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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 775 (MP)

J. K. Verma v. State of M. P.

2011-07-15

ALOK ARADHE, RAJENDRA MENON

body2011
ORDER 1. Challenging the order-dated 30.1.1999 - Annexure P/1, by which Petitioner's services have been dispensed with on the basis of misconduct, proved in a departmental enquiry, Petitioner has filed this writ petition. Challenge is also made to order-dated 2.1.2001, by which the appeal/representation filed by the Petitioner has been rejected. 2. Facts in brief, indicate that Petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge Class I, on 10.11.1975 in the M.P. Lower Judicial Service on the basis of a process of selection conducted by Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'PSC'). He was promoted after due selection as a Member of the M.P. Higher Judicial Service with effect from 30.9.1989 and at the relevant time, in the year 1998, he was posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, in Bilaspur - now, in the State of Chattisgarh. While discharging his duties as an Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bilaspur it was found that Petitioner had committed various irregularities in the matter of deciding more than 30 cases, particularly in the matter of granting bail to various persons. Accordingly, charge-sheet - Annexure P/3 dated 17.1.1998 was issued to the Petitioner imputing certain acts which amounted to misconduct under Rule 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 [hereinafter referred to as 'Conduct Rules']. Petitioner was directed to show-cause as to why he should not be proceeded and punished under Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 [hereinafter referred to as 'Discipline and Appeal Rules']. In the article of charges issued to the Petitioner, three articles of imputations were made and details of the cases in which the irregularities were committed by the Petitioner were indicated as Schedule A and Schedule B, to the charge-sheet. The statement of imputation of the misconduct and mis-behaviour was indicated in Annexure-II to the charge-sheet. Petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet vide Annexure P/4 and as the same was found to be unsatisfactory vide Annexure P/5 dated 10.3.1998, a disciplinary enquiry as contemplated under Rule 14 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules was initiated against the Petitioner. The District Judge (Vigilance), Jabalpur Zone was appointed as enquiry authority to conduct an enquiry into the charge-sheet issued to the Petitioner. The enquiry officer conducted the enquiry on 21.5.1998, in the enquiry more than 36 documents were taken on record and exhibited as Exhibit No. P/1 to P/36. The District Judge (Vigilance), Jabalpur Zone was appointed as enquiry authority to conduct an enquiry into the charge-sheet issued to the Petitioner. The enquiry officer conducted the enquiry on 21.5.1998, in the enquiry more than 36 documents were taken on record and exhibited as Exhibit No. P/1 to P/36. On behalf of the prosecution one Shri N.P. Gupta was examined as PW/1, his statement is Annexure P/6. Statement of the Petitioner was recorded as Annexure P/7 and on the basis of evidence and material that came on record, enquiry officer submitted his report - Annexure P/8 dated 28.5.1998. Based on the findings recorded in the enquiry a show-cause notice - Annexure P/11 dated 14.7.1998 was issued to the Petitioner and he submitted his reply to the same vide Annexure P/12 and after due approval of the Full Court of the High Court vide Annexure P/1, dated 30.1.1999, Petitioner was dismissed from service. Petitioner preferred an appeal and the same was also rejected vide Annexure P/15 dated 2.1.2001 and, therefore, the Petitioner is before this Court challenging the impugned action. 3. Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, argued that the entire enquiry was conducted and concluded on a single day i.e.... 21.5.98; statement of prosecution witness Shri N.P. Gupta was recorded; Petitioner was asked certain questions by the presenting officer and the enquiry officer; his statement was recorded vide Annexure P/7; and, thereafter without giving any opportunity to the Petitioner to submit his defence, it is stated that the entire enquiry was completed. Accordingly, the first ground canvassed is to the effect that the enquiry which was conducted in a hasty manner and concluded on the same day is illegal. The second ground canvassed was to the effect that the allegations against the Petitioner are only to the effect that the Petitioner has granted bail in more than 29 cases in a negligent manner without recording proper reasons, without appreciating the records, without application of mind and, therefore, it is held that the same amounts to improper conduct on the part of the Petitioner. Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, taking us through the statement and article of charges submitted that the allegations against the Petitioner were that he granted bail and passed orders in the cases under enquiry in pursuance to his corrupt or improper motive on extraneous consideration and with total disregard to the settled principles of law for grant of bail. Learned Senior Advocate took us through the entire enquiry report, the findings of the enquiry officer in paragraph 73 of the report, and argued that from the statement of Shri N.P. Gupta - PW/1, the allegations of corrupt or improper motive or use of extraneous considerations in deciding the criminal cases as per Schedule A to the charge-sheet is not established. It was emphasized by him that in the absence of corrupt or improper motive being established and in the absence of any material to show that extraneous considerations weighed in the mind of the Petitioner for grant of bail or dealing with the cases as alleged in the charge-sheet, the action taken is said to be wholly unsustainable and illegal. 4. Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, argued that the only finding recorded against the Petitioner is that he was negligent or at best reckless in deciding the matters, this according to learned Senior Advocate is not a misconduct and in the absence of enough material being available on record to hold that Petitioner has decided the matters with corrupt or improper motive, it is argued that the action taken is unsustainable. Referring to the following findings recorded by the enquiry officer, in paragraph 73, as detailed herein: 73. Now, the question is what inference can be drawn from such bail orders? Certain limitations, in all fairness to Shri Verma had been there in this inquiry: (a) These bail orders have become final. They are being acted upon by the parties. No revision is either filed or allowed. No application for cancellation of bail is either filed or allowed; (b) Respective case diaries or criminal records are not there before me. Certain limitations, in all fairness to Shri Verma had been there in this inquiry: (a) These bail orders have become final. They are being acted upon by the parties. No revision is either filed or allowed. No application for cancellation of bail is either filed or allowed; (b) Respective case diaries or criminal records are not there before me. Facts as noted and disclosed by Shri Verma in impugned bail orders have to be taken to be correct and relied upon as they are; (c) Inspection Note of either District Judge (Vigilance), District Judge or Hon'ble Portfolio Judge taking exception to these bail borders has not come before me; and, (d) There has been no complaint against Shri Verma, atleast no complaint has been filed in this enquiry. Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, argued that once the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion that the allegations of corruption are not proved, the action taken against the Petitioner is unsustainable. Emphasizing on the aforesaid finding recorded by the enquiry officer and further contending that if the finding of the enquiry officer are meticulously scanned, it would be seen that the finding of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration is not based on any evidence or material available on record, as such it is a perverse finding, learned Senior Advocate prays for interference into the matter. In sum and substance, the arguments of Shri Silva was to the extent that the allegations of improper or corrupt motive and use of extraneous consideration is not established from the material available on record, it is based on assumptions of the enquiry officer is, therefore, perverse and on such consideration the action taken is unsustainable. 5. In support of his contention, learned Senior Advocate, invites our attention to the following judgments: K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P. 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540; P.C. Joshi v. State of UP and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 491 ; Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and Anr. (2007) 4 SCC 247 ; and, an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors. v. Jai Bhagwan Civil Appeal No. 4213/2001, decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 10.5.2011, and submits that the action taken against the Petitioner on the basis of a perverse finding based on assumptions and presumptions is unsustainable and, therefore, the Petitioner should be exonerated. 6. v. Jai Bhagwan Civil Appeal No. 4213/2001, decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 10.5.2011, and submits that the action taken against the Petitioner on the basis of a perverse finding based on assumptions and presumptions is unsustainable and, therefore, the Petitioner should be exonerated. 6. Inviting our attention to the principles laid down and the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra), it was argued by Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, that grant of bail to an accused persons is a significant judicial function to be performed by a judicial officer and in the absence of any complaint or objection from any person or in the absence of any improper motive being established, initiating disciplinary proceedings solely on the ground that the discretion exercised by the judicial officer and the bail granted is not on strong grounds is unsustainable. It is stated that in the absence of any material or ill-will or ill-motive being established, the action taken is unsustainable. Similar observations made in the case of K.P. Tiwari (supra) is highlighted in support of the above contention. 7. Accordingly, the arguments advanced by Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, was that the action taken is unsustainable and on the ground of grant of bail or decision on some criminal cases on insufficient ground, no disciplinary action can be taken against a judicial officer nor can he be punished on this count. 8. Rebutting the aforesaid contentions Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondents 2 and 3, argued that the allegations against the Petitioner were with regard to improper conduct in the matter of granting bail in more than 29 cases, so also dealing with more than 4 criminal cases as per Schedule B to the charge-sheet in a reckless and illegal manner. It was the contention of Shri Kishore Shrivastava that even if there is no direct evidence or material to show corrupt motive or extraneous consideration, but if the material available is enough to show reckless act on the part of the Petitioner in the discharge of his judicial duties, act committed in a negligent manner in total disregard to and by omission to the set legal norms prescribed for grant of bail and when such conduct is repeatedly undertaken by him in more than 30 cases which came up for scrutiny, a judicial officer can be proceeded and punished as the act amounts to misconduct. Emphasizing that recklessness and negligent way of dealing with the judicial proceedings, particularly bail cases pertaining to serious offence like rape, have to be dealt with seriously and if the act of the judicial officer in more than 30 cases is found to be nothing but a reckless and negligent act contrary to well set norms and principles of law, then a Senior Judicial Officer like the Petitioner, who had more than 20 years of service, can be proceeded for the action taken. Inviting our attention to the scope of judicial review in such cases as laid down by the Supreme Court, in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 416 ; the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56 ; Union of India and Ors. v. Upendra Singh (1994) 3 SCC 357 ; and, Union of India and Ors. v. A.N. Saxena (1992) 3 SCC 124 ; Shri Kishore Shrivastava argued that when the conduct of the employee, who holds the post of judicial officer is such that he, consistently in more than 30 cases, commits serious acts of recklessness and negligence, the same is a conduct which would amount to misconduct in the discharge of duties and, therefore, the High Court was right in taking action in the matter for maintaining high standard of judicial discipline and propriety and for upholding the confidence of the people in the judiciary. 9. 