Umanath Pandey v. Sripur Area Office Employees Co-operative Credit Society Ltd.
2011-06-13
HARISH TANDON
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : - 1. This revisional application is directed against an order no. 57 dated 25.9.2008 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Asansol in Money Suit No. 23 of 1999 by which an application challenging the maintainability of the suit was rejected. 2. The suit is at the instance of the Cooperative Credit Society, praying for a decree for recovery of money lent and advance to the defendants therein for purchase of the immovable property. 3. The defendant no. 1/petitioner raised objection as to the maintainability of the suit in view of an embargo created under the provisions of West Bengal Cooperative Society Act, 1983. 4. Mr. Probal Kumar Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing for the defendant no. 1 petitioner submits that the word “dispute” has been defined under Section 2(20) of the said Act which means any matter capable of being the subject matter of civil litigation including the claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a Cooperative Society. He further submits that Section 95 (1) of the said Act confers jurisdiction upon the Registrar of the Cooperative Society to adjudicate the dispute concerning the business and affairs of Co-operative Society which includes the transaction between the Co-operative Society and another person. He strenuously submits that Section 134 (2) (d) of the said Act creates a bar upon the civil court to adjudicate the dispute as defined in the said Act which is conferred upon the Registrar, Co-operative Society. To buttress such submission, he relies upon a judgement of the Special Bench in case of Anjan Chowdhury Vs. Anandaneer Co-operative Registered Housing Society & Ors. reported in 1990(1) CHN 404 and a Division Bench judgement in case of Konnagar Samabayay Bank Ltd. Vs. Nilmonee Banerjee & Ors. reported in 91 CWN 1112 and in case of Sisir Kanun Guha & Anr. Vs. Ayakar Griha Nirman & Anr. reported in 2008 (4) ICC 185. 5. Mr Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party no. 1 submits that the court should not consider any material than the averments made in the plaint at the time of considering an application raising a question of maintainability of the suit. He strenuously submits that there is no averment that the act of purchase of the property by the society relates to the business and affairs of the Co-operative Society.
He strenuously submits that there is no averment that the act of purchase of the property by the society relates to the business and affairs of the Co-operative Society. He therefore submits that the said suit is for recovery of possession and the bar created under Section 134 has no manner of applicability. In absence of any express bar relating to the jurisdiction of the civil court, the court is competent to determine the cause and relies upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Dhudabhai Vs. Sate of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 and in case of Prakash Narayan Sharma Vs. Bhumah Shell Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. reported in (2002) 7 SCC 46 . 6. Having considered the respective submissions it is undisputed that this is a suit simplicitor for recovery of money at the instance of the Co-operative Credit Society. It is a specific case made out in the plaint that the said society entered into an agreement for purchase of the immovable property and a sum of Rs. 1,80,000/- was paid as and by way of an advance. Since the said vendor does not intend to sell any more, he is obliged to return/refund the said money lent and advance by the said society. 7. Co-operative Credit Society is defined in Section 2 (17) of the said Act which means a Co-operative Society, the primary object of which is to create funds for lending money to its members and includes a credit union. 8. The “dispute” has been defined in Section 2(20) of the said Act which means any matter capable of being the subject matter of civil litigation, and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a Co-operative Society. Section 95 confers jurisdiction upon the Registrar, Co-operative Society in relation to any dispute concerning the business of a Co-operative Society capable of being the subject matter of civil litigation or any dispute relating to the affairs of a Co-operative Society. Section 134 (2) (d) creates an embargo on the civil court to entertain any dispute referable to the Registrar under Section 95 of the said Act. 9. Therefore on the meaningful reading of the aforesaid provisions it appears that the dispute must be a dispute concerning civil litigation and must relate to the business and affairs of the Co-operative Society.
Section 134 (2) (d) creates an embargo on the civil court to entertain any dispute referable to the Registrar under Section 95 of the said Act. 9. Therefore on the meaningful reading of the aforesaid provisions it appears that the dispute must be a dispute concerning civil litigation and must relate to the business and affairs of the Co-operative Society. Any dispute which falls outside the ambit as aforesaid, can be decided by the civil court. 10. Although the business and affairs of the Co-operative Credit Society has not been spelt out in the plaint but one has to understand the primary business of the said Cooperative Credit Society then under Section 2(17) of the said Act. The primary object is to create funds for lending money to its members. Certainly a suit for realization of money lent and advance by the Co-operative Credit Society for purchase of the immovable property does not come within the purview of creation of funds for lending money to its members. 11. The Special Bench in case of Anjan Chowdhry (supra) laid down that all kinds of suits in which the Cooperative Society is involved does not mean that the civil court is not competent to decide the lis but the subject matter therein must relate to the business and affairs of the society in these words : “From the Order of Reference it appears that there are two decision rendered by two learned Judge of this Court holding that s. 86 of the Act of 1973, corresponding to s. 95 of the Act of 1983, “are wide enough to cover al disputes concerning the cooperative society’. The Division Bench in the order of reference has expressed its apprehension that such a view would “lead to the result that all kinds of suits in which the Co-operative Society may be involved, irrespective of whether they involve complicated questions of law or not, would be out of bounds for the Civil Court and must be adjudicated by the Registrar”. The Division Bench wondered “as to whether the Legislature really intended to confer upon the Registrar-not being properly equipped as a Civil Court-the entire jurisdiction of the Civil Courts for the purpose of adjudicating complicated civil suits irrespective of their nature and character, in the event a Co-operative Society is a party to the said dispute. 12.
The Division Bench wondered “as to whether the Legislature really intended to confer upon the Registrar-not being properly equipped as a Civil Court-the entire jurisdiction of the Civil Courts for the purpose of adjudicating complicated civil suits irrespective of their nature and character, in the event a Co-operative Society is a party to the said dispute. 12. We are afraid that if, as noted in the order of reference, the learned single Judges have stated that “the provisions of s. 86” (of the Act of 1973, now replaced by s. 95 of the Act of 1983 ) were enough to cover all disputes concerning the Co-operative Society”, they have stated the proposition too broadly. As we have already indicated, the “dispute”, in order to come within the provisions of s. 86 of the Old Act and s. 95 of the New Act and thus to go out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under the provisions of s. 132 of the Old and s. 134 of the new Act, must be disputes, not just concerning or involving a Co-operative Society, but concerning the business or relating to the affairs of the Society, such business or affairs which the Society is authorized to be concerned with or be involved in order to carry out its objectives under the Act and as chartered by and in its Rules and By-laws. A loan granted by a Society which is only a Co-operative Housing Society and not a Co-operative Credit Society, or a tenancy granted in respect of a portion of its property by a Society which is only a Co-operative Housing Society and not a Co-operative Credit Society, or a tenancy granted in respect of a portion of its property by a Society which is a Co-operative Credit Society and not a Co-operative Housing Society, can not thus give rise to a dispute concerning the business or relating to the affairs of the Society. But, as already stated, if the dispute concerns or relates to something which the Society is legally authorized to and required by its Rules and By-laws to undertake, it would squarely come within the provisions of s. 95 of the new Act, corresponding to s. 86 of the old Act and cannot be entertained by the Civil Court if the parties to the dispute are as specified in those Sections.
And once those conditions are satisfied, the dispute must be referred to the Registrar and cannot be taken cognizance of by the Civil Courts, however complicated the questions of law the dispute may involve. If that be, and we think that to be, the law made by our Legislature and that law does not suffer from any Constitutional infirmity, then it is simply useless to express any anxiety, as manifested in the Order of Reference as to whether the Registrar, not being expected to be “properly well equipped as a Civil Court”, would be able to decide the dispute effectively. Even if a legislative measure appears to be unwise, we must leave it at that, for neither we can review legislative wisdom nor should we be presumptuous to think that wisdom is our sole monopoly. Justice Holmes once said to Justice Stones that if the Legislature enacts a measure and “I can’t find anything in the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not, “Goddamit, let them do it”. 13. Subsequently the Division Bench in case of Konnagar Samabayay Bank Ltd. (supra) also held that the dispute must relate to the business and affairs of the society. 14. While concurring with the aforesaid views another Division Bench in case of Sisir Kumar Guho (supra) held: “Bearing in mind the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the abovementioned Special Bench, we now propose to consider the object of the defendants against whom the suit has been filed. Those are quoted below: “The object of the society shall be primarily to establish on Co-operative basis, settlements of housing schemes for persons with moderate income, by affording each settled facilities for owning a house or flat and ultimately to develop as far as practicable, the settlement so established into self-sufficient communities. In furtherance of the above object the society shall, in conformity with the Act, rules and bye-laws have the power to raise funds; to procure lands on purchase, hire or lease; to develop, to sell, leave or let out such lands;.............................................................................” 15.
In furtherance of the above object the society shall, in conformity with the Act, rules and bye-laws have the power to raise funds; to procure lands on purchase, hire or lease; to develop, to sell, leave or let out such lands;.............................................................................” 15. At this stage it will also be profitable to refer to some of the powers and duties of the managing committee of the society as provided in Rule 59 of the bye-laws which are reproduced below:- (j) to enter into all such agreements, make all such arrangements, take all such proceedings, and do all such acts and things as may be necessary or proper for the due management of the affairs of the society has been established and for securing and furthering its interest subject to the provisions of the Act and rules and subject all to the bye-laws for the time being of the society; (k) to enter into all contracts for the society and settle the terms thereof; (p) to buy, sell hire, mortgage, let out and develop buildings and other properties of the society and decide terms thereof and to make such arrangement as may be necessary for their up-keep, periodical repairs and payment of rates and taxes; (x) to do all such acts and things as are incidental to or which the committee may think conductive to the attainment of the objects of the society or any of them”. 16. On consideration of the provisions of the bye-laws mentioned above, we find that the agreement with the plaintiffs best for purchase of the land and then for selling part thereof after developing the same and constructing the link road were made strictly in the terms of the byelaws which authorized the societies to purchase, develop and sell lands by dealing with the outsiders and those acts were within the scope of the words “affairs of the society” and thus, the resultant dispute with the “outsiders” who had dealings with the society in this regards comes within the purview of the words “any person having transactions with the society” and as such, is required to be referred to the Registrar and consequently, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded”. 17.
17. As has been held in case of Prakash Narayan Sharma (supra) that the court should always lean towards the maintainability of the action before the civil court unless the subject matter involved in the said suit has been excluded by the special statute to be entertained by the civil court. 18. Thus I find that the suit is maintainable before the civil court which has also been held by the trial court in the impugned order. 19. I also do not find any infirmity and/or illegality in the impugned order. It is however made clear that after the closure of the evidence, if the court finds that the dispute is not entertainable the court shall adjudicate the same irrespective of the fact that the point of maintainability is decided against the petitioner as the present consideration is made by the court on the basis of the averment made in the plaint and not otherwise. 20. The revisional application is, therefore, dismissed. 21. It is expected that the trial court shall make all endeavour to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible. 22. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis.