JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—This is a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 29.9.1988 passed in Civil Appeal No. 152 of 1986 (Mirza Anis Ahmad v. Chandrama Singh and others) by Additional District Judge, (Special Judge), Ghazipur. 2. This Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law : “1. Whether the Registered Power of Attorney under the provisions of Section 32 read with Section 33 and Section 17 (1) (b) of the Indian Registration Act could be revoked without registration or cancellation thereof” 3. Under an order dated 16.8.2010 (passed in this appeal) this appeal survives only between the Appellant No. 2 namely Ramjas Singh Yadav and the Respondent namely Mirja Anis Ahmad. 4. Mirja Anis Ahmad, who was the owner of Plot No. 273 area 0-18-0 biswa situate in Village Baleshar, Pargana Ihaburala, District Ghazipur executed a Registered Power of Attorney on 17.3.1967 in favour of Ram Ker Singh who executed registered Sale-deed dated 26.12.1975 transferring half share each to Chandrama Singh and Ramjas Singh Yadav. 5. Mirja Anis Ahmad (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) brought an Original Suit No. 123 of 1977 in the Court of Munsif Ghazipur for cancellation of Sale-deed dated 26.12.1975 and for possession mainly for the reason that he had cancelled the Power of Attorney dated 17.3.1967 by a notice dated 20.2.1973 hence Ramker Singh was not a competent person to act on his behalf to execute the sale-deed dated 26.12.1975. 6. The Trial Court non-suited the plaintiff by dismissing his suit vide the judgment and decree dated 17.4.1986. The plaintiff’s Civil Appeal No. 152 of 1986 has been allowed by the judgment and decree dated 29.9.1988 whereagainst this Second Appeal has been filed by the two vendees namely Chandrama Singh (hereinafter referred to as the defendant No. 1) and Ramjas Singh Yadav (hereinafter referred to as the defendant No. 2) as also the Power of Attorney Ramker Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Attorney). 7. The First Appellate Court recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff had proved by evidence that the notice dated 20.2.1973 was sent by registered post and was duly served on the Attorney. It took into consideration the evidence that was produced and proved. The postal receipt Ext. Ka-2 and postal acknowledge Ext. 7. The First Appellate Court recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff had proved by evidence that the notice dated 20.2.1973 was sent by registered post and was duly served on the Attorney. It took into consideration the evidence that was produced and proved. The postal receipt Ext. Ka-2 and postal acknowledge Ext. Ka-3 were proved by the hand writing and Finger Print Expert for the signature of the Attorney. The other Expert Report was considered and the Court found that when all the internal features of the signature tallied then a few external features on appearance could not be a ground to discard the Expert Evidence. It considered the admission of the attorney made in the proceedings for Bhumidhari Sanad where he had compromised with the plaintiff and such compromise was verified by the Presiding Officer and an order dated 19.7.1973 was passed (Ext.1). The Court took into account the oral statement of the witnesses and set aside the findings recorded by the trial Court for the reason that the Trial Court has erred by considering an isolated sentence whereas the oral statement as a whole should have been seen. When the entire oral statement indicated a particular stand then only one sentence was wrongly relied upon which was erroneously interpreted. The first appellate Court also held that the defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were not bona fide purchasers. The defendant No. 1 was real brother of the Attorney and although the plaintiff was present in the village they made no efforts to speak to the plaintiff even though the plaintiff and the Attorney were at issue in proceedings of Bhumidhari Sand and in proceedings dated 16.10.1975 under Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code. It held that no sale consideration was given to the plaintiff. The Court found two very relevant circumstances to disbelieve the plea of the Attorney. The first was that his power was cancelled by registered notice duly served and the second was the plaintiffs clear stand in the compromise that the Attorney was unnecessarily interfering in the plot No. 273. On the issue of jurisdiction the Court held in favour of the plaintiff since that issue had already attained finality between the parties up to the High Court. The plaintiff’s suit was decreed for possession and the sale-deed dated 26.12.1975 was cancelled. 8. On the issue of jurisdiction the Court held in favour of the plaintiff since that issue had already attained finality between the parties up to the High Court. The plaintiff’s suit was decreed for possession and the sale-deed dated 26.12.1975 was cancelled. 8. Sri Ashutosh Srivastava, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel and others v. Nirmala Jayprakash Tiwari, (2010) 5 SCC 104 . Sri M.D.Singh ‘’Shekhar’ learned senior counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has also relied on the same decision. The appellants have also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Saktivel (Dead) by L.Rs. v. M. Venugopal Pillai and others, (2000) 7 SCC 104 . 9. A power of attorney includes an instrument empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the person executing it. Under Section 2 of The Powers of Attorney Act, 1882 a holder of a Power of Attorney can execute and do all things with his own name and it shall be as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in the name of the donor thereof. This Act does not provide for registration of the Power of Attorney under The Indian Registration Act, 1908. In the case of T.C. Mathai and another v. District and Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, JT 1999(2) SC 494, it was held that a Power of Attorney is not a pleader as in Section 303 of Criminal Procedure Code. Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act would not override the statutory provisions of Criminal Procedure Code. On the same analogy it can be safely held that this Act will not override the statutory provisions of any other Act including The Registration Act, 1908. 