JUDGMENT A.C. Upadhyay, J. 1. The challenge in the writ petition is to the order passed by the respondent, suspending the petitioner from his service and subsequent order of drawing up departmental proceeding against him. 2. Facts, necessary for disposal of this writ petition, may be stated as follows: 3. In the year 1970, the Petitioner joined as constable in Tripura Police and continued to serve the department to the best of his abilities and to the satisfaction of all concerned. 4. In the year 1973, the Petitioner was promoted to the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (Armed Branch). This promotion of the Petitioner was made in recognition of his efficiency and satisfactory service. During the tenure of his service, the Petitioner was given as many as 29 rewards, out of which, 24 were major rewards of the department as a police officer. 5. On 30.09.1982, the Petitioner was confirmed as Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (Armed Branch), in the police Department. On 25.06.1975 the Petitioner was attached to the office of the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Cash Section. Since then, he was working in the cash section of the office of the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura. The Petitioner was entrusted with the bills of the Department for presentation to the Treasury and consequent encashment of bills. The Petitioner used to receive payments from the State Bank of India and then hand over the money to the Cashier. 6. For certain period, the Petitioner was also required to put his signature, as a token of receipt of bills and after encashment of the bills he was supposed to give receipts of the money, however, but no receipt was ever issued to the Petitioner by the cashier. 7. In the meanwhile, vide DO No. 9983 dated 23.12.1987, issued by the Respondent No. 2, the Petitioner was placed under suspension with immediate effect, for gross mis-conduct. Thereafter, the Inspector of Police, (DIB) West, West Tripura, Agartala, lodged a formal complaint dated 21.09.1988 to the officer-in-charge of West Agartala police station, alleging misappropriation of Government money by the Petitioner and requesting to register a case and investigate. Thereafter, the Inspector of Police, (DIB) West, West Tripura, Agartala, lodged a formal complaint dated 21.09.1988 to the officer-in-charge of West Agartala police station, alleging misappropriation of Government money by the Petitioner and requesting to register a case and investigate. The FIR disclosed that the Petitioner, who was attached with the cash section of the office of the Superintendent of Police since 1975 to 18.11.1987 was entrusted the duty to encash the bills from the State Bank of India, Agartala Branch through Agartala Treasury and then to deposit the same with the cashier of the police office (West), Agartala, for further action towards receipt and disbursement. It was found by the officials in the department on scrutiny that several bills were drawn by the Petitioner between 30.07.1985 to 30.06.1987. Upon several reminders by the police department, the Petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 1,02,200/- with the department. However, the remaining sum of Rs. 2,43,921'89 was not deposited by the Petitioner with the cashier, police office, West Tripura. It has been alleged in the FIR that the Petitioner misappropriated a sum of Rs. 2,43,921'89 of the Government. In the meanwhile, by an order dated 11.10.1993 the suspension of the Petitioner was revoked by the Respondent No. 2. 8. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the Petitioner was put under suspension for almost six years without initiating departmental proceeding, besides, after the Petitioner surrendered before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, he was remanded to judicial custody for 28 days, whereafter he was released on bail. 9. After the revocation of suspension order, a proceeding was drawn up against the Petitioner by the Respondent purportedly in exercise of powers under Regulation 861 of the Police Regulation of Bengal on the following charges: Annexure-I Statement of articles of charge framed against Ar.ASI Narayan Mishra of West Tripura District in connection with Department Proceeding No. 08/94 dated 10-2-94. Article-I That Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR(West) is charged for gross misconduct in that while he was attached with the works of encashment of bills from S.B.I., Agartala Branch through Agartala Treasury and to deposit the same to Cashier. Police Office (West), he made a lot of irregularities during the year 1985 to 1987 as could be detected by the then D.D.O. (West). Police Office (West), he made a lot of irregularities during the year 1985 to 1987 as could be detected by the then D.D.O. (West). Thus he failed to show his performance in duty by violating the constitutions procedure of the general duties and showed such a conduct which is unbecoming of a police officer. Article-II That Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR (West) is charged for gross misconduct and dereliction of duty in that while he was attached to Cash Section of Police Office (West), on 21.3.87 he was instructed to make entries in the Treasury/Bank Movement Register regularly before depositing the bills in treasury and after encashment of the same from the S.B.I., Agartala Branch to make similar entries. But he did not pay any attention on the matter in spite of repeated instructions/persuations from the concerned DDO (West) for his ulterior motive. Thus he intentionally violated the lawful order of the authority and showed such a conduct which is unbecoming of a police officer. Article-III That Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR (West) is charged for gross misconduct in that while he was attached to Cash Section, Police Office (West), number of bills which were endorsed to him for encashment from S.B.I., Agartala Branch, he kept pending with him during the year 1985 to 1987 without any reasons/justifications though he was directed to give day to day progress of the work to the cashier and Accountant, Police Office (West). But the said Armed A.S.I. Mishra did not feel it necessary to inform either to Cashier or the Accountant regarding drawal of the bills for the reasons best known to him. Thus he intentionally violated the constitutional procedure of the police force and showed such conduct which is unbecoming of a Police Officer. Annexure-II Statement of imputation of gross misconduct and dereliction of duty in support of the articles of charge framed against Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR, West Tripura District. Thus he intentionally violated the constitutional procedure of the police force and showed such conduct which is unbecoming of a Police Officer. Annexure-II Statement of imputation of gross misconduct and dereliction of duty in support of the articles of charge framed against Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR, West Tripura District. Article-I From the report of Shri Ranjit Kumar Das, Cash Section, Police Office (West) dated 4.3.90 and other documents, it transpired that Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR (West) while attached to Cash Section of Police Office (West) and was entrusted with the works of encashment of bills from SBI, Agartala Branch through Agartala Treasury and to deposit the same to Cashier, Police Office (West), he made a lot of irregularities during the year 1985 to 1987 as could be detected by the then D.D.O. (West). Thus he failed to show his performance in duty by violating the constitutional procedure of the general duties and showed such a conduct which is unbecoming of a Police Officer. Article-II From the report of Shri Ranjit Kumar Das, Cash Section, Police Office (West) dated 4.3.90 and other documents, it transpired that Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR (West) while was attached to Cash Section of Police Office (West) on 21.3.87 he was instructed to make entries in the Treasury/Bank Movement Register regularly before depositing the bills in Treasury and after encashment of the same from the SBI, Agartala Branch to make similar entries, but he did not pay any attention on the matter in spite of repeated instructions/persuasion from the concerned DDO (West) for his ulterior motive. Thus he intentionally violated the lawful order of the authority and showed such a conduct which is unbecoming of a Police Officer. Article-III From the report of Shri Ranjit Kumar Das, Cash Section, Police Office (West) dated 4.3.90 and other documents, it transpired that Armed ASI Narayan Mishra of DAR (West) while attached to Cash Section of Police Office (West) number of bills which were endorsed to him for encashment from SBI, Agartala Branch, he kept pending with him during the year 1985 to 1987 without any reasons/justifications though he was directed to give day-to-day progress of the work to the Cashier and the Accountant, Police Office (West) regarding drawal of the bills for the reasons best known to him. Thus he intentionally violated the constitutional procedure of the police force and showed such a conduct which is unbecoming of a police officer. 10. Having no alternative, the Petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court praying for quashing, setting aside and reversing the impugned order of suspension and consequent departmental proceeding. The writ petition was registered as Civil Rule No. 172 of 1994. In the writ proceeding Rule was issued by this Court, to which the Respondent filed the counter affidavit to the writ petition and rejoinder to the counter affidavit was filed by the Petitioner. Thus the case was ready for hearing and disposal. However, basing on an incorrect information about the death of the Petitioner, the writ petition was withdrawn, but subsequently, when it was known that the information was wrong, on the prayer so made before the Court on behalf of the Petitioner, the writ petition was restored to file. 11. In the meantime, charge-sheet was submitted in the criminal case instituted against the Petitioner, alleging commission of offence under Section 409 Indian Penal Code. On conclusion of the trial of the case, the Petitioner was acquitted of the charges under Section 409 Indian Penal Code. 12. Mr. S. Talapatra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted that the crux and core of the charge in criminal case and the departmental proceeding are same based on similar allegations. The same set of witnesses, who were to be examined to prove the charges in the criminal case against the Petitioner, are also listed in Annexure-III to the Memo of the departmental proceeding, are sought to be examined in support of the disciplinary proceeding pending against the Petitioner. 13. Mr. Talapatra, learned Senior Counsel submitted that since the Petitioner has been acquitted from the criminal charges, the departmental proceeding pending against the Petitioner on same charges based on same set of allegation with common witnesses, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, ought to have been closed. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner pointed out that as the departmental proceeding and criminal case are based on identical set of fact, if the employee is acquitted in the criminal charges, the order of acquittal in the criminal case in fact concludes departmental proceedings. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the decisions of Capt. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the decisions of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Coal Mines Ltd. AIR (1999) SC 1416. 