Judgment Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. 1. The matrix of the facts, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant writ petition and emanating from the record, is that petitioner Dr.Sukhpal Varni was appointed as Hindi Lecturer on 12.11.1988 by the Managing Committee of I.B.College, Panipat respondent No. 4 (for brevity "respondent- Managing Committee") in the pay scale of Rs. 2200-4000, on probation for a period of one year, vide appointment letter (Annexure P1). The petitioner claimed that although his work and conduct was satisfactory, but the Principal of the respondent- Managing Committee concocted a false story/case against him and tried to play with his career. Consequently, his services were terminated, by way of impugned letter dated 16.10.1989 (Annexure P2). The appeal (Annexure P3) filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Director of Higher Education, Haryana (respondent No. 2), by means of impugned order dated 23.1.1990 (Annexure P4). The revision (Annexure P5) filed by the petitioner was dismissed as well, by the Commissioner & Secretary to Government of Haryana (respondent No. 1), by virtue of impugned order dated 16.10.1991 (Annexure P6). 2. The petitioner still did not feel satisfied and preferred the instant writ petition, challenging the impugned orders (Annexures P2, P4 & P6), invoking the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, inter- alia pleading that his services were not dispensed with on account of his unsatisfactory work and conduct, but it was on the ground of misconduct and in an arbitrary manner, without issuing any show cause notice and affording opportunity of being heard to him. According to the petitioner, although the impugned termination order caused aspersion on his conduct and is stigmatic, but still his services were terminated without following the due procedure of inquiry and in complete violations of the statutory rules. The impugned orders were stated to be, not only illegal and arbitrary, but against the principles of natural justice as well. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the petitioner sought the quashment of impugned orders (Annexures P2, P4 and P6) in the manner depicted hereinabove. 3. The respondent-Managing Committee contested the claim of the petitioner and filed its written statement, inter-alia pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the writ petition, cause of action and locus standi of the petitioner. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the petitioner sought the quashment of impugned orders (Annexures P2, P4 and P6) in the manner depicted hereinabove. 3. The respondent-Managing Committee contested the claim of the petitioner and filed its written statement, inter-alia pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the writ petition, cause of action and locus standi of the petitioner. The case set up by the contesting respondent, in brief in so far as relevant, was that the petitioner was appointed on probation on 12.11.1988. As his work and conduct was not satisfactory, therefore, his services were dispensed with on 16.10.1989 during the period of probation. He was confronted with the situation, vide various letters (Annexures R-4/2 to R-4/12) in this regard. Sufficient opportunities were stated to have been provided to the petitioner to improve, but in vain. Keeping in view the unsatisfactory work and conduct of the petitioner, termination simpliciter order was passed during the period of probation. The impugned orders (Annexures P2, P4 and P6) were stated to be legal and valid. It will not be out of place to mention here that the contesting respondent has stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the writ petition and prayed for its dismissal. That is how, I am seized of the matter. 4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record and legal position with their valuable assistance and after considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant writ petition in this respect. 5. The initial argument of learned counsel that since the respondent- Managing Committee decided to dispensed with the services of the petitioner in the meeting held on 14.10.1989, in which, the representative of the Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra (respondent No. 3) (for short "KU") did not participate, so, the impugned termination order (Annexure P2) is illegal, is not tenable. 6. The perusal of the record would reveal that the intimation dated 30.9.1989 (Annexure R4/14) was given to Professor Virmani, the authorized representative of KU. He gave his consent to attend the meeting on 14.10.1989 at 2.30 P.M. and noted on it that date suits him. 6. The perusal of the record would reveal that the intimation dated 30.9.1989 (Annexure R4/14) was given to Professor Virmani, the authorized representative of KU. He gave his consent to attend the meeting on 14.10.1989 at 2.30 P.M. and noted on it that date suits him. Once the authorized representative of KU was duly informed the date of meeting and he consented thereto, vide indicated letter and if he had chosen not to participate, in that eventuality, his nonparticipation will not nullify the decision taken by the remaining members in the meeting of the respondent-Managing Committee. 7. As is evident from the record, that petitioner was appointed as Hindi Lecturer on 12.11.1988 by the respondent-Managing Committee in the pay scale of Rs. 2200-4000, on probation for a period of one year, by way of appointment letter (Annexure P1). The petitioner claimed that although his work and conduct was satisfactory, but the respondent- Managing Committee concocted a false story against him, tried to play with his career and illegally terminated his services, by way of impugned order (Annexure P2), which, in substance, is as under :- "You were appointed on one year probation period on 12.11.1988 and the college Governing Body has decided in its meeting held today, the 14th Oct. 1989, that your services are no longer required from today and are hereby dispensed with. In accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment letter a cheque No. 641750 dated 16.10.1989 for Rs. 3,246.65 (Rupees three thousand two hundred forty six and paise sixty five only) as salary in lieu of one months notice has been deposited in your salary account No. IB-74 on 16.10.1989 in Oriental Bank of Commerce Panipat." 8. Aggrieved by the impugned order (Annexure P2), the petitioner filed the appeal (Annexure P3), which was dismissed by respondent No. 2, by virtue of impugned order (Annexure P4). Sequelly, the revision (Annexure P5) filed by him was also dismissed, by respondent No. 1, by means of impugned order (Annexure P6) in this context. 