Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—The learned Single Judge of this Court has opined that the present matter deserves to be referred to the Larger Bench for examining the following questions:— (a) Whether an incumbent of the office of the Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, President, Vice President against whom the Panchayat has passed resolution expressing ‘no confidence’ in him can challenge it by way of appeal under Section 242 or revision under Section 249 or section 259 as the case may be of Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Panchayat Act’), in light of the provisions of Panchayat Act with special emphasis of provisions of Sub-section (2) of Sections 56, 70, and 84 of the Panchayat Act ? (b) If the remedy is held to be available, then what interim relief could be granted to such incumbent in light of the statutory provisions of Sub-section (2) of Sections 56, 70, and 84 of the Panchayat Act ? 2. The matter was placed before the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice for appropriate orders and hence, the present matter before us. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Waghela. We have also heard Ms.Pathak, learned AGP for the Respondent No. 1 and Mr. P.C. Kavina, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 5. None has represented Respondents No. 2 to 4, though they were served. 4. The first preliminary contention was raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 5 that the learned Single Judge, as per the law of precedents, was bound by the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court on the aspects of maintainability of the appeal against the resolution of the Gram Panchayat for ‘motion of no confidence’ and, therefore, the learned Single Judge could not have referred the matter to the Larger Bench. He submitted that, therefore, the present reference was not called for. The learned Counsel, in support of his submission, relied upon the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors. vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 . 5. We may record that the learned Single Judge, before opining to refer the issue to the Larger Bench in the order dated 11.8.2011 passed by him in the present proceedings vide Paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 has observed, thus:— “22. vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 . 5. We may record that the learned Single Judge, before opining to refer the issue to the Larger Bench in the order dated 11.8.2011 passed by him in the present proceedings vide Paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 has observed, thus:— “22. As could be observed from the decisions of this Court in cases touching upon the provisions of Sections 242, 249 and 259 of the Panchayat Act on question of challenge to passing of ‘no confidence motion’ it becomes evident that no bench was specifically invited to examine the issue on framing searching question, but the benches have expressed opinion that appeal would be available under Section 242 of the Panchayat Act for challenging resolution of no confidence. It is also required to be noted that the observations made in other earlier judgments were not cited before the Court. The Apex Court has in case of State of U.P. and another vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. reported in (1991) 4 SCC 139 observed as under: “In Jaisri V. Rajdewan Dubey this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a bench extracted a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England incorporating one of the exception when the decision of an appellate court is not binding. 41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusion be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silention “A decision passes sub-silentio, in technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to it mind (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn p.153) In Lancaster Motor Company (London)Ltd V. Bremith Ltd the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered ‘without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of authority’ It was approved by this Court Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Gurnam Kaur ((1989 ) 1 SCC 101). The bench held that ‘precedents sub-silentio and without arguments are of no moment’. The bench held that ‘precedents sub-silentio and without arguments are of no moment’. The courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reason nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In B. Shama Rao vs. Union territory of Pndicherry ( AIR 1967 SC 1480 ) it was observed that ‘it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down therein.’ Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law.” 23. The another decision of the Apex Court also needs to be cited on the point as in case of Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija vs. Collector Thane reported in (1989) 3 SCC 396 the Apex Court has observed as under “21. Chief Justice Pathak in recent decision stressed the need for clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court. Speaking for the Constitution Bench (Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh ((1998) 2 SCC 754) learned Chief Justice said : The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transaction forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decision of a Court. 22 Cardozo propounded a similar thought with more emphasis : I am not to mar the symmetry of the legal structure by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevances and artificial exceptions unless for some sufficient reasons, which will commonly be some consideration of history or custom or policy or justice Lacking such a reason, I must be logical just as I must be impartial, upon like grounds. It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. In our system of judicial review which is part of our constitutional scheme, we hold it to be the duty of judges of superior courts and tribunals to make the laws more predictable. The question of law directly arising in the case should not be dealt with apologetic approaches. The law must be made more effective as a guide to behaviour. It must be determined with reasons which carry convictions within the courts, profession and public. Otherwise, the lawyers would be I a predicament and would not know how to advice their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinions. The general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimate falls into disrepute. 