34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the Respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, 'the raid conducted at the Appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles there from.' The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the Appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the Appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the Appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the Appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the Appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the Appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the Appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex-parte departmental proceedings, to stand. 36. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge, in so far as it purports to allow the Writ Petition, is upheld. The learned Single Judge has also given liberty to the Respondents to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, specially having regard to the fact that the Appellant is undergoing this agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted by the criminal court in 1987, we would not direct any fresh departmental inquiry to be instituted against him on the same set of facts. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, specially having regard to the fact that the Appellant is undergoing this agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted by the criminal court in 1987, we would not direct any fresh departmental inquiry to be instituted against him on the same set of facts. The Appellant shall be reinstated forthwith on the post of Security Officer and shall also be paid entire arrears of salary, together with all allowances from the date of suspension till his reinstatement, within three months. The Appellant would also be entitled to his cost which is quantified as Rest, 15,000/- 14. In order to appreciate whether the trial of the Petitioner in the criminal charge was based on same sets of facts as stated in the departmental proceeding, it would be apposite to depict herein the charges framed against the Petitioner in the criminal case being G.R. No. 1676 of 1988, wherein the Petitioner was acquitted. The charge framed by the learned Court below under Sections 406 and 409 Indian Penal Code reads as follows: I, Shri S.R. Deb, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Agartala, Tripura (West) do hereby charge you shri Narayan Misra as under - i) That you were attached with the cash section in the Office of the Superintendent of Police (West) Agartala, Since 1975 to August 1988 and being a Government Official as Armed A.S.I. you were entrusted to encash the bills from the State Bank of India, Agartala Branch, Agartala, through Agartala Treasury as endorsed to you. You were then required to deposit the same to the Cashier but since 1984 to August, 1988 several bills were drawn by you after encashment from the Bank but you unauthorisedly retained an amount of Rest. 6,53,673'46 paise for considerable period from January, 1984 to August, 1988 and converted the same to your use and thereby you committed Criminal breach of trust. Thereby you committed an offence Under Section 406 I.P.C. and within my cognizance. ii) That during the tenure of Service from January 1984 to August 1988 as Armed A.S.I. and a public servant you were attached with the Cashier in the Office of Superintendent of Police (West) Agartala and entrusted to encash bills from the State Bank of India, Agartala Branch through Agartala Treasure and to deposit the same to the Cashier. You have encashed the bills an amount of Rest. You have encashed the bills an amount of Rest. 2,83,284'73 paise from the Bank in your capacity as a public servant but you did not deposit the same to the Cashier as required and as such you committed a Criminal breach of trust in respect of the property amounting to Rest. 2,83,284'73 paise and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 409 of I.P.C. and within my cognizance. 15. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner drew the attention of the Court to the judgment of the learned Trial Court in the trial of criminal charge against the Petitioner, wherein it has been observed that the defalcation and misappropriation of Government money, allegation against the Petitioner, may have been committed by persons other than the Petitioner. The concluding observation of the Trial Court is given hereinbelow, for the purpose of appreciation of the decision arrived at the criminal trial, against the Petitioner. The extract of the decision of the learned Trial Court reads as follows: 10. I have carefully gone through the report of the special audit conducted by the A.G., Agartala which disclosed that the maintenance of cash book in the office of the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala was not properly made which should immediately be looked into for the interest of the proper administration. The special report says that the bills were directly endorsed to the accused Narayan Misra for encashment by the D.D.O. directly, but from the depositions it appears that the accused Narayan Misra was endorsed by the cashier for collection of money from the bank and to deposit to the cashier for disbursement. The fact that bills were directly endorsed to the accused Narayan Misra instead of endorsing to the cashier by the D.D.Os. was not disclosed by any prosecution witnesses in this case and the cashier who was supposed to be endorsed by the D.D.Os. had also not come forward to depose to this Court that he was not endorsed by the D.D.Os. directly and all bills were directly endorsed to the accused Narayan Misra for collecting encashment from the State Bank of India Agartala Branch. All D.D.Os. who had deposed in this case had stated that it is the duty of the cashier to get bills endorsed by the D.D.Os. and collect cash from the bank and make entry on regular basis. directly and all bills were directly endorsed to the accused Narayan Misra for collecting encashment from the State Bank of India Agartala Branch. All D.D.Os. who had deposed in this case had stated that it is the duty of the cashier to get bills endorsed by the D.D.Os. and collect cash from the bank and make entry on regular basis. If this procedure was known to every body including the cashier, it was found mysterious why they did allow the accused Narayan Misra to unauthorisedly get endorsed by the D.D.Os. and collect cash from the State Bank of India, Agartala Branch for the long period. After going through the case record, it pricks to my conscience that due to faulty investigation and conduct of prosecution the responsible persons for the alleged defalcation are getting acquitted from this case, but I suggest that suitable step be taken by the police department to bring the responsible persons to book either departmentally or in any other way to avoid further defalcation in future. 11. On the basis of the evidence on record and discussions made here-in-above, I hold that the prosecution could not prove the case beyond doubt against the accused Narayan Misra and so the point Nos. I & II of points for determination we decided in favour of the accused Narayan Misra on the ground of doubt. 16. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners, drawing the attention of the Court to the facts, leading to the criminal charges, as well as the article of charges in the departmental proceedings, submitted that crux and core of both set of charges in criminal case and the departmental proceedings, are similar, excepting some words of expressions which are dissimilar. Learned Counsel submitted that in such a situation, the departmental proceeding stands concluded, after the judgment in the criminal case against the delinquent is delivered by acquitting him. 17. Mr. Talapatra, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in support of his contention has relied on the following decisions: 1. AIR (1998) SCW 1629: State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan (paras 19 & 20). 2. AIR (1990) SC 1308: The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr. (para 4). 3. AIR (2006) SC 207: P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board ( paras 15 & 17). 4. AIR (2006) SC 2129: G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Anr.(paras 31 & 32) 5. 2. AIR (1990) SC 1308: The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr. (para 4). 3. AIR (2006) SC 207: P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board ( paras 15 & 17). 4. AIR (2006) SC 2129: G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Anr.(paras 31 & 32) 5. (1994) 3 Supp. SCC 674: Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand v. Commissioner of Police and Ors.(Paras 2 & 15). 18. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also pointed out that the delay in initiating the departmental proceeding against the Petitioner, without any explanation whatsoever has been depricated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In appropriate cases the departmental proceeding should be closed considering the unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned, for keeping him on charge of corruption and disputed integrity, for a long period of time, without concluding the departmental proceeding. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the decisions reported in AIR 2006 SC 207 P. v. M. v. M.D., Tamilnadu Housing Board, wherein it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows: 15. Section 118 specifically provides for submission of the abstracts of the accounts at the end of every year and Section 119 relates to annual audit of accounts. These two statutory provisions have not been complied with at all. In the instant case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The expenditure ought to have been considered in the accounts of the succeeding year. In the instant case the audit report was ultimately released in the 1994-1995. The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the audit account cannot stand scrutiny in view of the above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 17. It is now stated that the Appellant has retired from service. There is also no acceptable explanation on the side of the Respondent explaining the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior counsel is appearing for the Respondent. His submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities by the Appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the Respondent in this Court in the counter affidavit is not convincing and is only an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay. 16. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the Respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the Appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The Appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the Appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the Appellant should not be made to suffer. 19. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radha Krishnan AIR 1998 SC 1833 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not possible to lay down any predetermined principle applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the proceeding, whether on that ground the proceeding are to be terminated, each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances relating to it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also pointed out that the essence of the matter is that all relevant factors are required to be taken into consideration to determine if it is in the interest of the clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after the delay, particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that the disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and monetary loss for no fault of him. 20. The delinquent employee has a right that the disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and monetary loss for no fault of him. 20. In AIR 2006 SCW 2709 G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat keeping in view the facts of honourable acquittal of the delinquent from the criminal charge held that if in case the departmental proceeding and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of charge in an offence against the Appellant before the criminal Court are one and the same it would be unjust and unfair rather oppressive departmental proceeding to stand after the acquittal of the Petitioner from the criminal case. The relevant extract of the decision of the aforesaid case G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat (Supra) reads as follows: 31. The judgments relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents are not distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the Appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the Appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the Appellant's residence, recovery of articles there from. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the Appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the Appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the Appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the Appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the Appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 32. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the Appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the Appellant deserves to be allowed. 21. Referring to the delay of six years in initiating disciplinary proceeding against the Petitioner, learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on the decision reported in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr. AIR (1990) SC 1308, wherein, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the irregularities which were the subject matter of the inquiry had taken place long before the initiation of departmental proceeding, it is unreasonable to think that it would have taken long years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, unless a satisfactory explanation, for the inordinate delay, in issuing the charge memo, is submitted. The relevant extract of the decision reads as follows: 4. The appeal against the order dated 16-12-1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The appeal against the order dated 16-12-1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal. 22. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court rendered by a Single Bench in W.P.(C) No. 396 of 2007, Shri Dilip Kr. Bhattacharjee v. The State of Tripura and Ors. on 26.05.2008 learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that this Court by relying on the decision of P.V. Mahadevan v. Tamilnadu Housing Board (Supra) observed as follows: 7. In the second case [1998] 2 SCR 693, the Respondent was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. A report dated 7.11.1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal Administration & Urban Development Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorized constructions in multi storied complexes in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with municipal authorities. On the basis of the report, the State issued two memos both dated 12.12.1987 in respect of three officials including the Respondent-Radhakishan, the then Assistant City Planner. In this case, till 31.07.1995 the articles of charges had not been served on the Respondent. 23. On the basis of the report, the State issued two memos both dated 12.12.1987 in respect of three officials including the Respondent-Radhakishan, the then Assistant City Planner. In this case, till 31.07.1995 the articles of charges had not been served on the Respondent. 23. In yet another decision reported in W.P.(C) No. 360 of 2006, a Single Bench of this Court in Chand Mohan Saha v. The State of Tripura and Ors. by referring on the decision of Capt. M. Paul Anthony and in G.M. Tank and Anr. v. State of Gujarat held that it would be unfair and unjust to promote the departmental inquiry to proceed after over 8 years, which would cause serious breach to the charged employee, who has already retired from service. The relevant extract of the decision as reads as follows: 18. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has also relied upon the Supreme Court decision reported in (1999) 3 SCC 67, Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and also the decision in AIR 2006 SCW 2709 , G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Anr. to contend that since the criminal proceeding and the departmental proceeding arise out of the same set of facts and as they are sought to be proved by the same set of witnesses and since the Criminal Court has already acquitted the Petitioner by holding the charge to be not maintainable, it may not be justified to permit the departmental enquiry as no challenge to the acquittal order dated 6.8.2005 has been made by the State. 19. In the instant case as can be seen from the charge in the criminal trial and the charge indicated in the impugned charge memo dated 28.4.2006 that there is hardly anything to distinguish one charge from the other and it can be said that the charges against the Petitioner for the criminal trial and the departmental enquiry are substantially the same. It is also noticed that the several witnesses who were to be relied upon to prove the charge during departmental enquiry were also witnesses in the trial and from the evidence adduced by these witnesses, the charge against the Petitioner could not be established in the trial. 23. It is also noticed that the several witnesses who were to be relied upon to prove the charge during departmental enquiry were also witnesses in the trial and from the evidence adduced by these witnesses, the charge against the Petitioner could not be established in the trial. 