JUDGMENT Poonam Srivastav, J. – Heard the parties. 2. The instant writ petition is preferred challenging the order dated 16.10.1990• (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) as well as the revisional order dated 14.6.1999 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition), passed by the respondent nos. 2 and 1 respectively. The Order is under Section 71 A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as CNT Act) alongwith the application for restoration. 3. The primary contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the restoration application was barred by limitation and, therefore, was not maintainable. Besides, the dispute involves, not only question of simpliciter restoration but complicated question of title, mortgage, its redemption etc. and, therefore, it could not be decided in a summary proceeding as has been done in the instant case under Section 71 A of the CNT Act. 4. The facts of the case are that on 9.9.1970, late Masih Das Munda, predecessor-in-interest of Respondent Nos. 4 to 6, preferred an application under Section 71 A of the CNT Act for restoration of land. The land in question are Plot Nos. 519 (1.59 Acres) and 520 (29 Decimals) of Khata No. 90/2, Village-Saldega. 5. The submission of the learned counsel is that no date of transfer was mentioned in the restoration application. There was no details relating to transfer 'but merely that the land was transferred in an illegal manner against the provision of Section 46 of the CNT Act. 6. On the basis of the aforesaid application SAR Case No. 140/70-71 was registered. The petitioner filed a show-cause raising a number of objections to the effect that Khata No. 519 was recorded in the name of one Suleman Munda son of Etwa Munda and Bandhana Munda, son of Fago Munda in the Revisional Survey Record of Rights. Both the recorded tenants died issueless but during the life-time, a mortgage deed was executed on 5.4.1926 in favour of one Dilwar Uraon for a sum of Rs. 300/-. The said mortgage was redeemable after 1931 i.e. after five years. The Revisional Survey Record of Rights published also mentions the aforesaid mortgage. The mortgagee continued in possession and the claim of the petitioner is that he acquired title by adverse possession since the mortgage was not redeemed. 7. Dilawar Uraon, mortgagee died leaving behind a son Paul Kachhap and dauhter -in-Iaw Halyani Kachhap. The Revisional Survey Record of Rights published also mentions the aforesaid mortgage. The mortgagee continued in possession and the claim of the petitioner is that he acquired title by adverse possession since the mortgage was not redeemed. 7. Dilawar Uraon, mortgagee died leaving behind a son Paul Kachhap and dauhter -in-Iaw Halyani Kachhap. The legal heirs granted a Oar Raiyati Settlement in favour of the petitioner in the year 1956 and, thereafter, the petitioner continues to be in possession of the land in dispute. 8. It is further submitted that the petitioner constructed a house and some other structures and also a pucca well was excavated much before the Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 came into effect. It is further contended that the name of the petitioner stood mutated vide Mutation Case• No. 29/1961-62. 9. On the basis of the aforesaid facts, the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has strongly contended that there is neither any violation of any of the provisions of the Act much less Section 46 of the CNT Act and also, respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 are neither legal heirs nor successor of the recorded tenant and, therefore, they have no right to claim restoration. The transferee acquired title by adverse possession and, therefore, the restoration application was liable to be rejected outright. 10. On the question of non-contravention of the provisions of the CNT Act. It is contended that under Section 71 A of the CNT Act, there are three prerequisite conditions:- (i) land must belong to a member of the Scheduled Tribe; (H) The land must be transferred by the owner/recorded Raiyat of that Scheduled Tribe; (iii) The transfer must be in contravention with the provisions of CNT Act. Admittedly, in the instant case, mortgage was entered into in the year 1926 by one Scheduled Tribe in favour of another Scheduled Tribe. At the relevant time, there was no restriction of transfer inter se between the members of the Scheduled Tribe. Thus, there is neither any violation of the Act nor Section 71A of the Act would apply. The authorities below have failed to take this aspect into consideration and illegally allowed the restoration application. Admittedly, the recorded tenant were out of possession since the year 1926 whereas, the restoration application was filed only in the year 1970 and thus, highly barred by limitation. The authorities below have failed to take this aspect into consideration and illegally allowed the restoration application. Admittedly, the recorded tenant were out of possession since the year 1926 whereas, the restoration application was filed only in the year 1970 and thus, highly barred by limitation. Admittedly, the restoration application was filed after a lapse of more than thirty years. 