Judgment Talukdar, J. 1. THE Judgment of the Court was delivered by : -Fast Track, Second Court, Alipurduar (functioning as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal) in connection with MAC Case No. 35/05 returned her verdict on 28.2.2007. 2. IT has been carried at the instance of the Appellants, who were the Claimants before the learned Tribunal for realising compensation in respect of the death of their son due to motor cycle accident, occasioned by the offending vehicle of Opposite Party No. 2. The Tribunal after examining five witnesses, who were the Parents of the deceased (the Appellants - P.W.1 and P.W.2), an eyewitness (P.W.3), a Sahayika of the Sishu Shiksha Kendra (P.W.4) and a local member of Gram Panchayat (P.W.5), came to the conclusion"..........The petitioners have failed to dispel the could that his cast upon the real identity of Biplab and they are the parents of a boy, named Biplab Das, who died in a road accident on 30.12.2000, caused by a motor bike........................". Reasons in support of her conclusion as understood from our foray of the Judgment and Order under Appeal in the light of the submissions made by Shri Banerjee in support of the Appeal and Shri Bose for the Company can be set out briefly which is as follows : (a) failure to prove the original Post-mortem Report, (b) no proof worthwhile the name having been forthcoming that the Appellants were the Parents of the deceased Biplab, (c) P.W.4, Minoti Mondal being a helper of the Sishu Shiksha Kendra (SSK) having produced the School Register pertaining to the education of the deceased, Biplab in the said centre which was at the first instance discrepant with the year of his study and that as to why the helper and not the Headmistress came forth with a Register, (d) P.W. Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were mutually contrary of each other and the fulcrum episode of the accident which resulted in the death of the deceased boy had been violently contradicted through these evidence, (e) her perception of the demeanour of P.W.1 in course of her evidence when she faltered while giving out the names of her other existing children and the mention of the deceased as Utpal but in subsequent stage resiling from the same. 3. THIS is the pith and substance of the order, which persuaded the learned Tribunal to have dismissed the claim petition. 4. 3. THIS is the pith and substance of the order, which persuaded the learned Tribunal to have dismissed the claim petition. 4. IN the light of the broad contours thereof we would now advert to the submissions made by Shri Banerjee for the Appellants. Shri Banerjee was of the view that the Post-mortem Report was marked 'X' for identification as the original was not available due to the fact that the same was filed in connection with the proceedings of G.R. Case No. 02/05, pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipurduar in connection with the case lodged by P.W.2, Father of the deceased child under Sections 279/337/338/304(A) of the Indian Penal Code. Shri Banerjee would further submits that even though the learned Tribunal had taken exception of the demeanour on account of the fact that P.W.1 had been faltering in her evidence while giving out the name of her children. It should not be lost sight of the fact that it was the trauma on account of the loss of the child of P.W. 1 that had made her remorse and may be slow in giving out the name of her other children. 5. REFERRING to the provisions of Sections 168 and 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short, the said Act), Shri Banerjee would submit that it was incumbent upon the learned Tribunal to have caused an enquiry in regard to various facets of the claimants' case; instead it had counted the errors in the fashion which has resulted in a system failure and it requires to be retrieved. 6. SHRI Bose on the other hand for the Company has placed before us the entire order under Appeal in his own way and has referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2009)10 SCC 636 and Krishna Mochi and Others v. State of Bihar reported in (2002)6 SCC 81 to illustrate his point that in view of the glaring inconsistencies in the evidence of P.W. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with regard to the position of the child when the fateful incident took place and also the exclusion of the vital narration of the incident of the Parents (P.W. Nos. 1 and 2) and the purported eyewitness (P.W.3) renders the entire claim case unbelievable on account of such incredible inconsistencies. 