JUDGMENT H. K. RATHOD, J. Heard learned A.G.P. Ms. Mathur appearing on behalf of appellant-State of Gujarat and learned Advocate Ms. Sejal K. Mandavia appearing on behalf of respondent-Shri Jamal Mahammed Ismail Bloch. 2. In this Second Appeal, following substantial question of law has been formulated by this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. M. Mehta) while admitting matter on 28-4-2006 : "1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower Court was right in law in dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1994 under which the judgment and decree declaring the plaintiff's dismissal vide order dated 29-3-1985 is illegal, null, void and inoperative. 2. Whether the decree passed by the learned trial Judge and as confirmed in appeal is vitiated in law on the question of jurisdiction? 3. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the suit and whether the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal would have jurisdiction?" 3. Thereafter, on 5-7-2006 this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Justice A. M. Kapadia) has passed following order in Civil Application No. 10131 of 2005. "1. By filing this application, applicants/appellants have prayed to stay the execution, implementation and operation of the judgment and order passed by the learned 3rd Assistant Judge, Junagadh, rendered in Regular Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1994 on the grounds stated in the application. 2. Having heard Mr. K. L. Pandya, learned Advocate of the applicants/appellants and Ms. Sejal K. Mandavia, learned Advocate of the Opponent and a perusal of the impugned judgment and decree, and since Second Appeal No. 225 of 2005 has been admitted by this Court vide order dated 28-4-2006 by formulating substantial questions of law, if the prayer made in this application is not granted, it would amount to dismissing the Second Appeal without adjudicating the contention raised therein. 3. In aforesaid view of the matter, the impugned judgment and decree deserves to be stayed till pendency of the Second Appeal. 4. For the foregoing reasons, the application succeeds, and accordingly, it is allowed. The prayer in terms of Para 4(A) is granted, which shall remain operative till decision of the Second Appeal. Rule is made absolute. 5. On the facts and in the circumstances emerging from the record of the case, Second Appeal No. 225 of 2005 is ordered to be expedited." 4. The prayer in terms of Para 4(A) is granted, which shall remain operative till decision of the Second Appeal. Rule is made absolute. 5. On the facts and in the circumstances emerging from the record of the case, Second Appeal No. 225 of 2005 is ordered to be expedited." 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with judgment and decree dated 24-3-1994 passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 321 of 1985 passed by 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Junagadh, present appellant had filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1994, which was decided on 18-10-2004 and against that judgment and decree, appellant has preferred present Second Appeal. Trial Court has set aside dismissal order dated 29-3-1985 and also directed present appellant not to implement dismissal order against plaintiff and it was also directed to present appellant to reinstate plaintiff within 30 days with all back wages, which were required to be paid within 3 (Three) months from date of judgment and decree. Regular Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1994 was filed on 16-12-1994 and it was decided on 18-10-2004 vide Exh. 22, whereby lower Appellate Court dismissed said appeal, which was preferred by appellants. 5. Brief facts of present appeal are as under : 5.1. Plaintiff was serving as Forest Guard at Ramnath Round in Mojaria Bit and at the time of his service tenure about 980 trees were illegally cut down. Hence, to fix responsibility of respondent, a departmental inquiry was carried on by Special Officer of Rajkot. He inquired into the matter and believed that charges are proved against plaintiff. According to appellant, in inquiry, appellant had given ample opportunity to respondent and on 29-3-1985, dismissal order was passed by present appellant. 5.2. According to appellant, plaintiff had failed to carry out his duties to protect forest area and also failed to comply with his duty, therefore, departmental inquiry was held. There was an allegation against plaintiff that about 980 trees were illegally cut in this area, even though, he has not taken any steps as per Forest Manual. Other two Forest Guards are also dismissed with plaintiff and one Round Forestor, who was in next officer of plaintiff was also compulsorily retired. 6. Before trial Court, on basis of pleadings, vide Exh. 61, following issues have been framed : "1. Whether the plaintiff proves that impugned order is null and void and without jurisdiction? 2. Other two Forest Guards are also dismissed with plaintiff and one Round Forestor, who was in next officer of plaintiff was also compulsorily retired. 6. Before trial Court, on basis of pleadings, vide Exh. 61, following issues have been framed : "1. Whether the plaintiff proves that impugned order is null and void and without jurisdiction? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that reasonable opportunity of being heard was not given to him in departmental inquiry? 3. Whether this suit is legally tenable without exhausting remedies provided for appeals against the order of the departmental inquiry? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief, if yes what? 5. What order and decree?" 7. First, second and third issues were decided in affirmative and ultimately, judgment and decree were passed in favour of plaintiff. 8. Before trial Court, according to plaintiff, he was working as a Forest Guard in Forest Office at Dungarpur during period of 28-1-1981 to 2-121981. Present appellant-State of Gujarat had filed reply vide Exh. 10 against interim relief application preferred by plaintiff before trial Court. Plaintiff had given application for inspection, vide Exh. 67, which was subsequently not pressed by plaintiff. Present appellant has filed reply against plaint preferred by plaintiff. Before trial Court, certain documents were produced by plaintiff vide Exhs. 63 to 66. Out of that, Exh. 63 being show-cause notice and findings given by Inquiry Officer, Exh. 64 being reply of show-cause notice given by plaintiff, Exh. 65 being a copy of dismissal order and Exh. 66 being one application given by plaintiff and order passed below it are produced on record and in said application status-quo was granted on 16-4-1985. Thereafter, same was confirmed on 1-7-1987, till final disposal of suit. An affidavit was filed by plaintiff vide Exh. 6 and list of documents was presented by present appellant vide Exh. 68. Presenting Officer Mr. V. M. Radadia, Range Forest Officer was appointed by present appellant in departmental inquiry. 9. In departmental inquiry, first witness Kasammiya Hasammiya was examined, who made panchnama in presence of plaintiff as well as in presence of Babu Karshan. Number of cut-down trees were calculated, which were cut-down during the period of 8 days to 6 months. Panchnama was prepared in presence of staff on 26-11-1981 and 27-11-1981. 9. In departmental inquiry, first witness Kasammiya Hasammiya was examined, who made panchnama in presence of plaintiff as well as in presence of Babu Karshan. Number of cut-down trees were calculated, which were cut-down during the period of 8 days to 6 months. Panchnama was prepared in presence of staff on 26-11-1981 and 27-11-1981. Number of cut-down trees were calculated between 26-11-1981 to 27-11-1981, but no separate panchnama was prepared, because, it was continuous work, carried out by witnesses. This cutting-down trees was not personally seen by witness of present appellant and witness did not give clear answer in departmental inquiry. 10. In departmental inquiry, another witness Vinod Jairam was examined, who has made statement in departmental inquiry that before 6 to 7 months, police personnel came with papers when he was in Bhikhubhai's hotel at Bilkha and obtained his signature on papers. These police personnel belong to Junagadh and he had not read papers. This witness made it clear that because of Jilubha, he signed papers. Facts shown in panchnama, bearing his signature was denied in his evidence before Inquiry Officer. This witness also denied identification of one person Vagharam and this witness is also not aware of area of Mojaria bit. He also made it clear that when police personnel came with papers, Jilubha and Jagu were present. 