9. Above being the position on record, now the sole question, though important, that arises for determination in this petition is, as to whether the impugned termination order is stigmatic or punitive (as urged on behalf of the petitioner) or simpliciter order passed during his period of probation (as claimed by the respondent-Managing Committee) ? 10. 9. Above being the position on record, now the sole question, though important, that arises for determination in this petition is, as to whether the impugned termination order is stigmatic or punitive (as urged on behalf of the petitioner) or simpliciter order passed during his period of probation (as claimed by the respondent-Managing Committee) ? 10. Having regard to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, to me, the impugned termination order (Annexure P2) cannot possibly be termed as stigmatic or punitive order. 11. What is not disputed here is that petitioner was appointed as Hindi Lecturer on 12.11.1988 by the respondent-Managing Committee on probation for a period of one year, vide appointment letter (Annexure P1). As his work and conduct was not found satisfactory, therefore, his services were terminated during the course of period of his probation by the respondent-Managing Committee. He was paid the salary in lieu of one months notice period and the order of termination was simpliciter and no stigma is attached to it. The mere fact that the petitioner was confronted with the situation of having not taken the class, nonteaching of MA previous students, advised to improve his method of teaching, to maintain proper discipline and to be punctual, by means of letters (Annexures R4/1 to R4/9), would not entail any disqualification in this relevant connection. 12. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was sub- sequently appointed as Hindi Lecturer in Markanda National College, Shahabad, District Kurukshetra on 18.9.1991 on regular basis and was confirmed on 18.9.1992, which is clear from the letters dated 5.12.1998 (Annexures R4/15 and R4/16), would suggest and corroborate the stand of the respondent- Managing Committee that the impugned termination order was not stigmatic or punitive. As the petitioner did not improve his work and conduct despite the assurance given by him in reply (Annexure R4/2), therefore, such correspondences (Annexures R4/1 to R4/9) cannot lead to the conclusion that the order terminating his services during the period of probation, was stigmatic. This matter is not res Integra and is well settled. 13. As the petitioner did not improve his work and conduct despite the assurance given by him in reply (Annexure R4/2), therefore, such correspondences (Annexures R4/1 to R4/9) cannot lead to the conclusion that the order terminating his services during the period of probation, was stigmatic. This matter is not res Integra and is well settled. 13. An identical question came to be decided by the Honble Apex Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I, of Medical Sciences and another, 2002(2) S.C. T. 358: AIR 2002 Supreme Court 23, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Arun Kumar Madhavrao Sinddhaye and another, 2007(1) S.C.T. 96 : (2007) 1 S.C.C. 283 and Chaitanya Prakash & Anr. v. H.Omkarappa 2010(1) S.C.T. 579 : 2010 (1) RSJ 568. Having considered the various aspects of the matter and previous judgments, it was ruled in para 20 of Chaitanya Prakashs case (supra) as under :- "In our considered opinion, the ratio of the above- referred decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The respondent was time and again informed during the probation period about his deficiencies and was given ample opportunities to improve them. Therefore, enough precautions were taken by the appellants to see that the respondent improved his performance and such an opportunity was provided to him. But such advices and opportunity were totally misplaced as the respondent considered the same as unnecessary encroachment and interference in his work and wrote back rudely in an intemperate language. Whether or not a person is suitable to be retained and confirmed in service could be considered and assessed by the Managing Director, namely, appellant No. 1, but he after making an appraisal submitted his report along with all other records of the respondent before the Board of Directors, who finally took the decision. The Board of Directors constituted of responsible persons and they while deciding the suitability of the respondent not only considered the Performance Assessment Report but also considered all other records, and thereafter they took a considered and conscious decision that the respondent was not suitable for confirmation and terminate his service. The said decision of the Board of Directors appears to be in parity with the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of this Court (supra). The reasons mentioned in the letter dated 29.11.1999 - terminating the services of the respondent cannot be said to be stigmatic. The said decision of the Board of Directors appears to be in parity with the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of this Court (supra). The reasons mentioned in the letter dated 29.11.1999 - terminating the services of the respondent cannot be said to be stigmatic. The appellant had time and again specifically brought to the notice of the respondent his short comings and no misconduct as such is alleged against the respondent by the appellant and therefore the present case is a case of termination simpliciter due to unsuitability of the respondent and not a case of punishment for misconduct." 14. The same view was reiterated by this Court in case "Diljit Singh son of Santokh Singh v. State of Punjab and others" CWP No. 17187 of 1991 decided on 9.3.2010. As the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments mutatis mutandis is applicable to the facts of the present case as such and is the complete answer to the problem in hand, therefore, the contrary arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner "stricto sensu" deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. 15. In this manner, it is held that the impugned order (Annexure P2) is termination simpliciter order passed during the period of probation of the petitioner, after giving him the salary in lieu of one months notice period. As neither the impugned termination order is stigmatic nor punitive, therefore, the same was rightly upheld by the appellate as well as revisional authorities, vide impugned orders (Annexures P4 and P6), which deserve to be and are hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 16. No other point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 17. In the light of aforesaid reasons, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant writ petition is dismissed as such.