24. Thus it is of utmost important to settle the position of law qua purvey and purport of Sub-section (2) of Sections 56, 70 and 84 and the legislative intent in enacting and the jurisdiction powers and purvey of the district appellate committee working under Section 242 and State authority working under Section 249 and 259 of the Panchayat Act in respect of resolution passed by Panchayats against it’s Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, President and Vice-Presidents under Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Panchayat Act. There are observations and directions both by learned Single Judges and Division Benches in respect of Sections 242, 249 and 259, hence the matter is in fact requires to be referred to a larger bench under Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules 1993 which reads as under: — Rule 5: (1) A Single Judge may refer any matter before him or question arising in such matter to a Division Bench of two Judges or a Larger Bench. (2) A Division Bench of two Judges may refer any matter before it or any question arising therein or any question referred to it under Sub-rule (1)above to a Larger Bench. 25. (2) A Division Bench of two Judges may refer any matter before it or any question arising therein or any question referred to it under Sub-rule (1)above to a Larger Bench. 25. On the question as to whether a Single Judge of this Court can directly refer the matter to Larger Bench or it has to be referred only to the Division Bench, the full bench of this Court has in case of Ram Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd and another vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in 2001 (1) G.L.H. 698 held as under : “ 4.1 It will be seen from the provisions off Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules 1993 that a Single Judge may refer any matter before him or question arising in such matter to a Division Bench of two or more Judges or a Larger Bench. The rule does not require any reason for being recorded for the purpose and it is sufficient if in the opinion of learned Single Judge the requires to be considered by a Division Bench of two Judges or Larger Bench. Therefore even if no reason is recorded for referring the matter there can arise no question of a Larger Bench not being able to consider the matter, because , the process of assignment of work to Benches is purely an internal matter of the High Court governed by these Rules and a matter, which could have been considered by a learned Single Judge, can always be referred for a decision to a Larger Bench.” 6. The aforesaid as such clearly go to show that after considering the provisions of Rule 5, the learned Single Judge found that important questions have arisen in the present matter and, therefore, he has opined to refer the matter to the Larger Bench. But we find that the matter does not end there for considering the contention of Respondent No. 5 on the aspects of maintainability and the reason being that the opinion of the learned Single Judge to refer the matter to the Larger Bench by raising the questions remained as the opinion when the matters were placed before the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice on administrative side for placement of the matter to the Larger Bench. The Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice having considered the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has found it proper to place the matter before the Larger Bench. Therefore, if the Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice on administrative side has taken decision for placement of the matter before the Larger Bench, whether the learned Single Judge could refer the matter to the Division Bench or Larger Bench would lose its significance, since ultimately the Hon’ble Chief Justice or the Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice, is the Master of Roster and the power on administrative side cannot be controlled by the contention raised on behalf of the Respondent No. 5 as canvassed. 7. Apart from the above, we also find that the important questions of law have arisen in the present matter as observed by the learned Single Judge on the aspects of maintainability of the appeal or revision against the ‘motion of no confidence’. At this stage, we may refer to certain observations of the Larger Bench in the case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya and Ors. vs. Director of Agriculture Marketing and Rural Finance & Anr., reported in 2002 (2) GLR 1132 , wherein more or less similar contention was raised, which has been dealt with by the Larger Bench at Paragraph at 5 as under:— “At the out set, we consider it appropriate to record that as on the question raised before the learned Single Judge the earlier Single Bench decision of this Court in Narmadaben V. Parmar (Supra) was relied on, in which reliance was placed on Division Bench decision of this Court in Chimanbhai R. Patel (Supra) which was binding precedent on her, an order of reference to a Bench larger than of Two Judges was not required, unless the learned Single Judge would have expressed a dissenting opinion on the question of law involved in the case. None the less, since both the Letters Patent Appeals and Special Civil Applications raising a question of law of general importance have been placed before us, we proceed to decide the same on merits.” 8. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors. vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors. None the less, since both the Letters Patent Appeals and Special Civil Applications raising a question of law of general importance have been placed before us, we proceed to decide the same on merits.” 8. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors. vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors. (Supra) when the matters were placed before the Larger Bench, the Bench who heard the reference found that two Judges’ Bench could not have referred the matter to the Constitutional Bench and, therefore, did not examine the aspect about the importance of the questions to be decided by them. Therefore, they referred the matter back holding that the matter could not have been referred to the Constitutional Bench by two Judges of the Apex Court and consequently directed the placement of the matter before three Judges of the Apex Court. Such are not the fact situation in the present case. In the facts and circumstances of the case, for the reasons recorded by us herein above, we are inclined to adopt the same course as was undertaken by the earlier Full Bench (Larger Bench) of this Court in the case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya and Ors. vs. Director of Agriculture Marketing and Rural Finance & Anr. (Supra), since we find that as the Special Civil Application, raising questions of law of general importance, has been placed before us, we proceed to decide the same on merits. Under these circumstances, the preliminary contention raised by Respondent No. 5 fails. 