11. Even third witness Vagharam also made it clear that on 19-4-1982, he has not visited Mojaria bit and he has not calculated cut-trees. He was sitting in the hotel at Bilkha and on that occasion, because of saying by Jilubha, he has signed papers. He has not visited place of incident and he has not read over panchnama. In inquiry proceedings, one Babu Narsinh was also examined, who was present on duty, but, he was not present while pane/mama was being drawn. According to him, after 4-5 days mobile Range Forest Officer came with panchnama and because of his saying, he has signed. Moreover, according to him, he has signed as example and not signed as pancha. Jilubha was also examined, where he had made statement that Mr. Radadia was there and about 4 months before, in Bilkha at Ambica Hotel between 3 to 4 p.m., there were two boys, one's name was Vagho and name of other boy is not remembered. Moreover, according to him, he has signed as example and not signed as pancha. Jilubha was also examined, where he had made statement that Mr. Radadia was there and about 4 months before, in Bilkha at Ambica Hotel between 3 to 4 p.m., there were two boys, one's name was Vagho and name of other boy is not remembered. He had made statement that what was written in papers is not known to him and he is not aware about illegal cutting of trees in forest as allegations made by appellants. 12. This witness Jilubha was examined as defence witness. The aforesaid evidence was laid by department against plaintiff in departmental inquiry. It is not possible to carry out panchnama of 960 cut-trees in 2 days. Presenting Officer, Mr. Radadia was also examined. On 14-9-1981, plaintiff-Jamal Mahammed Ismail Bloch was working as Forest Guard in Mojaria bit. In presence of Range Forest Officer as well as in presence of Mobile Squad from 26-11-1981 to 27-11-1981, calculation was made about number of cut-trees and pane/mama was prepared, which was considered to be one panchnama, because it was continuous calculation of cutting-trees. 13. Reply was given by plaintiff denying facts of panchnama and he was not aware about persons who have signed panchnama. According to plaintiff, as per Rule, in one hour only 10 number of cut-trees can be calculated and it is not possible to calculate 980 cutting-trees within a period of 2 days. Allegation made against plaintiff has been specifically denied by him and he has made report immediately to higher authority and not remained negligent. Round Forester was also informed orally and in writing was given by plaintiff. Bit Guard has to cover area of 3-4 kms. and one Bit Guard has to take care of 3-4 kms. area. According to him, panchnama of number of cut-trees covering a period of 8 days to 6 months, which has been calculated by staff was not prepared on the spot and when this incident was occurred, he had completed only 21/2 month service. Finding report was also produced by appellant vide Exh. 63 and that Finding Report has been considered by trial Court and according to plaintiff, there is no prima facie case established against him. Reply was given by plaintiff vide Exh. 64 produced before trial Court. Plaintiff was also examined on oath vide Exh. Finding report was also produced by appellant vide Exh. 63 and that Finding Report has been considered by trial Court and according to plaintiff, there is no prima facie case established against him. Reply was given by plaintiff vide Exh. 64 produced before trial Court. Plaintiff was also examined on oath vide Exh. 80 and he gave evidence that he was transferred to Mojaria bit on 14-9-1981, but for handing over and taking over charge at the time of transfer that procedure was not followed. According to plaintiff, based on wrong and false allegation, he was placed under suspension by department. Plaintiff has given application vide Exh. 67 to trial Court to produce relevant documents, which were in possession of appellant, but no answer was given. Cross-examination of plaintiff has made it clear that in Dungarpur range he had only 2 months and 12 days service, he reported and accepted charge of post on 14-9-1981, he was only Bit Guard and he was required to go outside for 15 to 20 days in a month, and for that, necessary report was made by plaintiff. He has made 18-19 F.O.R. during his service of 2 months. He also made it clear in his cross-examination that F.O.R. regarding old trees were made. Out of F.O.R. made, 2-3 cases were noted unclaimed and remaining were recovered. At the spot, there was no Rojkam made about 980 cut-trees and panchnama was not prepared in his presence, however, he accepted his signature in pane/mama. He has studied upto 10th Standard. One Mr. M. D. Jangal was with him during round and he was also suspended by department and he is receiving 50% salary as suspension allowance. 14. Appellant has produced documents vide Exh. 83, plaintiff has accepted his signature vide Exh. 84 and plaintiff has given closing purshis vide Exh. 85 before trial Court. Presenting Officer Mr. Radadia was required to be examined before trial Court, but appellant has not examined Presenting Officer Mr. Radadia before trial Court. 15. One Mr. Ishwar Mohanlal Kaila was examined vide Exh. 87. He has stated that he was working as Deputy Conservator of Forest, Junagadh Division and Mojaria bit was under his control and jurisdiction. According to evidence of Ishwarbhai Kaila in area, where plaintiff was working, total 980 trees were illegally cut-down and against which no F.O.R. has been given by plaintiff to higher officer. 87. He has stated that he was working as Deputy Conservator of Forest, Junagadh Division and Mojaria bit was under his control and jurisdiction. According to evidence of Ishwarbhai Kaila in area, where plaintiff was working, total 980 trees were illegally cut-down and against which no F.O.R. has been given by plaintiff to higher officer. Departmental inquiry report is produced vide Exh. 88 and dismissal order is produced vide Exh. 65. Said witness had admitted before trial Court that how inquiry proceeding was carried out and that entire and complete proceeding is with him, but he was not ready to produce before trial Court. Presenting Officer Mr. Radadia was in service at the time of evidence of plaintiff as well as at the time of evidence of witness Ishwarbhai Kaila, even though, Mr. Radadia was not examined before trial Court. Witness Ishwarbhai Kaila was not having knowledge, even after verifying records that Forester under whom plaintiff was working was examined during departmental inquiry or not. In cross-examination of said witness, he admitted that before issuing charge-sheet to plaintiff, no opportunity of hearing or notice was given to plaintiff. He also admitted that when charge-sheet was given, plaintiff had completed 3 months 16 days in that bit, after transferring him from another bit. This witness was not having knowledge of how many F.O.R. was prepared by plaintiff. He was also not aware of facts how many reports given by plaintiff to Forester, he was also not aware about area of Mojaria bit and he was also not aware about reply given by plaintiff against show-cause notice. 16. In light of aforesaid evidence, which has been recorded during departmental inquiry, trial Court had came to conclusion that there was no positive evidence led by department against plaintiff by which misconduct can be proved against plaintiff. Charges levelled against plaintiff were not proved by satisfactory evidence as led by present appellant and on that basis conclusion of Inquiry Officer, which was supplied to plaintiff along with show-cause notice was found to be baseless and perverse, without application of mind and without giving any reasons in support of its conclusion. Charges levelled against plaintiff were not proved by satisfactory evidence as led by present appellant and on that basis conclusion of Inquiry Officer, which was supplied to plaintiff along with show-cause notice was found to be baseless and perverse, without application of mind and without giving any reasons in support of its conclusion. Inquiry officer has not appreciated cross-examination of witness produced by appellant though there was noted in departmental inquiry, but, same has not been considered by inquiry officer, therefore, on basis of aforesaid evidence, which was found from record, where allegation made against plaintiff about negligence of illegal cutting of trees in Mojaria bit about 980 trees that aspect in detail examined by trial Court and on that basis trial Court has come to conclusion that there was no evidence laid by department against plaintiff, which proved charge-sheet against plaintiff. Therefore, it has been considered to be a case of no evidence and findings has been declared baseless and perverse. 