Judgment : Both the appeals are filed questioning the common judgment of the lower appellate Court in A.S.Nos.13 of 1991 and 7 of 1997 dated 18.11.1998, which reversed the judgment of the trial Court in O.S.Nos.138 and 172 of 181 dated 21.12.1990. 2. The appellants as well as the respondents herein filed the aforesaid two cross-suits for injunction relating to same property and both of them had obtained temporary injunction against each other. The respondents, however, lost possession during the pendency of their suit O.S.No.136 of 1981 and therefore, sought amendment of plaint to seek relief for possession. The amendment was allowed and the respondents’ suit for permanent injunction was amended to that for possession. The trial Court held in favour of the respondents on almost all the issues but dismissed the suit on the ground that it does not disclose the cause of action for seeking relief of possession and consequently, decreed the appellants’ suit O.S.No.172 of 1981 for injunction. On appeals, the lower appellate Court has revered the said decree and while decreeing the suit of the respondents for possession had dismissed the appellants’ suit for injunction; hence, these second appeals. 3. One of the principal questions urged by Mr. K. V. Subrahmanya Narusu, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, is that in the respondents’ suit for possession there were no consequential averments in the plaint in support of even the basic claim of the respondents that they have lost possession on a particular day pending the suit nor there is any cause of action set out in the plaint and except the substitution of relief sought for, the rest of the body of the plaint continued to show, as if it is a suit for injunction. Learned senior counsel, therefore, placed strong reliance upon Order 6 Rule 18 as well as Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and relied upon the following decisions: UNION OF INDIA v. PRAMOD GUPTA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND OTHERS (2005) 12 SCC 1; SMT. SISIR KANA GUHA v. AYAKAR GRIHANIRMAN SAMABAYA SAMITY LTD. AIR 2002 CALCUTTA 247; T. SRIRAMULU v. STATE OF KERALA 1971 (1) An.W.R. 168; SAMAR SINGH v. KEDAR NATH AIR 1987 SC 1926 ; RAM SARUP GUPTA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND OTHERS (2005) 12 SCC 1; SMT. SISIR KANA GUHA v. AYAKAR GRIHANIRMAN SAMABAYA SAMITY LTD. AIR 2002 CALCUTTA 247; T. SRIRAMULU v. STATE OF KERALA 1971 (1) An.W.R. 168; SAMAR SINGH v. KEDAR NATH AIR 1987 SC 1926 ; RAM SARUP GUPTA (DEAD) BY LRS. V. BISHUN NARAIN INTER COLLEGE AND OTHERS AIR 1987 SC 1242 ; SHAIK MUNNI v. M/s. JAGAN MOHAN SALT INDUSTRIES, CALINGAPATNAM AND OTHERS 2003 (1) ALT 112 and RAJ KUMAR v. DIPENDER KAUR SETHI (2005) SCCR 166 4. Based on the above decisions, learned senior counsel contends that the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to disclose cause of action seeking relief for possession was fully justified and ought not to have been interfered with by the lower appellate Court. 5. The second appeals were admitted on 16.04.1999 on the following question: “Whether the first appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit, which was originally framed as one for injunction based on title, subsequently the amendment petition for converting it as a suit for possession having been dismissed by the trial Court, in the absence of any averments as to when the plaintiffs were dispossessed and when the cause of action arose for the suit for recovery of possession?” 6. I have heard at length Mr. K.V. Subrahmanya Narusu, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. G. Vasantha Rayudu, learned counsel for the respondents and also called for amendment application filed by the plaintiffs from the lower Court records and perused the respondents’ application I.A.No.720 of 1988. The said record, which was called for was also perused by the both the learned counsel and they have been heard again in that respect as well. 7. I am of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeals are liable to be dismissed by answering the substantial question of law against the appellants. The reasons, therefor, are as follows. 8. The undisputed facts are as follows: (a) The suit schedule property in both the suits is one and the same and the said property belonged to one Batti Jogayya of Battigalluru. His wife predeceased him, but B. Jogayya had one daughter by name Jogamma, who was married to Kandi Ramayya. The reasons, therefor, are as follows. 8. The undisputed facts are as follows: (a) The suit schedule property in both the suits is one and the same and the said property belonged to one Batti Jogayya of Battigalluru. His wife predeceased him, but B. Jogayya had one daughter by name Jogamma, who was married to Kandi Ramayya. After the death of B. Jogayya, Kandi Jogamma became the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and she is survived by three sons, who are respondents herein. At the time of death of Kandi Ramayya and Kandi Jogamma, all the respondents were minors and they alleged that they were cultivating the land with the help of their uncle Kandi Bairagi. The appellants’ claim that the respondents 1 and 2 represented by their guardian Kandi Bairagi sold the suit schedule property to the father of the appellants under registered sale deed dated 10.01.1972. The appellants claim that they were in possession since then. While the respondents filed O.S.No.136 of 1981 for perpetual injunction and obtained interim injunction in I.A.No.441 of 1981 to protect their possession, the appellants claimed that to resist dispossession, under the garb of interim injunction granted in favour of the respondents, they also filed O.S.No.172 of 1981 for permanent injunction and obtained temporary injunction in I.A.No.574 of 1981. The appellants, therefore, claimed that under the sale deed dated 10.01.1972 they are having legal and valid title and are continuing in possession. It was also alleged that the first respondent being 25 