Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—As both the appeals arise from the common judgement, they are being considered simultaneously. 2. Both the appeals are directed against the judgement and award passed by the Reference Court in Land Reference Case Nos. 63/84 and 64/84, whereby the Reference Court has awarded additional compensation of Rs. 2,56,086.10 in Land Reference Case No. 63/84 and Rs. 67,96,327.50 in land Reference Case No. 64/84 and has additionally awarded interest under Section 28 of the Act with the observation of making it applicable from the date on which the possession was taken over of the land in question. 3. The short facts are that the lands for the project Sukhi, Unit-I, Baroda were to be acquired at Village Alikherva of Taluka Sankheda, District Baroda under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for short). There were two parcels of land; one was land bearing Survey No. 206, admeasuring 53 Are and 64 sq. mtrs., whereas another parcel of the land was bearing Survey No. 207, admeasuring 13 hectare, 66 Are and 83 sq. mtrs. The possession of the land in contemplation of the proceedings under land acquisition by way of agreement was taken over on 18.2.1971. The Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 13.9.1979. The Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 2.7.1981. The award was passed under Section 11 of the Act on 27.12.1983 and the Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at Rs. 2/- per sq. mtrs. As the claimants were not satisfied with the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, they raised dispute under section 18 of the Act and demanded compensation of Rs. 60/- per sq. mtrs. The Reference Court, at the conclusion of the references, awarded the compensation by fixing the market value of the land at Rs. 40/- per sq mtrs., and thereafter awarded additional compensation. The reference Court has also calculated the amount of additional compensation by making deduction of 5% for the land bearing Survey No. 206 on the ground that it was new tenure land. The Reference Court declined the benefits of increase under Section 23(1-A) of the Act to the original claimants, but the Reference Court awarded interest from the date of taking over the possession and not from the date of Notification under Section 4 of the Act or the award. The Reference Court declined the benefits of increase under Section 23(1-A) of the Act to the original claimants, but the Reference Court awarded interest from the date of taking over the possession and not from the date of Notification under Section 4 of the Act or the award. Under these circumstances, the present appeals before this Court. 4. We have heard Mr. Soni, learned AGP for the appellant in both the appeals and Mr. S.N. Shelat, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Mr. Majmudar for the respondents – original claimants and their legal heirs. We have considered the record and proceedings. We have gone through the judgement and reasons recorded by the Reference Court. 5. The first aspect, which may be required to be considered in the present matter, is the assessment of the market value of the land in question. The perusal of the judgement and the reasons recorded by the Reference Court and more particularly Paragraphs 27 to 31 of the impugned judgement shows that the Reference Court has mainly relied upon the earlier award passed by the Reference Court for acquisition of the land for ST Depot at the very village and the decision of the same was produced at Exh. 38. We find that if the Reference Court has relied upon the fixation of the compensation in respect of the land of the nearby area, which came to be acquired earlier, such approach on the part of the Reference Court cannot be said to be erroneous, since the said aspect can be considered as one of the most relevant and vital circumstances for assessment of the market value of the land. 6. We have considered the said documents at Exh. 38 namely the decision of the Reference Court for acquisition of the land in Reference Case Nos. 27 and 28 of 1981. The perusal of the said judgement shows that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act in that case was published on 15.3.1977, but the area under acquisition was admeasuring 1 acre 4 Are and 42 sq. mtrs., and another was 0 acre 90 Are and 04 sq. mtrs. Therefore, roughly it can be said that approximately 1.5 acre. The another relevant aspect is that in the very decision at Paragraph 16, the Reference Court observed that though the market value of the land was assessed at Rs. mtrs., and another was 0 acre 90 Are and 04 sq. mtrs. Therefore, roughly it can be said that approximately 1.5 acre. The another relevant aspect is that in the very decision at Paragraph 16, the Reference Court observed that though the market value of the land was assessed at Rs. 58/-, but as the compensation claimed was at Rs. 35/- per sq. mtrs., by the claimants of Land Reference Case No. 28/81 compensation was awarded at Rs. 35/- per sq. mtrs. The additional aspect required to be considered is that the assessment of the market price of the land was on the basis of the sale instances of the locality by making comparison of the lands with the non-agricultural land. 7. Keeping in view the said aforesaid aspect in mind, we need to further examine the impugned judgement. 