JUDGMENT : In the present appeal, challenge is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 25th August, 2006, whereby the Court punished the contemnor and convicted him for an offence of criminal contempt under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act') and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of four months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks. The contemnor, Shri Chandra Prakash Singh Chauhan, is an advocate practicing in the Civil Court at Mainpuri. He while appearing before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, used abusive, unparliamentary and uncalled for language, when the Court was dealing with Criminal Case No.3926/1998 titled State v. Devesh Kumar and others, on 25th September, 2004, at about 1.10 p.m. According to the advocate, he had moved an application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and wanted the matter to be heard and orders passed thereupon immediately. When the Court advised that he could wait for a while and the matter could be kept for sometime and dealt with, the counsel became angry and started shouting and used the following undesirable words: "Maine teretatha tere tamam magistrate ki prati ki prati likhtt shikayaten ki hain, tere zila judge ki bhi shikayat ki hai, tera zila judge mere shikayat per ghar baith gaya hai, too is liya mera yah prathana patra nistarit nahin kar raha hai, saale nauaa teri aukat nahin hai, too mera prathana patra jan bujhkar take up nahi kar raha hai." The above language at the face of it, is unparliamentary and, in fact, is not expected of an officer of the court to be spoken to. The learned Judge dealing with the matter still waited for the counsel to calm down and tender apology, however of no avail. This rude behaviour and use of abusive language by the advocate against the Judge in open court compelled the Judge to make a reference to the High Court for taking proceedings against the counsel under the provisions of the Act and the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (for short, 'the Rules') framed by the High Court for that purpose. This rude behaviour and use of abusive language by the advocate against the Judge in open court compelled the Judge to make a reference to the High Court for taking proceedings against the counsel under the provisions of the Act and the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (for short, 'the Rules') framed by the High Court for that purpose. This recommendation was accepted by the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court and the counsel was issued notice to show cause why proceedings be not taken against him and he be punished in accordance with law. These proceedings were contested by the counsel-contemnor and finally it being a criminal contempt of court, was placed before the Division Bench of that Court and as already noticed, after following the procedure of law, the said advocate has been convicted. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant before us contended that in view of the rules which have been framed by the Allahabad High Court, the very initiation of contempt proceedings against the accused are barred by limitation. The High Court of Allahabad, in exercise of the powers vested in it under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, has framed rules (Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules) that deals with the contempt proceedings. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant rules: "2. Every application, reference or motion for taking proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shall mention at the head whether it relates to the Commission of 'Civil Contempt' or 'Criminal Contempt': Provided that, if there are allegations both of Commission of Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt against the same person/persons, two separate application shall be moved, one dealing with Civil Contempt and the other with Criminal Contempt. 3.(1) Every such motion or reference made under Section 15(1) of the Act shall contain in precise language the statement setting forth the facts constituting the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty and shall specify the date or dates on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. (2) Every motion made by the Advocate General under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act shall state the allegations of facts and the view of the informant that in relation to these facts contempt appears to have been committed of which the Court should take cognizance and take further action. (2) Every motion made by the Advocate General under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act shall state the allegations of facts and the view of the informant that in relation to these facts contempt appears to have been committed of which the Court should take cognizance and take further action. The motion should contain sufficient material to indicate why the Advocate General is inclined to move the Court. (3)(a) A petition for taking contempt of court proceedings shall be supported by an affidavit. In case of criminal contempt three copies of the application and the affidavit shall accompany the application: Provided that if there are more than one opposite parties, the petition shall be accompanied by as many extra copies as there are opposite parties. (b) When the petitioner relies upon any document or documents in his possession, he shall file the same along with the petition or a copy thereof as annexure to affidavit. (c) A petition made under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act shall also be accompanied by the consent in writing of the Advocate General and a copy thereof. (4) Every petition in respect of criminal contempt, where it is not moved by the Advocate General and where the consent in writing of the Advocate General had not been obtained, and every petition in regard to criminal contempt of a subordinate court where no reference has been made by it and the petition is moved without the consent of the Advocate General shall clearly state the reasons why the consent in writing of the Advocate General could not be obtained and why the court has been approached to act suo motu. 4.