years; the second respondent being 23 years and the third respondent being 18 years on the date of the suit, the suit claim of the respondents is barred. (b) As mentioned above, the amendment application was filed by the respondents seeking relief of possession, which was ultimately allowed by this Court in CRP.No.500 of 1989 dated 24.08.1989 and in the relief portion, ‘perpetual injunction’ was substituted by ‘delivery of possession’ but no consequential amendment to the plaint was made by the respondents, which is the primary reason for the trial Court to dismiss the suit of the respondents for not disclosing the cause of action. On the other issues, the trial Court held that Kandi Bairagi, the uncle of the respondents, cannot, in law, represent as guardian of the respondents and in law, has no right to sell the property of the minor respondents to the appellants’ father, as claimed by the appellants. Consequently, it held that Ex.B1 sale deed of the appellants is void and not binding on the respondents. It also held that the respondents were not in possession on the date of the suit and that the appellants being in possession, their suit for injunction was decreed and the suit of the respondents was dismissed. (c) The lower appellate Court while reversing the said decree by taking note of the fact that the defendants had led evidence of being in possession of the property by virtue of Ex.B1 sale deed but the evidence produced on behalf of the defendants only shows their possession since 1982 and consequently, on the date of the respondents’ suit, it was held that the defendants failed to establish their possession and that the respondents were dispossessed pending the suit. The lower appellate Court held that the said Kandi Bairagi, who executed Ex.B1 sale deed, was not competent guardian and Ex.B1 is not a valid document of title in favour of the defendants/appellants herein. The lower appellate Court, however, went on to consider as if the respondents’ suit is justified under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and ultimately, held that the respondents are entitled to possession. 9. Learned senior counsel for the appellants criticized the judgment of the lower appellate Court by contending that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act has no application whatsoever and the lower appellate Court has completely misdirected itself. Learned senior counsel placed great stress on the aspect of the plaint not containing any consequential amendments after relief for possession was sought for and the bare reading of the plaint shows that the said objection of the learned counsel is fully justified, as apparently the counsel appearing for the respondents has failed to seek and carry out consequential amendments in the plaint. Thus, while the body of the plaint shows, as if it is a suit for injunction, the relief portion shows that it is a suit seeking possession. Thus, while the body of the plaint shows, as if it is a suit for injunction, the relief portion shows that it is a suit seeking possession. Placing reliance on the judgments above, the learned senior counsel contended that on account of the said fatal defect in the plaint, the suit must be dismissed. 10. Learned senior counsel, however, was unable to substantiate as to how the defendants/appellants have acquired valid title by obtaining sale deed from Kandi Bairagi, the uncle of the minor respondents. Ex.B1 sale deed under which the respondents claim title and possession is not preceded by any permission of a competent civil Court under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act nor on the face of it any legality of the said title is evident. To the extent of the title claimed by the appellants, therefore, it is to be held that the appellants are squatting on the suit schedule property without any valid title since 1972, as found by the lower appellate court whereas the respondents, who are rightful owners of the property, have been deprived of the possession notwithstanding the pre-existing title by survivorship vesting in them. 11. Having reached the finding of title, as above, the crucial question that needs resolution is whether, in the absence of consequential amendments justifying the relief of possession, the respondents are entitled to the decree for possession? As stated above, I had called for the lower Court record relating to I.A.No.720 of 1988. The affidavit filed by the first respondent in support of the said application, the material portion of the affidavit is worth extracting. “I am the 1st plaintiff. I am acquainted with the facts of the case. I and my two brothers have filed the suit for permanent injunction. We have also obtained temporary injunction against them. At the time of drafting we gave some wrong information with regard to extent, patta No. and village in which the land is situated. But the identity of the lands is the same. Later, the defendants took possession from us by using brutal force. So the suit filed by us requires some amendment i.e., In the suit in the prayer column in the place of “to restrain the defendants from entering into or interfering with the enjoyment etc.” “To deliver the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs”. Later, the defendants took possession from us by using brutal force. So the suit filed by us requires some amendment i.e., In the suit in the prayer column in the place of “to restrain the defendants from entering into or interfering with the enjoyment etc.” “To deliver the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs”. In the schedule:-Extent Ac.1.42 instead of Ac.2.47 cents; Patta No. 129 instead of 29; Village: Ionkaluru instead of Battigalluru” 12. The said amendment application was opposed by the appellants herein by filing counter objecting to the delay of 4 years in seeking amendment of plaint that too after evidence is led and the main objection was with regard to the reopening of the suit for the purpose of said amendment. The appellants filed another counter affidavit pointing out that the affidavit filed by the first respondent in the said IA was a forged one or procured by impersonation on the ground that the first respondent was not in the village on the date of the affidavit and opposing amendment on the ground of delay amounts to introducing new case. The trial Court, on consideration, had dismissed the said application of the respondents by order dated 21.11.1988. The said application was, however, allowed by this Court in CRP.No.500 of 1989 dated 24.08.1989. Though the reasoning of the lower appellate Court applying Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be approved, the ultimate decision of the lower appellate Court deserves to be upheld for the reasons mentioned herein. 13. The objections of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to non-mentioning of cause of action for the relief of possession would have a bearing and would have been considered by the Court had there been only the suit of the respondents, initially for injunction and later for possession, but in the present case, the appellants also filed a suit for injunction claiming possession i.e. O.S.No.172 of 1981 and a memo filed before the trial Court by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs in both the suits for joint trial accepts the fact that the subject matter of both the suits is one and the same. The appellants, therefore, were justifying their possession and seeking injunction against the respondents whereas the respondents initially claiming injunction, sought possession against the appellants as they lost possession pending the suit and consequently, thereafter sought relief of delivery of possession. The appellants, therefore, were justifying their possession and seeking injunction against the respondents whereas the respondents initially claiming injunction, sought possession against the appellants as they lost possession pending the suit and consequently, thereafter sought relief of delivery of possession. It must be kept in mind that we are concerned with the plaint, which was drafted in the Mufossil Court and the pleadings in the Mufossil Courts cannot be considered in a strict technical manner unlike that of pleadings in metropolitan cities. Rules of pleading as embodied under Orders 7 and 8 of CPC require that the plaintiff shall give all facts surrounding the cause of action and showing that the Court has jurisdiction so that the defendant would be in a position to effectively reply to the said statements in the plaint. In other words, the objects under the aforesaid Orders 7 and 8 CPC is to ensure that the defendant is not taken by surprise while defending the claim of the plaintiff. In this context as early as in 1964 the Supreme Court in BADAT & Co. v. EAST INDIA TRADING Co. AIR 1964 SC 538 laid down the rule as to how the pleadings in mofussil Courts have to be construed and the relevant portion is extracted as under: “10. Have the conditions been proved in the present case? I shall first take the arguments based on the pleadings. Before doing so, it would be convent to read the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject, as the arguments turn upon the application of those provisions to the pleadings. 11. Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes, among others, that the plaintiff shall give in the plaint the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose, and the facts showing that the court has jurisdiction. The object is to enable the defendant to ascertain from the plaint the necessary facts so that he may admit or deny them. Order VIII provides for the filing of a written-statement, the particulars to be contained therein and the manner of doing so; rules 3, 4 and 5 thereof are relevant to the present enquiry and they read: Order VIII Rule 3. Order VIII provides for the filing of a written-statement, the particulars to be contained therein and the manner of doing so; rules 3, 4 and 5 thereof are relevant to the present enquiry and they read: Order VIII Rule 3. It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. R. 4 Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. R. 5. Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically, or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. These three rules from an integrated code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. The written-statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when a defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. If his denial of a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary. The first paragraph of R. 5 is a reproduction of O. XIX, R. 13, of the English rules made under the Judicature Acts. But in mofussil Courts in India, where pleadings were not precisely drawn, it was found in practice that if they were strictly construed in terms of the said provisions, grave injustice would be done to parties with genuine claims. But in mofussil Courts in India, where pleadings were not precisely drawn, it was found in practice that if they were strictly construed in terms of the said provisions, grave injustice would be done to parties with genuine claims. To do justice between those parties, for which Courts are intended, the rigor of R. 5 has been modified by the introduction of the proviso thereto. Under that proviso the Court may, in its discretion, require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. In the matter of mofussil pleadings, Courts, presumably relying upon the said proviso, tolerated more laxity in the pleadings in the interest of justice. But on the Original side of the Bombay High Court, we are told, the pleadings are drafted by trained lawyers bestowing serious thought and with precision. In construing such pleadings the proviso can be invoked only in exceptional circumstances to prevent obvious injustice to a party or to relieve him from the results of an accidental slip or omission, but not to help a party who designedly made vague denials