1, 2 and 3 with regard to the position of the child when the fateful incident took place and also the exclusion of the vital narration of the incident of the Parents (P.W. Nos. 1 and 2) and the purported eyewitness (P.W.3) renders the entire claim case unbelievable on account of such incredible inconsistencies. Shri Bose further submitted that unless it can be proved that the Parents being the Appellants, the legal representatives of the deceased no claim case is maintainable. Shri Bose has submitted further that as the very identity of the Appellants are in doubt, very rightly the learned Tribunal has refused to accept the claim case and dismiss it. 7. LEARNED Counsel for the Insurance Company further submitted that the evidence of P.W. Nos. 1 and 2 are all mutually contrary to each other. He was of the view that when the Mother (P.W.1) was not sure with regard to the exact name of her son, how far the entire claim case can be believed? 8. STRESSING much reliance on the evidence of P.W.4 with regard to the missing portion of the academic record of the late child, as produced by P.W.4, Shri Bose submitted that the helper instead of Headmistress had brought the record which would be difficult to accept in evidence and the same was rightly treated in the manner which she deserved before the learned Tribunal. He was much vociferous with regard to the Death Certificate (Ext. 1) which he pointed out from the finding of the learned Tribunal was obtained in course of the deposition of P.W. 1. After we have perused the evidence and the judgment and Order under Appeal and have heard both Shri Banerjee and Shri Bose with captive attention for a length of hours, we would now be required to see as to whether the finding returned by the learned Tribunal can pass Muster. 9. AT the out set, we are tempted to refer to the two decisions Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and Krishna Mochi and Others v. State of Bihar (supra), referred to by Shri Bose. These relate to criminal trials and the question, of appreciation of evidence within the parametres of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. In the present case we are dealing with a claim petition from the Tribunal. These relate to criminal trials and the question, of appreciation of evidence within the parametres of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. In the present case we are dealing with a claim petition from the Tribunal. Although certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 195) are applicable (See : Section 169); but, yet, the regular trappings of either a civil suit or a criminal trial is not inculcated in this proceeding which is deemed to be a summary one. It has been incorporated in the Statute Book since the British time for the purpose of amelioration of the plight of the distraught next of the kin, who have either lost them or have suffered injuries due to fortuitous circumstances, as known under Sections 163A/166 of the said Act. 10. EVEN if we accept the stand of Shri Bose that there has been discrepancy, which we cannot altogether discount in the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3, but we have to keep in mind the very essence of the issue, which unfortunately has been lost sight before the learned Tribunal. That a death had taken place and a regular autopsy has been done - have not been disputed. Challenge thrown on the identity of the Parents (Appellants) had not been sought to be repudiated by way of leading any evidence contrary thereof. In the same line the learned Tribunal could have also resorted to her plenary powers in causing an enquiry, which has been rightly pointed out by Shri Banerjee, within the meaning of Section 166(4) of the said Act. 11. WITH regard to non-production of the original copy of the post-mortem report, we are of the view that the entire records of G.R. Case No. 02/05 if brought on record, easily the same could have been proved in the manner as known to law either by way of adducing evidence at the instance of the Tribunal or calling upon the Medical Officer of the Alipurduar Sub-divisional Hospital where the post-mortem of the deceased was held. Simply, the learned Tribunal washed off her hand from the same by citing the fact the same was not produced, which is also factually not correct since from the evidence it is found the xerox copy of the same has been marked 'X' for identification. Reasons behind the same are not known to us. 12. Simply, the learned Tribunal washed off her hand from the same by citing the fact the same was not produced, which is also factually not correct since from the evidence it is found the xerox copy of the same has been marked 'X' for identification. Reasons behind the same are not known to us. 12. NOW, with regard to the question of what would be the correct name of the deceased whether it was Biplab or it was Utpal. Shri Bose has doubted that the nickname of the deceased could have been Biplab, which is rather uncommon in our society. We need not advert ourselves to that aspect of the matter. But, if we have a glimpse of the entire evidence in this respect, we would find that in the claim petition in the FIR (Ext.4), the Autopsy Report (marked 'X' for identification), and the Death Certificate (Ext. 1) everywhere this position has been clarified that Biplab alias Utpal. Whereas in the evidence of P.W.1 at the first instance she made out that the name of her son was Utpal. It was immediately clarified by her in the next few lines of her deposition. 13. TO our astonishment, we find the learned Tribunal in course of recording the evidence of the Appellant No. 1 (P.W.1) i.e. the Mother of the deceased could pose the question have you filed any document to prove that Biplab Das was your son? In our view, while the learned Tribunal like a civil Court has the plenary powers to put questions for clarifying the issue. We feel, without being uncharitable to her, this simply shows that she had foreclosed the issue in her mind; otherwise this question cannot find place in the very outset when P.W.1 had spoken about the name of her deceased son as Utpal which she subsequently resiled from. 14. THE situation here is not concomitant with the other facets of the deposition that we have perused. Now, the question comes, as Mr. Bose has pointed out with regard to the Death Certificate in the light of the finding of the learned Tribunal that the same was obtained in the course of the deposition of P.W. 1 to show that it was manufactured. Needless to say under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, this is a public document, issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death. Needless to say under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, this is a public document, issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death. Its probative value may not be certified by us. Even if it is true, as Mr. Bose is right in his submission, that the same was obtained in course of the deposition of the evidence, fact remains that the death of the child took place on 30.12.2004 and the factum of death was reported on 23.2.2005. What is important in this matter is as to when the death was reported that means the date of registration and not the date of obtaining the copy of the same, which is of course in the course of the evidence. 15. HAD the learned Tribunal entertained any doubt in her mind with regard to the veracity of the same, she could have easily put in on evidence by way of calling upon the authorities to produce necessary proof in support of the veracity of the same; instead she simply noted her disapproval which resulted in disbelief and ended in the order that we have seen. 16. FURTHERMORE, learned Tribunal took stock of the deficiency in the deposition of P.W. 1 to the extent of her demenour and slip in the name of the Deceased and found fault in the Claim case. But in the same process she lost sight of the evidence of P.W.2, Father of the Deceased. In fact he has blurted out the name of their children spontaneously. He has corroborated P.W.3 about the fact of receiving the information of the fateful incident and visiting the Police Station. Shri Banerjee has also very rightly pointed out that it ought to have been borne in mind that no other Claim case over the self same incident has been ever reported. And the fact of the pending G.R. Case No. 02/05 before the jurisdictional Court is a reckoning factor and should have been noted in its due consideration. 17. WE are of the opinion had these facts been taken into account, perhaps, a different conclusion may have been reached. 18. FROM a wholesome appreciation of the entire evidence and other materials on record, we are of the consistent view that the learned Tribunal had occasioned a failure in dismissing the claim petition. 17. WE are of the opinion had these facts been taken into account, perhaps, a different conclusion may have been reached. 18. FROM a wholesome appreciation of the entire evidence and other materials on record, we are of the consistent view that the learned Tribunal had occasioned a failure in dismissing the claim petition. It should have been borne in mind by her that she was neither presiding over a regular criminal trial or civil suit; on the contrary, a claim petition which was not only summary in nature but it had some welfare trappings. The Supreme Court in Ashwani Kumar and Anr. v. Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner and Anr. reported in (1999)8 SCC 364 had held that Motor Vehicles Act is after all a social welfare legislation. We find the learned Tribunal pounced upon the evidence with the scalpel of a surgeon so as to dissect the pros and cons of the evidence which is gone into a regular criminal trial. 19. ACCORDINGLY, after being unable to persuade ourselves with the ratio of the order under Appeal we set aside the same and direct the learned Tribunal to conduct an exercise afresh de novo within a period of 30 days from the date of communication of this Order and pass a fresh judgment. 20. SINCE we are remitting the Appeal before the learned Tribunal, entire issue would remain open. Necessary liberty would obviously, remain reserved to both the Appellant and the Respondent to prove and disprove their respective cases. Appeal disposed. L.C.R. sent down. Urgent Photostat copy of this order be available. No cost.