9. The aforesaid would lead us to examine the questions to be decided. 10. The first question in our view can be sub-classified into two categories namely; one would be the maintainability of the appeal under Section 242 of the Act against the ‘motion of no confidence’ passed by Gram Panchayat under Section 56 of the Act or against the ‘motion of no confidence’ passed by Taluka Panchayat under Section 70 of the Act and the second would be the maintainability of the revision before the State Government under Section 259 of the Act against the ‘motion of no confidence’ passed by the District Panchayat under Section 84 of the Act. The third incidental question may also arise of maintainability of the revision under Section 259 of the Act in a case where the power has already been exercised by the Appellate Committee under Section 242 of the Act against the ‘motion of no confidence’. 11. In order to examine the aforesaid questions reference to certain statutory provisions would be relevant. Section 56 of the Act reads as under:— “56. Motion of No-confidence.—(1) Any member who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch or the Upa-Sarpanch may give notice thereof in the prescribed form to the panchayat concerned. If the notice is supported by one half of the total number of the panchayat concerned, the motion may be moved. (2) Where in the case of the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members of the panchayat, the Sarpanch or, as the case may be the Upa-Sarpanch, shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried unless he has resigned and the resignation has become effective earlier; and thereupon the office held by him shall be deemed to have become vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or, as the case may be, an Upa-Sarpanch, shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him, but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (4) When the offices of both the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch become vacant simultaneously, such Officer as the Taluka Development Officer may authorise in this behalf shall, pending the election of the Sarpanch, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of Sarpanch but he shall not have the right to vote in any meetings of the panchayat. (4) When the offices of both the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch become vacant simultaneously, such Officer as the Taluka Development Officer may authorise in this behalf shall, pending the election of the Sarpanch, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of Sarpanch but he shall not have the right to vote in any meetings of the panchayat. (5)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 91 or 95 a meeting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which the notice of such motion is received by the panchayat; (b) If the Sarpanch fails to call such meeting, the Secretary of the panchayat shall forthwith make a report thereof the competent authority and thereupon the competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the report.” 12. The other provisions for consideration of the ‘motion of no confidence’ in a Taluka Panchayat or in a District Panchayat as per Section 70 and Section 84 of the Act respectively are by the same language, except with the only difference that in the case of Gram Panchayat the words are “The Sarpanch” or “The Up-Sarpanch”, whereas in the case of Taluka and District Panchayat, the words are “The President” or “the Vice President” and, therefore, save and except the aforesaid substitution of the words and the different reporting authority in the event the meting is not called for, as per the hierarchy, there is no difference in the mode and manner of consideration of the ‘motion of no confidence’ and the effect to be given to such motion if carried out by requisite majority of 2/3rd of the total number of then members of the Panchayat. 13. Section 242 of the Act reads as under:— “242. Appeals against order of village panchayat.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, an appeal shall lie to the district panchayat against any order or decision of a village panchayat or taluka panchayat affecting any individual or institution. (2) Such appeal shall be made within a period of thirty days from the date of the order or decision. Appeals against order of village panchayat.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, an appeal shall lie to the district panchayat against any order or decision of a village panchayat or taluka panchayat affecting any individual or institution. (2) Such appeal shall be made within a period of thirty days from the date of the order or decision. (3) The district panchayat may pass such order on the appeal as it may deem just and proper and the order on appeal shall be final.” 14. Section 259 of the Act providing the power of the State government to call in the proceedings reads as under:— “259. State Government may call for proceedings.—The State Government may call for and examine the record of proceeding of any panchayat or of any committee thereof or of any officer for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety or any order passed and may revise or modify the order as it shall deem just.” 15. The aforesaid Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Act use the language “Where in the case of ... the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members of the panchayat” and it further provides that the person concerned against whom the motion is carried by the requisite majority shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried, unless he has resigned and the resignation has become effective earlier and thereupon the office held by him shall be deemed to have become vacant.” In our view, the aforesaid language used by the legislative in a case of motion of no confidence and the effect to be given makes the total distinction in comparison to any other business to be transacted by a Panchayat at the meeting, may be Gram Panchayat or Taluka Panchayat or District Panchayat. The language used by the legislature is not for passing of a resolution by a Gram Panchayat, but the language used is “motion is carried by the requisite majority”. The language used by the legislature is not for passing of a resolution by a Gram Panchayat, but the language used is “motion is carried by the requisite majority”. So it provides for support of the motion by requisite majority and it does not refer to any decision to be taken at the meting by the Gram Panchayat, nor does it refer to any resolution to be passed by an Panchayat, but it only speaks for “motion to be carried by requisite majority”. 