23. In view of the categorical finding by the trial Court that the charge itself is not established, it can be concluded that acquittal of the Petitioner is not a technical acquittal but is a clear acquittal referable to the merit of the charge. In view of the fact that the Petitioner has been given acquittal on the very same set of charge as is sought to be enquired into in the impugned departmental enquiry and since the said charge is sought to be established by the same set of witnesses and since the enquiry is sought to be conducted at a much belated stage after over 8 years of Petitioner's suspension on 15.1.1997,1 am of the view that it would be unfair and unjust to permit the departmental enquiry to proceed as it would cause serious prejudice to the charged employee who has already retired from service. Accordingly, the impugned decision dated 28.4.2006 is held to be unsustainable and the same is quashed. 24. Mr. J. Majumder, learned Government counsel appearing for the State Respondent submitted that the criminal case which was pending before the Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, in which acquittal was recorded by the trial Court has no consequence in the departmental proceeding as the purpose of criminal case and the purpose of departmental proceeding are totally different, moreover the charges framed in the criminal proceeding is quite different from that of the departmental proceeding. The departmental proceeding was drawn up against the Petitioner as he failed to show his performance in duty by violating the constitutional procedure of general duties and showed such a conduct which is unbecoming of a police officer and further the Departmental proceeding was for intentional violation of lawful order of the authority, which is unbecoming of a police officer. 25. Mr. J. Majumder, learned Government counsel appearing for the State Respondent further submitted that the Petitioner has no right to challenge the suspension order dated 23.12.1987, as because he has complied with the said order of suspension, without any objection. 26. Mr. 25. Mr. J. Majumder, learned Government counsel appearing for the State Respondent further submitted that the Petitioner has no right to challenge the suspension order dated 23.12.1987, as because he has complied with the said order of suspension, without any objection. 26. Mr. J. Majumder, learned Government counsel appearing for the State Respondent submitted that the writ petition is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata since the contentions raised by the Petitioner in this writ petition is same as that of Civil Rule No. 172 of 1984, which was finally disposed of on 15.11.2002. 27. Learned Counsel for the Respondent further submitted that in Civil Rule No. 172 of 1994, the Petitioner prayed inter alia, for a writ for quashing, setting aside and/or reversing the impugned order of suspension and consequent departmental proceeding, which is the subject matter of this instant writ petition also. 28. In reply to the above contentions, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the earlier Civil Rule 172/84was not disposed of on merit. It was disposed of with an observation by the Court for an expeditious disposal of the criminal proceeding pending against the Petitioner. The cause of action for this present petition has arisen after the disposal of the criminal case, which was pending against the Petitioner on similar set of charges framed against the Petitioner in the departmental proceeding. Therefore, apparently, after the acquittal of the Petitioner in the criminal case, since the Respondent authority proposed to continue with the departmental proceeding, for the same set of charges framed against him in the departmental proceeding, the cause of action for this writ petition arose. 29. Mr. Talapatra, learned Senior Counsel in support of his contention has relied on a decision reported in 1999 4 SCC 149 : Ferro Alloys Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. which reads as follows: In this connection, it would be profitable to refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed and Ors. v. Syed Meharban Ali and Ors. [1974] 3 SCR 464, dealing with the principle of res judicata which obviously would include also the question of constructive res judicata between the co-defendants. K.K. Mathew J., speaking for the Court in that case made the following pertinent observations: 13. v. Syed Meharban Ali and Ors. [1974] 3 SCR 464, dealing with the principle of res judicata which obviously would include also the question of constructive res judicata between the co-defendants. K.K. Mathew J., speaking for the Court in that case made the following pertinent observations: 13. Now it is settled by a large number of decisions that for a judgment to operate as res judicata between or among co-defendants, it is necessary to establish that (1) there was a conflict of interest between codefendants (2) that it was necessary to decide the conflict in order to give the relief which the Plaintiff claimed in the suit and (3) that the Court actually decided the question. 14. In Chandu Lal v. Khalilur Rahaman Lord Simonds said: It may be added that the doctrine may apply even though the party, against whom it is sought to enforce it, did not in the previous suit think fit to enter an appearance and contest the question. But to this the qualification must be added that, if such a party is to be bound by a previous judgment, it must be proved clearly that he had or must be deemed to have had notice that the relevant question was in issue and would have to be decided. 15. We see no reason why a previous decision should not operate as res judicata between co-plaintiffs if all these conditions are mutatis mutandis satisfied. In considering any question of res judicata we have to bear in mind the statement of the Board in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad Narayan Singh that the rule of res judicata while founded on ancient precedent is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time' and that the application of the rule by the Courts 'should be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law. The raison d'etre of the rule is to confer finality on decisions arrived at by competent Courts between interested parties after genuine contest: and to allow persons who had deliberately chosen a position to reprobate it and to blow hot now when they were blowing cold before would be 20 W.P.