JUDGMENT :- 1. Petitioners-defendants in O.S.No.111 of 2006 of the Court of learned Sub Judge, Sulthan Bathery made an attempt to nip the suit against them in the bud by taking recourse to Rule 11(a) and (d) of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “the Code”) Learned Sub Judge nipped that attempt in the bud. Hence, this civil revision. 2. The parties are closely related-by blood and/or bond-first petitioner is the husband of the second petitioner. Second petitioner is the daughter of respondent. Third petitioner is said to be private limited company of which petitioners 1 and 2 are the directors. Respondent, who claimed to be a person of Indian origin settled and living in the United States of America, a medical practitioner by profession claimed to have advanced certain amount to the first petitioner from his NRI account for acquisition of the suit property and claimed reliefs against petitioners such as, a declaration that petitioners hold the suit property in trust for and on behalf of the respondent, a consequential perpetual prohibitory injunction restraining petitioners, their agents or men from alienating, transferring or parting with the suit property wholly or in portions, from creating any charge or mortgage and from creating documents with respect to the suit property or any portion thereof, from selling, cutting or removing timber therefrom and from committing act of waste therein, a consequential mandatory injunction directing petitioners to take such steps as are legally necessary to bring in and incorporate respondent as a share holder and director of the third petitioner, the company with 90% of shares in it and its assets with the share of petitioners 1 and 2 being limited to 5% each failing which, to have the Court be pleased to act on behalf of petitioners 1 and 2 and take such lawful steps as are necessary to effectuate the said relief in favour of the respondent. Along with the plaint, respondent produced certain documents which included copy of the assignment deed executed by Van Ingen, a foreign national in favour of the third petitioner, company and two letters allegedly sent by the first petitioner to the respondent. Along with the plaint, respondent produced certain documents which included copy of the assignment deed executed by Van Ingen, a foreign national in favour of the third petitioner, company and two letters allegedly sent by the first petitioner to the respondent. The plaint was registered and summons was issued to the petitioners who appeared and filed I.A.No.747 of 2006 under rule 11 of Order VII of the Code contending that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action and at any rate, the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by law. Reference was made on behalf of the petitioners to the relevant provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (for short “the FEMA”) and the Regulations framed thereunder to contend that respondent being a Non Resident India (for short, “NRI”) is debarred either, from acquiring any plantation or agricultural land or, investing any amount in a company engaged in the business of the nature referred to in the relevant Regulations. It was contended that in the circumstance, none of the reliefs sought by the respondent could be granted and as such, the suit itself is barred. It was also contended that in the view of that, respondent had no cause of action against petitioners to sustain the suit. Learned Sub Judge held the plaint cannot be rejected as requested for in I.A.No.747 of 2006. Learned Sub Judge while holding that the plaint did disclose a cause of action has also taken the view that even if it is ultimately to be held that respondent is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for, that does not mean that the suit is not maintainable. 3. Learned Senior Advocates, Sri.V.Chitambaresh and Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer in their own inimitable style has addressed arguments at length on the various points canvassed by them. Learned Senior Advocate, Sri.V.Chitambaresh has referred me to the scope and ambit of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code and contended that an Activist Judge is the answer to frivolous suits-he is required to lift the veil created artistic pleadings in the plaint and find what exactly is the substance of the claim and the reliefs prayed for. If the reliefs prayed for cannot be allowed in view of the law in force, it must be held that the suit itself is not maintainable as is barred by such law. If the reliefs prayed for cannot be allowed in view of the law in force, it must be held that the suit itself is not maintainable as is barred by such law. According to the learned Senior Advocate, having regard to the relevant provisions of the FEMA and the Regulations under it (which I will be adverting to in detail a bit later), respondent is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in which case whatever pleaded in the plaint cannot confer a cause of action for the respondent to sue petitioners. It is argued that in such circumstances petitioners need not be dragged into Court to undergo the cumbersome procedure of a long drawn trial and ultimately get the suit dismissed. Learned Senior Advocate has argued that Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code is enacted to prevent vexatious and frivolous suits being brought into the Court and that if the Court is satisfied that the suit as brought either does not disclose a cause of action or, is barred by any law the plaint has to be rejected at the entry point itself. It is pointed out that the said function is to be exercised by the Court scrupulously before registering the plaint and even after summons is issued and before conclusion of trial, be it suo moto or on the request of the opposite party to the suit. It is contended that averments in the plaint would show that respondent is an Indian national resident in the United States (NRI) and his attempt was to acquire a coffee plantation or agricultural land which is prohibited under the law. It is pointed out that reliefs prayed for are to the effect that respondent be given 90% shares in third petitioner, company which is prohibited under the law. According to the learned Senior Advocate, a company being a juristic person cannot have any fiduciary relationship with a third party, the fiduciary relationship the company has, is only vis-à-vis its shareholders. Hence, it cannot be said that third petitioner, company was holding the property in trust for the respondent. According to the learned Senior Advocate, a company being a juristic person cannot have any fiduciary relationship with a third party, the fiduciary relationship the company has, is only vis-à-vis its shareholders. Hence, it cannot be said that third petitioner, company was holding the property in trust for the respondent. It is contended that the principle of piercing the corporate veil of the company is available only when there is allegation of fraud but, in the present case request of respondent is that he may be given 90% of shares of the third petitioner, company in which case a plea of fraud cannot stand. Various decisions are cited in support of the above contentions. 4. In response, learned Senior Advocate, Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer has contended that for a rejection of the plaint, be it before issue of summons or thereafter, what could be looked into is only the plaint and the documents if any, produced along with the plaint. The Court is not required or permitted to look into the defence pleaded by the defendants, not to say about any document that the defendants might rely upon. It is also contended that in deciding whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or not, no portion of the plaint can be truncated and looked into; instead the entire allegations in the plaint must be read as a whole. It is pointed out that reliefs prayed in the plaint is not part of the cause of action of the respondent and that even if it is assumed that some of the reliefs prayed for in the plaint are not allowable, if any one relief prayed for could be allowed, it cannot be said that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action or that the suit is barred by any law. According to the learned Senior Advocate, at the stage of rejection of plaint under Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code the Court is not required to go into intricate questions of law and/or fact which are matters to be relegated to the trial stage of the litigation. It is pointed out that even a juristic person like a company can have fiduciary relationship with third parties and that it is not merely in the case of fraud alone that the corporate veil could be lifted. It is pointed out that even a juristic person like a company can have fiduciary relationship with third parties and that it is not merely in the case of fraud alone that the corporate veil could be lifted. In other permitted circumstance also it is within the power of Court to lift the corporate veil and find two exactly are the persons behind the company. It is submitted that none of the provisions of the FEMA or the Regulations framed hereunder could be invoked at this stage since respondent has not admitted that he is a NRI or that the suit property is either a coffee plantation or agricultural land. According to the learned Senior Advocate, these are disputed facts not required to be, decided at the entry stage under Rule 11 of Order VII to the Code. Learned Senior Advocate contended that the plaint averments taken along with the letters first petitioner has sent to the respondent and produced along with the plaint would show that first respondent had prevailed upon, affectionately pressurized or as the learned Senior Advocate would contend, cunningly trapped the respondent to advance huge amount to the first petitioner on a promise that for the advantage of respondent the suit property will be acquired. The averments in the plaint as also the said letters would indicate that respondent was reposing much confidence in petitioners 1 and 2, that they made respondent believe that they would act for the benefit of respondent and that created a trust and an obligation annexed to the ownership of the land in question and hence provisions under Sec.88 of the Indian Trust Act applied. According to the learned Senior Advocate, even if it is assumed that respondent is not entitled to get any relief vis-à-vis the third petitioner, the company by getting shares as prayed for in the plaint, he is entitled to the declaration of trust and a consequential injunction restraining petitioners from doing any act affecting the said trust and the benefit that respondent is to get from the said trust. Learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on various derisions and other authorities in support of the above contentions. 5. It is necessary to understand the scope of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code. Learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on various derisions and other authorities in support of the above contentions. 5. It is necessary to understand the scope of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code. Under Sec 9 of the Code, a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has, independently of any statute a right to institute a suit in a civil Court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. At two stages a defendant, before the suit goes for trial car resist the suit against him. The first is under Rule 11 of Order VII and the second, under Rule 2(2) of Order XIV of the Code. Now I am concerned with the question of cause of action and bar to the suit created by any law in force under Rule II of Order VII. The relevant provisions in Rule 11 of Order VII and Rule 2(2) of Order XIV of the Code are as under: Order VII. Rule 11 Order XIV. Rule 2(2) 2(2) Where issues both of law and of fact of fact arise in the same suit, and the is of opinion that the case or any part there of may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to,-(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (a) …….. (b) …… (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. (c) …….. (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Rejection of Plaint-the plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- At the state of Rule 11 Order VII, only the averments in the plaint and documents produced along with the plaint which could be treated as part of the pleadings alone can be looked into; but at the stage of Rule 2(2) of Order XIV, the defence set up by the defendant and his documents also can be looked into. 6. As I stated above, the thrust of argument learned Senior Advocate for petitioners has advanced is that the suit is barred under the relevant provisions of the FEMA and the Regulations made thereunder and hence, the averment in the plaint does not constitute a cause of action. 6. As I stated above, the thrust of argument learned Senior Advocate for petitioners has advanced is that the suit is barred under the relevant provisions of the FEMA and the Regulations made thereunder and hence, the averment in the plaint does not constitute a cause of action. In asking the Court to decide an issue (relating to rejection of plaint) which is essentially a ‘demurrer’ petitioners must be taken to admit for the sake of argument that allegations of the respondent in his plaint are true, modo et forma-in manner and form. (See Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India, LD., (1913) 40 Cal. 598. The power to reject a plaint under Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code must be exercised only if the Court comes to the conclusion that even if all the allegations are proved, respondent could not be entitled to any relief whatsoever. In Jagannath Prasad and Ors. V. Smt. Chndrawati and Anr., AIR 1970 All. 309, relied on in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ganga Charan, 1974 MPLJ 533 it was held that a distinction must be drawn between a case where the plaint itself does not disclose a cause of action and another, in which, after considering the entire materials on record the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no cause of action. In the latter case, the plaint cannot be rejected. 7. The expression “cause of action” has been the subject matter for consideration in various decisions. In short, the expression means the bundle of material facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him succeed in the suit. It is a bundle of facts which gives the plaintiff a right of action. (See Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair, 2004(1) KLT 1082 and Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 59. The expression ‘cause of action’ refers only to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or, in other words, to the media upon which plaintiffs asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour (See Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. V. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 137. The expression ‘cause of action’ refers only to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or, in other words, to the media upon which plaintiffs asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour (See Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. V. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 137. At the stage of verification under Rule 11(a) of Order VII, the question whether respondent in the present case has a ‘cause of action’ to seek all or any of the reliefs he has prayed for in the plaint must be ascertained with reference to the averments in the plaint as a whole and the documents produced along with it which must be treated as part of the pleadings in the plaint. 8. The Supreme Court, in T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal and Anr., (1977) 4 SCC 467 and in particular, paragraph 5, Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd v. M.V. Sea Success I and Anr., (2004) 9 SCC 512 (paragraph 139) and N.V.Srinivasa Murthy and Ors. Murthy and Ors. V. Mariyamma and Ors., (2005) 5 SCC 548 (paragraph 17) has stated that the Activist Judge must give consideration for the averments in the plaint, lift the veil created by artistic pleading and find whether the suit is frivolous and could cross the barrier under Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code. In T.Arivanandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. (supra), V.R. Krishna Iyer, J observed that the Court should remember that if on a meaningful, not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue the Court should exercise its power under Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled and if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, the Court must Dip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties fearchingly under Order X of the Code. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits, it is held. The trial Court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigations ran be shut down at the earliest stage. The same principle is adopted in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I and Anr. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits, it is held. The trial Court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigations ran be shut down at the earliest stage. The same principle is adopted in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I and Anr. And N.V. Srinivasa Murthy and Ors. V. Mariyamma and Ors. (supra). In Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and Ors. Also, reliance is placed in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. (supra) and it is held that for the purpose of clause (d) (of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code) it is the duty of the person who files an application (to reject the plaint) to satisfy the Court that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. In order to answer the said question it is incumbent on the part of the Court to verify the entire plaint. 9. In the present case, contention is that the suit is barred under provisions of the FEMA and the Regulations framed under it and hence the plant does not disclose any cause of action. Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code makes a marked difference with a similar expression found in Rule 2(2)(b) of Order XIV of the Code in that, while clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII says, “where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law” Rule 2(2)(b) of Order XIV of the Code says, “a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force”. The difference is that so far as clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII is concerned, it must “appear” from the averments in the plaint that the suit is barred by any law while, when it comes to Rule 2(2)(b) or Order XIV it must be shown that the suit is barred by any law for the time being in force. 10. I referred to the presence of the expression “appears” in Rule 11(d) of Order VII of the Code. It is held by the Supreme Court (See Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094 though referring to Sec.24 of the Evidence Act that the appropriate meaning of the word “appears” is “seems”. 10. I referred to the presence of the expression “appears” in Rule 11(d) of Order VII of the Code. It is held by the Supreme Court (See Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094 though referring to Sec.24 of the Evidence Act that the appropriate meaning of the word “appears” is “seems”. Thus, from the plaint averments and documents produced along with and from that alone, the Court must have the satisfaction that the suit appears or seems to be barred by any law for the time being in force. My endeavour is to find whether from the averments in the plaint and the documents produced along with the plaint it can be said that the suit “appears” to be barred by any law. If the finding is in the affirmative, necessarily I must hold that the averments in the plaint does not reveal any cause of action. 11. Before going into the crucial question, I think, a Reference to the averment in the plaint is required. In paragraph 1, respondent says that he is a person of Indian origin settled and living in the United States of America. In paragraph 4, it is stated that on account of the familial relationship respondent and petitioners 1 and 2 had, they were on very close and cordial terms. Paragraph 5 states that during the year 2004, first petitioner brought a proposal to the respondent to purchase a land (by the respondent) and that first petitioner persuaded and requested the respondent to purchase the said land since according to him it was profitable for respondent to invest money by making the said purchase. It is further stated in the same paragraph that by letter dated August 20, 2004 (produced with the plaint) first petitioner informed respondent about the said proposal (to purchase land from Van Ingen). First petitioner insisted and persuaded respondent to purchase the said property. In paragraph 7 of the plaint, it is averred that respondent agreed to that proposal (made by the first petitioner) and gave green signal petitioners 1 and 2 to go ahead and facilitate the transaction on behalf of respondent. First petitioner insisted and persuaded respondent to purchase the said property. In paragraph 7 of the plaint, it is averred that respondent agreed to that proposal (made by the first petitioner) and gave green signal petitioners 1 and 2 to go ahead and facilitate the transaction on behalf of respondent. Paragraph 8 of the plaint avers that before August 20, 2004 respondent had sent `11,00,000/- to the first petitioner of that `5,00,000/- was given to him by way of gift and the balance sum of `6,00,000/- was with the first petitioner (on behalf of respondent). In paragraph 9, it is stated that first petitioner informed respondent over telephone that he has entered into an agreement for purchase of the property as per proposal with the vendor (Van Ingen), acting in trust for the respondent in a fiduciary capacity. Respondent got letter dated October 14, 2004 (produced with the plaint) from the first petitioner confirming payment of `10,00,000/- (to the vendor) as advance. First petitioner informed respondent that if necessary, he will get the required sanction from the RBI. He told respondent that it was for the respondent to decide what should be the role of first petitioner in the matter. In paragraph 10, it is stated that petitioners 1 and 2 acted in a fiduciary capacity in trust for the respondent to facilitate the transaction. The agreement (for purchase of the land) was executed on August 27, 2004 by petitioners 1 and 2 in a fiduciary relationship with the respondent. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, it is stated that later, respondent was told over phone that to facilitate the transaction it is necessary to form a private limited company, that the first petitioner will fully protect the interest of respondent and that petitioners 1 and 2 will do all what is necessary to complete the transaction through the company (third petitioner). In paragraph 14, it is stated that while so, in May 2005, first petitioner informed respondent that he has done everything to purchase the suit property-33.50 acres-and that the vendor has agreed to execute and register the document of sale. Paragraph 16 says that respondent took steps to transfer $3,20,000/- from his NRI account with the State Bank of Travancore to the account of the first petitioner and issued a cheque (to the first petitioner). Paragraph 17 also stated about transfer of money. Paragraph 16 says that respondent took steps to transfer $3,20,000/- from his NRI account with the State Bank of Travancore to the account of the first petitioner and issued a cheque (to the first petitioner). Paragraph 17 also stated about transfer of money. Paragraph 18 states that first petitioner encashed the cheque on May 16, 2005. First petitioner informed respondent that the amount was paid to the vendor. Respondent believed that petitioners 1 and 2 will act honestly. Paragraph 19 says that the sale deed was not sent to the respondent and respondent when he came to India in August, 2005 saw a copy of the sale deed which was seen taken in the name of third petitioner. Respondent learned that only petitioners 1 and 2 are the directors of third petitioner, company and that they acted fraudulently to exclude respondent from the company. In paragraph 20 of the plaint it is averred that petitioners have no independent right over the property and that in law, petitioners are bound to hold the property for the benefit of respondent and in trust for turn. Paragraph 21 states that petitioners 1 and 2 misused the trust. In paragraph 22, it is stated that third petitioner, the company is only a creation of petitioners 1 and 2. Paragraph 23 states that entire purchase money (for acquiring the suit property) went from the respondent. It is stated in paragraph 25 that in the circumstance, petitioners are debarred from claiming any right over the property for themselves. Petitioners are trying to alienate the suit property and in the circumstance, he has prayed for reliefs which I have first above stated. 12. Now the question arises whether as pleaded in the plaint, there could be a fiduciary relationship for the third petitioner, the company in favour of respondent. Learned Senior Advocate, Sri. V.Chitambaresh has placed reliance on the decision in Narayandas Shreeram Somani v. Sangli Bank Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 170 and in particular the observations in paragraph 6. There, it is held that the director of a company stands in a fiduciary position towards the company and is bound to protect its interest. Learned Senior Advocate, Sri. V.Chitambaresh has placed reliance on the decision in Narayandas Shreeram Somani v. Sangli Bank Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 170 and in particular the observations in paragraph 6. There, it is held that the director of a company stands in a fiduciary position towards the company and is bound to protect its interest. For long, it has been an established rule of equity that he must not place himself in a position in which his personal interest conflicts with his duty and unless authorized by the company’s articles he must not vote as a director or any contract or arrangement in which he is directly or indirectly interested. Standard articles give effect to that rule of equity. Reference is also made to paragraphs 22 and 23 of P.C.Agarwala v. Payment of Wages Inspector MLF and Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 104. There, it is held that the doctrine of lifting the veil has been applied in the words of Palmer, in five categories of cases such as where companies are in relationship of holding and subsidiary (or sub-subsidiary) companies; where a shareholder has lost the privilege of limited liability and has become directly liable to certain creditors of the company on the ground that, with his knowledge, the company continued to carry on business six months after the number of its members was reduced below the legal minimum. In paragraph 23, there is reference to the observations made by Gower as to when all the corporate veil could be lifted. In short, the argument of learned Senior Advocate is that a company being juristic person cannot have fiduciary relationship with third, parties and that fiduciary relationship of the company is only vis-à-vis its shareholders. 13. As against that, reliance is placed by learned Senior Advocate for the respondent on the decision in Mrs. Nellie Wapshare and Ors. V. Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd and Ors., AIR 1960 Madras 410 where of course, the company was found to have fiduciary relationship with its shareholders. Then came the decision in 1.M/s. Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd 2. Miss Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare and Ors. V. 1. Miss Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare and Ors. 2.M/s. Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd and Ors., AIR 1969 SC 843. That was a case involving three companies. The old company was indebted to the Imperial Bank of India. Then came the decision in 1.M/s. Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd 2. Miss Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare and Ors. V. 1. Miss Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare and Ors. 2.M/s. Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd and Ors., AIR 1969 SC 843. That was a case involving three companies. The old company was indebted to the Imperial Bank of India. The old company was to discharge its liability by November 15, 1937 and on failure, the trustees under the debenture trust were to enter into possession of the property of the old company. The appellant company was appointed as the managing agent to sell the estate of the old company. In the new company, appellant company had 50% shares. The wife and children of the directors of the old company sued the appellant company for a declaration that the company is in existence and that it was the owner of the property and that the new company held the property in trust for the old company. In paragraph 3 of the decision it is held that it is settled rule of equity that any person bound in a fiduciary character to protect the interest of another person should not put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflicts. In paragraph 4, referring to the contentions raised, the Supreme Court observed, “we agree with the High Court that the appellant stood in a fiduciary relationship towards the old company and was bound to protect its interest”. Thus, going by the above decision it is not as if a juristic person, a company cannot hold the property in fiduciary relationship for others. 14. I shall refer to the provisions of the FEMA and the Regulations made under it, relied on by the learned senior Advocate for the petitioners. Clause 4(b) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Permissible Capital Account Transactions) Regulations, 2000 (for short, “the Regulation I”) is relied on. Clause 4 deals with prohibitions and in the view of sub-clause (b), no person resident outside India shall make investment in India, in any firm or in any company or partnership firm concerned or propriety concern or in any entity incorporated or not which is engaged or proposes to engage- (i) ……. (ii) ….. (iii) in agricultural or plantation activities… (iv) …. (v) …. (ii) ….. (iii) in agricultural or plantation activities… (iv) …. (v) …. Clause (v) of Sec.2 of the FEMA defines person resident India and clause (w) of the said section defines person resident outside Indian. Person resident outside India means a person who is not resident in Indian. In short, the argument based on clause 4 (b)(iii) of the Regulation I above stated and the definition of person resident outside India given in clause (w) of Sec.2 of the FEMA is that a reading of the plaint would indicate that respondent is a NRI citizen and that his attempt was to acquire interest in a company engaged in agricultural or plantation activities. It is contended with reference to the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulation 2000 (for short, “the Regulation II”), schedule 4, clause (i) that there is prohibition for a NRI purchasing shares/convertible debentures of companies if the said company is a chit fund or a nidhi company or is engaged in agricultural/plantation activities or real estate business or construction or farm house or dealing in transfer of development rights. 15. It is therefore contended that respondent being a NRI was prohibited under law from either acquiring a plantation or agricultural land or, investing in a company (third petitioner) engaged in plantation or agricultural activities. It is argued that averments in the plaint, its schedule and the copy of sale deed produced along with it show that respondent is a NRI, the third respondent (company) is engaged in plantation activities and that the suit property is a coffee estate. 16. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent contended that the question whether respondent is a NRI, whether the suit property is either a plantation or agricultural land and whether third respondent is engaged in plantation or agricultural activities being disputed facts cannot be decided at the stage of Rule 11 of Order V. of the Code. It is contended that there is no admission in the plaint that respondent is a NRI or that the suit property is either a plantation or agricultural land or that the third petitioner is engaged in such activities. Learned Senior Advocate has contended that the mere statement in the plaint that respondent has transmitted the money from his NRI account cannot be taken as an admission that he is an NRI. 17. Learned Senior Advocate has contended that the mere statement in the plaint that respondent has transmitted the money from his NRI account cannot be taken as an admission that he is an NRI. 17. I am afraid, I cannot accept that contention of the learned senior Advocate having gone through the averments in the plaint. I read from paragraph 1 of the plaint where respondent has described himself as a person of Indian origin settled and living in the United States of America, it is stated in paragraph 16 of the plaint that respondent has transmitted money from his ‘NRI’ account. There could be no doubt that the words ‘NRI account’ refers to the account of a Non Resident Indian. To understand that, one need not travel beyond paragraph 16 of the plaint. Thus, going by paragraph 1 and 16 of the plaint it is clear that respondent is a NRI as understood in Sec.2(w) of the FEMA. 18. The next question is whether the suit property as pleaded in the plaint is either agricultural land or a plantation, in the plaint, it is stated that the suit property is 33.50 acres forming part of a coffee estate having a total extent of 246 acres. True, in the plaint it is not specifically stated that the suit property is either a coffee plantation or agricultural land but, reading the plaint as a whole it is clear that the suit property formed part of a coffee estate the total extent of which as per paragraph 5 of the plaint is 246 acres. 19. I stated that documents produced along with plaint formed part of the pleadings. It is profitable to refer to the copy of sale deed in respect of the Suit property got executed in the name of the third petitioner and produced with the plaint in the preambular portions of that document it is stated that the vendor is the owner in possession of 246.07 acres of coffee plantation and of that coffee estate, 33.50 acres (i.e. the suit property), more particularly described in the schedule of the document is being sold to the assignee. To clear the lingering doubt if any, reference can be made to the schedule of the said document where the tenure of the property is described as “coffee estate”. To clear the lingering doubt if any, reference can be made to the schedule of the said document where the tenure of the property is described as “coffee estate”. Hence the inescapable conclusion, reading the plaint and the document produced along with, is that the suit property is a coffee plantation. 20. Then the next question is whether for the said reason, at this stage, this Court can say that the suit is barred under the provisions of FEMA and the Regulations I have extracted above, I stated that under clause 4(b)(ii) of the Regulation I, no person resident outside India can investment in India in any name in any company or partnership firm or property concerned or in any entity whether incorporated or not which is engaged or proposed to engage, as per clause (iii), in agricultural or plantation activities. 21. I stated form clause (c) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code that unlike Rule 2(2)(b) of Order XIV that to reject the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by any law, it must “appear” from the averments in the plaint that the suit is so barred. In other words, a deeper consideration of the question of law and/or fact is not contemplated under clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII. I must bear in mind that at the entry stage (before registering the plaint) it is without the assistance of the opposite party that the Court is required to reject the plaint on the face of the averments in the plaint. True, the opposite party can request the Court, at any time before conclusion of trial to reject the plaint and strike it off from the file. In either case the Court is not required to go into intricate question of law and/or fact at the stage of scrutiny at the entry stage. This view gets support from the decision of the Apex Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & 1 Association Ltd v. M.V. Sea Success 1 and Anr.(supra). There, in paragraph 147, the decision in D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999)3 SCC 267 is quoted with approval. It is held that in considering clause (d) of Rule 11, the test is to see whether any of the reliefs prayed for could be granted to the appellant if the averment in the petition are proved to be true. There, in paragraph 147, the decision in D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999)3 SCC 267 is quoted with approval. It is held that in considering clause (d) of Rule 11, the test is to see whether any of the reliefs prayed for could be granted to the appellant if the averment in the petition are proved to be true. For the purpose of considering preliminary objection the averments in the plaint should be assumed to be true. “The Court cannot probe into facts on the basis of the controversy raised in the counter”. In paragraph 151, it is stated that the Court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry into the doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. By the statute the jurisdiction of the Court is restricted to ascertaining whether or the allegations a cause of action is shown. Reference is made to the observations in Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941. There, it was observed that in ascertaining whether petitioner shows a cause of action the Court should not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merit of the claim made by the petitioners, the Court cannot take into consideration the defence which the defendant may raise upon the merit: nor is the Court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated question of law or fact. 21. I referred to the prohibition contained in clause 4(b)(iii) of Regulation I. on going through the plaint, it would appear, prima facie that it is not as if respondent wanted to invest in a company, incorporated or not which is engaged in agricultural or plantation activities. Nor is it admitted that the third petitioner, the company is engaged in plantation or agricultural activities. On the other hand, averments in the plaint read as a whole would indicate that respondent wanted to invest money in landed property and it was represented by the first petitioner that to facilitate purchase, a private limited company has to be formed and accordingly, a company was formed. At one stage of the plaint, (See paragraph 18) respondent would say that he learned that only petitioners 1 and 2 are the directors (of the third respondent-company) and that they acted fraudulently to exclude the respondent from the said company. At one stage of the plaint, (See paragraph 18) respondent would say that he learned that only petitioners 1 and 2 are the directors (of the third respondent-company) and that they acted fraudulently to exclude the respondent from the said company. In paragraph 22 of the plaint it is stated that the company (third petitioner) is a “creation” of petitioners 1 and 2. Hence, it is to be decided whether it is a case where respondent wanted to invest his money in the company (third petitioner) which is dealing with agricultural or plantation activities (which is prohibited by clause 4(b)(iii) of Regulation I) or it is a case where petitioners 1 and 2 made respondent believe that to facilitate the purchase a company was “created”, i.e. whether really any such company existed. These matters are not required to be decided at the stage of scrutiny of plaint under Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code. 23. Learned Senior Advocate for petitioners has contended that since in the relief portion, respondent has claimed that he be given 90% of shares of the company (third petitioner), he cannot say that the company is fictitious. That of course is a matter which requires deeper consideration, whether notwithstanding the allegations that respondent has made in the plaint either that petitioners 1 and 2 defrauded him or that the company is a ‘creation’ of the petitioners 1 and 2 and it was represented by the first petitioner that to facilitate the transaction there must be a company formed, whether the transaction respondent claimed would attract the mischief of clause 4(b)(iii) of Regulation I. The effect of (alleged) contradictory stand of respondent, at one stage saying that the company is a “creation” of petitioners 1 and 2 and at the same time claiming induction as share holder and director with 90% shares, how far affects his claim is also not a matter required to be decided at this stage. I am inclined to think, also in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.Y. Sea Success I and Anr. (supra) that such deeper considerations and a rejection of plaint on that, account is called for at this stage. 24. I am inclined to think, also in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.Y. Sea Success I and Anr. (supra) that such deeper considerations and a rejection of plaint on that, account is called for at this stage. 24. Now coming to the prohibition contained in clause (i) of schedule 4 of Regulation II, that provision says that no purchase of shares or convertible debentures of Indian company shall be made under the said scheme if the company concerned is a chit fund or a nidhi company or is engaged in agricultural/plantation activities. No doubt, one of the reliefs claimed is that 90% of shares in the third petitioner company be allotted to the respondent leaving the remaining 10% shares to petitioners 1 and 2, equally but I must bear in mind that, that is not the only relief that respondent has claimed. He has claimed beneficial interest in the trust which according to him was formed with reference to the suit property and claimed he is the beneficiary and petitioners may be restrained from alienating the said property. Assuming that the relief of allotting shares in the third petitioner, company cannot be granted for any reason whatsoever, Court has to consider whether relief prayed for with reference to the trust and beneficial interest for the respondent could be granted. As aforesaid, it also to be decided whether the company is engaged in plantation/agricultural activities or as at one stage respondent pleaded, is only a “creation” of petitioners 1 and 2 to facilitate purchase of the property. 25. It is argued by the learned Senior Advocate for petitioners that question of trust in respect of the suit property does not arise in view of the allegations in the plaint. Learned Senior Advocate, referring to the various decisions has submitted that in view of the averment in paragraph 20 of the plaint that petitioners have no independent right over the suit property, a plea of trust cannot be founded. Learned counsel has submitted that trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property for the benefit of the beneficiary and that under law, the trustee continues to be owner of the property. Learned counsel has submitted that trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property for the benefit of the beneficiary and that under law, the trustee continues to be owner of the property. In paragraph 20 of the plaint it is pleaded that petitioners have no independent right over the property which means that respondent is claiming to be the absolute owner of the property. In that situation, no question of trust would arise. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Mrs.Arundhati Balkrishna Shri Ambica Mills Premises, Ahmedabad v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp(1) SCC 278, Ram Bharose Sharma v. Mahant Ram Swaroop and Ors., (2001)9 SCC 471, Sngrmsingh P. Gaekwad and Ors. V. Shanta Devi P. Gaekwad (Dead) though Lrs. & Ors. (2005)11 SCC 314 in the first of the above decisions, it is observed in paragraph 7 that what the trustees receive as the income pertaining to the beneficiary is received by him under an obligation to pass on that income to the beneficiary and that in most cases administration charges and expenses have to he met out of the Trust’s income and it is only the net income which reaches the beneficiary. The above observations are relied to contend that in the case of a trust, the trustee is the owner and the beneficiary is only to get profits out of the property whereas, averments in paragraph 20 of the plaint is that petitioners have no independent right over the property. 26. In Ram Bharose Sharma v. Mahant Ram Swaroop and Ors. (supra), in paragraph 20 a trust is defined as “where a person has a property or rights which he holds or is bound to exercise for or on behalf of another or others, or for the accomplishment of some particular purposes or he is said to hold to property or rights in trust for that other or those others or for that purpose, or those purposes and he is called a trustee.” It is further reserved from a careful reading of the definition that it can be gathered that when an ostensible owner holds a property for the benefit of another person as an obligation annexed to the ownership, he is said to hold the property in trust for that other person. In the present case, it is argued that going by the averments in the plaint respondent claimed to be ostensible owner of the property and hence no element of trust is involved. 