17. Trial Court has come to conclusion that Civil Court has jurisdiction to interfere in case when there is no evidence in departmental inquiry and decision taken by department is baseless and perverse. Therefore, on both grounds, trial Court has come to conclusion that dismissal order dated 29-3-1985 based on such evidence which is baseless and perverse. As there are no positive evidence against plaintiff, therefore, trial Court has answered issue Nos. 1 to 3 in affirmative and ordered to reinstate plaintiff with all back wages and consequential benefits. Trial Court has considered decision of this Court reported in Anandram Jaind Rai Vasawani v. Union of India, 1982 (3) SLR 172, S. T. Das Diya v. Commissioner, Surat Municipal Corporation, 1983 (2) SLR 616 and Badridan Bheravadon Gadhavi v. State of Gujarat, 1984 GLH 958 . In such circumstances, Civil Court has jurisdiction to interfere with order of punishment of dismissal. Trial Court has decided Civil Suit filed by plaintiff on 24-3-1994. 18. It is necessary to note that reasoning given by lower Appellate Court on basis of pleadings of parties, which are as under : "The appellants are the original defendants and present respondent is the original plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 321 of 1985 which are narrated as such hereinafter for the sake of brevity and convenience. 18. It is necessary to note that reasoning given by lower Appellate Court on basis of pleadings of parties, which are as under : "The appellants are the original defendants and present respondent is the original plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 321 of 1985 which are narrated as such hereinafter for the sake of brevity and convenience. The plaintiff has filed the suit and contended that when he was serving as a Forest Guard in Dungar Range then from 28-1-1981 to 2-12-1981 between this period he was charge-sheeted due to negligence in service, hence the departmental enquiry was held against him. In such enquiry, defendants have not given ample opportunity to defence and also contended that the witness of prosecution has not supported the allegations against the plaintiff and Special Inquiry Officer has also narrated such specific facts in his report. Even though, the defendant No.2 has issued a show-cause notice regarding dismissal to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has answered the said notice, even though, the defendant No.2 has not taken into consideration the reply of notice, and passed the order of dismissal on 29-3-1985. Prior to this suit, the plaintiff has also filed R.C.S. No. 521 of 1982 and challenged the legality and validity of said show-cause notice, but at that time, he was not dismissed. Hence, in that suit, the plaintiff has also asked permanent injunction and it was confirmed by the competent Court, but then he was not dismissed, at that time, then the said suit was withdrawn by the plaintiff with a condition to file fresh suit as and when he was dismissed by the authority and order passed by the Court as asked by the plaintiff on 30-11-1984 like as and when the authority dismisses the plaintiff, then the said implementation of order should be suspended till seven days; such type of order of Court is ineffective, even though, the authority has dismissed the plaintiff. The authority has not taken into consideration the facts of plaintiff which he was narrated in reply of charge-sheet. He was not given ample opportunity to defence. The authority has also failed to comply the interest of justice. The plaintiff is a 4th class employee and does not know the law and procedure. There was no "evidence" and the order of authority is extraneous inference and its finding is perverse and based no evidence. He was not given ample opportunity to defence. The authority has also failed to comply the interest of justice. The plaintiff is a 4th class employee and does not know the law and procedure. There was no "evidence" and the order of authority is extraneous inference and its finding is perverse and based no evidence. Hence, as per the rules, such type of findings is not sustainable. The authority has not applied his mind before giving second show-cause notice to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has answered the said notice, and there is no any new issue in reply, hence passed the order of dismissal, but, it is not a speaking order, it is illegally null and void and ab-initio void. Hence, against such type of order, it is not necessary to file the departmental appeal. He has also contended that before passing impugned order, the authority has not taken into consideration any specific reasons or cogent reasons and also not narrated in his order and passed the order and done civil death of plaintiff. Hence, such type of order is null and void and inoperative, and therefore, he has challenged the said order in suit and asked a reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction in suit and on the same day, the plaintiff has filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of C. P. Code at Exh. 5 Court has primarily order to maintain status-quo pertaining to impugned order and than said application heard on merits and order passed by the Civil Court to maintain status-quo till final disposal of the suit." 19. The lower Appellate Court also examined this issue, while appreciating evidence, which are on record and also support reasons have been given by trial Court, while confirming judgment and decree passed by trial Court in Paras 8 and 9 of judgment passed by lower Appellate Court, which are quoted as under : "8. Point No. 1 :- Looking to all the records of the suit, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff was serving as a Forest Guard and in his service tenure, due to negligence, he was charge-sheeted, and ultimately, he was dismissed by the order of defendant No.2. Point No. 1 :- Looking to all the records of the suit, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff was serving as a Forest Guard and in his service tenure, due to negligence, he was charge-sheeted, and ultimately, he was dismissed by the order of defendant No.2. But at the time of issuing the notice on dismissal, the plaintiff has filed an R.C.S. No. 521 of 1982 and asked the injunction against the act of respondent's and injunction was confirmed by the Court. But at that time, he was not dismissed, hence with permission to file a fresh suit he has withdrawn the suit then he was dismissed on 29-3-1985, hence he has challenged the order of dismissal in the present suit. There is only one allegation against the plaintiff that illegal cutting the trees in the area of plaintiff. The witness of pane/mama is also hostile. Even though, defendant No.2 has held that the respondent has not proved his innocence in the said matter, hence passed an order of punishment, the said order is on no evidence or extraneous inference basis. The appellants have denied all the facts of the suit in his written statement. The trial Court has carefully examined the evidence on record and after considering all the documentary evidence, they have passed a legal order. The show-cause notice is at Exh. 63, reply of the said notice is at Exh. 64, the impugned order is at Exh. 65, withdrawal pursis with order of Court of R.C.S. No. 581 of 1982 is at Exh. 66. The report of Special Inquiry Officer is at Exh. 88. Plaintiff Jamal Mahmad Ismail Bloch has submitted his oral evidence in suit at Exh. 80 and he has stated in his deposition that, he was serving since last 3 months and 12 days and no any witness has deposed against the plaintiff in inquiry and said act of illegally cutting the trees was not cutting in his service tenure. The said witness has also admitted in his cross-examination that 18 to 19 F.O.R. has lodged against the plaintiff and there was no any rojkam prepared at the place of cutting the trees before the said witness. Mr. Ishwar