16. Section 62 of the Act reads as under:— “62. Acts and proceedings of panchayat and Committee not vitiated by disqualification, etc. of members thereof.—(1) No disqualification of or defect in the election of any person acting as a member, Sarpanch, or Upa-Sarpanch or Chairman or member of a committee constituted under this Act or defect in the appointment of a presiding authority of the first general meeting shall be deemed to vitiate any act or preceding of the panchayat or any such committee, as the case may be, in which the person has taken part wherever the majority of persons, parties to such act or proceeding were entitled to act. (2) No resolution of a panchayat or of any committee constituted under this Act shall be deemed invalid on account of any irregularity in the service of notice upon any member, provided that the proceedings of the panchayat or committee were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity. (3) Until the contrary is proved, every meeting of a panchayat or of a committee constituted under this Act in respect of proceedings whereof a minute has been made and signed in accordance with this Act, shall be deemed to have been duly convened and held and all the members of the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly qualified, and where the proceedings are the proceedings of a committee, such committee shall be deemed to have been duly constituted and to have had the power to deal with the matters referred to in the minute. (4) During any vacancy in a panchayat or committee thereof the continuing members may act as if no vacancy had occurred.” 17. (4) During any vacancy in a panchayat or committee thereof the continuing members may act as if no vacancy had occurred.” 17. Relevant aspect is that Section 62(2) of the Act, if compared with Section 56(2) of the Act, the legislature could have used the words “resolution of a Panchayat”, as it has so used under Section 62(2) of the Act, but in Section 56(2) of the Act, the legislature has not used the word “resolution of a Panchayat”, but has used the words “motion carried by majority”. 18. Further Sub-section (3) of Section 62 additionally provides for minitization of the proceedings made and signed in accordance with law and it does not refer to any particular resolution specifically, nor the legislature has used the language of “resolution”. 19. Under these circumstances, it appears to us that it is true that the motion of no confidence is to be considered by any Panchayat at its meeting. It is also true that whether the motion is carried by requisite majority or not is to be reduced into the proceedings of Gram Panchayat by minitization of the same, but such minitization of the proceedings for carrying the motion of no confidence by necessary consequence cannot be termed as “resolution” or a decision of a Gram Panchayat. The word “resolution” or “decision” pre-supposes the existence of any dispute or controversy to be resolved. Unless there is any controversy to be resolved or any dispute to be decided, the minitization of the proceedings at the meeting cannot be termed for all purpose a resoltuion or a decision of any Panchayat. In Law Lexican of P. Ramanatha Aiyar the word “decide” has been defined as ‘to determine, to form a definite opinion, to render judgement; to give judgement for or against a party to suit or other proceeding in Court; to determine (a question, controversy or cause).” Further, the meaning of the word “decide”, “determine”, “resolve” is; “resolution betokens a choice made between action and inaction, and is opposed to doubt, reluctance or inaction. Determination betokens a choice made between motives and opposed to vacillation, uncertainty. Decision is final and irrevocable act of the will or judgement, and is opposed to indecision or hesitation (Smith. Syn. Dis.). Determination betokens a choice made between motives and opposed to vacillation, uncertainty. Decision is final and irrevocable act of the will or judgement, and is opposed to indecision or hesitation (Smith. Syn. Dis.). In the same book, the word ‘resolution’ is defined as: “something that is resolved; something that is determined upon.” At the first brush, one might get an impression that in a case where the motion of no confidence is to be carried at the meeting of a Panchayat, the Panchayat may be required to decide as to whether the motion is passed by the requisite majority or not and, therefore, it may be termed as resolution or “resolution of a Panchayat”. But the detailed scrutiny would show that the action for carrying the motion of no confidence is not by the collective body of the Panchayat as a whole, but is by the individual member of a Panchayat whether to support the motion of no confidence against the person or not and thereafter if the requisite number of members of the Panchayat has supported the motion, such motion is automatically carried. It is not depended upon any collective decision of the body of Gram Panchayat as a whole. The aforesaid makes the distinction in consideration of the motion of no confidence to be carried by the requisite majority. Therefore, it appears to us that when the legislature has consciously not used the word ‘resolution’, but has used the words ‘motion to be carried by requisite majority’ the proper meaning deserves to be given. Under these circumstances, it is not possible for us to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 5 that carrying of the motion by requisite majority is also a collective action by resolution of the Gram Panchayat or a decision of Gram Panchayat to pass the motion of no confidence. 20. If the action at the meeting cannot be termed as a collective decision of a Panchayat, then as a natural consequence it would not fall within the ambit of scope of appeal under Section 242 of the Act, which only is available against any order or decision of a Village or Taluka Panchayat. 20. If the action at the meeting cannot be termed as a collective decision of a Panchayat, then as a natural consequence it would not fall within the ambit of scope of appeal under Section 242 of the Act, which only is available against any order or decision of a Village or Taluka Panchayat. In our view, carrying of motion of no confidence by requisite majority of the members of the Panchayat in view of the expressed language of the section for consideration of motion of no confidence can neither be termed as “an order”, nor can be termed as “any decision of a collective body of a Panchayat”. 21. The resolution at the meeting of the Panchayat would also pre-suppose the collective decision of the whole body, which is not the requirement as provided by the relevant provisions of the statute for consideration of motion of no confidence. Further, after the motion is carried, the collective body of the Panchayat has not to take any action in furtherance thereof, but the statute itself expressly provides for the consequence of carrying of the motion of no confidence by requisite majority, inasmuch as after the expiry of the period of three days the person would cease to hold the office and his post is deemed to have become vacant. 22. Even under Section 259 of the Act for the revisional powers of the State Government, such are available against any order passed by any Panchayat. Since, as observed earlier carrying of the motion of no confidence cannot be termed as an order passed by the Panchayat, the revisional powers would not be available to the State Government under Section 259 of the Act. 23. Apart from the above, the relevant provisions of the Act for consideration of the motion of no confidence and the effect to be given, provides for a complete mechanism of its own for reflecting the ‘will’ of the elected representative for Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch or President or Vice President of the Panchayat as the case may be. The State Government may have general power of superintendence, which may include revisional jurisdiction under Section 259 of the Act, but such revisional jurisdiction, if read with the State Government, it may result into diluting the effect of carrying the motion by elected representative, which would run counter to the democratic principles. The State Government may have general power of superintendence, which may include revisional jurisdiction under Section 259 of the Act, but such revisional jurisdiction, if read with the State Government, it may result into diluting the effect of carrying the motion by elected representative, which would run counter to the democratic principles. Therefore also, we find that in a matter where the subject matter is pertaining to the carrying the motion of no confidence under the relevant provisions of the Act in any Panchayat, the power of the State Government under Section 259 of the Act would not be attracted. 24. In case of Bhanumati and Ors vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in (2010) 12 SCC page 1, the Apex Court at Paragraph 66 has laid down emphasis on enjoying of the continuous confidence of the members of the Panchayat as under:— “66. Democracy demands accountability and transparency in the activities of the Chairperson especially in view of the important functions entrusted with the Chairperson in the running ofPanchayati Raj Institutions. Such duties can be discharged by the Chairperson only if he/she enjoys the continuous confidence of the majority members in the Panchayat. So any statutory provision to demonstrate that the Chairperson has lost the confidence of the majority is conducive to public interest and adds strength to such bodies of self Governance. Such a statutory provision cannot be called either unreasonable or ultra vires Part IX of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 25. Further on the aspect of motion of no confidence at Paragraph 72, it was observed, thus:— “72. Upholding the concept of vote of no-confidence in Mohan Lal Tripathi (Supra) this Court further elaborated the concept as follows:— “...Vote of no-confidence against elected representative is direct check flowing from accountability. Today democracy is not a rule of ‘Poor’ as said by Aristotle or of ‘Masses’ as opposed to ‘Classes’ but by the majority elected from out of the people on basis of broad franchise. Recall of elected representative is advancement of political democracy ensuring true, fair, honest and just representation of the electorate. Therefore, a provision in a statute for recall of an elected representative has to be tested not on general or vague notions but on practical possibility and electoral feasibility of entrusting the power of recall to a body which is representative in character and is capable of projecting views of the electorate. Therefore, a provision in a statute for recall of an elected representative has to be tested not on general or vague notions but on practical possibility and electoral feasibility of entrusting the power of recall to a body which is representative in character and is capable of projecting views of the electorate. Even though there was no provision in the Act initially for recall of a President it came to be introduced in 1926 and since then it has continued and the power always vested in the Board irrespective of whether the President was elected by the electorate or Board. Rationale for it is apparent from the provisions of the Act...” (Emphasis supplied) 26. The Full Bench of this Court (Coram: D.M. Dharmadhikari, C.J., J.M. Panchal and N.G. Nandi, J.J.) in the case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya & Ors. (Supra) had also an occasion to consider the effect of no confidence and it was observed, inter alia, at Paragraph 60, the relevant of which is reproduced as under:— “60. ... It is clear no-confidence motion does not require statement of any reasons for moving the motion, nor does it require passing of motion by stating reasons for passing the same. As has been rightly emphasized by the Counsel for the respondents, confidence in the elected holder of the officer is the soul of democracy. All democratic institutions function on mutual confidence between the members and their leader. Loss of confidence without anything else, which is based on objective basis, is sufficient to move the motion. ...” (Emphasis supplied) 27. In case of Geetaben L. Rathwa vs. State of Gujarat, reported at 2005 (9) GLJ. (414) this Court (Coram: Jayant Patel, J. - one of us) did observe that if the motion of no confidence is carried by requisite majority against President or Vice President of District Panchayat, the revision under Section 259 of the Act or Section 249(4) of the Act would not be available. (414) this Court (Coram: Jayant Patel, J. - one of us) did observe that if the motion of no confidence is carried by requisite majority against President or Vice President of District Panchayat, the revision under Section 259 of the Act or Section 249(4) of the Act would not be available. Of course, in the said case, the question had not arisen on the aspect as to whether the appeal under Section 242 of the Act would be competent or not, nor the question had arisen as to whether the revisional power of the State Government would be attracted under Section 259 of the Act in a case where the appellate powers under Section 242 of the Act are already exercised by this Court in a case where the motion of no confidence was carried by the requisite majority against Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat or against President or Vice President of Taluka Panchayat. 