(C) No. 316 of 2005 Page 20 of 23 completely to ignore the whole foundation of the rule."(see Ram Bhaj v. Ahmed Said Akhtar Khan AIR (1938) Lah 571). Therefore, in my view, the present writ petition which has been filed, for quashing the pending departmental proceeding, on new set of grounds, which arose after the acquittal of the Petitioner from criminal charge, is not hit by the principles of res judicata. 30. Mr. Majumder, learned Government counsel appearing for the State Respondent has submitted that the charges in the criminal proceeding are not same as the charges framed in the departmental proceeding and except the FIR no other documents have been shown in the departmental proceeding initiated against the Petitioner. 31. In reply to the above Mr. Talapatra, learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner contended that though the wordings in the charges in the criminal proceeding and the departmental proceeding may vary but the characteristics of the charges in both the proceeding are similar and the witnesses and the documents obviously will have to be same in order to prove the charges against the Petitioner for alleged misappropriation of fund for the period indicated in the FIR. 32. After the Petitioner was placed under suspension, no ardent effort was made by the Respondents to complete the departmental proceedings. Apparently, there was no desire on the part of the Respondent department in initiating disciplinary proceedings at the earliest point of time. Having not done so, at this late point of time, viz., after nearly twenty years, certainly it would not be possible for the Petitioner to give his reasonable explanation by way of objection to the charges levelled against him. 33. In P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005 (4) CTC 403, it was held by the Supreme Court that after a long and unexplained delay of ten years in initiating disciplinary proceedings, such proceedings cannot be allowed to continue, since the same is prejudicial to the government servant resulting in unbearable mental agony. The Supreme Court has held as follows: Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the Respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the Appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The Appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the Appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the Appellant should not be made to suffer. 34. P.V. Mahadevan v. State of A.P.(supra) made it clear that, in the absence of any impediment on the part of the department in proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings at the earliest point of time, if the department sleeps over the issue, it would be detrimental to the interest of the delinquent and certainly such disciplinary proceedings cannot be allowed to continue. It has already been laid by the Apex Court that inordinate delay in framing charges and completion of disciplinary proceedings causes mental agony and suffering and the delinquent cannot be made to suffer due to the mistake committed by the department. 35. Subsequently, in Ranjeet Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2008 (3) CTC 781, it was held that the unexplained delay would be prejudicial to the interest of the delinquent. By following the earlier decisions in P.V.Mahadevan case, supra, and State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: 8. This Court has repeatedly held that inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings is a ground for quashing the enquiry unless the employer satisfactorily explains the delay. For example, where the matter is referred to CBI for investigation and there is delay in getting its report or where the charge is of misappropriation and the facts leading to misappropriation come to light belatedly, it can be said that the delay is not fatal. For example, where the matter is referred to CBI for investigation and there is delay in getting its report or where the charge is of misappropriation and the facts leading to misappropriation come to light belatedly, it can be said that the delay is not fatal. But where the alleged misconduct was known and there was no investigation pending and when no explanation is forthcoming in regard to the delay, necessarily the unexplained delay would cause serious prejudice to the employee and, therefore, enquiry will have to be quashed. (Vide State of A.P. v.N.Radhakishan, [1998] 4 SCC 154 and P.V.Mahadevan v.Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005 (4) CTC 403: [2005] 6 SCC 636). 36. It is true that even after the acquittal in criminal case, the department can proceed with the delinquent in the disciplinary proceedings if there are grounds available. But in cases where the crux and core of charges in criminal case as well as the disciplinary proceedings are one and the same, the department must be careful in proceeding with the departmental proceeding after a lapse of considerable period of time. In such circumstances, there is absolutely no justification for the Respondent to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner, after a lapse of almost twenty years. Apparently, the disciplinary action which was at first initiated against the Petitioner on 23.12.1987, is yet to be concluded. 37. In the above backdrop, since the departmental proceeding is still pending against the Petitioner, I propose to dispose of the writ petition, with a direction to the Respondents to reconsider continuance of the departmental proceeding against the Petitioner, in the light of the above discussion and observation made therein. 38 The Respondents shall take a decision in this regard within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. However, the Petitioner shall be at liberty to approach the court for redressal of his grievance. With the above direction and order this writ petition stands disposed of.