(a) Every case relating to civil contempt shall be presented before the Bench of a Single Judge constituted for that purpose. (b) Every case of criminal contempt coming under Section 15 of the Act shall be presented before the Bench of not less than two Judges constituted for the purpose. (c) Provided that every case of contempt of Court presented before the Court shall bear the report of the Stamp Reporter as to sufficiency of Court fee paid and also about limitation. (c) Provided that every case of contempt of Court presented before the Court shall bear the report of the Stamp Reporter as to sufficiency of Court fee paid and also about limitation. Reference relating to contempt of court received on Administrative side from the subordinate courts shall, along with the office report with respect thereto, be laid before the Chief Justice, who shall have the discretion to file the same or to order that the same be laid before the Bench concerned, for further proceedings in connection with the case. 5. Such allegations contained in the petition as appear to the Court to make out a prima facie case of contempt of Court against the person concerned, shall be reduced into charge or charges by the Court against such person, and notice shall be issued only with respect to those charges: Provided that the Court shall not issue notice if more than a year has elapsed from the alleged act of contempt of court. " On the strength of the above provisions, the counsel appearing for the appellant contended that initiation of contempt proceedings and even framing of a charge against the appellant was vitiated in law for the limitation contained in Rule 5 of the said Rules. Before we examine the merit or otherwise of the contention raised before us on a question of law, we must and we do not hesitate in observing that conduct of the advocate was contemptuous and cannot be justified on any grounds whatsoever. The counsel who, besides being a representative of a party, is always treated as an officer of the courts, owes a duty to the system to act with utmost dignity, respect and morality. The profession of advocates besides being controlled by the statutory provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder is also expected to maintain certain high values and standards of professionalism. The advocates owe a dual duty, firstly to the Court, i.e. the justice delivery system and secondly, to the Society at large. Public reposes great confidence in the judicial system of the country, of which lawyers are an indispensable part. In the present case, the contemnor, who wears the robes of a lawyer, has thrown off the winds of dignity, values and expectations of all concerned by using filthy and abusive language in the Court. Public reposes great confidence in the judicial system of the country, of which lawyers are an indispensable part. In the present case, the contemnor, who wears the robes of a lawyer, has thrown off the winds of dignity, values and expectations of all concerned by using filthy and abusive language in the Court. This is nothing but a definite act of criminal contempt within the scope of Section 12 of the Act. We are aware that power of contempt of a court should be used sparingly, but certainly not where the majesty of the court as well as the administration of justice system is being undermined by use of such foul language and, that too, with an attempt to get a particular relief from the judges, who are dealing with the cases at the ground level and are serving the society to the best of their ability. Limitations of these courts in regard to the infrastructure and other matters are a well known fact. Add to that injury is the insult inflicted by such unruly behaviour of the advocate, who has no respect for system, to which he himself belongs to. To add to his glory of disrepute, we are also informed that the same counsel is involved in some criminal cases and has been in and out of jail. We do express a hope that this would be an eye opener for the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India to examine whether such person should be on the rolls of this noble profession and enjoy the benefits, privileges and freedom available to this profession. Despite service of notice, nobody is present on behalf of any of the Bar Councils. Therefore, we are left with no alternative but to issue a specific direction to them to take action in accordance with law and take a view which would be expected of the august Body of the State Bar Council and in its default, by the Bar Council of India in the facts of the case. Reverting back to the question of law raised in the present appeal, first we must keep in mind that the scheme of the Rules needs to be examined. The contempt proceedings can be initiated either by filing a petition (application), reference or on suo motu action. In other words, the proceedings under the Act can be initiated by different modes. Reverting back to the question of law raised in the present appeal, first we must keep in mind that the scheme of the Rules needs to be examined. The contempt proceedings can be initiated either by filing a petition (application), reference or on suo motu action. In other words, the proceedings under the Act can be initiated by different modes. All these categories have a different procedure which should be adopted by the Court and different safeguards which are available to the contemnor during the course of proceedings. The Allahabad High Court has framed the Rules, which we have already reproduced. The expression 'motion' or 'reference' has been used in Rules 2 and 3 of the said Rules. These rules have a different connotation and cannot be treated synonymous to each other. This is further evident from the fact that Rules 4 and 5 have used a different language. Under Rule 4 presentation of a petition for contempt is to be dealt with under Rule 4(a), where every criminal contempt, as in terms of Section 15 of the Act has to be presented in terms of Rule 4(b). Rule 4(c) has two different facets inbuilt in itself. Firstly, every case of contempt of court is to be presented before a court, subject to the limitation and sufficiency of court fee. This is one class which clearly indicates that a petition for contempt is to be filed before the court of competent jurisdiction and subject to the rules that may be framed on that behalf. The second category is references relating to contempt of court received on administrative side from the subordinate courts by the High Court. This is not on presentation of a petition by a party but has entirely a different field of operation. In such cases, the discretion has been vested in the Chief Justice of the High Court.Every reference has to be placed before the Chief Justice and it is his decision whether it is a fit case where the proceedings under the Act should or should not be initiated in terms of the reference made to the High Court, which is final. The time of one year postulated under proviso to Rule 5 has no application to the class of cases which fall under the second kind of category, under Rule 4(c). The time of one year postulated under proviso to Rule 5 has no application to the class of cases which fall under the second kind of category, under Rule 4(c). Rule 5 opens with the words "such allegations contained in the petition as appear to the Court to make out a prima facie case of contempt of Court against the person". This is clear intent of the rule framers that Rule 5 will operate only in the field where a contempt petition is filed by a party. The expression 'petition' cannot take within its ambit the expression 'reference'. As we have already noticed, reference and petition are two different well recognized terms in law and have different implications and connotations and field of operation. In our considered view, the limitations spelt out under proviso to Rule 5 would only operate in the cases of contempt initiated by the institution of a petition by a party in accordance with law. It cannot have any application to the reference that may be made by the learned Judges of the subordinate courts to the High Court. If the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is accepted, this would frustrate the very purpose of Rule 4(c) and even the provisions of the Act. It is a well accepted fact that in the cases of reference, some time is bound to be taken before the Courts can make a reference, satisfy themselves that a case under the provisions of the Act is made out and then make a reference, which thereupon is required to be considered by the Chief Justice of the High Court in accordance with the Rules of the High Court. For these reasons, we find no substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant. Unlike Section 20 of the Act, Rule 5 of the Rules does not refer to proceedings initiated suo motu, which are proceedings contemplated under the provisions of the Act and are different from the proceedings initiated by a party upon presentation of a petition. For these reasons, we find no substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant. Unlike Section 20 of the Act, Rule 5 of the Rules does not refer to proceedings initiated suo motu, which are proceedings contemplated under the provisions of the Act and are different from the proceedings initiated by a party upon presentation of a petition. We may also notice that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant while relying upon the judgment of this Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others (2001) 7 SCC 549 , contended that the limitation under Section 20 of the Act would come to the aid of the appellant and the proceedings initiated subsequent to the lapse of one year are no proceedings in the eyes of law and the appellant is entitled to the order of discharge. We are again not impressed by this contention at all, primarily, for the reason that the provisions of Section 20 of the Act places a bar on initiation of any proceeding of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. This limitation is squarely satisfied in the present case. The incident is stated to be of 25th September, 2004, while the High Court decided to issue notice to the advocate concerned on 22nd December, 2004, which is much within the prescribed period of limitation of one year. Thus, even on facts, the notice issued, charge framed and the punishment awarded by the Court does not suffer from any infirmity of law or appreciation of evidence. The plea of limitation either founded on Section 20 of the Act or Rule 5 of the Rules merits rejection alone. For the reasons afore-recorded, we find no merit in the present appeal and sustain punishment of four months with fine as awarded by the High Court to the advocate for his contemptuous behaviour, which we have no hesitation in condemning even at this stage. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. We direct the appellant to surrender within two weeks from today to undergo the remaining part of the sentence awarded to him in the contempt proceedings. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. We direct the appellant to surrender within two weeks from today to undergo the remaining part of the sentence awarded to him in the contempt proceedings. We further make it clear that in the event of default, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mainpuri, U.P., shall issue non-bailable warrants for arrest of the said contemnor and ensure that he undergoes the remaining sentence. A copy of this order be sent forthwith to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mainpuri, U.P. as well as to the Bar Council of India and Bar Council of U.P. at Allahabad for action in accordance with law.