10. The Power of Attorney dated 17.3.1967 is available on the record. It is a Power of Attorney relating to the agricultural land of the plaintiff and includes the power to sell the land. When there is a transfer of all rights and liabilities over the land including the power to transfer then it was required to be registered and was registered. The Power of Attorney contained a clause that it would not be disputed or that there shall be no dispute between the parties and it shall not be ignored. When there is a transfer of all rights and liabilities over the land including the power to transfer then it was required to be registered and was registered. The Power of Attorney contained a clause that it would not be disputed or that there shall be no dispute between the parties and it shall not be ignored. By its cancellation the rights created are sought to be extinguished. The rights created related to immovable property of a value of more than one hundred rupees. Hence under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act a document that creates or extinguishes any right in such immovable property would require registration. In the event a document required to be registered under Section 17 is not registered the effects of non registration are detailed under Section 49 of the Act. Such a document shall not affect any immovable property or confer any power or create any right or relationship. Therefore, in the present case the document whereby the registered Power of Attorney dated 17.3.1967 was cancelled required registration under Section 17 of the Act and since it was admittedly not registered the effect of non registration under Section 49 of the Act would affect it. 11. Section 32 of The Registration Act names the persons who can present a document for registration. They are the person executing the document or the person claiming under the document, or by the representative or assignee of the executor or by a power of attorney. In case a document required to be registered is presented by a power of attorney or by an agent, representative or assignee duly authorised by the power of attorney he can be a proper person for presentation of the document for registration only if the circumstances detailed in Sections 33 (1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act exist. They are quoted hereunder : “33. They are quoted hereunder : “33. Power of attorney recognizable for purposes of Section 32.—(1) For the purposes of Section 32, the following power of attorney shall alone be recognized namely : (a) if the principal at the time of executing the power of attorney resides in any part of India in which this Act is for the time being in force, a power of attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub- registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides; (b) if the principal at the time aforesaid resides in any part of India in which this Act is not in force, a power of attorney executed before and authenticated by any Magistrate; (c) if the principal at the time aforesaid does not reside in India, a power of attorney executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice Consul or representative of the Central Government.” 12. In the present case the facts attract only clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the Act. Admittedly the plaintiff was residing in India and the Act was in force at the place of his residence. The reason for giving the Power of Attorney by the plaintiff is detailed therein. He states that often he has to go out in connection with his business. It was not his case that he has to go out of India even in his pleadings. Therefore, for being recognised as the person entitled to present a document for registration the power of attorney was such a person under Section 32 of the Act. The circumstances indicate that on the date of the sale-deed dated 26.12.1975 was registered the plaintiff was present in the village. 13. The conclusion would, therefore, inevitably be that when the document/notice of cancellation dated 20.2.1973 was compulsorily registrable and it was not registered then even upon its execution or service upon the Attorney it would not in any manner affect the rights created under sale-deed dated 26.12.1975. It did not extinguish the rights created or assigned on the Attorney upon execution of a registered Power of Attorney. 14. Learned counsel for both the parties have referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel’s case (supra). Paragraph 40 of the judgment is quoted hereunder : “40. It did not extinguish the rights created or assigned on the Attorney upon execution of a registered Power of Attorney. 14. Learned counsel for both the parties have referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel’s case (supra). Paragraph 40 of the judgment is quoted hereunder : “40. It is crystal clear that the appellants chose not to avail an opportunity which was available to them. In such circumstances, it will not be appropriate to say that the deeds and documents as well as the powers of attorney executed in favour of Respondent 9 stood revoked merely by filing complaints with the police. We cannot lose sight of the fact that a registered document has a lot of sanctity attached to it and this sanctity cannot be allowed to be lost without following the proper procedure. The law is, therefore, absolutely clear. A registered document cannot be nullified by actions such as of filing police complaints. When there is a requirement of registration of a document that intends to cancel a previous registered document dealing with rights to immovable property then the previous registered document where from rights flowed and were created cannot be annulled except through the proper procedure. 