28. We may also state that in a matter to consider the motion of no confidence, it is the confidence of the elected representative/member which is of the paramount consideration. No procedure for holding the meeting or otherwise can be allowed to operate, so as to frustrate the real will and desire of the elected representative. If the elected representatives have lost the confidence upon the Sarpanch or the Up-sarpanch or President or Vice President of any Panchayat, as the case may be only requirement would be to the State as to whether such motion is to be carried out or not. Even if it is presumed for the sake of consideration that there were some procedural lapse while convening the meeting and/or of issuing the agenda and or other procedural aspects, unless it is found to be mandatory, the same cannot be allowed to operate, which results into nullifying the effect of motion of no confidence, which is otherwise passed by the requisite majority of the elected representatives, more particularly when the legislature itself has provided for contingencies thereupon and cessation of office by the office-bearers against whom the motion of no confidence is carried. The powers under Section 259 of the Act of the State Government is broadly concerned with the procedure to be adopted by the Panchayat for the purpose of maintenance of its record and proceedings. The powers under Section 259 of the Act of the State Government is broadly concerned with the procedure to be adopted by the Panchayat for the purpose of maintenance of its record and proceedings. In view of the aforesaid observations as proceedings and procedure pertaining to motion of no confidence do not assume much importance in the matter of carrying of motion of no confidence and giving its effect, even if the principles of purposive interpretation of section of the statute are considered, it would be reasonable to hold that the power of the State Government under Section 259 of the Act shall not be attracted in a matter where it is pertaining to carry out the motion of no confidence by the elected representative. But is it that if no remedy is available under the statute i.e., the act, such officer-bearer against whom the motion of no confidence is passed is remediless, even if the mandatory procedure has not been followed for consideration of motion of no confidence and the serious prejudice is caused to him we find that we need not elaborate the said contention, because it is hardly required to be stated that if the statute does not provide for any remedy, the aggrieved person can invoke the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, provided such a case is made out in accordance with law. 29. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 5 by taking support of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Gujarat Panchayats (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) did raise the contention that the rule making authority has also incorporated as if the decision of Panchayat and, therefore, Rule 21 has been shown couched by such a language and, therefore, it was submitted that carrying different motion by the requisite majority in a Panchayat can be termed as the decision of Panchayat. Rule 20 and 21 of the Rules for ready reference read as under:— “20. Notice of no confidence motion.—(1) Any member of a panchayat who desires to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch/President or Up-Sarpanch/Vice-President of the panchayat, shall give notice thereof to the Secretary in Form-A. Where the motion of no confidence is to be moved against the Sarpanch/President as well as Up-Sarpanch/Vice-President, two separate notice shall be given. Notice of no confidence motion.—(1) Any member of a panchayat who desires to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch/President or Up-Sarpanch/Vice-President of the panchayat, shall give notice thereof to the Secretary in Form-A. Where the motion of no confidence is to be moved against the Sarpanch/President as well as Up-Sarpanch/Vice-President, two separate notice shall be given. If the notion is given jointly by more than one member, the motion may be moved by any of the members who have assigned the notice. Every such notice shall be supported by atleast one-half of the total number of members of the panchayat. (2) The member giving any notice under Sub-rule (1) shall forward therewith three additional copies thereof to the Secretary who shall deliver one copy to the Sarpanch/President, one copy to the Up-Sarpanch/Vice-President and one copy (i) to the taluka Development Officer where the motion relates to the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch, or (ii) to the District Development Officer where the motion relates to the President or Vice-President of a taluka panchayat, or (iii) to the Development Commissioner where the motion relates to the President or Vice-President of a district panchayat. Explanation.—For the purposes of this rule, if the total number of members of a panchayat is odd, then, in calculating the number for the purpose of this rule, a fraction shall be counted as one, that is to say, if the number of members is thirty one, the member required for supporting the notice so that a motion may be moved shall be sixteen and so on. 21. Decision of panchayats and names of members voting for or against motion to be reported.—When the panchayat takes a decision on any motion of no confidence, the Secretary shall forthwith communicate to the officer to whom a copy of their motion was sent under Sub-rule (2) of rule 20, the names of all the members who were present at the meeting at which such decision was given taken and the nature of vote given by each member by show of hands whether in favour of or against the motion and the names of members who abstained from voting.” 