JUDGMENT 1. The appellant-plaintiff has filed this second appeal under section 100 of C.P.C., against the judgment and decree dated 19.5.2001, passed by the First Additional District Judge, Bhind, District Bhind in Civil Appeal No. 45-A/2000, whereby the judgment and decree dated 18.9.2000, passed by the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 475-A/1998 has been reversed and set aside. 2. This Second Appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 26.4.2008 on the following substantial question of law :- “i) Whether the First Appellate Court committed error of law in dismissing the suit filed by the appellant on the ground that the suit filed by the appellant is barred by time? 3. The plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration, injunction and delivery of possession. He pleaded that he was the Maurusi Kashtakar of the suit land which was given to him by the then Zamindar. Thereafter he became Pakka Krishak and owner of the land. His name was also entered in the revenue record. In the year 1995, he left his house and went to live with his daughter because he was an old,aged and disabled person. At the time of settlement of Village Sanduri in the year 1995 when he did not receive the revenue papers of the land, he enquired from the Settlement Officer and found that the land was recorded in the name of defendants. Then he received the revenue papers. He came to know that vide an order dated 11.5.1971, the suit land was allotted in the name of Dhan Singh. 4. The defendants denied the claim of the plaintiff. They admitted the fact that the name of the plaintiff Shyam Lal was recorded as Maurusi Kashtkar in half of the portion of the land and half of the portion was in the name of Ramcharan. The possession of the land was with the forefathers of the defendants and thereafter the land was mutated in the name of Dhan Singh. 5. The trial Court after appreciation of evidence has held that the defendants by playing fraud recorded the land in their name by way of mutation, however, the land is of the plaintiff. He is the owner of the land and awarded decree of injunction, declaration and possession in favour of plaintiff. 6. 5. The trial Court after appreciation of evidence has held that the defendants by playing fraud recorded the land in their name by way of mutation, however, the land is of the plaintiff. He is the owner of the land and awarded decree of injunction, declaration and possession in favour of plaintiff. 6. The first appellate Court on appeal reversed the findings after holding that the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation, hence, suit is barred by time. 7. The trial Court framed the issue No. 4 in regard to limitation and held that as per the pleadings of the defendants also the plaintiff was the Maurusi Kashtkar of the land and thereafter he became the Pakka Krishak of the land. The trial Court further held that the defendants failed to prove the fact that how their names were mutated in the revenue record by way of mutation in the year 1971. After appreciation of evidence, the trial Court further held that without any evidence of ownership by playing a fraud, the defendants got their name mutated in the revenue record. The defendants themselves did not plead any plea of adverse possession. Hence, the suit is well within the limitation. 8. In the present case, admittedly the defendants have not filed any counter-claim in regard to their plea of ownership on the basis of adverse possession. The defendants themselves admitted that the plaintiff was the Maurusi Kashtkar of the half of the suit land. After abolition of Zamindari, the plaintiff became Pakka Krishak of the land and Bhoomiswami. In such circumstances, it was obligatory on the part of the defendants to prove that how their names were recorded as owner of the land by way of mutation. In such circumstances, the finding of the trial Court by playing fraud the name of defendants were recorded in the mutation is in accordance with law. 9. When there is no pleading on behalf of the defendants in regard to adverse possession, then the finding of the first appellate Court on the basis of oral evidence that the defendants were in possession of the land since 1971 is against the law. The first appellate Court relied in arriving at on the aforesaid finding on the basis of oral appreciation of evidence. The plaintiff specifically pleaded that the defendants got possession of the land on 1.7.1996. 10. The first appellate Court relied in arriving at on the aforesaid finding on the basis of oral appreciation of evidence. The plaintiff specifically pleaded that the defendants got possession of the land on 1.7.1996. 10. The learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ram Nath v. Baijnath and others, reported in [2005 RN 339 = 2005 (4) MPLJ 72 ], has held as in regard to Article 65 of the Limitation Act :- 11. Now the question is whether the suit is within limitation or not. Counsel for the appellant urged that the present suit is not on the basis of title and, therefore, it will be governed by Article 64 of the Limitation Act and as the suit is not filed within twelve years from the date of expiry of two years period the suit is barred by limitation. According to him as per section 165 (2) (a) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code period of six years is maximum period. In the present case as the parties have agreed to reconvey the property within two years, the period of lilmitation will start after expiry of two years and, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. He further submits that even if it is held that property is redeemed after expiry of six years i.e. in the year 1975, still the suit which filed in the year 1991 is barred by limitation and, therefore, the suit be dismissed as time barred. For this purpose counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ramsingh v. Kashiram, 1997 RN 195 wherein it is held that once a period of six years is expired in case of usufructuary mortgage in respect of agricultural land then suit for redemption is not maintainable as the property is already redeemed by virtue of section 165 (2) (1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. 11-A. From the persual of the aforesaid judgment I find that this Court in the aforesaid case has not laid down about the nature of possession of a mortgagee after expiry of the said period. It is true that the suit for redemption will not lie as there is an automatic redemption but nonetheless a suit for possession is maintainable. 11-A. From the persual of the aforesaid judgment I find that this Court in the aforesaid case has not laid down about the nature of possession of a mortgagee after expiry of the said period. It is true that the suit for redemption will not lie as there is an automatic redemption but nonetheless a suit for possession is maintainable. In the present case, the plaintiffs have not only prayed for the relief of redemption but have also prayed for possession which cannot be said to be not maintainable in view of the aforesaid judgment. 11. Looking to the aforesaid principle of law and the facts of the case in may opinion, the first appellate Court has committed an error of law in holding that the suit is barred by limitation. I answer the substantial question of law accordingly by holding that the suit is not barred by limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 12. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 19.5.2001, passed by the First Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 45-A/2010 is hereby quashed and the judgment and decree dated 18.9.2000, passed by the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 475-A/1998 is hereby upheld. Looking to the facts of the case, parties are directed to bear their own cost of appeal.