11. The next argument is that in the year 1926, there was no embargo vis-a-vis permission by the Deputy Commissioner and thus there was no such fundamental requirement of law at the relevant time. The CNT Act came in effect only in the year 1947 whereas, the transfer had taken place in the year 1926 itself i.e. much before Section 46 of the Act came into force. 12. Learned counsel has laid emphasis repeatedly on his submission that Dilawar Uraon had acquired title by adverse possession. The alternative argument is that assuming that he has not perfected his right but no benefit can be accorded to the respondents on account of Regulation 1 of 1969, which came into effect in the year 1986. 13. An emphatic submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the Title was perfected in the year 1956 itself. The requisite period for perfecting title is 12 years as provided under Section 46(4A) of the CNT Act and it came to an end in the year 1968 whereas, Regulation 1 of 1969 was implemented subsequently and, therefore, the period of 30 years as provided by the subsequent Regulation would not come in. the way of the petitioner's title. The period of limitation for claiming restoration as provided under Section 46(4A) of CNT Act is only 12 years and Section 71 A of the said Act was introduced for the first time in 1969. In the instant case, the transfer took place in 1926 and the period of limitation under Section 46(4A) expired in the year 1938. The alternative argument advanced is, assuming the date of transfer is taken as 1956, even then the period of limitation expired in the year 1968. Thus, it is emphasised that the restoration application was barred by law of limitation since it was filed after lapse of 44 years of the initial transfer. The claim of the petitioner is also on the basis of adverse possession which applies to the land belonging to the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. Thus, it is emphasised that the restoration application was barred by law of limitation since it was filed after lapse of 44 years of the initial transfer. The claim of the petitioner is also on the basis of adverse possession which applies to the land belonging to the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. The mortgagee namely Dilawar Uraon continued in possession even after lapse of the period agreed in the mortgage deed. Evidently, Dilawar Uraon acquired title by the law of adverse possession. The reasoning given by the lower appellate court and the revisional authority on the basis of Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 is a ground carved out by the authority themselves. It is vehemently objected that the provisions of the said Act will not come into play. The Bihar Money Lenders Act was enforced in the year 1974 i.e. much after the mortgage was entered into and the period of mortgage lapsed and, therefore, there is no applicability of the provisions of Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974. Reliance has been placed by Mr. P.K. Prasad, Sr. Advocate on a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of AIR 1981 Pat. 172 [Sushil Kumar Singh vs. Braj Mohan Singh]. 14. Refuting the arguments of the counsel on behalf of the petitioner, Shri Jai Prakash, learned Senior Counsel has placed provisions of Section 71 A of the CNT Act. Emphasis is that a bare reading of the provisions at the outset makes it clear that the intention of the Legislature is that “…..If at any time it came to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner.........". Meaning thereby that no period of limitation or embargo is intended vis-a-vis period for restoration of possession if the land has gone to a non-tribal. 15. Learned counsel has also stressed on the second and third proviso of Section 71 A But this is regarding the substantial structure constructed by the transferee. In the instant case, since certain amount of compensation has been awarded and there being no dispute that structures are standing on the land it is not very material to the present controversy. 16. The next argument is that Section 46 of the CNT Act prohibits any transfer of right by a Raiyat, the period of mortgage should not exceed five years. 16. The next argument is that Section 46 of the CNT Act prohibits any transfer of right by a Raiyat, the period of mortgage should not exceed five years. It is submitted that proviso (a) also bars a transfer to a Scheduled Tribe of local limits without permission of the Deputy Commissioner, therefore, the land transferred is liable to be restored. 