8. We have considered the record and the sketch of the location of the land and the map produced. The Reference Court has found that the distance between the earlier land, which came to be acquired in the year 1977 of the land in question is approximately 1 km., and the another aspect is that the size of the area under acquisition in the present case is much larger, roughly about more than ten times than the land in question, which came to be acquired in the year 1977. Keeping in view the first aspect, the Reference Court has found it proper to make deduction of 33% and has assessed the market value of the land at Rs. 40/- per sq. mtrs., after recording the findings that the market value of the land, which came to be acquired in the year 1979 was assessed at the rate of Rs. 60/- per sq. mtrs., and if the deduction of 33% is made from the said price, the market price of the land in the present case would be Rs. 40/- per sq. mtrs. We find that to that extent it cannot be said that the Reference Court has committed error, but the basic, vital aspect, which has not been properly considered by the Reference Court, the nature and character of the land in question. The Reference Court has found that since after taking over of the possession of the land, subsequently the acquiring body has used the land for non-agricultural purpose. The Reference Court has found that since after taking over of the possession of the land, subsequently the acquiring body has used the land for non-agricultural purpose. Hence, thereafter as the permission has been granted for continuation of the use for non-agricultural purpose with retrospective effect, the land should be treated as non-agricultural land and thereafter, has proceeded to make the assessment of the market value. We find that such an approach on the part of the Reference Court is erroneous on the face of it for the reasons stated hereinafter. One is that the market value of the land has to be considered on the basis of the position prevailing prior to handing over of the possession or, in any case, when the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published, whichever is earlier. It is an admitted position that when the possession of the land was taken over on 18.2.1978, the nature and character of the land was as that of the agricultural land and not of non-agricultural land. The fact that subsequently the acquiring body unauthorizedly started making use of the land for non-agricultural purpose, as such cannot be read to earn any extra compensation by the original owners of the land, since it was not an action by the original owners, but was by the acquiring body. Even if it is considered that such unauthorized action for utilization of the land for non-agricultural purpose remained, then also such action on the part of the acquiring body, in normal circumstance, can be termed as an illegality committed, for which no party can be allowed to earn premium therefrom, much less any compensation. Apart from the above, even on the date when the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published i.e. on 13.7.1979, the land was not converted into non-agricultural purpose by permission of the competent authority and such permission came to be granted only on 9.1.1980 i.e. later to the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. If the character or the nature of the land was to be considered as legally permissible on the date when the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published, then also, it can be termed as the agricultural land and any unauthorized action undertaken by the acquiring body cannot be read for adding the market value of the land as sought to be canvassed. If such is entertained for the purpose of enhancing of the compensation, it would result into allowing party, who commits wrong or commits illegality to earn premium, which cannot be permitted. 9. Under these circumstances, we find that the nature or character of the land was agricultural land on the date when the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published, cannot be deemed as non-agricultural land, nor can be identified as non-agricultural land, since, in any case, lawful permission for utilization of the land for non-agricultural purpose was not available on that date. Therefore, if the land was agricultural land, it was required for the Reference Court to consider the aspects of valuation of the land having character of agricultural land. At this stage, we may refer to the decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat through Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Amaji Mohanji Thakore, reported in 2010 (3) GLH 447 and more particularly the observations made at Paragraphs 29 and 30 for finding out the difference between the market price of the agricultural land and non-agricultural land. The same reads as under:— “29. The aforesaid takes us to examine the next question about the nature of the land and change in the nature of the land, if any, and its effect for the purpose of the assessment of the market value of the land. 30. The order of the Collector dated 31.3.2006 for allotment of the land is of Block No. 1724 admeasuring 1 Hectre – 00 Are in favour of the Water Supply and Sewerage Board. The said order shows that the Valuation Committee has made the value of the land of the very village Kherwa on 10.5.2004 at Rs. 200/- per sq. mtrs. Further, the allotment of the land is for non-agricultural purpose for construction of Head Works in the Water Supply Project, whereas the land in question has been acquired as per the Notification under Section 4 of the Act on 1.12.2005 and the nature of the land was agricultural land and not non-agricultural land. If the area and the size of the different portions of the agricultural land acquired in the present case is considered claimant/owner-wise, in majority of the acquisition the area is less than 1 hectre. If the area and the size of the different portions of the agricultural land acquired in the present case is considered claimant/owner-wise, in majority of the acquisition the area is less than 1 hectre. Therefore, so far as the area is concerned and as the land allotted is 1 hectre and the acquisition of the majority of the land is less than 1 hectre per claimant/owner-wise there would not be any change or reduction in the valuation of the land of larger size acquisition as against the price fixed for a smaller area. The nature of the land or the character of the land under acquisition and the land which is allotted by the Direct Collector appears to be different inasmuch as the land under acquisition is acquired as agricultural land, whereas the land allotted by the Director Collector is though waste land, but for non-agricultural purpose. If any agricultural land is to be converted for non-agricultural purpose, there will be about 25% deduction in the area itself and further the conversion charges of agricultural land will have to be paid for non-agricultural use and such expenses for conversion would also be roughly 5%, by way of a burden upon the agricultural land. Therefore, it appears to us that if the aforesaid two circumstances are taken into consideration, the difference between the market price of the agricultural land and the market price of the non-agricultural land shall be minimum 30%. To say in other words, the agricultural land shall be less by 30% as against the price of the non-agricultural land.” 10. The aforesaid shows that as observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision the price of the agricultural land shall be less by 30% as against the price of the non-agricultural lands. We are inclined to take same view. Under these circumstances, even if it is accepted that the market price of the land was arrived at by the Reference Court by making appropriate deduction of 33% after making comparison and consequently Rs. 40/- per sq. mtrs., additional deduction of 30% would be required to be made. 30% of Rs. 40/- would to Rs. 12/- per sq. mtrs., and consequently, net amount would come to Rs. 28/- per sq. mtrs., which can be reasonably assessed as the market value of the land on the date when the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published. mtrs., additional deduction of 30% would be required to be made. 30% of Rs. 40/- would to Rs. 12/- per sq. mtrs., and consequently, net amount would come to Rs. 28/- per sq. mtrs., which can be reasonably assessed as the market value of the land on the date when the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published. Hence, we find that the findings recorded by the Reference Court for assessing the market value exceeding Rs. 28/- per sq. mtrs., cannot be sustained and ultimate conclusion deserves to be modified accordingly. 11. It further appears from the observations made by the Reference Court at Paragraph 32 of the impugned judgement that the Reference Court has proceeded on the wrong premise that either the claimants would be entitled to the interest under Section 28 from the date of taking over of the possession, which is prior to the Notification under Section 4 of the Act or would be entitled to the benefits under Section 23(1A) of the Act. The Reference Court as observed earlier has found that the interest would be available under Section 28 of the Act from the date of taking over of the possession, but has declined the admissibility of the benefits under Section 23(1A) of the Act. We find that such approach on the part of the Reference Court is erroneous on both the counts. 12. On the aspect of availability of the benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the Act is concerned, the law is well settled by the Constitutional Bench’s judgement of the Apex Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1994) 5 SCC 593 , wherein by majority view, at Paragraphs 74 and 75, it has been observed as under:— “74. If Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is construed in the light of the provisions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23(1 A), by itself, has no application to proceedings which had commenced prior to the enactment of the amending Act and the applicability of the said provision to pending proceedings is governed exclusively by Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. A perusal of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982. While Clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, Clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982. By virtue of Clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-1982. It covers (1) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both the Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A), independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15 the provisions of section 23(1-A) would have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1 A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1 A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1) Section 23(1-A) would not have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act. 75. Merely because Sub-section (1) of Section 30 only refers to award made by the Collector while Sub-section (2) of Section 30 also refers to an award made by the Court as well as the order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such award does not mean that Section 23(1-A) was intended to have application to all proceedings which were pending before the civil Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. The difference in the phraseology in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 only indicates the limited nature of the retrospectivity that has been given to provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) under Section 30(1) as compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 under Section 30(2). The limited scope of the retrospectivity that has been conferred in respect of Section 23(1-A) under Sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not lend support to the contention that the scope of such retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further retrospectivity into the provisions of Section 23(1-A). For the reasons aforementioned we are of