Judgment :- 1. These batch of writ appeals are preferred by the State, challenging that portion of the learned Single Judge’s order interpreting Section 3-D of the Karnataka Tax on Luxuries Act, 1979 (for short, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), holding that the Section does not stipulate any levy on the mere existence of the facility and the tax is leviable only on the member who utilizes the facility available in the club. 2. The Karnataka Legislature, in order to augment the revenue of the State, proposed to levy tax on luxuries provided in hotels and lodging houses and therefore, it enacted Karnataka Tax on Luxuries Act, 1979 which came into force from 31st March, 1979. At the inception, there was no provision for levy and collection of tax on luxuries provided in a club. In fact, as the law stood then, the word ‘club’ was included in the definition of the word ‘hotel’. It was inserted by Act No.5/2000 giving retrospective operation. However,the legislature, by way of an amendment to the Act, inserted Section 3D by way of substitution by Act No.3/2004 and it was declared that it shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from 01.04.2003. In other words, retrospective effect was not given by the legislature expressly restricting its operation only from 01.04.2003. The constitutional validity of the said provision was challenged by the respondents herein by filing writ petitions this court. 3. Thelearned Single Judge who heard the matter, upheld the constitutional validity of the said provision. However, he interpreted the said section and held that, the Section does not stipulate any levy on the mere existence of a facility. It is the user of the facility by a member which is the taxing event. The measure of levy is not on the total membership of the club, but is only at the rate per member. Consequently, he quashed all the proposition notices issued to the said clubs, with liberty to the authorities to re-do the assessment, if need be, in the light of the law as declared. The measure of levy is not on the total membership of the club, but is only at the rate per member. Consequently, he quashed all the proposition notices issued to the said clubs, with liberty to the authorities to re-do the assessment, if need be, in the light of the law as declared. In respect of all other petitioners, as the orders having not been given effect to and are made subject to the outcome of the writ petition, if passed at variance as declared above were directed to be redone in accordance with law and in consonance with the interpretation placed on Section 3-D in the said decision. It is against that interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge, the State is in appeal. 4. The respondents – clubs have not challenged that portion of the order of the learned Single Judge upholding the constitutional validity of Section 3 –D of the Act. The order upholding the constitutional validity has attained finality. Therefore, this court in these appeals is called upon to decide, whether the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge on Section 3-D is correct or not? 5. The learned Government Advocate, assailing the impugned order contends, as the Section stands, the insistence of tax is on the clubs providing luxury to its members, which are required to pay any amount as fee, deposit or donation, etc., and the liability to pay tax is not dependent on the user of the said facilities by the members. Once the luxury as defined in Explanation (1) to Section 3D is provided by a Club, to its members and the members are required to pay any fee or any other amount for utilization of the said luxury, whether it is actually used or not, the liability to tax arises as per the table given in the said Section. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that no taxable event accrues by mere providing the luxury and tax is payable only when the said luxury is used by the member, is on the face of it erroneous, contrary to the plain meaning of the words used in Section 3-D of the Act. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/clubs contended that for mere providing a luxury, no tax can be levied as held by the Apex Court in M/s. Godfrey Philips & Anr. Vs. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/clubs contended that for mere providing a luxury, no tax can be levied as held by the Apex Court in M/s. Godfrey Philips & Anr. Vs. State of U. P. & Ors. reported in (2005) 139 STC 537. The liability to pay tax arises only when a member pays the requisite fee for enjoying the luxury provided by the club and therefore, the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge is opt and no case for interference is made out. 7. In the light of the aforesaid facts and the rival contentions, the question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is, “Whether the liability to pay luxury tax under Section 3-D arises the moment the club provides luxury to its members and they are required to pay fee or when the members actually use luxury and pay fee?” 8. In this regard, it is necessary to look into Section 3-D, which reads as under: “3-D. Levy and collection of tax on luxury provided in a club-(1) There shall be levied and collected a tax on luxuries provided in a club to the members who are required to pay any amounts as fee, deposit, donation or any other such charges by whatever name called, at the rate as specified in column (3) of the table below: Sl No. Location of club Rate of tax (1) (2) (3) 1 Corporation area Six hundred rupees per member per annum 2 Other areas Three hundred rupees per member per annum Provided that no tax shall be payable in respect of a member who has attained sixty five years of age and who is not a corporate member subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. Provided further that no tax shall be payable in respect of a member of a Youth Club registered or recognised as such by the Department of Youth Services. (2) The tax levied under sub-section (1) shall be paid by every proprietor within such period and in such manner as may be prescribed. Explanation I: For the purpose of this section, luxuries means more than one of the facilities like card room, bar, billiards room, snooker room, tennis court, swimming pool, sauna, Jacuzzi and the like, gymnasium, golf