JUDGMENT 1. Rule, made returnable forthwith. None for the respondents, though served. 2. In the above petitions, notice came to be issued on 3/5/2011 and the same was made returnable on 4/7/2011 and the respondent in each of the above petitions was put to notice that the above petitions may be heard and disposed of finally at the admission stage. 3. The above petitions take exception to the order dated 10/12/2010 passed by the 3rd Labour Court, Nagpur and the order dated 3/1/2011 passed by the 4th Labour Court, Nagpur by which applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came to be allowed and the applicant in each of the said application was directed to be paid the amount, which was mentioned in the operative part of the said orders. 4. Writ Petition No.847/2011 is treated as a lead matter and the facts therein are adverted to for the sake of convenience: The petitioner no.1 is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and is running an establishment and School for the handicapped students on grant-in-aid basis. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner Society comes within the meaning of the term 'industry' as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent in the said Writ Petition No.847/2011 was working with the petitioners and was initially appointed as a probationer. It appears that on or about 1/6/1994, the respondent along with other employees proceeded on strike for certain demands. This resulted in the petitioners instituting a complaint before the Industrial Court, in which complaint the Industrial Court passed an interim order. After passing of the interim order, the petitioners requested the respondent and other employees to join the duties. However, they did not do so. Thereafter on 1/6/1994, the respondent was intimated that as he had not come to join his duties, his name was being struck off from the muster-cum 15 wage register as the the petitioners believed that the respondent was not interested in working with the petitioners. The respondent construing the said letter dated 1/6/1994 to be an order of termination, approached the Labour Court by filing Complaint (ULP) challenging the said termination order. However, pending the complaint, the respondent filed IDA No. 37/1994 under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act. 5. The respondent construing the said letter dated 1/6/1994 to be an order of termination, approached the Labour Court by filing Complaint (ULP) challenging the said termination order. However, pending the complaint, the respondent filed IDA No. 37/1994 under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act. 5. It was the case of the respondent that he has not been paid the full wages and in spite of approaching the petitioners from time to time, no heed was given to his request. The respondent has, therefore, claimed the difference of the actual pay paid to him and pay admissible to him as per the particulars given in Schedule 'B' to the said application. The respondent relied upon the pay scale as sanctioned by the Social Welfare Department on 1/4/1991 and, therefore, claimed that he is entitled to get the said pay scale from 1/4/1991. The petitioners countered the said case of the respondent and contended that the respondent has been paid as per the pay scale applicable and that the respondent has signed in acknowledgment of having received the same and, therefore, was not entitled to get the amount as shown in Schedule 'B' and sought rejection of the said application filed under Section 33C(2) by the respondent. 6. It appears that during pendency of the said IDA No.37/1994, the parties had filed a pursis, which was signed on behalf of the petitioners as well as respondent workman. The said pursis was numbered as Exh. 53 and was filed on 18/10/2010. It was agreed between the parties that the respondent would be paid 45% of the claim made by him in IDA No.37/1994. 7. The said application filed under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act numbered as 37/1994 came to be decided by the learned 3rd Labour Court, Nagpur. By the impugned order dated 10/12/2010, the said application came to be allowed to the extent of 45% of the claim on the basis of the pursis, which came to be filed on behalf of the parties on 18/12/2010. By the impugned order dated 10/12/2010, the said application came to be allowed to the extent of 45% of the claim on the basis of the pursis, which came to be filed on behalf of the parties on 18/12/2010. The learned Presiding Officer of the 3rd Labour Court, Nagpur has inter alia held that the pay scale as fixed by the Social Welfare Department from 1/4/1991 is applicable to the School run by the petitioners and, therefore, the applicant is entitled to get the said pay scale from 1/4/1991 and since the parties have arrived at a compromise to the effect that the applicant would get 45% of the amount of the claim, the Labour Court thought it fit to allow the said application to the said extent. 8. Heard Shri S.S. Ghate, the learned Counsel for the petitioners. None appears for the respondents though served. 9. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that though the pursis was filed on 18/10/2010, the same has been withdrawn by the petitioners as it was later on found that the respondent in each of the above petitions has already been paid. It is contended that though it cannot be disputed that the pay scale fixed by the Social Welfare Department from 1/4/1991 would be applicable, entitlement of the respondent in each of the above petitions ought to have been adjudicated by the Labour Court in view of the fact that the pursis, which was filed, has been withdrawn by the petitioners. Without adjudicating the entitlement of the respondent in each of the above petitions, the Labour Court has proceeded on an erroneous footing by allowing the applications merely on the basis of the said pursis. The learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal Singh (2005) 8 SCC 58 : [2006(2) ALL MR 6 (S.C.)] wherein the Apex Court has held that right to money or benefit, which is sought to be executed under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act must be an existing one, i.e. already adjudicated upon and must arise in course of and in relation to relationship between industrial workman and employer. Relying upon the said judgment, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Labour Court ought to have adjudicated upon the entitlement of the respondent in each of the above petitions. 10. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners, in my view, a case for remanding the matter back to the Labour Court is made out. The Labour Court though in accepting the position that the pay scale fixed by the Social Welfare Department on 1/4/1991 would be applicable, ought to have adjudicated upon the entitlement of the respondent in each of the above petitions. More so, in view of the fact that it is the claim of the petitioners that the respondent in each of the above petitions has already been paid and that their signatures have been obtained against their names in the register, as held by the Apex Court in the judgment in State of U.P. and another vs. Brijpal Singh [2006(2) ALL MR 6 (S.C.)] (supra), right to money or benefit, which is sought to be executed under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act must already been adjudicated upon. In my view, since it is an admitted position that the pay scales fixed on 1/4/1991 were applicable, there was no dispute as regards the entitlement of the respondents to the said pay scales. In the instant case, as can be seen, instead of adjudicating upon the claim of the respondents on the basis of the said pay scales, the Labour Court has proceeded on the basis of the pursis filed by the parties. In my view, the Labour Court proceeded on an erroneous premise considering that the pursis was already withdrawn by the petitioners. The fact that by the pursis, the respondents had agreed to accept 45% of the claim would make no difference. Since the pay scales as on 1/4/1991 fixed by the Social Welfare Department were applicable, the Labour Court ought to have adjudicated the claim on the said basis by considering the case of the petitioners that they have already paid the respondents as per the said pay scales. The Labour Court, in my view, has, therefore, erred in relying upon the said pursis without adjudicating upon the claim of each of the respondents in the above petitions and thereby in a way short-circuited the matter. 11. The Labour Court, in my view, has, therefore, erred in relying upon the said pursis without adjudicating upon the claim of each of the respondents in the above petitions and thereby in a way short-circuited the matter. 11. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders dated 10/12/2010 and 3/1/2011 are required to be set aside and the matters are required to be remanded back to the Labour Court for a de novo consideration of the applications under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act. The Labour Court would be well advised to consider the claim of the each of the respondents in the above petitions in terms of their entitlement after considering the evidence that would be produced by the petitioners of having paid the respondents as per the said pay scale. On remand, the Labour Court to hear and decide the matters latest by 31 st December 2011. The amount of 50% deposited by the petitioners in this Court pursuant to the order dated 3/5/2011 to be transmitted to the Labour Court and to lie in deposit pending consideration of the applications under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act in terms of the remand. 12. Rule is accordingly made absolute in the aforesaid terms with the parties to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.