30. As such in view of the interpretation made by us of the relevant provisions of the Act namely; for carrying out motion of no confidence, the contention cannot be accepted for two reasons; one is that Rule 21 provides for only reporting of the names of the persons, who voted for or against the motion and it in no manner can be read to dilute the language for carrying of the motion of no confidence and the effect thereof, nor can be termed to attract the collective decision of a Gram Panchayat as against the individual action of a member, who supported or opposed the motion of no confidence at the meeting. Further, such procedural aspects as provided by the Rule cannot be given effect to dilute the expressed provisions of statute made by the legislature. Apart from the above, it is hardly required to be stated that the rule cannot run counter to the express provisions of statute and if the rule making authority has used the word “decision of Panchayat” under Rule 21 as against the legislature making use of the word “motion is carried by majority of not less than 2/3rd of total number of members of the Panchayat”, such language used can be termed as ultra vires the powers to that extent. It is well settled principles of interpretation of statute that rule has to give way for giving effect to the statutory provisions. Therefore, we find that Rule 21 deserves to be read down to the effect that the language used in Rule 21 (decision of Panchayat) does not convey to mean that when for motion of no confidence if carried by requisite majority, would amount to the decision of the Panchayat, but Rule 21 only provides for reporting of the minitization of the proceedings at the meeting and the individual stand of each member of the Panchayat for supporting or against the motion of no confidence. 31. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, we are of the view that:— (a) In a case where the motion of no confidence is carried by requisite majority against Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat or against President or Vice-President of Taluka Panchayat, no appeal would be competent under Section 242 of the Act before the District Panchayat, nor the District Panchayat will have appellate power against the same. (b) In a case where the motion of no confidence is carried by requisite majority against Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat or the President or Vice-President of a Taluka Panchayat or District Panchayat, the revision before the State Government under Section 259 of the Act would not be competent, nor the State Government will have a revisional power under Section 259 of the Act. 32. The next aspect deserves to be considered is as to whether the revision would be competent before the State Government under Section 259 of the Act in a case where the District Panchayat has already exercised the appellate power against the motion of no confidence already carried by the requisite majority of the members of Gram or Taluka Panchayat, as the case may be. Section 242(3) of the Act provides that the District Panchayat may pass such order on appeal. In a case where the power is already exercised under Section 242 of the Act, such would be an order of a District Panchayat under Section 242 of the Act. Only in those circumstances, the jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 259 of the Act may be attracted since the language as observed earlier under Section 259 of the Act is against any order passed by the Panchayat, and the decision of the District Panchayat in appeal under Section 242 of the Act can be termed as an order. Hence, the revision would be competent to that extent only. Under these circumstances, our conclusion would be as under:— (i) In a case where the District Panchayat has already exercised the power under Section 242 of the Act and has taken the decision under Section 242 of the Act in connection with carrying of any motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat or President or Vice-President of Taluka Panchayat, the revision under Section 259 of the Act would be competent. 33. The next aspect deserves to be considered is if the remedy is held to be available, then what interim relief to be granted to such incumbent in light of the statutory provisions of the Act. We find that in view of the observations and conclusion recorded by us herein above no appeal under Section 242 of the Act or no revision under Section 249 or 259 of the Act would be competent now. We find that in view of the observations and conclusion recorded by us herein above no appeal under Section 242 of the Act or no revision under Section 249 or 259 of the Act would be competent now. However, so far as the remedy already found available by us under Section 249 or 259 of the Act in a case where the District Panchayat has already taken the decision under Section 242 of the Act is concerned, the competent authority will have to exercise the discretion to grant interim relief, keeping in view the intention of the legislature for giving effect to the loss of confidence by the members of any Panchayat upon Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch or President or Vice-President, as the case may be and the effect so provided by the legislature in its express language and to keep in mind the democratic process. However, if any procedure is found to be mandatory in nature not followed or there is inherent lack of jurisdiction or competence before consideration of the motion of no confidence and a serious prejudice is demonstrated satisfactorily, in rare case, the departure therefrom may be permissible. Hence, we answer the same accordingly. 34. The aforesaid now would lead us to examine the facts of the present case, since the main matter itself has been referred to us for final decision. 35. The facts of the present case goes to show that on 10.2.2009 the petitioner and other members of the Gram Panchayat moved the notice of no confidence against Sarpanch – Respondent No. 5 herei and thereafter Respondent No. 5 Sarpanch communicated to the Talati that there is no need to convene the meeting of the Panchayat for consideration of motion of no confidence. Upon the report submitted by Talati on 19.2.2009 vide order dated 20.2.2009 TDO – Respondent No. 3 herein appointed Shri D.N. Parmar Taluka Panchayat Officer for conducting the meeting of no confidence. The said officer issued notice dated 20.2.2009 for convening the meeting to be held on 2.3.2009. On 2.3.2009 out of 26 members, 24 members supported the motion of no confidence, whereas two members opposed the motion. Under these circumstances, the motion was carried by the requisite majority and the proceedings were minitized. On 3.3.2009, the charge of Sarpanch was handed over to Up-Sarpanch. On 2.3.2009 out of 26 members, 24 members supported the motion of no confidence, whereas two members opposed the motion. Under these circumstances, the motion was carried by the requisite majority and the proceedings were minitized. On 3.3.2009, the charge of Sarpanch was handed over to Up-Sarpanch. The aforesaid factum shows that the motion after it was being carried by requisite majority, the effect was also given. 