JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner is the plaintiff (hereafter the plaintiff) in Title Suit No. 2772 of 2007, pending on the file of the learned Judge, Bench VII, City Civil Court at Calcutta, wherein the opposite parties are the defendants (hereafter the defendants). It is a suit for declaration, mandatory injunction, permanent injunction as well as for damages. After the suit was filed, the plaintiff filed two applications, one under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereafter the Code) read with Section 151 thereof, inter alia, seeking to restrain the defendants and their men and agents from bringing any vehicle within the compound of the suit premises or from parking any vehicle therein. The petitioner had also filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code read with Section 151 thereof praying for appointment of a Receiver. 2. BY order no.15 dated 24th June, 2008, the learned Judge passed, on contest, an order of injunction on contest. The defendants were restrained from bringing any vehicle within the suit premises or from parking any vehicle therein till the disposal of the suit. However, the application for appointment of Receiver stood rejected. It is not in dispute that none of the parties to the suit questioned the propriety and/or legality of the order dated 24th June, 2008 and hence the same attained finality. Alleging that the order dated 24th June, 2008 was being persistently violated by the defendants, the plaintiff moved an application under Section 151 before the trial Court seeking an order of police help. On a contested hearing, the learned Judge by order dated 23rd September, 2008 allowed the application. The Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station, Kolkata, was directed to render sufficient police protection to implement the order of injunction dated 24th June, 2008. 3. A further application under Section 151 of the Code was preferred by the plaintiff on 6th May, 2010 alleging, inter alia, that no help had been extended by the police authorities and as a result of police inaction, the defendants were flouting the Court's order with impunity. 4. 3. A further application under Section 151 of the Code was preferred by the plaintiff on 6th May, 2010 alleging, inter alia, that no help had been extended by the police authorities and as a result of police inaction, the defendants were flouting the Court's order with impunity. 4. ACCORDINGLY, it was prayed that an order be passed directing the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station, and the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Central), Kolkata Police to personally appear before the Court and explain why appropriate action should not be taken against them for not rendering police help to the plaintiff in spite of specific direction. The application was opposed by the defendants by filing written objection. Dismissal of the application was prayed for on the ground that the police officers are not parties to the suit and hence no order could be passed against them. 5. THE defendants despite service of summons and entering appearance in the suit had not filed their respective written statements within the time allowed by Order 8 Rule 6 of the Code. Accordingly, both the defendants filed separate applications before the learned Judge praying for acceptance of their written statements upon condonation of delay. 6. BY a composite order dated 9th July, 2010, the learned Judge rejected the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 151 of the Code and allowed the prayer of the defendants to accept their written statements filed beyond time upon imposition of costs of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) to the plaintiff as condition precedent. This composite order dated 9th July, 2010, is under challenge in this revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. THE application under Section 151 of the Code filed by the plaintiff was rejected by the learned Judge on the ground that attention of the learned Judge could not be drawn by the plaintiff's learned advocate to any provision of law that empowers him to direct the Officer-in- Charge, Hare Street Police Station and the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Central) to appear personally in the Court for alleged inaction on their part to obey the order of Court. According to the learned Judge, the Court of writ has the jurisdiction to pass order for police help. According to the learned Judge, the Court of writ has the jurisdiction to pass order for police help. The learned Judge was also of the view that no application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code having been preferred by the plaintiff, there could be no decision in respect of the allegation leveled by the plaintiff that the order of injunction was being violated by the defendants. The learned Judge further noted that if despite denial of the allegations of the plaintiff by the defendants the police authorities are summoned to appear in Court, nothing would survive for a decision in the suit. 8. IN so far as the order allowing the prayer of the defendants for accepting the written statements that were filed beyond time is concerned, the learned Judge was of the view that discretion ought to be exercised in favour of the defendants for promoting justice rather than defeating it by making it clear that awarding compensatory costs would sub-serve justice. Mr. Chakraborty, learned advocate for the plaintiff and Mr. Mitra, learned Advocate for the defendants have been heard at length. I have also considered the decisions cited by them, ratio decidendi whereof are not in dispute. 9. I propose to examine first whether the learned Judge was justified in exercising discretion on facts and in the circumstances, thereby allowing the defendants to file their written statements upon payment of costs as condition precedent. I am of the view that provisions of Order 8 Rule 6 of the Code specifying the time limit to file written statement being directory, it has to be seen whether the discretion that has been exercised by the trial Court is beyond limits of reasonableness and fairness or not. Discretion that has been exercised in favour of a party is ordinarily not interfered with on the ground that a different conclusion on facts is possible. 10. IT is settled law that procedural law is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. Indeed, if the written statements filed by the defendants are not accepted on the ground that the time limit prescribed in Order 8 Rule 6 of the Code has expired, that would immensely prejudice the defendants in their defence and would ensue a virtual walk- over for the plaintiff. Indeed, if the written statements filed by the defendants are not accepted on the ground that the time limit prescribed in Order 8 Rule 6 of the Code has expired, that would immensely prejudice the defendants in their defence and would ensue a virtual walk- over for the plaintiff. The learned Judge having believed the reasons assigned by the defendants for having failed to file their written statements within the time limit prescribed in Order 8 Rule 6 of the Code and the power to extend time being there in the statute, I do not consider that there has been error in exercise of jurisdiction which could be termed unjustified. In the circumstances, the inconvenience caused to the plaintiff arising out of belated filing of written statements was taken care of by the learned Judge who was right in imposing costs, payment whereof was made a condition precedent for acceptance of the written statements of the defendants. I do not find any reason to interfere with that part of the impugned order by which the objection of the plaintiff was disallowed and the written statements accepted. However, the first part of the impugned order by which the application under Section 151 of the Code filed by the plaintiff was rejected requires consideration in some depth. 11. AS observed above, one of the grounds for its rejection was that no application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code had been filed by the plaintiff. Rule 2A of Order 39 reads as follows: "2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.- (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto." 12. A plain reading of the provision makes it clear that the same could be invoked in the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order was made. If indeed the defendants have violated or disobeyed the order of injunction, the plaintiff would be free to prefer an application under Rule 2A (supra) seeking redress. However, the order dated 23rd September, 2008 was passed by the learned Judge on an application under Section 151 of the Code whereby the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station was directed to render police protection to implement the order of injunction dated 24th June, 2008 that was passed earlier by the Court. An allegation of violation of or disobedience to the order dated 23rd September, 2008 by the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station could not have been subject of scrutiny in an application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code for the simple reason that such order was not passed in exercise of power under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code and at the same time, violation of or disobeying an order passed under Section 151 of the Code would not attract Order 39 Rule 2A thereof. In terms of Section 23 of the Police Act, 1861, a police officer has a statutory duty to obey and execute all orders lawfully issued to him by a competent authority. I do not see reason to exclude a competent Court of law from the term 'competent authority' referred to in Section 23 thereof. A Court of law cannot be rendered inactive because the police are not co-operative. I do not see reason to exclude a competent Court of law from the term 'competent authority' referred to in Section 23 thereof. A Court of law cannot be rendered inactive because the police are not co-operative. It needs no reiteration that an order passed by a competent Court of law, so long it is not set aside or modified in appeal or revision or review, is binding and it was for the Court passing the order to ensure that it does not remain a paper tiger, and violated or disobeyed by a party at his whim. If only the learned Judge had granted the application under Section 151 of the Code dated 6th May, 2010 preferred by the plaintiff and directed personal presence of the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station in Court to meet and/or counter the allegations of the plaintiff and if the Officer-In-Charge had violated and/or disobeyed such order by not remaining personally present, the learned Judge ought to have exercised the power of referring such act of violation and/or disobedience to this Honourable Court for being dealt with under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereafter the said Act), being the statutory provision that recognizes the power of each and every High Court to punish for contempt of sub-ordinate Courts functioning within such High Court's territorial jurisdiction, as if the contempt committed was of the High Court itself. The learned Judge was not correct in his understanding of law that in the circumstances only the Court of writ could pass an appropriate order and not the civil Court. Having regard to the extant laws, it is for the learned Judges of the subordinate Courts to uphold their dignity and prestige by issuing directions, which commend to be appropriate, reasonable, just and fair in the circumstances. The learned Judge ought not to have shied away from passing a direction on the Officer-in-Charge on the ground of failure of the learned advocate for the plaintiff to draw his attention to the provisions contained in Section 10 of the said Act. The application did not merit rejection in the manner it was dealt with by the learned Judge. The learned Judge ought not to have shied away from passing a direction on the Officer-in-Charge on the ground of failure of the learned advocate for the plaintiff to draw his attention to the provisions contained in Section 10 of the said Act. The application did not merit rejection in the manner it was dealt with by the learned Judge. Least the learned Judge could have done at the stage the impugned order had been passed was to call upon the Officer-in-Charge to show cause why he should not be directed to remain personally present in Court for alleged failure to take steps to provide sufficient police force to implement the Court's earlier order dated 24th June, 2008 and in the event of violation of and/or disobedience to the same, to refer such act for being dealt with by this Court under the said Act. To this extent the learned Judge appears to have committed gross jurisdictional error for which interference in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution is considered necessary. 13. THE first part of the order under challenge, therefore, stands set aside meaning thereby revival of the application under Section 151 of the Code dated 6th May, 2010. The learned Judge is requested to proceed henceforth in accordance with the observations made hereinabove for ensuring that its order dated 23rd September, 2008 is obeyed by the Officer-in-Charge. The learned Judge shall also be free to consider whether there has been disobedience on the part of the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Central) or not at any stage of the proceedings and to pass appropriate orders on the said application under Section 151 of the Code. 14. THE application stands disposed of accordingly, without costs. Urgent photo-stat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.