Judgment Smt. Abhilasha Kumari, J.—Rule. Mr. Dipen A. Desai, learned advocate, waives service of notice of Rule for Respondent No. 1 – Gujarat Technological University, in each of the petitions. Respondent No. 2 has not appeared before this Court, pursuant to service of notice. As no relief has been sought against Respondent No. 2, in any of the petitions, the Court does not consider it necessary to issue Rule to the said respondent. As common questions of fact and law arise in the petitions, they are being heard together and decided by a common judgment. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the facts as stated in Special Civil Application No. 14430/2011, shall be noticed. 2. This petition under Article-226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred, inter-alia, with a prayer to quash and set aside the order dated 27.07.2011, passed by Respondent No. 1 – University, whereby the results of the petitioner in all subjects of the current Semester Examination, have been cancelled, and they have been debarred from appearing in the next two Summer/Winter examinations, that are to be conducted by the respondent – University. 3. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are that, the petitioner is a student of Respondent No. 2 – Institution, and has passed the 4th Semester, in the course of Civil Engineering. On 31.05.2011, the petitioner appeared in the 3rd Semester Remedial Examination in the subject of Mathematics-III. On 12.07.2011, the petitioner received a notice from Respondent No. 2, asking him to remain present before Respondent No. 1, at the stipulated date and time, in connection with the hearing in connection with the use of unfair means in the Examination held by the respondent – University, during May to July, 2011. The petitioner appeared before Respondent No. 1 on 20.07.2011, as directed. It is the case of the petitioner that he has not been provided an opportunity of hearing by Respondent No. 1. According to the petitioner, he was directed to give a written statement. The petitioner denied the allegation regarding use of unfair means, by giving the statement. However, the impugned order dated 27.07.2011 was issued, holding the petitioner guilty of indulging in unfair means. A penalty as per Clause-3(D) of Circular dated 03.11.2010 of the University has been imposed upon the petitioner. Hence, the petition. 4. Mr. The petitioner denied the allegation regarding use of unfair means, by giving the statement. However, the impugned order dated 27.07.2011 was issued, holding the petitioner guilty of indulging in unfair means. A penalty as per Clause-3(D) of Circular dated 03.11.2010 of the University has been imposed upon the petitioner. Hence, the petition. 4. Mr. Dipak B. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted : (a) That the imposition of the penalty upon the petitioner is unjust and illegal, as the respondent – University has not issued a Show Cause Notice to the petitioner or supplied him with a copy of the Examiner’s Report, on the basis of which action has been taken. (b) That the Observers and Supervisors, who were present in the Examination Hall, have not made any Report or complaint regarding mass copying, or indulgence in unfair means by the petitioner. Moreover, no material has been recovered from the petitioner. Therefore, there is no material on record to sustain the allegation against the petitioner. (c) The petitioner has been deprived of an opportunity of a proper and adequate hearing and putting up a defence, and has been prejudiced due to non-supply of material documents, on the basis of which the action has been taken against him. That there is a serious violation of the principles of natural justice, therefore, the impugned decision may be quashed and set aside. (d) That the Examination Committee has not conducted any further scrutiny or inquiry regarding the Report submitted by the Examiner, in order to arrive at a satisfaction that the petitioner has indeed indulged in unfair means. The inference based by the Examiner has not been put to scrutiny by any Expert Body, which ought to have been done, considering the severity of the penalty that is sought to be imposed. Instead of this, the report of the Examiner has been accepted in toto, straightway, without application of mind. (e) The impugned order whereby the decision of the Examination Committee has been conveyed to the petitioner is an unreasonable and non-speaking one. (f) That the Examiner’s report upon which reliance has been placed by the University, has been placed on record for the first time along with the affidavit-in-reply, but has never been supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner has not been called upon to render any explanation on the basis of the same, at any point of time. 5. (f) That the Examiner’s report upon which reliance has been placed by the University, has been placed on record for the first time along with the affidavit-in-reply, but has never been supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner has not been called upon to render any explanation on the basis of the same, at any point of time. 5. Reliance has been placed by the learned advocate for the petitioners upon the judgments dated 17/18/19.10.2011 passed in Special Civil Application No. 5979/2011 and judgment dated 08.11.2011 passed in Special Civil Application No. 13441/2011 with Special Civil Application No. 15424/2011, on the same issue, pertaining to the same University, wherein the impugned orders have been quashed and set aside, on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. 6. Mr. Dipen A. Desai, learned advocate for the respondent-University has submitted (i) That the petitioners were aware that they have been called to appear before the Examination Committee for use of unfair means, as the notice issued to Respondent No. 2–Institution contains this stipulation. There has been no violation of principles of natural justice and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners. (ii) That the Examiner has stated in his Report that the petitioners have given identical answers to certain questions in the Mathematics paper and have made the same mistakes. He has rightly arrived at an inference that mass copying has taken place. (iii) That there may not be direct evidence of copying, and in such circumstances, indirect evidence and the preponderance of probabilities ought to be taken into consideration. (iv) That cases of malpractice in examinations should be dealt with severely, so as to maintain educational standards. The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is as per the Circular of the respondent-University and cannot be said to be harsh or disproportionate. Further, this Court may not interfere under Article-226 of the Constitution of India. The learned advocate for the respondent – University fairly submits that the present cases are similar to the cases of the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 5979/2011 decided on 17/18/19.10.2011, in which the Court has set aside the impugned orders, on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, and liberty has been reserved to the respondent – University to take fresh action, in accordance with law. 7. 7. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and in view of the statements made at the Bar and considering the material on record, the following aspects emerge for consideration of the Court: (A) Admittedly, no Show Cause Notice has been issued to the petitioners, therefore, it follows that they were not in a position to reply effectively to the allegations made by the respondent – University against them. The only communication that has been received by the petitioners before issuance of the Show Cause Notice is that dated 12.07.2011 from Respondent No. 2 – Institution, informing them that they are to remain present before the respondent–University at the specified time and date, in connection with the hearing of an unfair means case. The details regarding the unfair means allegedly used by them have not been mentioned, and Respondent No. 1 has not addressed any communication directly to the petitioners regarding the same. Owing to this, it does appear that the petitioners have been deprived of an opportunity of defending themselves, or even offering an explanation. They have straightway been asked to appear before the Examination Committee on 20.07.2011, which they did. (B) What transpired before the Examination Committee is not known, as there is no material on record regarding this aspect. The grounds on which the Examination Committee has arrived at the final decision, and the reasons that have weighed with it in doing so, have never seen the light of day. Not only has the decision of the Examination Committee, and the reasons in support thereof, not been supplied to the petitioners, this record has not been produced before this Court as well. In such circumstances, it is not possible to ascertain how, and for what reason the Examination Committee came to the conclusion that the petitioners are guilty of indulging in unfair means. (C) It does not transpire from the record that the Report of the Examiner, which is the basis of the action against the petitioners, has been subjected to any further scrutiny by an Expert Body. It is significant to note, that the Examiner has arrived at an inference after checking the papers of the petitioners as, they have given identical answers to certain questions, and have made the same mistakes. It is significant to note, that the Examiner has arrived at an inference after checking the papers of the petitioners as, they have given identical answers to certain questions, and have made the same mistakes. Looking to the severe nature of punishment imposed upon the petitioners, it would stand to reason that some further verification of the Report of the Examiner ought to have been conducted by the Examination Committee, before imposition of penalty. (D) By not serving the petitioners with a Show Cause Notice, amounts to denying them an opportunity to put up an effective defence. By not supplying a copy of the Examiner’s Report, which forms basis of the action against them, the petitioners have been deprived of a reasonable and adequate opportunity of hearing. In the view of this Court, this would amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice. As the results of the petitioners for all the Examinations in the current Semester have been cancelled, and they have been debarred from appearing in next two Summer/Winter Examinations, it follows that grave prejudice has been caused to them, as this penalty would have an adverse effect upon their studies and their careers. (E) It is no doubt true, that ordinarily the decisions taken by an Educational Institution, in educational matters, should not be lightly interfered with, by Courts. The standards of education ought to be maintained, and with this end in view, educational institutions may be within their rights in taking action in cases where the use of unfair means is detected. However, it is equally true, that any action taken by an educational institution, ought to conform to the settled principles of law, and meet with the requirement of the principles of natural justice and fair play. This requirement assumes greater importance if the action taken against the offenders entails civil consequences, which are likely to cause serious prejudice. (F) An opportunity of hearing should not be reduced to a mere formality. It would entail providing a reasonable and adequate opportunity of hearing. By not providing crucial documents to the petitioners, and by not issuing a Show Cause Notice specifying the nature of their alleged misdemeanors and not granting them an opportunity of defending themselves, the petitioners have been deprived of a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing, that amounts to a violation of the principles of natural justice. 8. By not providing crucial documents to the petitioners, and by not issuing a Show Cause Notice specifying the nature of their alleged misdemeanors and not granting them an opportunity of defending themselves, the petitioners have been deprived of a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing, that amounts to a violation of the principles of natural justice. 8. In Malavkumar Arunbhai Patel vs. Sardar University and Others, this Court, after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court, has held as below: “22. The provisions of Section 23(xxxii) of the Act make it clear that the Syndicate was fully empowered to constitute the “Unfair Means Committee”. Therefore, the ground taken by the petitioner that the Committee, being contrary to the Ordinance of the University, had no power to inflict the punishment upon the petitioner and that the proceedings should be declared null and void is not correct and is not accepted. 23. Any action taken by an administrative or quasi judicial authority which entails civil consequences should only be taken after complying with the principles of natural justice. Although the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula, it cannot be disputed that the doctrine of natural justice exists not only to secure justice but also to prevent the miscarriage of justice. It is true that strict rules of evidence do not apply in proceedings such as those which took place in the case of the petitioner before the “Unfair Means Committee”. However, even the requirement of preponderance of probabilities has not been adhered to since the impugned Notification dated October 4,2000 as well as the Minutes of the proceedings which led to the passing of the impugned order do not disclose the material which was available with the committee which pointed out the involvement of the petitioner in the incident. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is also not a speaking one and does not disclose the reasons or the grounds on which the decision to permanently debar the petitioner has been taken. 