36. It appears that thereafter on 28.4.2009, the Respondent No. 5 approached the State Government under Section 259 of the Act by preferring the revision and the State Government at the relevant point of time did exercise the power and quashed and set aside the proceedings of motion of no confidence. The petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the state Government preferred SCA No. 4436 of 2009 before this Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 26.6.2009 quashed the order of the State Government, inter alia, on the ground that the State Government could not have usurped the power when the appeal under Section 242 of the Act was maintainable. The matter was further carried by Respondent No. 5 before the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 2313 of 2009 and the Division Bench, vide order dated 23.11.2009 expressed the view that when the motion is carried by the requisite majority, it does not cease to be the decision of the Gram Panchayat and, therefore, the Division Bench observed that the appeal was maintainable under Section 242 of the Act and, therefore, dismissed the LPA by confirming the order of the learned Single Judge. It appears that thereafter the matter was taken in appeal under Section 242 of the Act and vide decision dated 12.4.2010, the appellate Committee of the District Panchayat allowed the Respondent No. 5 to continue as the Sarpanch of the village. However, as the Deputy DDO was of the view that there is no power to decide the appeal he decline to sign the proceedings, against which the Respondent No. 5 preferred SCA No. 5904 of 2009 before this Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court directed the DDO to implement the order of the appellate committee and thereafter the order came to be passed on 4.6.2011 for quashing of the motion of no confidence. The petitioner herein preferred revision under Section 259 of the Act against the said decision of the District Panchayat in appeal and the interim relief was granted in the said revision and the revision was also admitted. However, vide impugned order dated 29.7.2011 the State Government through its officer took the view that the revision would not be maintainable in a matter of motion of no confidence and, therefore, disposed of the revision. Under these circumstances, the present petition has been preferred. 37. It appears to us that there is error apparent on the face of record committed by the State Government while exercising the revisional power inasmuch as it has lost sight of the important aspect that the revision was not preferred by the petitioner against carrying out the motion of no confidence by the District Panchayat before the State Government. The view taken by this Court in SCA No. 14565 of 2003 vide order dated 10.3.2005 was in fact of the case, wherein the motion of no confidence was carried by the District Panchayat, against which the revisional powers were invoked under Section 259 of the Act and the said aspect is apparent from the relevant portion of the decision, which is reproduced in the impugned order of the State Government, whereas in the present matter it was a case of invoking the revisional power against the power already exercised by the District Panchayat in appeal under Section 242 of the Act. The second important aspect which has been lost sight of by the State Government was that in a case where the appellate power was already exercised by the District Panchayat, the revisional power of the state Government could be said as attracted under Section 259 of the Act as per the view taken by us herein above. The aforesaid is coupled with another aspect that the learned Single Judge of this Court in SCA No. 2436 of 2009 had observed for maintainability of the appeal and the said order was not interfered with by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid LPA. The aforesaid is coupled with another aspect that the learned Single Judge of this Court in SCA No. 2436 of 2009 had observed for maintainability of the appeal and the said order was not interfered with by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid LPA. It is true that as held by us herein above the appeal would not be maintainable, nor the revision under Section 259 of the Act against carrying of the motion of no confidence by the concerned Panchayat, but in a case where the appellate powers are already exercised by the District Panchayat against carrying of the motion of no confidence against Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch or against President or Vice President of Taluka Panchayat, the revisional powers could be said as attracted. Under these circumstances, we find that the State Government in exercise of the revisional power has committed error apparent on the face of record and has failed to exercise the jurisdiction, which was vested in it. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. 38. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussion, the impugned order passed by the State Government in revision is quashed and set aside with the further direction that the revision shall stand restored to the file of the State Government and it is also directed that the State Government shall give opportunity of hearing to both the sides and decide the revision in accordance with law afresh. However, so far as the interim relief to operate pending the hearing of the revision application is concerned, the interim relief was granted by the State Government. Apart from the above, as per the view expressed by us herein above, the motion is carried by the requisite majority and if the interim relief is granted creating a situation of continuing in office by Respondent No. 5 as Sarpanch, it would not only run counter to the statutory provisions of the cessation of office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried out by the requisite majority, but it would also run counter to the democratic principles of maintenance of confidence by the Sarpanch of Members of the Gram Panchayat. Hence, we find that in the meantime, until the revision is finally heard, the interim relief deserves to be granted, staying the operation and implementation of the order passed by the District Panchayat in appeal. Consequently, Respondent No. 5 shall not be entitled to hold the office as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat and the person eligible to hold the office of the Sarpanch shall be Up-Sarpanch, unless he is disqualified to hold the post. 39. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. 40. After the pronouncement of the judgement and order, Mr. Kavina, learned Counsel with Mr. Majmudar for Respondent No. 5 prays to suspend the operation of the judgement and order for some time, so as to enable his client to approach before the higher forum. Considering the facts and circumstances, the said request is rejected. P P P P P