course, internet facility, video, video compact disk, digital video disk and computer games. Explanation I: For the purpose of this section, luxuries means more than one of the facilities like card room, bar, billiards room, snooker room, tennis court, swimming pool, sauna, Jacuzzi and the like, gymnasium, golf course, internet facility, video, video compact disk, digital video disk and computer games. Explanation II: Where any corporate membership or similar membership allows use of luxuries provided in a club by more than one person (other than a person who is a dependent of the member), tax shall be levied and collected in respect of every such person." Section 3-D deals with levy and collection of taxes on luxuries provided in a club. Though the word ‘luxury’ is defined in Section 2(4)(b), Explanation (1) to Section 3-D provides the meaning to be attached to the word ‘luxury’ in Section 3-D and therefore, it is that meaning which is to be taken note of. According to explanation (1), luxury means, more than one of the facilities like card room, bar, billiards room, snooker room, tennis court, swimming pool, sauna, jacuzi and the like, gymnasium, golf course, internet facility, video, video compact disk, digital video disk and computer games. In other words, if a club provided more than one of the aforesaid facilities, the said club is said to be providing luxuries for the purpose of Section 3 – D. Levy and collection of tax under the said proviso can arise only when the following conditions happen: (a) The club should provide luxuries to the members. (b) The members are required to pay any amount as fee, deposit, donation or any other such charges by whatever name called. If these two conditions are satisfied, then, the charging section comes into operation and a liability is cast on the club to levy and collect taxes. The rate of tax to be collected is specified in the table set out in Section 3-D. The proviso to Section 3-D makes it clear, such a liability to pay tax is not there on the club in respect of members who have attained 65 years of age and who utilizes its luxuries on payment of such fee, deposit or donation. The said proviso is also not applicable to Youth Clubs registered or recognized as such by the Department of Youth Services. Sub-Section (2) of Section 3-D abundantly makes it clear, who has to pay taxes. The said proviso is also not applicable to Youth Clubs registered or recognized as such by the Department of Youth Services. Sub-Section (2) of Section 3-D abundantly makes it clear, who has to pay taxes. According to the said sub-section, the tax shall be paid by every proprietor within such period and in such manner as may be prescribed. Explanation (2) is added to clarify the payment of the luxury taxes by the clubs in respect of corporate membership or similar membership. Though the corporate member is treated as one, if more than one person uses luxuries, then, the tax shall be levied and collected in respect of such number of persons who utilise luxuries of the club in pursuance of such corporate membership. This is the plain meaning one can make out from the language used in the aforesaid provision. 9. It is settled law that, in interpreting these statutory provisions, the intention of the legislature is primarily to be ascertained from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also what has not been said. The words of a statute are understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense. The phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. The rule of construction is to read the statute literally i.e., by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. The golden rule is that the words of statute must be given their ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning. Such a meaning cannot be departed from the judges in the light of their own views, as to policy although they can adopt a purposive interpretation. It is also equally well settled, when any statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, no question of interpretation of that provision would arise. The courts have to give effect to the meaning attributable to the words used in the said provision. 10. Therefore, in this background when we look at the words used in the said provisions, the legislative intention is very clear. The courts have to give effect to the meaning attributable to the words used in the said provision. 10. Therefore, in this background when we look at the words used in the said provisions, the legislative intention is very clear. If more than one facility/luxury is provided in a club to its members, Section 3-D of the Act is attracted to such club. Further the charging section makes it clear that, the tax shall be levied and collected on luxuries provided in a club to its members who are required to pay any amount as fee, deposit, etc., In other words, if the club provides a luxury to its members and their members are required to pay a fee for utilising such luxury, the charging section is attracted and luxury, the charging section is attracted and luxury tax is liable to be paid by the club at the rate prescribed in the table in Section 3-D. Therefore, there is no scope for any ambiguity or doubt in so far as the liability to pay tax is concerned. In the entire scheme of the Section, there is no indication that the liability to pay tax arises only when the member utilises the said luxury by paying a fee. On the contrary, the liability to tax arises when a luxury is provided and the member is required to pay for that luxury. Whether a member utilises the said luxury and pays fee or not, the taxing event is attracted, the moment the said luxury is provided for a price. 11. In fact, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Express Hotels Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1989 SC 1949 was dealing with somewhat identical situation where the question arose whether the taxable event arises whether by actual utilisation or the moment the luxury is provided. They were interpreting the provisions of Section 4 of the West Bengal Entertainments and Luxuries (Hotels and Restaurants) Tax Act, 1972 where the said Section 4 reads as under: “4. They were interpreting the provisions of Section 4 of the West Bengal Entertainments and Luxuries (Hotels and Restaurants) Tax Act, 1972 where the said Section 4 reads as under: “4. Liability for luxury tax.