27. Mukerji, on the Indian Trust Act at page 52 states that the obligation must be annexed to the ownership of property and it arises when the property is vested in the trustee. Unlike the English law the owner of trust property in Indian law is one and one alone namely, the trustee. At page 53, it is stated that this is succinctly brought out in the definition by Sir. Underhill, “for the benefit of persons of whom he may himself be one” that ownership of trust property may be exclusively for the benefit of the another and normally for the benefit of the owner alone. Reference can be made to the decision of the Privy Council in Chhatra Kumari Devi v. Mohan Bikram Shah and Ors. (AIR 1931 Privy Council). There, it is opined that the Indian law does not recognize legal or equitable estates, therefore, there can be but one “owner” and where the property is vested in trustee, the “owner” must be the trustee. The trustee is the owner of the trust, property, the right of the beneficiary being in a proper case to call upon the trustee to convey the same. The same principle is adopted by the Supreme Court in Narandas Karsonaas v. S.A.Kamtam and Anr., AIR 1977 SC 774. Thus, going by the decisions and the definition of ‘trust’ as given in the Indian Trust Act, trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and unlike in the English law, in Indian law the owner of property is the trustee and the beneficial interest of course is to be conveyed to the beneficiary. 28. No doubt, in paragraph 20 of the plaint respondent has stated that petitioners have no independent right over the property. It is also stated that under the law they are bound to hold the property for the benefit of respondent and in trust for him. 28. No doubt, in paragraph 20 of the plaint respondent has stated that petitioners have no independent right over the property. It is also stated that under the law they are bound to hold the property for the benefit of respondent and in trust for him. Various other paragraphs of the plaint as also the letters which first petitioner allegedly send to the respondent and produced along with the plaint would indicate that according to the respondent, it was on account of the familial relationship petitioners 1 and 2 and respondent had, the confidence respondent had reposed in petitioners 1 and 2 and on account of persuasion of affectionate compulsion or cunningly luring that respondent happened to invest the amount for the acquisition. Prima facie, it cannot be said that the averments in the plaint does not disclose a trust coming under Sec.88 of the Trust Act. It is by virtue of that allegation that respondent has prayed in the plaint that it may be declared that petitioners are holding the suit property in trust and for his benefit and for a consequential prohibition injunction restraining petitioners, their agents of men from alienating or transferring or parting with the suit property wholly or in portions, creating any charge or mortgage over the property, from creating documents with respect to the said property or in turn and from selling or cutting or removing timber therefrom or committing act of waste therein. The question whether on the plaint averments respondent could be accepted as a beneficiary of the trust is also a matter which requires deeper consideration at a later stage. In that situation, whether in view of the prohibition contained in clause (i) of schedule 4 of Regulation II, creation of trust is prohibited by the said provision also requires deeper consideration. 29. Viewed in that line, I am unable to say, reading the plaint and the documents produced along with that the suit “appears” to be barred by provisions of FEMA and Regulations I and II which I have referred above. I make it clear that I have not pronounced verdict on that quest on since the matter requires, as aforesaid deeper consideration at a later stage. I make it clear that I have not pronounced verdict on that quest on since the matter requires, as aforesaid deeper consideration at a later stage. In saying so, I also bear in mind that as I stated at the beginning, a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has, independently of any statute a right to institute the suit in a civil Court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Bar of jurisdiction cannot readily be inferred. It requires deeper consideration. A hair splitting argument and a decision based on that, is not what is contemplated under Rule 11(d) of Order VII of the Code. I am guided by the decisions of the Apex Court which say that when considering clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII, it must be strictly construed. I must also bear in mind that what is required to be decided is not whether ultimately the Court may find after consideration of the materials that respondent has no cause of action but, whether the plaint discloses a cause of action. I stated about the various averments in the plaint and that the question whether provisions of Regulations I and II framed under the FEMA applied to the facts of the case requires deeper consideration. If that be so, the plaint cannot be rejected under Rule (d) of Order VII. In that view of the matter it cannot be said in view of the various averments in the plaint that it does not disclose a cause of action for the purpose of rejection under Rule 11(a) of Order VII of the Code. I therefore do not find reason to interfere with the ultimate order passed by the learned Sub Judge on I.A.No.747 of 2006. 30. At this stage, learned Senior Advocate Sri.V.Chitambaresh submitted that petitioners have the next option of resisting the suit under Rule 2(2)(b) of Order XIV of the Code. Learned Senior Advocate pointed out that none of the limitations and restrictions which petitioners have at the stage of scrutiny under Rule 11(a) and (d) of Order VII exist while considering maintainability of the suit under Rule 2(2)(b) of Order XIV of the Code. Learned Senior Advocate pointed out that none of the limitations and restrictions which petitioners have at the stage of scrutiny under Rule 11(a) and (d) of Order VII exist while considering maintainability of the suit under Rule 2(2)(b) of Order XIV of the Code. Learned Senior Advocate therefore requested that the option of petitioners to contend that the suit is not maintainable, get a preliminary issue raised and decided under Rule 2(2) of Order XIV of the Code may be reserved. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent contended that such an option is not available to the petitioners since under the said provision maintainability of the suit can be challenged only if it is barred by any provision of law which has no reference to any decision on the facts involved. 31. I think, I need not enter into that area in this proceeding. If petitioners have the option of contending that the suit is not maintainable and getting preliminary issue raised and decided under Rule 2(2)(b) of Order XIV of the Code, that right cannot be resisted and it is not necessary that this Court should reserve that right. It is open to the petitioners to invoke the right if any available to them if the statutory provision enabled them to do so. With the above observations, this civil revision is dismissed.