Mohanlal Kaila has admitted in his oral evidence at Exhs. The said witness has also admitted in his cross-examination that 18 to 19 F.O.R. has lodged against the plaintiff and there was no any rojkam prepared at the place of cutting the trees before the said witness. Mr. Ishwar Mohanlal Kaila has admitted in his oral evidence at Exhs. 87 and 90 and he has stated in his cross-examination that he was not ready and willing to submit the records and proceedings of departmental enquiry. He has also admitted that five forest employees have also deposed that there was no any proceeding taken place in presence of said witness and he has also admitted that, when charge-sheet issued to the plaintiff, at the time plaintiff was charged for last six months old illegally cutting the trees. Hence, looking to such evidence, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was negligent in his service. No doubt, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such type of appeal, when it was based on departmental enquiry, but there is no evidence or there is extraneous considerations and even though the Inquiry Officer or any competent authority passed an illegal order, then the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. Looking to the departmental proceedings, the report which was submitted by Special Inquiry Officer at Exh. 88. The plaintiff was serving as a Forest Guard from 14-9-1981, panchnama was drawn on 27-11-1981. Hence, at the time of preparing panchnama, plaintiff was on service from last two months and 13 days at Mojaria Bit. The Inquiry Officer has concluded the report and averred on Page No. 15 that the said 77 trees were cut within 15 days, 326 trees were within 30 days and 226 trees were within two months, hence total 659 trees were cutting and said period as calculated on the above basis, days as per patrak, even though, in charge-sheet it is shown 980 trees, which is narrated without application of mind, but there is no specific allegation or specific reasons that after joining the service to plaintiff on 14-9-1981 then after joining service how many trees were cutting. Moreover he has also taken into consideration that there was no any rojkam prepared out about taken over the charge from relieving Bit Guard. Looking to the facts that panchnama drawn on 26-11-1981 and 27-11-1981. Even though, there is no any separate panchnama. Moreover he has also taken into consideration that there was no any rojkam prepared out about taken over the charge from relieving Bit Guard. Looking to the facts that panchnama drawn on 26-11-1981 and 27-11-1981. Even though, there is no any separate panchnama. The said cutting of trees were at least six months to 8 days old. Mr. Kasam Miya Hasammiya, R.F.O. has submitted his evidence before the Inquiry Officer on behalf Government which was on the page No. 2 at Exh. 88. This witness was carried on counting the trees with panch witness as well as Babu Narshi and prepared the panchnama in presence of witness and also done mark of hemar on tree and also affix number on trees by Damar. He has also visited said Bit prior into this preparation of panchnama within six months and also entry made in diary, even though, he has not produced any entry of diary. Vinod Jeram, who was the witness of prosecution and he was also examined, even though, he was hostile as per the page No. 3 of Exh. 88. Another witness of prosecution Mr. Vagha Ram was also hostile as per page No. 4 of Exh. 88. Prosecution witness Mr. Babu Narshi was also hostile as per page No. 4 of Exh. 88. The plaintiff has also submitted his written statement before the Inquiry Officer as per page 8 of Exh. 88. Even though, it is not considered by the competent authority, hence it can be said that there is no evidence as per the departmental enquiry report as per page No. 13 of Exh. 88. The Special Inquiry Officer has also mentioned that, when 980 trees were cutting and panch witness is not supporting the panchnama and such type of fact may be taken into consideration at the time of passing the final order. Nakka Karkoon Babu Narshi have also become hostile and not supported the pane/mama. Even though, Inquiry Officer has held on page No. 14 at Exh. 88, that the delinquent has failed to prove his innocence, hence such type of conclusion is as against the principles of natural justice. He has also averred in his conclusion that the delinquent has failed to produce any evidence to prove his innocence. But in my view, burden to prove the allegation does not lie upon the delinquent. Looking to the impugned order at Exh. He has also averred in his conclusion that the delinquent has failed to produce any evidence to prove his innocence. But in my view, burden to prove the allegation does not lie upon the delinquent. Looking to the impugned order at Exh. 65, the competent authority has not taken into consideration that the explanation of plaintiff and stated that there is no any new issue arises in explanation by the plaintiff. Hence, it is not necessary to 'further enquiry, hence reject the explanation and passed the order with misapplication of mind. The competent authority has also not narrated any reasons that, why he was confirming the report of Inquiry Officer and when department has failed to produce any record and proceedings of enquiry under the Specific Relief Act under Sec. 41(H). The plaintiff is entitled to file a suit. 9. As per the ruling of S. M. Sharma v. South Gujarat University, reported on 1982 (1) GLR 233 . In this case, it is held that the rule of evidence is there attracted not only in cases where there is complete lack of evidence, that is to say, where there is not a title or shed of evidence, but also in cases where the evidence, if any, is not capable of having any probative value, or on the basis of which no Tribunal could reasonably and logically come to the conclusion about the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the determination. Learned Advocate Mr. K. B. Sanghvi has also relied upon the decision reported in 1984 GLH 958 in the case of Badridan Bheravadan Gadhavi v. State of Gujarat. In this case, it is held that the Civil Court does not sit in appeal over the ultimate decision of the disciplinary authority in domestic enquiry under Sec., 9 of C.P. Code, but there were two exceptions to the subject rules, the first decision where the decision is based on no evidence and where the decision is perverse or unreasonable, in such circumstances, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. Looking to the above ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court and when the said impugned order is passed on report of Special Inquiry Officer, in my view, there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned trial Court. Looking to the above ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court and when the said impugned order is passed on report of Special Inquiry Officer, in my view, there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned trial Court. The competent authority has not taken into consideration the suggestions made by the competent authority in his report. No any witness has supported the allegations as per the charge-sheet to the plaintiff. The authority has not taken any explanation or written statement before passing the impugned order and authority failed to apply its mind. I am satisfied with the order passed by the trial Court, there is no any evidence of presenting officer Mr. Radadia on record. Therefore, in such circumstances, the order passed by the trial Court is not liable to set aside and it is not unjust, unfair and illegal. Hence, I evidence issue No. 1 in the negative and pass the following final order : ORDER The appeal is hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Decree to be drawn up accordingly." 20. The question of giving reasons on basis of evidence led in departmental inquiry, how findings should be given by Inquiry Officer that aspect has been examined by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Anilkumar v. Presiding Officer, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1121 . Relevant Paras 5 and 6 are quoted as under : "5. We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed our in clear terms the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is well-settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the Enquiry Officer has a duty to act judicially. The Enquiry Officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of the witness, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not creditworthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well-settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1966 (1) SCR 466 : AIR 1966 SC 671 , this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1971 (1) SCR 201 : AIR 1970 SC 1302 , this Court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case, the enquiry report is an order-sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have been a gross case of application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has been found favour with the Labour Court and the High Court. 6. Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable." 21. Learned A.G.P. Ms. But where the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable." 21. Learned A.G.P. Ms. Mathur raised contention before this Court that in such cases Civil Court has no jurisdiction to examine legality and validity of dismissal order. She also raised contention that against dismissal order of department, appeal is a remedy, which has not been availed, therefore, Civil suit is not maintainable. She submitted that reasonable opportunity was given to plaintiff and due procedure has been followed by department and findings recorded by Inquiry Officer is based on legal evidence and charge levelled against plaintiff is proved in departmental inquiry. However, she made it clear that there was no past misconduct committed by plaintiff, which found from record. She submitted that immediately after misconduct committed by plaintiff, he was placed under suspension. During period of year 1981 to 1998, 50% subsistence allowance was paid to plaintiff. Monthly allowance came to Rs. 1,235/-, and thereafter, year 1998 onwards, 75% subsistence allowance was being paid by department, which came to Rs. 1,665/-. 22, Against that, learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia submitted that this subsistence allowance was not paid on basis of revised pay-scale. She submitted that date of birth of plaintiff is 10-2-1953, he joined service on 28-3-1978, he had taken charge of Mojaria bit on 14-9-1981 and remained in service at Mojaria bit about 3 months. While making allegation against plaintiff of illegal cutting of trees for six months period, when plaintiff was not on duty for all six months. Admittedly, six months period plaintiff was not on duty on Mojaria bit. She also made it clear that only 21/2 months service was rendered at Mojaria bit as discussed by trial Court in its judgment and decree. She submitted that on 9-2-2011, being a date of retirement of plaintiff, but an Officer of appellant remained present along with plaintiff submitted that plaintiff will be retired from service on last day of this month i.e. 28-2-2011. 23. Learned Advocate Ms. She submitted that on 9-2-2011, being a date of retirement of plaintiff, but an Officer of appellant remained present along with plaintiff submitted that plaintiff will be retired from service on last day of this month i.e. 28-2-2011. 23. Learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia submitted that plaintiff being Government employee, charge-sheet and departmental inquiry was carried out and dismissal order was passed against plaintiff by department under statutory rules, which has been followed by department, therefore, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide legality and validity of dismissal order. She relied upon decision of this Court given in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Kanti Atmaram Vyas, decided on 21-12-2010 in Second Appeal No. 201 of 1985. She relied upon discussion made by this Court, considering recent decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of R.S.R.T.C v. Deen Dayal Sharma, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 3108. Therefore, she submitted that statutory rules framed by present appellant for conducting departmental inquiry is having statutory force, and therefore, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide legality and validity of dismissal order. She relied upon discussion made by this Court in Para 5 in aforesaid decision given in Second Appeal No. 201 of 1985 decided on 21-12-2010. Relevant Paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, which are quoted as under : "5. After aforesaid judgment and decree passed by trial Court as referred above, S.T. Corporation has preferred an appeal before lower Appellate Court, Second Extra Assistant Judge, Rajkot in Regular Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1983 Exh. 13 decided on 30-1-1984. The appeal preferred by Corporation has been dismissed while confirming judgment and decree passed by trial Court. The S.T. Corporation has raised contention before Appellate Court in respect to jurisdiction in deciding Civil Suit filed by plaintiff. The Appellate Court has come to conclusion that Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain suit on the strength of decisions, which have been relied by appellate Court of this Court in case of Amarsinh Setansing Medatia v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, reported in 1980 GLR 500 . The aforesaid decision has been discussed by Appellate Court in Para 17 that Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation is clearly within term "authority" under Art. 12 of Constitution of India and Rules and Regulations framed by this authority Corporation have a force of law, and consequently, it must satisfy mandate of Arts. The aforesaid decision has been discussed by Appellate Court in Para 17 that Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation is clearly within term "authority" under Art. 12 of Constitution of India and Rules and Regulations framed by this authority Corporation have a force of law, and consequently, it must satisfy mandate of Arts. 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. The following observation made by Division Bench of this Court as referred above in reported decision 1980 GLR 500 , in Para 14 is as under : "14. At the outset, it must be stated that State Road Transport Corporation is clearly within the term "authority" under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and the rules and regulations framed by this statutory Corporation have the force of law (vide: Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 ). A Division Bench of this Court has, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 131 of 1974 with Second Appeal No. 41 of 1973, decided on May 7. 1976 (Per Thakkar, J.), held that Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation is an authority within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution and its rules and regulations have the force of law, and consequently, therefore, must satisfy the mandate of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution." 6. It is necessary to note that Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation having their own discipline and appeal procedure for Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation employees, which has been framed under provisions of Sec. 45 of Road Transport Act and Service Regulation 80 of S.T. Corporation. Therefore, employment Standing Order Act, 1946 is not applicable to employees of Corporation because of having separate statutory Rules under Service Regulation 80 of S.T. Corporation, from which, discipline and appeal procedure for Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation employees has been framed by Corporation. So, this being a statutory Rules, if it is violated or in action if it is contrary to principle of natural justice, then Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide it. The Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation is having exemption from provision of Standing Order Act, 1946. Therefore, provisions of Standing Order Act is not applicable to S.T. Employees. 7. In light of this background and considering decision of Apex Court in case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishnakant, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1715 , learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Therefore, provisions of Standing Order Act is not applicable to S.T. Employees. 