- There shall be charged, levied and paid to the State Government a luxury tax by the proprietor of every hotel and restaurant in which there is provision for luxury and such tax shall be calculated – (a) In the case of a restaurant at the rate of an annual sum of rupees three hundred for every ten square meters or part thereof in respect of so much of the floor area of restaurant which is provided with luxury, and (b) In the case of a hotel at such rate not exceeding fifteen per centum on the daily charges of a room provided with luxury as may be notified by the State Government in the official gazette.” 12. The question posed for consideration was whether the impost on the mere possibility of enjoyment of a luxury can be taxed or not. In answering the said question, the apex Court held as under: “The concept of luxuries in the legislative entry takes within it everything that can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. The actual measure of the levy is a matter of legislative policy and convenience. So long as the legislation has reasonable nexus with the concept of luxuries in the broad and general senses in which expressions in legislative tests are comprehended, the legislative competence extends to all matters with respect to that field or topic of legislation. The taxable event need not necessarily be the actual utilization or the actual consumption as the case may be of the luxury. The contention, in substance is that the means of providing luxury, by itself, does not provide the nexus between the taxing power and the subject of tax and there must be an actual and not merely a national or potential, consumption or utilization of the luxury. As an instance of what can be said to be fairly and reasonably comprehended in a legislative entry, reference may be made to the national income, for purposes of a tax on income, of a person from a house property in his own personal occupation or a property not actually let. As an instance of what can be said to be fairly and reasonably comprehended in a legislative entry, reference may be made to the national income, for purposes of a tax on income, of a person from a house property in his own personal occupation or a property not actually let. In that context, this court said that which can be converted into an income can be reasonably regarded as giving rise to income (Bhagwan Dass Jain vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 907 ) A luxury which can be reasonably be said to be amenable to a potential conception does provide the nexus. If the provider of the luxury is also independently amenable to the tax, the further restriction on the power suggested by the argument tends to cut into the plenitude of the field of legislation. If the idea of luxuries is required to be so wide as to comprehend in it every aspect which can fairly and reasonably be said to be embraced by it, then, the taxing power cannot be limited to or conditional in the manner suggested. Once the legislative competence and the nexus between the taxing power and the subject of taxation is established, the other incidents are matters of fiscal policy behind the taxing law. The measure of the tax is not the same thing as and must be kept distinguished from, the subject of the tax. So far as the argument that fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) are violated by a levy on a mere provision for luxury, without its actual utilization is concerned, it is settled law that the mere excessiveness of a tax or that it affects the earnings cannot, per se, be held to violative Article 19(1) (g).” “Underlying by us” 13. Therefore, it is clear from the authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench, the State has power to levy tax on luxuries even if there is no actual utilisation or the actual consumption of the said luxury provided. When once, the nexus between taxing power of the State and the tax is established, all other matters are matters of fiscal policy and it is not amenable to the judicial review by the courts. 14. When once, the nexus between taxing power of the State and the tax is established, all other matters are matters of fiscal policy and it is not amenable to the judicial review by the courts. 14. A perusal of the judgment in M/s. Godfredy Philips makes it very clear, they did not go into the question whether the consumption or utilization of the luxury is a condition precedent for levying tax on luxury. The said judgment went into the question of constitutional validity of the power of the legislature to impose luxury tax only. In the instant case, the constitutional validity of those provisions has been upheld and thus it has reached finality. We are called upon to interpret only the said provision imposing the luxury tax. The law laid down in the Express Hotels Pvt. Ltd., squarely applies to the facts of this case. The levy of tax on luxury for merely providing the same is valid and legal and do not suffer from any legal infirmity as pointed out by the learned Single Judge. If we have to introduce the concept of utilization or consumption of the luxury as a condition precedent for the taxing event, it amounts to the court re-writing the Section which impermissible in law. There is no indication in the entire section about the legislative intent in that manner. In those circumstances, we find it difficult to agree with the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge to the said provision. The interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge is directly in contradiction with the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Express Hotels Pvt. Ltd., as such it cannot be sustained. Accordingly, it is hereby set aside. Hence, we pass the following: ORDER (I) All the writ appeals are allowed. (ii) The interpretation placed by the learned Single Judged in so far as Section 3-D is concerned, is hereby set aside. (iii) Consequently, all the assessment orders passed by the authorities are restored. However, the orders imposing liability prior to 01.03.2003 cannot stand and consequently, it is set aside. If there are no assessment orders passed yet, the authorities are at liberty to issue proposition notices, hear the clubs and pass the assessment orders in accordance with law.