the view that in relation to proceedings which were initiated prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act Section 23(1-A) would be applicable only to those cases which fall within the ambit of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. In this context it is also necessary to bear in mind the rule of statutory construction that even where a statute is clearly intended to be to some extent retrospective, it is not to be construed as having a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary. (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. In this context it is also necessary to bear in mind the rule of statutory construction that even where a statute is clearly intended to be to some extent retrospective, it is not to be construed as having a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary. (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, Para 924.) There is, therefore, no scope for extending the ambit of retrospective operation of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 beyond the limits specified in Section 30(1) of the amending Act so as to apply it to all proceedings initiated prior to the date of coming into force of the amending Act which were pending before the civil Court on reference under Section 18 of the principal Act irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. For the reasons aforementioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Zora Singh7 that Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending in the reference Court on the date of commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date on which award was made by the Collector. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 23(1 A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Filip Tiago 6 to mean that the obligation to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of the amending Act is confined to the matters covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view.” 12. We may also record that the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala and Ors. (Supra) has been subsequently considered by the Apex Court in a number of judgements and one of which can also be traced in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pralhad and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., reported in (2010) 10 SCC 458 , wherein, after considering the aspects of admissibility of the benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the Act, the Apex Court has further observed that even if the appeal or cross-objection are not preferred by the original claimant, such benefits could be available, if ultimately found by the Appellate Court. 13. 13. The examination of the facts of the present case shows that the land acquisition proceedings under the Act had commenced prior to the amending Act of 1984, which came into effect from 24.9.1984, but the effect is to be considered from the date of introduction of the Bill in the Parliament i.e. 30.4.1982. Taking into consideration the said aspect keeping in view the provisions of Section 30(1) of the Act of 1984, as the award has been passed in the present case after 30.4.1982 i.e. on 27.12.1983, the present case would be covered by the transitory provisions of Section 30(1) (a). Under the circumstances, benefit under Section 23(1-A) of the Act would be available to the original claimants on the market value for the purpose of awarding compensation. 14. The aforesaid aspect would take us to the examination of the aspect of interest awarded by the Reference Court from the date of taking over of the possession i.e. 18.2.1978 instead of the date for publication of notification dated 13.9.1979. At this stage we may refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors. vs. Punjaji Gopaji & Ors., in First Appeals No. 3615 of 2005 to 3616 of 2005, decided on 25.7.2011 wherein similar aspect came up for consideration about the entitlement of interest from the date prior to the publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. While examining the said aspect in the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed at Paragraph Nos. 32 to 42 as under:— “32.Aforesaid would take us to examine the aspect of fixation of awarding of rental compensation for the period prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. Learned AGP for the appellants contended that the Reference Court has committed great error in awarding interest under Section 28 of the Act for the period from the date of taking over of the possession until the amount is realised. She submitted that as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.L. Jain (D) by LRs vs. DDA and others, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 79 , it has been held that no interest under Section 28 or 34 of the Act can be awarded for the period prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. She submitted that, therefore, that part of the award passed by the Reference Court, in any case, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 33. Whereas learned Counsel appearing for the respondent claimants contended that, in any event, once the possession is taken over, the land owners are deprived of their property and if they are deprived of their property prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act, it is unauthorized action for which compensation, in any case, was required to be paid, but has not been paid. It was submitted that even in the award, there is reference to the same and, therefore, the Reference Court is justified in awarding interest as per Section 28 of the Act from the date of taking over of the possession. 