JUDGMENT All the aforesaid four applications, arising out of the same case bearing No. R.C. 9(A)/97(D) since were heard together, are being disposed of by the common order. 2. The facts, giving rise these applications, are that the then Executing Engineer, N.H. Division, Barhi lodged a case alleging therein that the then Engineer-in-Chief-cum-Additional Commissioner-cum-Special Secretary, Road Construction Department, Bihar placed a supply order bearing No. 1757(E) dated 17.5.1995 to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (for short BPCL), Haldia to supply 500 MT of Bitumen to NH Division, Barhi, Hazaribagh. In response to that order, transporter-Vinay Kumar Sinha lifted 496.7 MT of Bitumen from Haldia but he supplied only 171.49 MT of Bitumen at NH Division, Barhi. Thereby, he misappropriated 325.21 MT of Bitumen as a result of which, the State exchequer was put to loss to the extent of Rs. 18.50 lakhs. 3. On the said written report, a case was registered as Barhi P.S. Case No. 159 of 1996 dated 7.9.1996 under Sections 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) against said Vinay Kumar Sinha. Thereafter, Barhi Police started investigating the case. Meanwhile, on 20.2.1997 an order was passed by the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 10417 1996 whereby the C.B.I. was directed to take up the investigation of the case. The C.B.I. took up the case and registered the case against said Vinay Kumar Sinha and some unknown officials of Road Construction Department, National Highway Division and other department as R.C. 9(A)/97(D) under Sections 406, 407, 409, 420 and 120B of IPC and also under Section 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 4. The C.B.I. after investigating the case submitted charge-sheet against these four petitioners, who are the officials of BPCL, and also against the officials of the Bihar Government disclosing therein that as per the arrangements between the Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar and the Oil Company, the bulk bitumen was to be collected by the transporter from BPCL at Haldia Oil Refinery for carrying it to Barauni by way of stock transfer under Product Dispatch Note (PDN). Thereafter, according to the need of the Consignee, the same was to be transported at different locations of the Road Construction Department, NH Division but, in fact, the bitumen tankers never used to come to Barauni, rather the tankers carrying bitumen used to come straightaway to Barhi from Haldia. In spite of that, the officials of BPCL used to prepare false documents like DGS & D invoices as well as CRC at Barauni. 5. It was further revealed that upon order being placed, under Order No. 1757(E) dated 17.5.1995 transporter-Vinay Kumar Sinha through his representative lifted 495.84 MT of bitumen from Haldia Oil Refinery and sold major portion of it at Kolkata and delivered only 160.22 MT of bitumen at Barhi without taking bulk bitumen to Barauni Refinery. At Barhi tile officials of the Road Construction Department granted receipts showing receipt of 495.84 MT of bulk bitumen. Thus, the State of Bihar was put to loss to the extent of Rs. 15.37 lakhs being the cost of rest 335.62 (326.28) MT of bitumen. That apart, the transporter though had never transported the bulk bitumen from Haldia to Barauni and then from Barauni to Barhi, still he was paid carriage charge of Rs. 4.8 lakhs approx for entire distances. 6. The role, which was allegedly found being played by the petitioner-B.P. Singh, the then Deputy General Manager, BPCL, Kolkata is that though he was aware that the tankers after lifting bitumen from Haldia are not reporting Barauni, rather straightaway taking the bitumen to Barhi. He appointed one D.C. Sarkar to do documentation work mainly for preparation of CCDA and CRC showing movement of tankers from Barauni to Barhi, as there was huge backlog of documentation being done at Barauni. This was allegedly done in order to accommodate the carriage transporter for getting the carriage charge from Haldia to Barauni. 7. The allegation against the petitioner-Farooque Khurshid Ahmad is that he was also quite aware of the fact that the tankers leaving Haldia Oil Refinery with bitumen are never reporting to Barauni still false documentation work of preparation of CCDA. CRC and DCS & D were being made at Barauni to show movement at tankers from Haldla to Barauni and then from Barauni to Barhi. It has been further alleged that lie even passed order to draw false documents at Garauni: 8. CRC and DCS & D were being made at Barauni to show movement at tankers from Haldla to Barauni and then from Barauni to Barhi. It has been further alleged that lie even passed order to draw false documents at Garauni: 8. So far the allegation against petitioner-P.B. Mishra, Senior Operation Officer, at Barauni is concerned, it has been alleged that he by putting signature over the CRC acknowledged the movement of tankers from Barauni to Barhi though in fact, the tankers never used to report at Barauni and thereby he facilitated the transporter to claim payment towards transportation charge from Haldia to Barauni. Similarly, it has been alleged against the petitioner-Dwarika Das, Senior Operation Officer, posted at Barauni that he also put signature over the PDN showing carriage of bulk bitumen from Haldia to Barauni. 9. On these allegations, the C.B.I. requested the Authority to pass order sanctioning prosecution of the petitioners under the provisions of the Prohibition (sic-Prevention ?) of Corruption Act. While the order was awaiting, C.B.I. submitted the charge-sheet against the petitioners under Sections 406, 407, 409, 420 and 120B of IPC. On submission of charge-sheet, the Special Judge, C.B.I. took cognizance of the offences against the petitioners. That order was challenged by the petitioners namely, B.P. Singh, Farooque Khurshij Allmad and Dwarika Das vide Cr. M.P. No. 345 of 2003. However, the Court vide its order dated 7.5.2003 rejected the said application after holding that there has been no illegality in taking cognizance of the offences against the petitioners. 10. Much thereafter, these applications under Section 482 of tile Code of Criminal Procedure have been filed for quashing the First Information Report. 11. Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that prior to November, 1933, bitumen was being supplied to the Consignees from Haldia Oil Refinery itself and in that process, the Government of Bihar used to lose sales tax and, therefore, an understanding arrived at in between the Government of Bihar and the Oil Companies that pricing point would be Barauni instead of Haldia Oil Refinery and thereby stock transfer of bitumen was supposed to be carried from Haldia to Barauni and then from Barauni Oil Refinery to different points of Consignee under documentation which was being done at Barauni. This arrangement was made only for the reason that the State of Bihar was losing sales tax on account of sale being made earlier from Haldia. 12. Learned counsel fairly submits that since Barhi was situated somewhere in between Haldia and Barauni, the transporter instead of going Barauni and then coming back to Barhj straightaway used to carry the bitumen from Haldia to Barhi. This practice had been adopted by all other companies. The other companies also used to carry bitumen from Haldia to Barhi through the transporter authorized by the State of Bihar. Since the other Oil Companies had adopted that practice, there was no way out for BPCL but to adopt the same otherwise it would have been losing business. Under this situation, bitumen was being carried under PDN showing stock transfer from Haldia to Barauni where in fact, the bitumen was never carried as the outlet had no facility to store the bitumen and as such, the bitumen was being carried straightway from Haldia to Barhi. Since under the agreement, bitumen was supposed to be carried from Haldia to Barauni and then from Barauni to the point of Consignee, documentation work such as preparation of CCDA and CRC for showing carriage of bitumen from Barauni to the place of Consignee used to be done at Barauni. Thus, there was no ill motive on the part of the officials of BPCL in not insisting upon the transporter to take bitumen from Haldia to Barauni and then from Barauni to the place of Consignee. 13. Therefore, under these situations, when the C.B.I. sought order of sanction for prosecuting the petitioners, the department refused to grant sanction for prosecution of the petitioners by well reasoned order being convinced that nothing wrong has been done on the part at the petitioners, rather in order to compete with the other Oil Companies, the petitioners followed the same suit which was being followed by other Oil Companies. 14. Learned counsel further submits that when the C.B.I. realized the situation, under which the business was being run, it never sought the officials of BPCL to prosecute them in other case registered as R.C. 12(A) of 1997(D). 15. 14. Learned counsel further submits that when the C.B.I. realized the situation, under which the business was being run, it never sought the officials of BPCL to prosecute them in other case registered as R.C. 12(A) of 1997(D). 15. Learned counsel further submits that so far petitioner-B.P. Singh is concerned, he at relevant point of time was posted as Deputy General Manager at Haldia, who is being sought to be prosecuted on the allegation that he had appointed one D.C. Sarkar for doing documentation work at Barauni but certain documents would go to show that it was the decision of the Higher Authority of the Company at Kolkata to appoint D.C. Sarkar so that backlog of the documentation work be cleared at Barauni. Therefore, in absence of any materials showing petitioner-B.P. Singh being in league of the other accused particularly the transporter and the officials of the Bihar Government for committing offence of forgery or misappropriation, he cannot be said to have committed any offence under the Indian Penal Code. 16. Similar is the situation with the petitioner-Farooque Khurshid Ahmad, who at relevant point of time was posted at Patna, whose jurisdiction was certainly not at Barhi, rather it was within the jurisdiction of the person who had been posted at Ranchi and, therefore, he could not be imputed with any allegation of committing offence of forgery or misappropriation even if he did have knowledge of tankers not reporting at-Barauni and in spite of that the documentation work was being made at Barauni. 17. The similar is the position with other petitioners-P.B. Mishra and Dwarika Das, both Senior Operation Officers, who at relevant point of time were posted at Barauni and had been entrusted with the jobs of doing documentation work at Barauni but since that was being done under the accepted norms of the Company, they also cannot be said to have involved themselves in any manner in the alleged offence of forgery or misappropriation and cheating. 18. 18. Further, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is whatever act was done by the petitioners, it was done in the business interest of the Company and, therefore, the Competent Authority of the Company never granted order of sanction to prosecute the petitioners and if the order refusing sanction is taken into consideration by this Court, the circumstances would come to the surface under which the act was done by the petitioners in good faith keeping in view the business interest of the Company. Since the order refusing sanction is a document of unimpeachable character of sterling quantity, it can always be taken notice of by this Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent abuse of the process of law in view of the decision rendered in the case of State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005)1 S.C.C. 568] [ : 2005(1) JLJR (SC) 348]. Similar view was propounded in the case of Rukmini Narvekar vs. Vijaya Satardekar and Others [ (2008)14 S.C.C. 1 ], whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court putting reliance in Pad his case did hold that it is not an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges though this should be done in very rare cases i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. 