17. Counsel on behalf of the respondents has placed reliance on a number of decisions. The first one is in the case of Smt. Bina Rani Gose vs. Commissioner, South hhotanagpur reported in 1985 PLJR 732. This is a Full Bench decision which has taken into consideration the provisions of Section 71 A as well as' the time limits given to the Deputy Commissioner when can he rectify the violation of protection given to a Scheduled Tribe by invocation of Section 71A of the CNT Act and Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969. The conclusion of Full Bench was that the protection given is in wide ranging terms against all unlawful transfers. The emphasis of the Full Bench was to prevent fraudulent transfers depriving the Scheduled Tribes and the provisions of Section 71 A of the CNT Act introduced by Regulation 1 of 1969 was eloquent on the face of it, therefore, the arguments of the learned counsel that the instant transfer set at naught by the Courts below after payment of compensation, cannot be interfered. Reliance has also been placed on other decisions in the case of Fagu Mahto and Others vs. Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division and Others reported in 1986 BL T (Rep.) 173. This decision relates to Section 242 of the CNT Act. The provision is for ejectment of persons unlawfully obtaining possession of "Mundari Khunt Kattidar" tenancy or any portion thereof in Contravention of Section 240. The Deputy commissioner has a right to eject such a person being in unlawful possession. In my opinion, this question is not involved in the present controversy nor the citation relevant. 18. Next decision cited on behalf of the counsel for the respondents is Situ Sahu and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Others reported in (2004)8 SCC 340 [: 2004 (4) JLJR (SC)109]. In my opinion, this question is not involved in the present controversy nor the citation relevant. 18. Next decision cited on behalf of the counsel for the respondents is Situ Sahu and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Others reported in (2004)8 SCC 340 [: 2004 (4) JLJR (SC)109]. The said decision relates to the time limit for claiming restoration since there is no bar of limitation in exercise of power of restoration, at the same time this latitude cannot be exercised after an unreasonable lapse of long time, specially if a third party interest might have come into effect. 19. On the basis of rival arguments, I proceed to examine as to whether the transfer was in contravention with the provisions of Section 71A of the CNT Act and also the question whether the petitioner had perfected his right by adverse possession as well as the question of delay. 20. It is true that no specific period of limitation is provided under the Act for restoration of the land since Section 71 A of the CNT Act provides that the proceeding can be initiated at any time when it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner. But though no period of limitation is provided neither there is any clear and perfect time limit but still various decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court while dealing with the question of restoration of land in favour of a Tribal under Section 71 A and Section 46 of the CNT Act as well as Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969, it was held that the Act cannot be made applicable retrospectively and that too after an inordinate delay. In the case of Patras Oraon VS. State of Bihar and Others reported in (1991)2 JLJR 1048 it was held that the reasoning of the authorities that the Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 was applicable, was quashed and application of the provision with retrospective effect, was held to be unsustainable in law. Similarly, the Apex Court, in the case of Situ Sahu and Others (supra) interpreted the use of words "at any time" in Section 71 A. The interpretation by the Apex Court is that this denotes the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act i.e. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. But the Apex Court was conscious that since no period of time has been fixed, therefore, certain guidelines are necessary. It was held that the power for restoration cannot be exercised after an unreasonable long period of time during which third party interest might have come into effect. It is not a case that the appellant acquired the land fraudulently. So far the prohibition of Section 46 of the CNT Act whereby transfer by a Member of Scheduled Tribe without the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, was not in existence in the year 1926 and thus, I am of the opinion that there is no contravention of any other provision of the Act applying the law laid down in the case of Situ Sahu (supra), Reliance has been placed by the respondents as well on this citation also but I am of the view that since the Apex Court was clearly of the opinion that such a power of restoration cannot be exercised after an unreasonable long period during which third party interest might have been created. Therefore, in the instant case the petitioner is admittedly a third party and he has evidently perfected his right. The reasoning of automatic redemption as held by the authorities in the impugned orders is out of question. The appellate authority as well as the revisional authority did not take the subsequent event i.e. transfer in favour of the petitioner and the perfection of title much before the restoration application was filed; therefore the impugned order are vitiated in law. Similar view was adopted by the Apex Court in the case of Jai Mangal Oraon vs. Mira Nayak (Smt.) and Others alongwith Jai Mangal Oraon vs. Rita Sinha and Others reported in (2000)5 SCC 141 it was clearly held that the provisions commencing with words If at any time ......... ". cannot be taken to mean that powers under the provisions under Section 71 A can be exercised without any reference to time limit and without any consideration of the rights acquired in the meantime under the ordinary law. 21. On perusal of the revisional order, it transpires that the controversy has been decided against the petitioner on the basis that the mortgage stood redeemed after a lapse of five years and automatic redemption was accepted under the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974. 21. On perusal of the revisional order, it transpires that the controversy has been decided against the petitioner on the basis that the mortgage stood redeemed after a lapse of five years and automatic redemption was accepted under the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974. While upholding the claim of the respondents, the revisional court relied on Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1978 SC 941 . 22. So far the question of adverse possession is concerned. the finding of the revisional court is that the facts of the case are not disputed. The finding is that the petitioner has acquired title by adverse possession. Since admittedly the possession is for a very long period, much more than required for perfecting one's right for adverse possession. In fact the revisional court has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the basis of automatic redemption of mortgage and relied upon the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974. The question of automatic redemption, as held by the appellate Court as well as by revisional court in the instant Case, at the relevant time when the property was mortgaged is not acceptable since the said Act was not in existence even on the date when the automatic redemption is held by the Court below. Authorities failed to appreciate that mortgage was entered in the year 1926. In the circumstances, the finding recorded on the question of automatic redemption cannot be accepted. 23. The next question that has to be decided, the period of limitation for claiming restoration as provided under Section 46 of the CNT Act. The period was only 12 years subsequently by introduction of Regulation 1 of 1969 in Section 71 A of the CNT Act the period of limitation was enhanced to 30 years in the event certain constructions have been raised. In the instant case, the transfer took place in the year 1926. Therefore, the question of limitation under Section 46(4A) expired in the year 1938. Assuming that the date of transfer is accepted as 1956. even then the period of limitation expired in 1968. Therefore, the restoration application was barred by law as it has been filed after a lapse of 44 years. Following the principle of law laid down in Jai Mangal Oraon (supra), I hold that period of 44 years can by no stretch of imagination is "Reasonable Time". 24. even then the period of limitation expired in 1968. Therefore, the restoration application was barred by law as it has been filed after a lapse of 44 years. Following the principle of law laid down in Jai Mangal Oraon (supra), I hold that period of 44 years can by no stretch of imagination is "Reasonable Time". 24. I am in agreement with the contention of the counsel on behalf of the respondents regarding explanation for delay that a civil suit between the heirs of nearest agnates of late Masih Das Munda and Joseph Munda, was continuing between the heirs of the respondents and the heirs of the original recorded tenant vide Title Suit No. 783 of 1960 and thereafter the Appeal No. 152 of 1963 which was dismissed on 16th May, 1966, but this is of no consequence. The restoration filed in the year 1970, cannot be said to be reasonable. The 3rd party interest i.e. the petitioner was created much before and, therefore, the explanation regarding the continuation of the suit is not of much consequence though the Court below did not take into notice these facts which are in my view, quite irrelevant. 25. In view of what has been stated above, the orders impugned passed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority, cannot be upheld in law. The respondent nos. 4 to 13 filed an application under Section 71A of the CNT Act as heirs of Masih Das Munda without even mentioning date of disposition and how were they related with the recorded tenant. The case was registered as SAR Case No. 140 of 1970-71. On the basis of said application which is without forming any foundation of their claim. Mere alleging the fact that they were the heirs of the nearest agnates, as accepted by the two authorities, are liable to be set at naught and therefore, are hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed.