however made clear that the BDA being also a planning authority, it is nevertheless entitled to ensure that any development or land user in the area is concerned, it is all done only in consonance with the master plan and also to fall in line with the plan in the scheme as is envisaged for the area by the planning authority. It is the duty of the BDA to ensure compliance with this requirement about all landowners and land users. 140. It is the duty of the BDA to ensure compliance with this requirement about all landowners and land users. 140. In the light of above discussion, answers to the questions as raised above, are as under: Question No.1.- A scheme proposed by BDA if is not substantially implemented within a period of five years as is mandated under Section 27 of the BDA Act and has lapsed, there is no question of Court permitting further implementation of the scheme, if it is to the detriment of any person and such a person has sought for relief before Court; and Question No.2.- When once the scheme lapsed as per the provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act, there cannot be any further proceedings for acquisition either, and if the subject land sought to be acquired had not vested in the State Government before lapsing of the scheme, to the extent of the lands not vested in the State Government before the lapsing of the scheme, even the acquisition proceedings lapse, as the acquisition was only for the purpose of implementation of the scheme and to the extent of land not yet vested in the State Government, the scheme having lapsed, there is no possibility of the implementation of the scheme thereafter. 141. In the result, a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the acquisition proceedings in respect of subject lands which are covered under the preliminary notification and final notifications, but which have not vested in the State Government within the period of five years from the date of issue of the final notification. 142. The BDA is restrained from further implementation of the lapsed scheme if it is to be to the detriment and adverse to the interest of the landowners whose lands have, as a consequence of this order, revert to them. 143. Writ petitions are allowed awarding cost in favour of each of the petitioners at Rs.5,000/-. 142. The BDA is restrained from further implementation of the lapsed scheme if it is to be to the detriment and adverse to the interest of the landowners whose lands have, as a consequence of this order, revert to them. 143. Writ petitions are allowed awarding cost in favour of each of the petitioners at Rs.5,000/-. Cost to be met by the first respondent-State Government as the State Government has thoroughly failed in ensuring that its agency-the Bangalore Development Authority over which it has supervisory power has not implemented the scheme meant for the specific purpose within the timeframe envisaged by law and has allowed the scheme to lapse and in fact the vows of the BDA being compounded by several interferences by that State Government itself and the manner of acquisition of the subject land by the State Government being most quixotic and due to the arbitrary manner of exercise of power for issue of withdrawal notifications under Section 48 of the LA Act. 144. Cost to be paid to the petitioners and unless a memo to this effect is filed in the registry within six weeks from today, the registry to issue certificates in favour of each of the petitioners to enable them to recover the cost amount as though it is a decree of the Civil Court. 145. Registrar General of this Court is directed to forward copies of this order to the Law Commission of India and the Karnataka State Law Commission, for examination of their end.