7. In light of this background and considering decision of Apex Court in case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishnakant, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1715 , learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. N. Mathur (retd.)) in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ravji Tapubhai Goti, reported in 1998 (2) GLR 1418 , where this question was examined in light of aforesaid decision of Apex Court reported in AIR 1995 SC 1715 and this Court has also considered reported decision of 1980 GLR 500 . The relevant discussion made while deciding question No. 1 in Paras 2 to 4 are quoted as under : "2. The principles as regards the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to dispute between the employer and the employees have been well settled by series of decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court. The three Judges Bench judgment in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishnakant, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1715 after consideration of all earlier judgments, has finally recorded the relevant principles in this regard as follows : (1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract i.e. where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in Civil Court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though, such a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Sec. 2(k) or Sec. 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called 'sister enactments' to Industrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Sec. 2(k) and Sec. 2A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open. (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment, and hence, not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, the Supreme Court though, it fit to commend to the Parliament and the State Legislature to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly i.e. without requirement of a reference by the Government in case of industrial disputes covered by Sec. 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way of removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way of removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employer and employees, though they do not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court where recourse to Civil Court is open according to the principles indicated above. (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to Civil Courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such reliefs as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute. 3. It is contended by the learned Counsel that the plaintiff-respondent is a workman and as such the subject-matter being of Industrial Dispute, the Labour Court has only jurisdiction to entertain such disputes. The Civil Judge has exceeded the jurisdiction in granting injunction inasmuch as in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the Rajasthan S.R.T. Corporation (supra) the Civil Suit itself is not maintainable. He submits that the present case is covered by Para (2) of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan S.R.T. Corporation (supra). The learned Counsel submits that in that case also the conductors of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation were dismissed from service after having found them guilty of misconduct. The injunction was granted by the Civil Court which was confirmed by the High Court. However, the Apex Court applying the principles laid down therein held that the suit filed by the employees of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation was not maintainable. The learned Counsel submits that the present case is squarely covered by the said decision. 4. In my view, there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned Counsel. However, the Apex Court applying the principles laid down therein held that the suit filed by the employees of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation was not maintainable. The learned Counsel submits that the present case is squarely covered by the said decision. 4. In my view, there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned Counsel. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation's case the employees are governed by the certified Standing Orders framed under and the in accordance with Industrial Employment Standing Orders (Central) Rules, 1946. The said Standing Orders define misconduct and prescribe the procedure disciplinary proceedings against such employees. It appears that said Corporation has not framed Regulations prescribing the conditions of service of its employees in exercise of powers under Sec. 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. However, in the case of State of Gujarat in exercise of power under Sec. 45 of the R9ad Transport Corporation Act, 1950 Regulations have been framed prescribing the conditions of services of its employees which is known as "Gujarat State Transport Employees Service Regulations". Regulation 80 empowers the Corporation to specify the acts of misconduct or omissions liable to be treated as "acts of misconduct" or minor lapses or delinquencies". It empowers the Corporation to prescribe the procedure for dealing with the cases of acts of misconduct and minor lapses and delinquencies. The provision also authorises to appoint appropriate authority to impose punishment and hear the appeals and other disciplinary action. In exercise of powers under Regulation 80, the Corporation has framed Rules known as "Discipline and Appeal Procedure for Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Employees" (hereinafter referred to as the "Discipline and Appeal Rules"). Clause 5 provides for misconduct and procedure. It is held by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Amarsing v. G.S.R.T. Corporation, reported in 1980 GLR 500 that Rules and Regulations framed by the State Road Transport Corporation are statutory and have the force of law. This gives statutory status to the employees. Any violation of the statute while terminating the services of such employees entitles them to seek relief of a declaration, that the order is null and void. This gives statutory status to the employees. Any violation of the statute while terminating the services of such employees entitles them to seek relief of a declaration, that the order is null and void. The challenge of the order inflicting penalty on the delinquent not on the ground of violation of any Standing Order but based on the violation of common law, contending that their case is governed under the Discipline and Appeal Rules, clearly falls under Category-1 referred in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation case (supra). Thus, in my view, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and its employees." 8. The Apex Court has considered this question whether termination of employee if it is challenged before Civil Court in terms of Sec. 9 of Civil Procedure Code whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to try and decide legality or otherwise of an order of termination of employee in case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Bal Mukund Bairwa reported in 2009 (2) GLH 348. The observation made by Apex Court that if an employee intends to enforce his constitutional right or right in statutory Regulation, Civil Court will have necessary jurisdiction to try suit, but if however, employee claims his right and corresponding obligations only in terms of provisions of Standing Order and Industrial Disputes Act then Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. 9. Recently, in case of R.S.R.T.C. v. Deen Dayal Sharma, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 3108, where it is held that Standing Order have no statutory force and are not in nature of delegated/subordinate legislation. Therefore, Apex Court has come to conclusion that dispute regarding dismissal from service plea of respondent ascertaining his right that departmental inquiry has contemplated under Standing Orders ought to have been held before issuing order of dismissal. Such right could have been enforced by respondent only by raising an industrial disputes and in such case, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit challenging order of dismissal because Standing Order is not having statutory force. In aforesaid recent decision Apex Court has considered earlier decision on the same subject including case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. 10. Such right could have been enforced by respondent only by raising an industrial disputes and in such case, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit challenging order of dismissal because Standing Order is not having statutory force. In aforesaid recent decision Apex Court has considered earlier decision on the same subject including case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. 10. Before decision of Apex Court in case of Deen Dayal Sharma as referred above, Apex Court has considered same aspect and subject and question of law in respect to jurisdiction of Civil Court in identical dispute in case of R.S.R.T.C. v. Mohar Singh, reported in 2008 (5) SCC 542 . The Apex Court has considered that law laid down in Premier Automobiles case in 1976 (1) SCC 496 and held that Civil Court's jurisdiction held is barred only when right is claimed under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or Sister's Law otherwise Civil Court has jurisdiction. The violation of no right under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or Industrial Employment Standing Order Act, 1946 claimed then which has been held that employee was entitled to enforce his fundamental right and other mandatory provision of law against S.T. Corporation which was "State" under Art. 12 of Constitution of India. The Apex Court has also considered Sec. 9 of Civil Procedure Code and overlapping jurisdiction of two Courts of service matter, held when right occurs in suit or common law, employee has option to choose forum. Therefore, it cannot be said that Civil Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain suit filed by employee, which has been governed by Statutory Rules. The aforesaid decision has been considered by this Court in S.A. No. 201 of 2007 in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Jadeja Dilubha Jamubha dated 25-7-2008 (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. S. Jhaveri) where case of Mohar Singh has been considered as discussed in Paras 3 to 6, which are quoted as under : "3. Heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. The only contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellants is that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the departmental proceedings and the subsequent order of dismissal passed by a competent authority. Heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. The only contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellants is that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the departmental proceedings and the subsequent order of dismissal passed by a competent authority. The said contention raised by the appellants does not hold any ground in view of the recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan S.R.T.C. v. Mohar Singh, reported in 2008 (3) SCC 230 wherein, it has been held that a Civil Court may have a limited jurisdiction in service matters and it may not sit in appeal over the order passed in disciplinary proceedings or on the quantum of punishment imposed and it may also not direct reinstatement in service having regard to Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act. 1963. But, it cannot be said to have no jurisdiction at all to entertain a suit and it is trite that where the right is claimed by the plaintiff in terms of a common law or under a statute, other than the one which created a new right for the first time and when a forum has also been created for enforcing the said right, the Civil Court shall also have jurisdiction to entertain a suit where the plaintiff claims benefit of a fundamental right, as adumbrated under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India or mandatory provisions of statute or statutory rules governing the terms and conditions of service. 4. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that the order of dismissal came to be passed after the suit being Civil Suit No. 551 of 1987 preferred by the respondent challenging the validity of the departmental inquiry and the order of dismissal that may be passed by the appellant-Corporation was dismissed on the technical ground of being premature. Therefore, ultimately, when the order of dismissal dated 4-9-1987 came to be passed, a right shall accrue on the respondent to choose a forum vis-a-vis the common law before which he desires to redress his grievances. 5. Having gone through the record, it is evident that the action on the part of the appellant-authority is violative of the mandatory requirements of a statute or the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice. 5. Having gone through the record, it is evident that the action on the part of the appellant-authority is violative of the mandatory requirements of a statute or the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice. Therefore, in such case, the Civil Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the principle laid down in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. case (supra). 6. In view of the above discussion, I am of the view that the Court below was completely justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree. I am in complete agreement with the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below and hence, find no reasons to interfere in this appeal." 24. Learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia also submitted that there is no positive evidence against plaintiff led by department in departmental inquiry to prove negligence for a period as alleged in charge-sheet and findings recorded by Inquiry Officer is found baseless and perverse, which has been properly appreciated by trial Court and discussed that Civil Court has jurisdiction to interfere with dismissal order. She submitted that either of Court has not committed any error, which requires interference. She also submitted that substantial question of law has been framed by this Court and out of that, question No.3 is about jurisdiction, which was not raised before trial Court by appellant. However, she submitted that if plaintiff is having alternative remedy to approach Gujarat Civil Service Tribunal, then also, it cannot be considered to be a bar to challenge dismissal order before Civil Court. For that, she relied upon decision in case of Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, reported in 1999 (1) SCC 472 . Relevant discussion is quoted as under : "The appellant was proceeded against departmentally when the Inquiry Officer found him guilty of the charges framed against him and submitted his report dated 17th November, 1992 to the Disciplinary Authority. After issuance of show-cause notice to the appellant seeking his reply, the Disciplinary Authority agreed with the Inquiry Officer and dismissed the appellant from service vide Memo dated 12th February, 1993. The order of dismissal was put in issue by the appellant by instituting a Civil suit for declaration that the order of dismissal from service was void and illegal and that the appellant was entitled to be reinstated. On 21st August, 1995, the suit was dismissed. The order of dismissal was put in issue by the appellant by instituting a Civil suit for declaration that the order of dismissal from service was void and illegal and that the appellant was entitled to be reinstated. On 21st August, 1995, the suit was dismissed. The appeal filed by the appellant before the learned District Judge, however, succeeded and on 30th July, 1996, the learned District Judge allowing the appeal declared that since proper procedure had not been followed and the appellant had been denied the facility of a defence assistant after his earlier defence assistant had ceased to act for him, the order of dismissal was illegal. The appellate Court, however, granted liberty to the respondent to continue with the departmental inquiry after providing the appellant a defence assistant of his choice from the stage at which his earlier defence assistant had ceased to act as defence assistant and to proceed therefrom. The respondent filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, while the appellant filed cross-objections. On 21st March, 1997, the second appeal, filed by the respondent, was allowed. The learned Single Judge of the High Court referred to Rule 24 of the C.C.S. (C.C. & A.) Rules, 1965 and opined that in view of those provisions, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had been taken away. The learned Single Judge went on to hold that where recourse is had to departmental proceedings, the order of the appellate authority, against an adverse order of the Disciplinary Authority, could only be subject-matter of challenge in a writ petition and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matter of this type through a Civil suit stood ousted. It is against the above judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the present appeal has been filed by special leave. We have heard Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant and Ms. Sumeet Kaur, learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents. It is against the above judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the present appeal has been filed by special leave. We have heard Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant and Ms. Sumeet Kaur, learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents. The opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge to the effect that in view of C.C.A. Rules, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted from dealing with an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority which can be questioned under the service rules and that even after recourse is had to the departmental proceedings recourse can only be to file a writ petition is palpably erroneous. The learned Single Judge readily accepted the ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Courts to deal with service matters without proper consideration of the matter. Indeed, it is appropriate to relegate a person to exhaust departmental remedies when he approaches the Court without exhausting departmental remedies under the service rules but to hold that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction while hearing a second appeal, after the matter has been litigated in Civil Court for more than five years was, to say the least, not proper. The learned Single Judge ought to have decided the case on its own merits and not made a short cut of it. The appellant could not have been non-suited on the ground that he had failed to take recourse to proceedings under the C.C.S. (C.C. & A.) Rules, 1965 against the order of dismissal. Again the opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge to the effect,-- It is my firm conviction that in the present case the Civil Court cannot make a declaration under Sec. 34 of the Specific Relief Act as its jurisdiction has been taken by the special rules i.e. C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules, 1965. Under the circumstances, it means a Civil Court does not have jurisdiction in respect of matters which are entertained and decided by the statutory Tribunal in conformity with the powers conferred by the enactment." is clearly erroneous, arid cannot be sustained. Service rules, neither expressly nor by implication have taken away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with service matter. The opinion of the learned Single Judge does violence both to the Code of Civil Procedure, the Specific Relief Act and the Service rules. Service rules, neither expressly nor by implication have taken away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with service matter. The opinion of the learned Single Judge does violence both to the Code of Civil Procedure, the Specific Relief Act and the Service rules. As a matter of fact, it appears to us that the learned Single Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him while non-suiting the appellant. It, therefore, appears appropriate to us to allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision of the regular second appeal and the cross-objections on their own merits. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The R.S.A. and cross-objections are remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal on merits in accordance with law." We clarify that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The parties shall bear their own costs in this appeal." 25. She also submitted that findings given by trial Court as well as lower appellate Court is not vitiated and both Courts have rightly examined this aspect. Therefore, she submitted that Second Appeal filed by department may be dismissed with cost. 26. I have considered submissions made by both learned Advocates, perused judgment and decree passed by trial Court as well as lower appellate Court and also perused record and proceedings received from below Courts. According to my opinion, trial Court has rightly come to conclusion that in departmental inquiry, there was no sufficient evidence to prove misconduct against plaintiff, which are alleged in charge-sheet against plaintiff. Findings recorded by Inquiry Officer is also baseless and perverse, because, there is no direct evidence, which prove negligence of plaintiff. The allegation made against plaintiff was not to take sufficient care for illegal cutting of about 980 trees during period of last 6 months in Mojaria bit. When admittedly, plaintiff had taken charge and remained in Mojaria bit, at the time of incident, he had completed 2½ months service, which is not in dispute between parties. Therefore, negligence was not proved in departmental inquiry and no positive evidence was led by present appellant and Presenting Officer was not examined before trial Court by present appellant. When admittedly, plaintiff had taken charge and remained in Mojaria bit, at the time of incident, he had completed 2½ months service, which is not in dispute between parties. Therefore, negligence was not proved in departmental inquiry and no positive evidence was led by present appellant and Presenting Officer was not examined before trial Court by present appellant. Witnesses, those who were examined by department before trial Court as well as in departmental inquiry have not supported allegations made against plaintiff. Therefore, finding recorded by Inquiry Officer is found to be baseless and perverse, for that, detailed reasons have been given by trial Court as well as lower appellate Court with application of mind, Departmental inquiry was conducted against present plaintiff under and on the basis of Statutory rules, therefore, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide legality and validity of dismissal order and also have jurisdiction to interfere in such cases, when it is a case of no evidence and findings recorded by Inquiry Officer found to be baseless and perverse. To have alternative remedy has not been considered a bar to file Civil Suit, challenging dismissal order by plaintiff. I have considered decisions, which have been relied upon by learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia, in support of her submissions. Both below Courts have rightly decided matter and rightly given decision in favour of plaintiff and for that, no interference is required. Accordingly, substantial question of law framed by this Court has been answered by this Court. Accordingly, there is no substance in present Second Appeal and present Second Appeal is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. 27. Learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia submitted that on 28-2-2011, plaintiff is retiring while reaching age of superannuation, therefore, judgment and decree passed by trial Court must have to be implemented as if plaintiff has remained in service throughout, deemed to be in continuous service and direct present appellant to calculate all retiral benefits for all purposes, throughout period as if the plaintiff has remained in active service with present appellant and to direct present appellant to pay all benefits within reasonable time, after deducting subsistence allowance, which has been paid by department to plaintiff. 28. In view of aforesaid, submissions made by learned Advocate Ms. 28. In view of aforesaid, submissions made by learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia, it is directed to present appellant-State of Gujarat, through Secretary, Forest and Environment Department and to Deputy Conservator of Forest to implement/execute judgment and decree passed by trial Court effectively, considering dismissal order dated 29-3-1985, null and void and plaintiff has remained deemed to be in continuous service for all purposes and on that from date of dismissal whatever service benefits being consequential benefits including retiral benefits be paid to plaintiff within a period of 4 (Four) months from date of receiving a copy of present judgment and order, after deducting subsistence allowance, whatever benefits paid to plaintiff is to be adjusted. Accordingly, present Second Appeal is dismissed. No order as to cost. Appeal dismissed.