19. Learned counsel further submits that on the same charge/allegation on which the C.B.I. has built up his case, the petitioners were put on departmental proceeding, whereby all of them have been exonerated and, therefore, in view of the ratio laid down in the case of P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar [ (1996)9 S.C.C. 1 ], it would not be desirable at all to allow the petitioners to face rigor of the trial, as when the petitioners have been exonerated in a departmental proceeding where the standard of proof to establish the guilt is much more less than the standard required to prove the criminal charge possibility would always be case ending in acquittal. 20. As against this, Mr. 20. As against this, Mr. Mokhtar Khan, learned counsel for the C.B.I., submits that as per the materials collected during investigation by the C.B.I., all the petitioners were knowing that the transporters carrying bitumen were not reporting to Barauni, rather they were taking bitumen from Haldia to Barhi straightaway, still documents were prepared at Barauni showing transportation of bitumen from Haldia to Barauni and then from Barauni to Barhi and thereby the accused persons in conspiracy with each other facilitated the transporters to have transportation charge from Haldia to Barauni and then from Barauni to Barhi putting the State exchequer to loss and that when the prima facie case is there, the Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure• would be loath in quashing the First Information Report. It was also submitted that whatever material has come in the order refusing sanction that is in defence of the accused which cannot be looked into at this stage when the petitioners have come to this Court for quashing the First Information Report and under these situations, all the applications are fit to be rejected by this Court. 21. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it does appear that the case of the prosecution and even as per the petitioners, in nutshell, is that there has been certain guidelines/norms laid down by the BPCL under which bitumen was to be supplied to the Consignees but those norms were not adhered to and as per the petitioners could not have been adhered to in the interest of the business of the Company. However, the procedure, which was adopted for delivering the bitumen, resulted into less coverage of the distance by the transporters in carrying the bitumen, but the transporters were allowed to have payment for the distance which was actually not travelled by them. However, as per the argument, advanced on behalf of the petitioners that deviation in the procedure though was within the knowledge of all the petitioners but they allowed it without there being any ill motive, rather it was allowed in the best interest of the Company which was found even by the Authority while dealing with the matter relating to sanction of prosecution and also by the Authority, who held the departmental inquiry and found the petitioners to be innocent. But the fact remains that the transporters did not cover the entire distance i.e. Haldia to Barauni and then from Barauni to Barhi and in spite of that, the transporters were allegedly paid transport charges of the full distance and according to the case of the prosecution, the petitioners facilitated the transporters to have transportation charges which they were not entitled to. However, as per the case of the petitioners, they were allowed without there being any motive. In such situation, the question does arise as to whether the First Information Report warrants to be quashed? 22. The principle providing for exercise of power by a High Court under 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash an F.I.R./Criminal Proceeding is well known. The Court shall ordinarily exercise the said jurisdiction inter alia, in the event the allegations contained in the FIR or the complaint petition even if on face value taken to be correct in their entirety, does not disclose commission of an offence. It is also well settled that save and except in very exceptional circumstances, the court would not look to any document relied upon by the accused in support of his defence. In a case of R. Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta ((2009)1 S.C.C. 516] following propositions of law has been laid down:-- (i) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and in particular a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety disclose any cognizable offence. (ii) For the said purpose the Court save and except in very exceptional circumstances would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (iii) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly, if the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mensrea, or actus reus. 23. (iii) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly, if the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mensrea, or actus reus. 23. It the instant case, the materials collected by the C.B.I. during investigation for laying down the charge-sheet prima facie disclose the commission of the offences alleged but as per the petitioners, any abrasion in the procedure relating to carriage of bitumen facilitating the transporters to pecuniary gain was unintentional evidently clear from the documents refusing sanction and the reports exonerating the petitioners from the charges but as per the decision referred to above any finding recorded at this stage as to whether the petitioners had any intention or not .to put the transporters to pecuniary gain would be unwarranted, rather that needs to be thrashed out during trial. Thus, I do not find it a fit case for exercising inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of the First Information Report for the reasons, stated above, and also for the reasons that earlier when cognizance of the offences was taken against the three petitioners by the Special Judge, C.B.I., order taking cognizance was challenged in Cr. M.P. No. 345 of 2003 which was dismissed. 24. It be further recorded that where cognizance of the offence has already been taken, it would not be desirable in view of the observation made in a case of Mahesh Choudhary vs. State of Rajasthan [ (2009)4 SCC 439 ] to quash the F.I.R. 25. Thus, I do not find any merit in these applications and, hence, these applications stand dismissed.