34. It is true that as per the decision of the Apex Court in R.L. Jain (Supra), it has been ruled that Sections 28 and 34 of the Act do not provide for awarding of interest for the period prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act in the event the possession is taken over prior to the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. However, the matter does not end there. In the very decision, the Apex Court at Paragraph 18 has observed thus : “18. In a case where the land owner is dispossessed prior to the issuance of preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act the government merely takes possession of the land but the title thereof continues to vest with the land owner. It is fully open for the land owner to recover the possession of his land by taking appropriate legal proceedings. He is therefore only entitled to get rent or damages for use and occupation for the period the government retains possession of the property. Where possession is taken prior to the issuance of the preliminary notification, in our opinion, it will be just and equitable that the Collector may also determine the rent or damages for use of the property to which the land owner is entitled while determining the compensation amount payable to the land owner for the acquisition of the property. The provision of Section 48 of the Act lend support to such a course of action. For delayed payment of such amount appropriate interest at prevailing bank rate maybe awarded.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. The provision of Section 48 of the Act lend support to such a course of action. For delayed payment of such amount appropriate interest at prevailing bank rate maybe awarded.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. Aforesaid shows that it has been held by the Apex Court that where the possession is taken over prior to issuance of the preliminary notification, it will be just and equitable that the Collector may also determine rent or damages for use of the property to which the land owner is entitled while determining the compensation amount payable to the land owner for acquisition of the property. It has been also observed by the Apex Court that for delayed payment of such amount, appropriate interest at the prevailing bank rate may also be awarded. Further, if the matter is strictly examined in light of the provisions of the Watan Abolition Act, it appears that the possession of the land in question after enactment of the Watan Abolition Act was resumed by the Government under the said Act. Thereafter, as the lands were shown in the revenue record as that of the Government, the possession was taken over in the year 1966 by the Executive Engineer of the capital project. Therefore, one view may be available to contend that the claimants could be entitled for compensation under the Watan Abolition Act, however, it appears that as per Jasol Committee’s report, the rights of the land owners were crystallized on account of payment of occupancy price prior to taking over of the possession and the land was to be regranted by formal order in favour of the claimants, but the orders were not passed. Not only that, but the right of the claimants as occupiers and entitlement of regrant were recommended to be conferred upon the original claimants or their predecessor in title. The said report of the Jasol Committee as referred to hereinabove was accepted by the Government and accordingly, the land was treated as deemed regranted to the claimants from the date on which they were entitled to, which is prior to 1966. Not only that, but the basis of their right in the land as regrantee for lawfully occupants as per the Watan Abolition Act having been found accepted, the proposal for acquisition of the land was moved. Not only that, but the basis of their right in the land as regrantee for lawfully occupants as per the Watan Abolition Act having been found accepted, the proposal for acquisition of the land was moved. Under these circumstances, the possession as was taken from 1966 until the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published could be said as deprivation of the property to the land owners by the State without there being any authority under the law. In the acquisition proceedings, while passing the award under Section 11 of the act, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has also recognized the rights for compensation at Paragraph 15. Of course, he has used the language of rental amount as per the Government Resolution. As observed earlier in the award, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has not quantified compensation under the said head i.e. for taking over of the possession from 23.3.1966 until the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published. If the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court in the case of R.L. Jain (Supra) are considered, it was required for the Land Acquisition Officer to fix compensation simultaneously while passing the award. If there is failure on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer to award compensation under the said head and dispute is raised under Section 18 of the Act, the Reference Court will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same and to award appropriate compensation. 