9. Inviting our attention to the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court, in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra), heavily relied upon by Shri Brian D'Silva, it was argued by Shri Kishore Shrivastava that the judgment in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) is delivered by a Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but earlier to that the question in this regard is considered and decided in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra). This is also a judgment of a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court and as the judgment in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) is not considered in the subsequent case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra), it is argued that the principle laid down in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) will prevail and the same has to be given due credence in the light of the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators Association and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Anr. 2003(1) MPJR 158 . It was argued by him that in case of conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court, both by benches comprising of equal number of judges, the decision of the earlier bench is binding unless explained by a later bench of equal strength. It is argued that as the judgment rendered in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) is neither explained nor considered in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra), the principle laid down in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra), which has approved the principle earlier laid down in the case of A.N. Saxena (supra) will prevail and, therefore, merely on the ground that the act of negligence does not amount to misconduct, it is argued that the Petitioner cannot be exonerated. Finally, Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, took us through the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in his report - Ex.P/8, with regard to each and every charge and argued that the observations made in paragraph 73 of the report pointed out by Shri Brian D'Silva, has to be read alongwith the entire finding given by the enquiry officer in its totality, the observations made in paragraph 73 cannot be read in isolation ignoring the findings in toto. It was argued by Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, that if the findings of the enquiry officer are meticulously analysed it would be seen that in about 30 cases, Petitioner has granted bail in a manner which is contrary to the settled norms for grant of bail even in serious cases under Section 376 IPC and, therefore, it is argued that the action taken by the High Court is proper. 10. Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that the reliance placed by the Petitioner to the judgment in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) and K.P. Tiwari (supra) are of no help in the present case because they are cases where action was taken against the judicial officer on the basis of a single or isolated instance and not on the basis of consistent acts undertaken in more than 30 cases. Accordingly, it was emphasized by learned Counsel that the action taken by the Respondents is legal and proper and the same does not warrant any consideration. 11. Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, in reply submitted that in most of the cases, which were decided by the Petitioner, the cases were received by the Petitioner on transfer from the District Judge and he had passed orders on the same day and, therefore, the possibility of improper motive can be safely ruled out. Accordingly, contending that for mere act of negligence, which is also not correct, the punishment imposed is not proper, Shri Brian D'Silva prays for interference into the matter. 12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the records. 13. A perusal of the charges levelled against the Petitioner as contained in the charge-sheet - Annexure P/3 dated 17.1.1998 indicates that three articles of charges are levelled against the Petitioner. The first article of charge indicates that in various criminal cases as per Schedule A to the charge-sheet i.e...in more than 29 cases, Petitioner improperly and in total disregard to the principle for grant of bail, granted bail to accused persons in a cryptic and casual manner without taking note of the gravity of the offence, the material available and without disclosing any reasons. Even though it is stated that this act of the Petitioner amounts to impropriety and makes his integrity doubtful and is, therefore, indicative of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration. Even though it is stated that this act of the Petitioner amounts to impropriety and makes his integrity doubtful and is, therefore, indicative of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration. Similarly, article No. 2 pertains to grant of bail in criminal cases as per Schedule B, wherein particulars of three cases are given and it is stated that in this case also Petitioner granted bail on improper consideration without appreciating the fact that earlier bail applications were rejected by the Petitioner, but they were allowed on subsequent applications without there being any substantial change in the facts and circumstances. It is alleged that the act of the Petitioner in dismissing the bail applications at the first instance and granting them without any substantial change in the second instance that also without looking to the gravity of the offence and without application of mind, is an improper action and on this count the allegation of improper motive, extraneous considerations and allegation of doubtful integrity are levelled against the Petitioner. The final charge contained in Article 3 is to the effect that accused Pinki @ Santosh Tiwari, who was accused for an offence under Section 307 read with Sections 120-B and 34 IPC, was granted anticipatory bail merely on the ground that he was a Municipal Councilor, even though there were serious charges against him with regard to offence under Section 307 IPC. If the allegations against the Petitioner and the statement of imputation of misconduct as contained in Annexure II, to the charge-sheet, is perused, it would be seen that the allegations are with regard to more than 32 cases and bail is granted by the Petitioner to accused persons in these cases for offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 376, 307, 506-B and even under Section 302 of the IPC alongwith Section 12 of the Passport Act. The enquiry officer conducted an enquiry and in the enquiry Shri N.P. Gupta - PW/1 appeared and produced 36 documents - Exhibit P/1 to P/36, which were mainly the order on the bail application and the official record with regard to these cases. Thereafter, the Petitioner's examination was undertaken and the enquiry report submitted. 14. On analysis of the grounds raised by the Petitioner, which was canvassed at the time of hearing, it would be seen that mainly two grounds are raised for assailing the impugned action. Thereafter, the Petitioner's examination was undertaken and the enquiry report submitted. 14. On analysis of the grounds raised by the Petitioner, which was canvassed at the time of hearing, it would be seen that mainly two grounds are raised for assailing the impugned action. The first ground raised is that the entire enquiry was conducted on a single day i.e. 21.5.98; examination of witness and production of documents were conducted on the same day and reasonable opportunity of defence was not granted to the Petitioner. However, it is seen from the records that when the proceedings were held on 21.5.98, Petitioner did not object to the procedure followed. The order-sheet of the enquiry indicates that the very outset the enquiry officer read out the charge-sheet to the Petitioner, the Petitioner denied the charges levelled against him and Shri N.P. Gupta, who was working as Reader to the Petitioner at the relevant time, was produced as witness alongwith records. This witness only exhibited the documents - Ex.P/1 to P/36, which were the records of the proceedings and after the statement of this witness was recorded as is evident from Annexure P/6, Petitioner cross-examined this witness and while cross-examining this witness Petitioner did not raise any objection nor sought for time, either to cross-examine the witness or to go through the 36 documents produced by this witness, without any objection in any manner whatsoever, Petitioner participated in the cross-examination of this witness, who was discharged after the Petitioner indicated that he has no further questions to put to this witness. Subsequently, when the Petitioner's statement was recorded as is evident from Annexure P/7, Petitioner answered the questions put to him by the enquiry officer and in question Nos. 28 and 29, the enquiry officer asked the Petitioner as to whether he has any further statement to make, whether he wants to produce any defence witness or does he want any documents, Petitioner replied in the negative and stated that he has nothing further to add in the matter. It is, therefore, clear that when the enquiry was held on 21.5.98 and when the witnesses were examined and documents were produced, Petitioner participated in the enquiry without any objection whatsoever and did not make any complaint with regard to the procedure followed. It is, therefore, clear that when the enquiry was held on 21.5.98 and when the witnesses were examined and documents were produced, Petitioner participated in the enquiry without any objection whatsoever and did not make any complaint with regard to the procedure followed. Once the Petitioner participated in the enquiry without any complaint and without any protest, the Petitioner is now estopped from assailing the procedure followed in the enquiry. The Petitioner was a Senior Judicial Officer, well conversant with such quasi-judicial proceedings and, therefore, if he had any objection with regard to the procedure followed or if he wanted any further time to examine any witness or peruse the documents he should have requested the enquiry officer, this having not been done, Petitioner is not entitled to contend that the enquiry was not properly conducted because it was concluded on the same day. 15. That apart, when an allegation of non-grant of opportunity or violation of the principles of natural justice is made, mere violation cannot be a ground for hold the enquiry to be vitiated. The delinquent employee is required to show and demonstrate the prejudice caused to him due to non-grant of opportunity and it is only when the prejudice is pleaded and demonstrated and the consequential effect of the same in the final outcome is established before the Court that the enquiry can be held to be vitiated. In the regard, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the following cases may be taken note of. Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja 2008 (2) SCC (L&S) 789; Sarva Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank v. Manoj Kumar Sinha 2010 (3) SCC 550; and, Union of India v. Shatrughan Pal 2010 (5) SCC 349. In all these cases, it is held by the Supreme Court that in the absence of prejudice being pleaded or demonstrated, mere allegation of non-grant of opportunity cannot be a ground for interfering with the procedure of enquiry. In the present case also, apart from the fact that the Petitioner participated in the enquiry which was held on 21.5.98, without any protest, the Petitioner is unable to demonstrate before this Court the prejudice caused to him due to the procedure followed nor is he able to demonstrate before this Court as to how the final outcome in the enquiry would be different if his contention is accepted. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any reason to uphold the first ground canvassed by Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, to the effect that the enquiry stands vitiated as it was concluded on the same day. 16. As far as the second ground is concerned, the same is based on two parts. The first is that the finding of the enquiry officer is perverse and the second is that for the acts alleged in the charge-sheet, the Petitioner - a judicial officer, cannot be punished without proof of improper motive, doubtful integrity or extraneous consideration. To appreciate these questions and before considering the principles canvassed by the parties concerned, it would be appropriate to take note of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the nature of allegations levelled, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the procedure followed by the Petitioner in the cases under enquiry. As indicated hereinabove, the charges levelled against the Petitioner are mainly with regard to improper procedure followed by him in the matter of granting bail. The report of the enquiry officer is in detail and runs into more than 40 pages. The enquiry officer has gone through the records of each and every case as is indicated in the charge-sheet, has meticulously gone into details and has analysed the manner in which the Petitioner dealt with the cases and granted bail or passed the orders. All the cases more than 32 in number, as indicated in Annexures A and B, to the charge-sheet, are criminal cases. The enquiry officer has at the very outset referred to various judgments which lay down the principle governing grant of bail in criminal cases and after evaluating the principles which are to be borne in mind, by a criminal court for grant of bail, has found that the discretion available to a court for granting or refusing bail is to be undertaken based on certain statutory guidelines, which emerge from the judgments available on the subject. Thereafter, the provisions of Sections 437, 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are taken note of and it is held by the enquiry officer that before granting bail the following factors should be taken note of by the court concerned, the nature of the offence, the probability of the accused persons absconding after grant of bail, the probability of the accused interfering with the evidence, the probability of the accused committing the offence again, the nature of injuries sustained and after analyzing all these factors, it is held by the enquiry officer that the statutory guidelines should be followed and cogent reasons given for grant of bail. After analyzing the principle, the enquiry officer in page 12 of the report, proceeded to analyse the orders passed by the Petitioner in each and every case. A table of cases alongwith the offence and the particulars are given and thereafter from paragraph 20 onwards the manner in which orders are passed by the Petitioner are dealt with. In paragraph 20 of the enquiry report, the enquiry officer has dealt with certain cases, wherein five criminal cases were registered under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 12 of the Indian Passport Act against certain prominent persons. This was a case where a gang of persons were involved in forging passports and tampering of documents for the purpose of issuing passports. It was found that the offences were cognizable and non-bailable and were triable by Magistrate First Class. In this case, it was found by the enquiry officer that only on the ground that the case is triable by Magistrate First Class bail was granted to the accused persons without evaluating the gravity of the act/offence and various other factors. The respective part played by the accused persons was not taken note of and bail was granted without application of mind and without considering the grounds normally followed for grant of bail. The enquiry officer recorded that in such a matter involving serious offence of forging passports bail was granted only because the case is triable by Magistrate. The finding recorded is that the bail has been granted without application of mind and without giving any valid reasons. Thereafter, another case is taken note of in paragraph 25 of the enquiry report, this case pertains to rape of a widow. The finding recorded is that the bail has been granted without application of mind and without giving any valid reasons. Thereafter, another case is taken note of in paragraph 25 of the enquiry report, this case pertains to rape of a widow. It is found by the enquiry officer that this crime was registered against the accused at 8.00 PM on 10.10.96 and the offences were under Sections 457, 376 and 506-B IPC, the accused was arrested on 16.10.96, he applied for bail on 18.10.96, it was transferred to the Petitioner's court on 24.10.96, due to death of an Advocate the case was heard on the next date, even though the prosecutrix was a widow and she had made clear statement with regard to commission of the offence, bail was granted by the Petitioner on the same day i.e. 25.10.96 without taking note of the medical report of the prosecutrix or her statement. It was found by the court below that in a serious case of rape of a widow, bail is granted to the accused person within 9 days of his arrest when the investigation is not complete, in a routine manner, without appreciating the seriousness of the offence and without referring to relevant documents. It is held that bail is granted in a very casual manner and it is also perverse in nature as relevant facts about the offence are not taken note of. 17. Similarly, various cases are taken note of by the enquiry officer meticulously and we do not propose to burden this judgment by referring to each and every case relied upon by the enquiry officer. Suffice it to say that in most of the cases it is found that the Petitioner has granted bail in a liberal manner by giving orders cryptic in nature, without appreciating the nature of offence or various other factors like the accused absconding, seriousness of the offence etc. Even in cases where the complainants were assaulted with sharp edged weapons and when bombs were hurled upon them, it is found that the Petitioner has granted bail in a very casual and cryptic manner, which does not show application of mind. Even in cases where the complainants were assaulted with sharp edged weapons and when bombs were hurled upon them, it is found that the Petitioner has granted bail in a very casual and cryptic manner, which does not show application of mind. Even though in some cases the enquiry officer found that bail is granted properly, but in more than 22 cases the finding recorded by the enquiry officer is that the bail is granted in a cryptic manner without application of mind, without considering the basic settled principles for grant of bail. Finally, after evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the finding recorded by the enquiry officer is that charges against the Petitioner are proved. In the enquiry report, the enquiry officer in paragraph 75, has recorded the following finding: 75. Most of the bail orders are laconic and cryptic. Merely skeletal facts are stated and Shri Verma has granted bail remarking that in the circumstances of the case, grant of bail has been proper. Shri Verma has failed to assess the prima facie evidence, lodging of FIR, nature and extent of injuries with their site and as to what punishment could be awarded on conclusion of trial. He has failed to note that the accused had been arrested after a pretty long time of the event or in other words had been fugitive from justice. He did not care to prevent the repetition of offences charged. He did not consider whether the Applicant was likely to tamper evidence and to overawe the witnesses. He has allowed bail mainly on the ground that trial and disposal of the case shall take time while the charge-sheet has already been filed and there was no objective reason to suppose that more than systematic delay was possible. Such instances are neither rare nor one or two only. He has allowed bail mainly on the ground that trial and disposal of the case shall take time while the charge-sheet has already been filed and there was no objective reason to suppose that more than systematic delay was possible. Such instances are neither rare nor one or two only. Many of the bail orders are perverse, particularly in: (1) M. Cr.C. No. 3075/96 Gaya Prasad v. State of M.P.; (2) M. Cr.C. No. 2626/96 Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P.; (3) M. Cr.C. No. 2363/96 Gyaneshwar v. State of M.P.; (4) M. Cr.C. No. 2959/96 Pappu Vishwakarma v. State of M.P.; (5) M. Cr.C. No. 1677/96 Moin Ahmad v. State of M.P; (6) M. Cr.C. No. 1703/96 Vakeel Ahmad v. State of M.P.; (7) M. Cr.C. No. 2451/96 Rinku v. State of M.P.; (8) M. Cr.C. No. 1633/96 Rajkumar v. State of M.P.; and, (9) M. Cr.C. No. 576/96 Pappu Sonkar v. State of M.P. Subsequent bail applications have been allowed despite there was no change in the facts and circumstances of the case, after, other previous applications were dismissed after due consideration on merits in (1) M. Cr.C. No. 2959/96 Pappu Vishwakarma v. State of M.P.; (2) M. Cr.C. No. 894/96 Kalloo @ Bhagwan and Sardar Singh v. State of M.P.; and, (3) M. Cr.C. No. 1863/96 Sudhir @ Sushil v. State of M.P., much against the ration of State of Maharashtra v. Buddhikota Subba Rao AIR 1989 SC 2022. Social status of the Applicant has been the sole basis of release of the Applicant on anticipatory bail, while he was the mind for murderous attack on an officer who had come for inspection of stock from Bhopal. (Emphasis supplied) It is seen by the enquiry officer that even after rejecting anticipatory bail immediately regular bail under Section 439 is granted by the officer and even in some cases when the first bail application is rejected without any change in the circumstances the second bail application is granted. It is, therefore, clear that the findings of the enquiry officer is to the effect that Petitioner has granted bail in a