15. In the case of S. Saktivel (supra) the Supreme Court laid down in paragraph 6 that the terms of a registered document can be altered, rescinded or varied only by a subsequent registered document and not otherwise’. Paragraph 6 is quoted here under : “6. In sum and substance what proviso (4) to Section 92 provides is that where a contract or disposition, not required by law to be in writing, has been arrived at orally then subsequent oral agreement modifying or rescinding the said contract or disposition can be substantiated by parol evidence and such evidence is admissible. Thus if a party has entered into a contract which is not required to be reduced in writing but such a contract has been reduced in writing, or it is oral, in such situations it is always open to the parties to the contract to modify its terms and even substitute by a new oral contract and it can be substantiated by parol evidence. In such kind of cases the oral evidence can be let in to prove that the earlier contract or agreement has been modified or substituted by a new oral agreement. In such kind of cases the oral evidence can be let in to prove that the earlier contract or agreement has been modified or substituted by a new oral agreement. Where under law a contract or disposition is required to be in writing and the same has been reduced to writing, its terms cannot be modified or altered or substituted by oral contract or disposition. No parol evidence will be admissible to substantiate such an oral contract or disposition. A document for its validity or effectiveness is required by law to be in writing and, therefore, no modification or alteration or substitution of such written document is permissible by parol evidence and it is only by another written document the terms of earlier written document can be altered, rescinded or substituted. There is another reason why the defendant-appellant cannot be permitted to let in parol evidence to substantiate the subsequent oral arrangement. The reason being that the settlement deed is a registered document. The second part of proviso (4) to Section 92 does not permit leading of parol evidence for proving a subsequent oral agreement modifying or rescinding the registered instrument. The terms of registered document can be altered, rescinded or varied only by subsequent registered document and not otherwise. If the oral arrangement as pleaded by the appellant, is allowed to be substantiated by parol evidence, it would mean rewriting of Ext. A-1 and, therefore, no parol evidence is permissible.” 16. The power of attorney dated 17.3.1967 was revocable. It did not contain any clause that it would be irrevocable. It only said that the parties thereto will not dispute it or ignore it. (INHARAF NA HOGA). Normally revocation is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person against whom it is made. In the present case the notice dated 20.2.1973 cancelling the power of attorney was duly served and received by the Attorney prior to the execution of the sale-deed dated 26.12.1975 by him. Admittedly it was a communication sent by the plaintiff to the Attorney. The power of attorney dated 17.3.1967 was not a mere proposal or just a promise. It was also not a simple agreement between the parties. An agreement between the parties would have to contain an element of consideration or act or omission to give it enforceability as a contract. The power of attorney dated 17.3.1967 was not a mere proposal or just a promise. It was also not a simple agreement between the parties. An agreement between the parties would have to contain an element of consideration or act or omission to give it enforceability as a contract. The power of attorney created rights in immoveable property including that of alienation. Being revocable it could be revoked. But not just by a communication. Since it dealt with immoveable property of a value of more than one hundred rupees and created a right to transfer the property it was compulsorily registrable. And when it was registered it could be revoked only upon execution of a registered document of revocation. Therefore, while finding that the power of attorney dated 17.3.1967 could be revoked but it was not revoked through the proper procedure. Hence due to non registration of the communication/document of revocation it could not affect the sale-deed dated 26.12.1975 executed by the Attorney nor it could affect the power of attorney dated 17.3.1967. The relationship of Principal and agent established through a registered deed could be validly terminated by a registered deed in view of the Registration Act. 17. On the question of sale consideration the first appellate Court has recorded that no sale consideration was given to the plaintiff. A perusal of the power of attorney indicates that there was no stipulation therein to the effect that if the attorney sells the land he would give the sale proceeds to the plaintiff. When all rights of an owner were vested with the attorney under a registered document including its liabilities then nothing further can be read into it as entitling the plaintiff to any sale consideration. If there had been such an intention it would have been so expressed. The giving or creating rights in the Attorney was definitely not as a gift or will. If it was a transfer of ownership rights the issue of sale consideration could be raised in case it was a sale-deed. When it was a power of attorney it could always contain a condition for payment of the sale consideration upon a transfer being affected by the Attorney. There was no such condition in the power of attorney dated 17.3.1967. When it was a power of attorney it could always contain a condition for payment of the sale consideration upon a transfer being affected by the Attorney. There was no such condition in the power of attorney dated 17.3.1967. Therefore, even if no sale consideration was given to the plaintiff the sale-deed dated 26.12.1075 executed by the Attorney in favour of the defendant- appellant No. 2 cannot be set aside for that reason. 18. It is, therefore, held that the notice/document dated 20.2.1973 sent by registered post being not registered under the Registration Act could not nullify the registered Power of Attorney dated 17.3.1967 since the subject matter was immoveable property of a value of more than one hundred rupees. The registered Power of Attorney could be validly revoked/cancelled by another registered document. The notice dated 20.2.1973 sent by registered post was only a communication and since it was not registered under The Registration Act it did not revoke the registered Power of Attorney dated 17.3.1967. The substantial question of law is answered as above. 19. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 152 of 1986 (Mirza Anis Ahmad v. Chandrama Singh and others) in so far as it is between the appellant No. 2 Ramjas Singh Yadav and Mirza Anis Ahmad is set aside. No order is passed as to costs. —————