36. Mr. Shelat, learned Counsel for the respondent claimants, by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Madishetti Bala Ramul (D) by LRs. vs. The Land Acquisition Officer, reported in Judgment Today, 2007 (8) SC 180, contended that after considering earlier decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.L. Jain (Supra) in a case where the possession was taken over 9 years prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act, the Apex Court has found it proper to award compensation at 15% per annum and, therefore, he submitted that the same criteria may be applied even in the present case. 37. Whereas learned AGP contended that as per the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimants at the most could be entitled to the rental amount of the land in question. She also submitted that rental compensation was assessed by the Government and the amount of Rs. 37. Whereas learned AGP contended that as per the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimants at the most could be entitled to the rental amount of the land in question. She also submitted that rental compensation was assessed by the Government and the amount of Rs. 6408/- and the amount of Rs. 5310/- are already paid to the respective claimants and, therefore, she submitted that the same should be sufficient. It was also contended that valuation as made by the Reference Court on the date when the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of assessment of the rental value or compensation to be considered from 1966 roughly about 36 years back and, therefore, she submitted that valuation is to be made of the land in question as prevailing then for the respective period and thereafter compensation can be assessed. However, she contended that as per the resolution of the Government, rental compensation would be Rs. 4.5% per annum until 1984 (until the amendment was made in the Land Acquisition Act) and after 1984 from 24.9.1984 it is to be calculated at the rate of 9% per annum. She, therefore, submitted that it was accordingly calculated and rental compensation is already paid. 38. We find considerable force in the submission of learned AGP that even if rental compensation is to be paid for deprivation of the land to the land owner or occupant as the case may be, valuation cannot be considered as the basis as assessed in the year 2002, but in order to consider rental compensation, valuation is to be made or considered for the period prevailing then for respective rental compensation. We may also record that it is not a matter where possession has been taken over just few years prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act, but it is a case where possession was taken over before long span of 36 years prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. 39. We may also record that it is not a matter where possession has been taken over just few years prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act, but it is a case where possession was taken over before long span of 36 years prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. 39. In order to rationalize the situation and thereby to find out the fair market value of the land in question at the relevant point of time for the purpose or arriving at a reasonable rental compensation, it appears to us that the rental compensation should be decided on the basis of the fair market value of the property at the relevant point of time for each year.. Further it is required to be appreciated that if a flat rate appreciation or depreciation is considered by taking the basis of the prevailing market value, it may reach to the figure of ‘0’ (zero) value within a span of 10 years, if reverse depreciation in the value is considered at the rate of 10% per annum and if it is considered at the rate of 7% per annum, then also, it may result into ‘0’ (zero) value at the end of 14 years and consequence may arise that for the subsequent period beyond the aforesaid 10 years or 14 years, as the case may be, the rental compensation may not be available at all, since the value would be ‘0’ (zero). Such situation, in our view, cannot be termed as a reasonable, nor such would bring about the position enabling the original claimant(s)/land-owner(s) to claim any compensation. Under these circumstances, we find that it would be reasonable to apply the depreciation in the prevailing market value on the date when the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on a reducing balance method and thereafter whatever is the value available for the respective year the rental compensation, as observed and may be directed hereinafter, can be arrived at accordingly by applying a fixed percentage, as may be found proper. 40. The aforesaid would lead us to examine the aspects about the computation of rental compensation. It is true that the awarding of interest can also be treated as one of the compensatory measures for deprivation of the property to the land owner. 40. The aforesaid would lead us to examine the aspects about the computation of rental compensation. It is true that the awarding of interest can also be treated as one of the compensatory measures for deprivation of the property to the land owner. However, the distinguishing aspect in the said matter is that the value of the principal amount remains unaltered or at the most, it may result into appreciation by compounding manner only. To say in other words, if a particular amount is invested in a fixed deposit receipt with a Bank and interest is earned on the said amount, at the end of the maturity period, the principal amount would remain the same and there will be only addition of the interest which may be earned by way of compensatory measure. Such situation is not completely at par with the compensation to be paid by way of rental compensation. In a matter where any immovable property held by any person, and if he is permitting any other party to use it, he may earn rental amount from such property and such relationship of rental basis may continue for a particular span, but upon the expiry of the said rental contract or otherwise, the owner of the property will also be benefited by appreciation in the property and additionally he will get the rental compensation for the interregnum period. Such aspects would not be available in a matter where particular amount is invested with the Bank in any deposits and the person earns the interest therefrom. Under these circumstances, we find that it would be reasonable to award the compensation by applying the principles of rental compensation and not to award interest, since the distinguishing feature in the land acquisition matter is that the owner of the property is already to be benefited by the prevailing market value at the time when Notification under Section 4 of the Act is published. In the event the possession is taken over prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act, and the compensation is to be fixed for the period prior to the Notification under Section 4, it would be reasonable to award compensation by considering the criteria of rental income or rental compensation, which would leave room for earning the appreciation by owner of the property, which ultimately to be realized taking the basis of the market value on the date of Notification under Section 4 of the Act. We may also record that we are inclined to apply the said principle, keeping in view the particular aspect that the possession came to be taken over in the present matter before a long span of 36 years prior to the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. 41. The aforesaid would further lead us to examine the reasonable amount or a reasonable percentage of rental compensation. It appears that even as per the State Government after 1984 onwards the reasonable rental compensation is to be calculated at the rate of 9% per annum on account of the amendment made for enhancing of the interest, etc., in the Act. Prior to 1984, the rental compensation even as per the policy of the State Government was 4.5%. Further, in any case, as observed earlier, the owners/occupants of the property are to earn appreciation in the property for the aforesaid period. 42. Under these circumstances, we find that it would be reasonable to calculate the amount of rental compensation at the rate of 4.5% per annum from 1966 until 1983 and after 1984 until the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published in the year 2002, the rental compensation should be calculated at the rate of 9% per annum on the value of the property as prevailing then from time to time as stated hereinafter.” 15. But we may record that in the present case the period between the date on which the possession was taken over and the date on which notification under Section 4 was published is approximately one and half years only and, therefore, it would be appropriate to award interest at the rate of 9% per annum by making deduction of 10% of the price fixed at the rate of Rs. 28/- per sq. mtrs., and the rounded off figure can be considered at Rs. 25/- per sq. 28/- per sq. mtrs., and the rounded off figure can be considered at Rs. 25/- per sq. mtrs. The interest after the date of the award can be considered at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and 15% p.a., for the subsequent year until the amount is paid to the original claimants or deposited with the Court. In our view of such will take care of the aspect of appropriate compensation and/or rental compensation for the period from 18.2.1978 to 13.3.1979. Under the circumstances, the interest awarded by the Reference Court under Section 28 of the Act to that extent deserves to be modified. 16. It further transpires that the Reference Court has committed error in deducting 5% of the amount towards new tenure land for the land bearing Survey No. 206. It is by now well settled that no deduction is to be made towards the land, which is held by the concerned owner as a restricted or a new tenure land. Hence, the said part of the order passed by the Reference Court also deserves to be modified. 17. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, it is hereby observed and directed that the original claimants/land owners shall be entitled to the additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 28/- per sq. mtrs. The original claimants shall also be entitled to solatium under Section 23(2) of the Act, increase in the market value under Section 23(1-A) of the Act on the aforesaid amount of compensation. It is also further observed and directed that the original claimants shall be entitled to the interest under Section 28 of the Act on the aforesaid amount of compensation and the solatium but the interest on the solatium shall be w.e.f. 19.9.2001 in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Iyasamy & Anr. vs. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 464 . The amount of interest shall be payable from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act i.e. 13.9.1979 onwards and not prior thereto. 18. It is further observed and directed that the original claimants shall be entitled to the rental compensation at the rate of 9% per annum on the price of Rs. 25/- per sq. 18. It is further observed and directed that the original claimants shall be entitled to the rental compensation at the rate of 9% per annum on the price of Rs. 25/- per sq. mtrs., of the land in question and such amount of compensation at the rate of 9% p.a., shall be payable from the date of taking over possession of the land on 18.2.1978 until the award is passed under Section 11 of the Act i.e. 27.12.1983. Additionally, the original claimants after the date of the award shall be entitled to the interest on the aforesaid amount of rental compensation at the rate of 9% p.a., for the first year and for the subsequent year 15% p.a., until the amount is paid to the original claimants and/or deposited with the Court, whichever is earlier. 19. The amount of compensation, after adjustment of the amount already deposited, shall be deposited within a period of 08 (eight) weeks from the receipt of the copy of the judgement and order of this Court. 20. The judgement and award passed by the Reference Court is modified to the aforesaid extent. The appeals are partly allowed accordingly. Considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Record and proceedings be returned to the Reference Court. P P P P P