24. In A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 the aim and relevance of the principles of natural justice have been clearly enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Para 20 thereof, which reads as under: “20. 24. In A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 the aim and relevance of the principles of natural justice have been clearly enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Para 20 thereof, which reads as under: “20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (Audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George vs. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, D/- 15.07.1968 = ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George vs. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, D/- 15.07.1968 = ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” 25. Further in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant, reported in (2001)1 SCC 182 , the Supreme Court has held as under in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the reported judgment: “Since the decision of this Court in Kraipak’s case (A. K. Kraipak vs. Union of India) one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean? Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge vs. Baldwin very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances - who then is a reasonable man - the man on the clapham omnibus? In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge vs. Baldwin in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds good even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below (SCC p.387, Para 8) “8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. Ltd. vs. Union of India upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below (SCC p.387, Para 8) “8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in H.K. (an infant), In re. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case as ‘insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances’. However, even the application of the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Everything will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, L.J observed in Russell vs. Duke of Norfolk: “The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth.” 2. While it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine, the law courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most-accepted methodology of a governmental action.” 26. It is now an accepted proposition of law that any statutory body which is entrusted by statute with discretion, must act fairly. It does not matter whether its functions are described as judicial or quasi-judicial on the one hand, or as administrative on the other. Even an administrative order, which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. Although the expression ‘civil consequences’ has not been defined anywhere, the observation made in Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 at Para-66 on page 440 is relevant in this context and reads as below: “What is civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, by passing verbal booby-traps? ‘Civil consequences’ undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties material deprivation and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence” 27. The permanent debarring of the petitioner from appearing in any examinations conducted by the University and from seeking admission in any of the courses to be conducted by the University, no doubt entails serious civil consequences. In these circumstances, the rule of Audi Alteram Partem should have been followed by the respondents. The principle that no man should be condemned unheard and both sides must be heard in order to ensure fairness on the part of the deciding authority or body before passing any order is well known. A person against whom any action is sought to be taken which entails civil consequences must have knowledge about the allegations/ charges/materials against him on the basis of which such a decision is sought to be taken. 28. A person against whom any action is sought to be taken which entails civil consequences must have knowledge about the allegations/ charges/materials against him on the basis of which such a decision is sought to be taken. 28. The Committee such as the “Unfair Means Committee” constituted by the Respondent No. 1 can be said to be acting quasi-judicially, although the Statute may not provide, in so many words, that the authority passing the order is required to act judicially. The very nature of rights affected are such that the authority passing the order is, in fact, required to act judicially and in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Fairness in action is a fundamental ingredient of the principles of natural justice wherein justice should not only be done but should also manifestly be seen to be done, in order to ensure that the authority arrives at a just decision which affects the rights of a person.” 9. In view of the principles of law enunciated in the above-quoted judgment, which are applicable to the facts of the present case, and for reasons stated in Special Civil Application No. 5979/2011 dated 17/18/19.10.2011, and Special Civil Application No. 13441/2011 and connected petitions, dated 08.11.2011, in the considered view of this Court, the impugned decision dated 27.07.2011 of the Respondent No. 1 – University, deserves to be quashed and set aside, on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. 10. For the aforestated reasons, the petition is partly-allowed. The impugned communication dated 27.07.2011 of Respondent No. 1 – University, imposing penalty upon the petitioners, is quashed and set aside, as being violative of the principles of natural justice. However, liberty is reserved to the respondent-University to take fresh action, in accordance with law, by following the principles of natural justice and providing the petitioners with all relevant material, including the Report of the Examiner and the actual decision of the Examination Committee, before any further action is taken. 11. It is clarified that, as this Court has interfered only on the grounds of violation of the principles of natural justice, the merits of the cases have not been entered into, therefore, it is not considered necessary to deal with the other aspects of the matter or contentions, raised by either side. 12. 11. It is clarified that, as this Court has interfered only on the grounds of violation of the principles of natural justice, the merits of the cases have not been entered into, therefore, it is not considered necessary to deal with the other aspects of the matter or contentions, raised by either side. 12. It is further clarified that, it is open to the Institutions in which the petitioners are studying to permit the petitioners to attend classes, if thought fit, subject to any further decision that may be taken by the respondent-University. 13. Rule is made absolute, to the above extent. There shall be no orders as to costs. P P P P P