and thereafter sought to rely upon them for non-suiting the plaintiff. The discretion under the proviso must be exercised by a Court having regard to the justice of a cause with particular reference to the nature of the parties, the standard of drafting obtaining in a locality, and the traditions and conventions of a Court wherein such pleadings are filed…” In another context and in generally construing the pleadings, the Supreme Court in SYED DASTAGIR v. T.R. GOPALAKRISHNA SETTY (1999) 6 SCC 337 has held as follows: “9. So whole gamut of issue raised is, how to construe a plea specially with reference to Section 16(c) and what are the obligations which the plaintiff has to comply with reference to his plea and whether the plea of the plaintiff could not be construed to conform to the requirement of the aforesaid Section, or does this section require specific words to be pleaded that he has performed or has always been ready and is willing to perform his part of the contract. In construing a plea in any pleading, Courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. In construing a plea in any pleading, Courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise, some times vague but still could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depends on the person drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are drafted by counsels hence aforesaid difference of pleas which inevitably differ from one to other. Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. This does not distract one from performing his obligations as required under a statute. But to test, whether he has performed his obligations one has to see the pith and substance of a plea. Where a statute requires any fact to be pleaded then that has to be pleaded may be in any form. Same plea may be stated by different persons through different words then how could it be constricted to be only in any particular nomenclature or word. Unless statute specifically require for a plea to be in any particular form, it can be in any form. No specific phraseology or language is required to take such a plea. The language in Section 16(c) does not require any specific phraseology but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has always been and is willing to perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of 'Readiness and willingness' has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. So to insist for mechanical production of the exact words of an statute is to insist for the form rather than essence. So absence of form cannot dissolve an essence if already pleaded.” 14. In view of the principle above, therefore, there is substantial reason for overlooking the deficiency in the plaint consequent upon the amendment of the relief for two main reasons: (1) The appellants themselves had filed cross-suit for injunction claiming possession and that was tried and disposed of along with the suit of the respondents and (2) The appellants also were specifically aware of the respondents case that they have lost possession pending the suit and are seeking recovery of possession from the appellants. I am unable to see any prejudice being caused to the appellants on account of any deficiency in carrying out consequential amendments in the body of the plaint. The averments and prayer in the amendment application of the respondents/plaintiffs were opposed by the appellants only on the ground of being belated and the same was rightly not accepted by this Court in CRP.No.500 of 1989 dated 24.08.1989. The appellants, therefore, were expressly aware of the respondents’ averment that they lost possession during the pendency of the suit and were seeking relief of possession. This aspect coupled with the finding, referred to above, that the title claimed by the appellants is on the face of it not valid leads to the only conclusion that the possession of the appellants over the suit schedule property is wholly unauthorized in law. The respondents, who are original title holders, admittedly, by survivorship, cannot be denied the relief of possession merely on the ground of technical pleas raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. 15. The decisions cited by the learned senior counsel, referred to above, are clearly distinguishable as most of the decisions dealt with principles of rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which is not an issue involved in the present case. Secondly, the decision of the Supreme Court in PRAMOD GUPTA’s case (1 supra) also does not assist the learned senior counsel, but the proposition therein in paras 134 to 138 relate to amendment of memo of appeal rather than the original pleadings and consequence of failure to amend the pleadings within the period specified under Order 6 Rule 18 CPC. Therefore, I am unable to see as to how that decision is applicable to the facts of the present case, when the respondents, admittedly, had carried out amendment with regard to the amended relief, as allowed by this Court in CRP.No.500 of 1989. The effect of the respondents not carrying out amendment in the body of the plaint, consequent upon the amended relief sought for, in the circumstances is not such a fatal defect, as the appellants’ suit for injunction claiming possession was jointly tried and disposed of along with the respondents’ suit and as mentioned above, the appellants’ had express notice of the claim for possession made by the respondents. In that view of the matter, the substantial question of law is answered against the appellants. In that view of the matter, the substantial question of law is answered against the appellants. Both the appeals are liable to be dismissed for the reasons mentioned above. In the result, the second appeals are dismissed. Since the decree for possession follows in view of the dismissal of these appeals, the appellants are granted time till 31.01.2012 to vacate and handover the possession of the schedule premises to the respondents. There shall be no order as to costs.