manner which is contrary to the settled norms and principles governing grant of bail in criminal jurisprudence and this is a reckless and negligent act on the part of the Petitioner. It is, therefore, clear that the findings of the enquiry officer is to the effect that Petitioner has granted bail in a manner which is contrary to the settled norms and principles governing grant of bail in criminal jurisprudence and this is a reckless and negligent act on the part of the Petitioner. It is further held by the enquiry officer that if bail is granted then it has to be concluded that it is an outcome of the improper motive of the Petitioner and is a result of extraneous consideration. This is in sum and substance, the finding of the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer in paragraph 73 has indicated that he has to be fair to the delinquent employee and has given the finding which is reproduced hereinabove as submitted by Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate. However, this Court cannot read the said finding in paragraph 73 of the report in isolation without referring to the remaining 76 paragraphs, where the enquiry officer has dealt with the manner in which the Petitioner has granted bail in various criminal cases. 18. On a close scrutiny of the enquiry report and the finding of the enquiry officer, we are of the considered view that the allegations against the Petitioner to the effect that he has granted bail in a cryptic manner without proper application of mind and in total disregard to the settled norms for grant of bail, is proved. It is a case where the Petitioner in an improper manner in total disregard to the settled norms for grant of bail, has granted bail to various accused persons in a cryptic and casual manner without considering the nature and gravity of the offence and without indicating the necessary facts to show application of mind before grant of bail. In some of the orders even the nature of the injury, the objection of the prosecution are not noted and bail is granted in a cryptic way. Even though there may be no direct evidence to show corrupt or improper motive, but the question is as to whether a judicial officer having more than 20 years of service can be let off merely because the material on record does not directly establish corrupt motive. Even though there may be no direct evidence to show corrupt or improper motive, but the question is as to whether a judicial officer having more than 20 years of service can be let off merely because the material on record does not directly establish corrupt motive. If a judicial officer acts in the matter of granting bail or deals with a criminal case improperly in an isolated case or one or two cases, the benefit can be granted to the judicial officer, but when within a short span of time, in more than 22 cases, consistently it is seen that the judicial officer has acted in a manner which cannot be approved of in any manner whatsoever, the inference of improper motive and extraneous consideration can always be drawn. 19. At this stage, we would now proceed to examine the principle with regard to taking disciplinary action for such acts. 21 20. If the judgment in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) relied upon of by Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, is taken note of, it would be seen that the employee therein Shri K.K. Dhawan was an Income Tax Officer and the allegation against him were with regard to conducting assessment of income tax returns of various Assessee in an improper manner, contrary to settled principles. It was found that in more than 9 cases assessments were made by Shri K.K. Dhawan during the financial year 1982-83 in an irregular manner with undue haste and it was inferred that this was with a view to confer undue favour on the Assessee. In the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) also similar grounds as were canvassed by Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, were put forth and a Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of certain principles and observations made in Pearce v. Foster (1866) 17 QBD 536, 542, wherein the following observations were taken note of: If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service of the business. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service of the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that servant., (Emphasis supplied) Thereafter, in paragraph 18, certain contentions with regard to exercise of quasi judicial powers was taken note of and the charge with regard to recklessness disclosed in the discharge of duties in utter disregard to settled norms were evaluated and it was held that if an employee discharging quasi-judicial functions acts in a manner which can be termed as reckless and the act discloses utter disregard to relevant provisions of rule and regulation, the same amounts to misconduct. After taking note of all this propositions in paragraph 19, the principle laid down is to the following effect [i.e...on the basis of the law laid down in the case of A.N. Saxena (supra)]: 19. The above case, therefore, is an authority for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the Government servant even with regard to exercise of quasi-judicial powers provided: (i) The act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the Government servant for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, or (ii) there is prima facie material manifesting recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of the official duty, or (iii) the officer had failed to act honestly or in good faith or had omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of statutory power. Thereafter, in paragraph 26 of the judgment reference is made to an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A.N. Saxena (supra) and after taking note of the principles laid down in paragraphs 7 and 8, it is held that disciplinary action could be taken if the officer who exercises judicial and quasi-judicial function acts in a reckless or negligent manner. The conclusion in this regard drawn in paragraph 28, reads as under: 28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. The conclusion in this regard drawn in paragraph 28, reads as under: 28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the Respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the Respondent but the conduct of the Respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases: (i) Where the office had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago 'though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great' 21. If the aforesaid principle is taken note of, it would be seen that if the material available on record prima facie shows that the official concerned has shown recklessness in discharge of duties or has acted negligently and has deviated from the prescribed condition which are essential for exercise of statutory powers then he has committed misconduct and renders himself liable to be proceeded against departmentally. If the case in hand is evaluated in the backdrop of the aforesaid principle, it would be clear that in dealing with more than 30 criminal cases, particularly relating to bail, Petitioner has shown reckless attitude, has acted negligently and has omitted to take note of prescribed conditions and settled principles of law, which we essential for discharge of his statutory duties for grant of bail and if the law laid down in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) is applied to the present case, there is no iota of doubt in our mind that disciplinary action could be taken against the Petitioner for this act even if the contention of the Petitioner is that extraneous consideration and illegal motive with regard to his integrity are not established. 22. At this stage, it would be appropriate to take note of the main ground canvassed by Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, to the effect that in the light of law laid down in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) that Petitioner cannot be proceeded with. 23. Even though Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) in paragraph 11 has held that initiating disciplinary proceeding against judicial officer has to be undertaken if strong grounds are available and action should not be taken for the manner in which a case is decided by the judicial officer, but the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court has to be evaluated in the light of the facts and circumstances of the cases and the law governing the binding effect of precedent. In the judgment rendered in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra), the earlier judgment by a co-ordinate Bench of Three Judges of K.K. Dhawan (supra) is not taken note of. That being so, Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, is right in contending that in the light of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators Association (supra), the law laid down in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) will prevail. That being so, Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, is right in contending that in the light of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators Association (supra), the law laid down in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) will prevail. In the case of Jabalpur Bus Operations Association (supra), a Full Bench of this Court in paragraph 10 has laid down the principle that when there is conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court, benches comprising of equal number of judges, decision of the earlier bench is binding unless explained by a later bench of equal strength, in which case the decision of the later bench would be binding. The same principle is reiterated by the Supreme Court recently in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. S.K. Kapoor (2011) 4 SCC 589 , wherein in paragraph 9, it has been so observed by the Supreme Court: 9. It may be noted that the decision in S.N. Narula case (2011) 4 SCC 591 was prior to the decision in T.V. Patel case (2007) 4 SCC 785 . It is well settled that if a subsequent coordinate Bench of equal strength wants to take a different view, it can only refer the matter to a larger Bench, otherwise the prior decision of a coordinate Bench is binding on the subsequent Bench of equal strength. Since, the decision in S.N. Narula case was not noticed in T.V. Patel case, the latter decision is a judgment per incuriam. The decision in S.N. Narula case was binding on the subsequent Bench of equal strength and hence, it could not take a contrary view, as is settled by a series of judgments of this Court. 24. If the aforesaid principle is applied in the present case, it would be seen that the decision in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) is neither considered now explained in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) and, therefore, the decision in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) would be binding. If that be so, then the contention of Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, based on the law laid down in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) cannot be accepted. If that be so, then the contention of Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, based on the law laid down in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) cannot be accepted. Instead, it has to be held that the action of the Petitioner in this case amounts to an act which can be termed as act reckless in nature, in the discharge of his duties; act which amounts to negligence in the discharge of his duties; and, acts which are in total disregard to the settled principles of law in the exercise of statutory powers and, therefore, the same amounts to a misconduct. 25. That apart, the question with regard to applying the principles in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) and K.K. Dhawan (supra) in this case can be viewed from a different perspective also. If the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) is taken note of, it would be seen that in the said case the allegations against the judicial officer was with regard to grant of bail in a single case and complaint received against him, action was taken against the judicial officer in the matter of grant of bail and the entire action was with regard to a single or an isolated case. In the case of Ramesh Chander Singh (supra), he was proceeded against departmentally only with regard to an act committed by him in one single instance. It was because of this reason that the question was considered by the Supreme Court and it was held that merely because in a single isolated case the delinquent judicial officer has acted in the manner alleged, then without proof of extraneous consideration or doubtful integrity being available, he should not be proceeded against. In the present case, it is not a case where the Petitioner has committed the act complained of as misconduct on a single isolated occasion. It is a case where he has on and off, on more than 30 occasions, committed the same act of commission or omission. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the law laid down in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) would apply with all force in the present case and it can be safely construed that if the Petitioner has acted in a reckless and negligent manner, he can be dealt with for acts of misconduct. 26. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the law laid down in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) would apply with all force in the present case and it can be safely construed that if the Petitioner has acted in a reckless and negligent manner, he can be dealt with for acts of misconduct. 26. That apart, the scope of judicial review in such matters by a High Court is considered in the case of Shashikant S. Patil (supra), relied upon by Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, and it has been held by the Supreme Court that interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, if it is found that disciplinary proceedings are held in violation to the principles of natural justice or in violation to statutory rules and regulations prescribed for conduct of such enquiry and if the decision is vitiated by consideration of extraneous evidence or material. In the present case, none of the aforesaid eventualities exist. Therefore, we are of the considered view that a reasonable and justifiable finding recorded by the enquiry officer cannot be interfered with by this Court merely because the Petitioner feels that he has granted bail by use of his discretion. 27. Recently also the Supreme Court, in the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 , has considered the scope of judicial review into findings of departmental authorities and the test for determining perversity in a finding of the enquiry officer is considered and the law is laid down in paragraph 7, in the following terms: 7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a Tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous consideration. [Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 ; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 ; Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana (1999) 5 SCC 762 ; and, High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil (supra)]. If the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the cases referred to hereinabove, are taken note of, then a reasonable finding arrived at by the enquiry officer in he present case based on material available on record can neither be interfered with by this Court nor can it termed as perverse or unreasonable to such an extent that interference can be made by this Court. 28. Even in the case relied upon by Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, that is - P.C. Joshi (supra) wherein reliance is placed on the judgment of A.N. Saxena (supra), it is seen that the judgments rendered in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) and A.N. Saxena (supra) are relied upon and the principle laid down in both these cases are upheld by the Supreme Court, but after scrutinizing the records of the particular cases in which there were allegations of granting bail in 19 cases, it was found by the Court that the delinquent employee had disposed of more than 3000 bail applications and in only 19 bail orders deficiencies were found, for which he was charge-sheeted. Out of these 19 cases, in 7 cases the enquiry officer found that the bail was properly granted and the charges to that extent were not proved. In the 8th case it was found that even though bail was granted, but it was recalled within one month. Out of these 19 cases, in 7 cases the enquiry officer found that the bail was properly granted and the charges to that extent were not proved. In the 8th case it was found that even though bail was granted, but it was recalled within one month. In the other 11 cases, the enquiry officer found that the orders rejecting or granting bail were having same pattern and the enquiry officer did not find any specific material to show malafides. The Supreme Court dealt with the matter and even though in the facts and circumstances of that case found that the questions involved were not serious in nature, they related to decision in cases pertaining to certain non-serious matters, the principle laid down in the cases of K.K. Dhawan (supra) and A.N. Saxena (supra) were approved and in paragraph 5, the observations in this regard have been made. That being so, case of P.C. Joshi (supra) has been decided in the light of the facts that were available in the said case and the Petitioner cannot take advantage of the said case. 29. As far as the case of K.P. Tiwari (supra) is concerned, that was a case of compulsory retirement of a judicial officer and the allegations against him was also with regard to a single isolated criminal case and not cases consistently on various occasions, as is available in the present case. 30. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that the contentions of Shri Brian D'Silva, learned Senior Advocate, to the effect that mere negligent way of dealing with the matter is not sufficient to take action against the Petitioner cannot be accepted even though there may not be any direct proof with regard to use of improper motive or extraneous consideration by the Petitioner, but when a judicial officer like the Petitioner, having an experience of more than 20 years, shows total recklessness and disregard in the matter of deciding more than 30 cases, particularly bail applications, in a manner which cannot be approved, inference of extraneous consideration and improper motive can be imputed and disciplinary action taken. It cannot be lost sight of that decision in the matter of taking action against the Petitioner is undertaken by the High Court after the allegations levelled were proved in the departmental enquiry and a Committee of Judges scrutinized the same and finally the matter was approved by a Full Court, of the High Court. Under such circumstances, this Court in exercise of its limited jurisdiction in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot sit over the said decision as if it is exercising further appellate jurisdiction. This Court can interfere only if statutory rules or regulations are found to be violated or the enquiry is found to be held in total disregard to or in contravention to settled norms of conducting the enquiry. In the present case nothing of this sort is brought to the notice of this Court. The only ground canvassed is to the effect that no corrupt motive or the allegation of doubtful integrity is proved and, therefore, the action is unsustainable. But, when the law on the subject is clear and when the law permits the competent authority to take action against the delinquent person if consistently he shows act of negligence and recklessness in the discharge of his duties, we are of the considered view that no interference in the matter is called for. 31. This Court while exercising the powers of judicial review in the matter of taking disciplinary action against a judicial officer is required to evaluate the case keeping in view the fact that a case of a judicial officer has to be dealt in a different manner and not like a normal case of disciplinary enquiry. A judicial officer is required to maintain a very high standard of devotion to duty and if it is found that a judicial officer has time and again shown utter disregard to settled principles and norms of justice in discharging his duty, a decision taken to remove such a judicial officer cannot be interfered with by this Court until and unless the material available on record shows non-application of mind and violation or breach of statutory and constitutional provisions. In the present case, no such breach or irregularity is found warranting consideration. 32. Accordingly, finding no case for interference on the grounds raised, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.