JUDGMENT : Rajesh H. Shukla, J. The present First Appeal has been filed by the appellant-Employees State Insurance Corporation under Section 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") challenging the impugned judgment and order passed by the Employees' State Insurance Court, Ahmedabad in E.S.I. Application No. 73 of 2005 dated 10-8-2011 accepting that the respondent-workman had suffered during the course of the employment the accident leading to the stretch of muscles. 2. The appeal has been preferred inter alia on the ground that in view of Section 54 of the Act it is not permissible for the E.S.I. Court to convert the case of sickness into that of an accident. It is also contended that the impugned judgment and order is based on surmises and conjectures and presumption without any material or evidence. It is also contended that the E.S.I. Court Jias erred in not entertaining and allowing the application without considering the relevant factors and material. 3. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Sachin D. Vasavada for the appellant-Corporation. He has strenuously submitted that the E.S.I. Court has no jurisdiction to convert the sickness into the accidental injuries and has erred in appreciating and reading the evidence. He, therefore, submitted that as provided in Section 2(20) of the E.S.I. Act, sickness has been defined to which he pointedly referred to and submitted that it provides : "Sickness means a condition which requires medical treatment and attendance and necessitates abstention from work on medical grounds." He, therefore, submitted that the accident is not defined and an accident is an event which occurs unexpectedly. Learned Advocate Mr. Sachin Vasavada submitted that even in Form 16 what has been mentioned is that when the respondent was carrying the bucket filled with bobbin to unload in the lorry, the muscle of the left hand had stretched. However, he submitted that this injury cannot be said to be an accidental injury, and for sickness, the benefits have been given as required under the Act. Therefore, learned Advocate Mr. Vasavada submitted that the present appeal may be allowed. 4. In support of his contentions he has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, AIR 2007 SC 248 and pointedly referred to the observations made in Paragraphs 23 and 24. 5. Therefore, learned Advocate Mr. Vasavada submitted that the present appeal may be allowed. 4. In support of his contentions he has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, AIR 2007 SC 248 and pointedly referred to the observations made in Paragraphs 23 and 24. 5. Similarly, he referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed, AIR 2007 SC 1208 . He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ramprasad Balmiki v. Anil Kumar Jain, 2008 (9) SCC 492 and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, 2011 (1) SCC 343 - Head Note `H'. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. Sachin Vasavada has strenuously submitted that the burden of proof is on the appellant, and without any such material or evidence, the Court could not have presumed. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kerala State Electricity Board v. C. P. Sivasankara Menon, AIR 2009 SC 1152 and submitted that the Court has failed to appreciate the evidence. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Sachin Vasavada has also referred to and relied upon the judgment in case of Rajappa v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, 1992 (2) LLJ 714 (Karnataka High Court) and submitted that the word "accident" has been considered. He, therefore, submitted that the present Appeal may be admitted. 8. Though, the submissions have been made, normally the First Appeal is required to be admitted, the point which is required to be considered is whether it raises any substantial question of law as required under Section 82 of the Act. The provisions of Section 82 of the Act provides : "(1) Save as expressly provided in this Section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law." Thus, it clearly provides that an Appeal shall lie to the High Court from the order of E.S.I. if it involves a substantial question of law. (Emphasis supplied) 9. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law." Thus, it clearly provides that an Appeal shall lie to the High Court from the order of E.S.I. if it involves a substantial question of law. (Emphasis supplied) 9. This itself would suggest that mere different view or possibility of different interpretation of the appreciation of the evidence is not a substantial question of law. In any view of the matter, as it appears from the record, admittedly the respondent-workman during the course of the employment while taking the bucket full of bobbins for loading the vehicle had found the muscle of his left hand stretched leading to the accident and the award has been passed. Therefore, the moot question which is required to be considered is whether it is a sickness as sought to be canvassed and not an accident. It is required to be mentioned that any incident which occurs unexpectedly is an accident. The Black's Law Dictionary provides and defines the word "accident" - An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated; An unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, neglect or misconduct. 10. Therefore, while discharging the duty if the workman in course of his employment suffers any such injuries as a result of the event or the incident which occurs, it would be an accident. The law on this aspect has been very well settled as the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, AIR 2007 SC 248 has on the contrary dealt with and discussed in Paragraph 24 as to the ingredients for such claims. In this very judgment, referring to word "accident" it has been quoted in Paragraph 22 : "We are not oblivious that an accident may cause an internal injury as was held in Fenton (Pauper) v. J. Thorley & Co. In this very judgment, referring to word "accident" it has been quoted in Paragraph 22 : "We are not oblivious that an accident may cause an internal injury as was held in Fenton (Pauper) v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd., 1903 AC 443 by the Court of Appeal : "I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the expression "accident" is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed." Lord Lindley opined : "The word "accident" is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is often used to denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause; and if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself would certainly be called an accident. The word "accident" is also often used to denote both the cause and the effect, no attempt being made to discriminate between them. The great majority of what are called accidents are occasioned by carelessness; but for legal purposes it is often important to distinguish careless from other unintended and unexpected events." 11. Therefore, as discussed above, the principles have been discussed in Paragraph 24 and again it has been observed : "...........that the work attributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same would depend upon the fact of each case." In Paragraph 27, again there is a reference to the facts which can be said to be a cause for such injury or rather accidental injury. Thus, it is the nature of the work in course of employment while on duty which leads to an event or the incident resulting into the injury would constitute it an accident which is unforeseen. It is a stress and strain of the work which results in such event suddenly leading to some kind of injury. It is required to be mentioned that when such an injury takes place, it is an accident but subsequently when treatment is given, it is treated as a sort of sickness or the ailment which may be cured or may be cured partially depending on the facts of the case. It is required to be mentioned that when such an injury takes place, it is an accident but subsequently when treatment is given, it is treated as a sort of sickness or the ailment which may be cured or may be cured partially depending on the facts of the case. Similarly, it is also well accepted that every accident or the accidental injury need not lead to a permanent disablement which again depends upon various factors. However, the factum of accident and the injury arising as a result of such unforeseen accident cannot be disputed. 12. Therefore, the submissions which have been made by learned Advocate Mr. Sachin Vasavada referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, 2011 (1) SCC 343 are misconceived as it only refers to the method and the burden of proof by evidence about the exact injuries or the disability. 13. Similarly, the judgment referred to and relied upon by learned Advocate Mr. Sachin Vasavada in case of Ramprasad Balmiki v. Anil Kumar Jain, 2008 (9) SCC 492 refers to the discussion about the total disablement and partial disablement for the purpose of deciding the compensation, which will not be applicable to the facts of the case. In the facts of the present case, the facts are not disputed and as stated in Form-16 also the injuries can be said to have taken place during the course of employment and the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, AIR 2007 SC 248 in Paragraph 35 has again observed referring to earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court : "The expression "accident" means an untoward mishap which is not expected or designed. "Injury" means physiological injury. In Fenton v. Thorley & Co. Ltd., 1903 AC 448, it was observed that the expression "accident" is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed. "Injury" means physiological injury. In Fenton v. Thorley & Co. Ltd., 1903 AC 448, it was observed that the expression "accident" is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed. The above view of Lord MacNaghten was qualified by the speech of Lord Haldane A.C. in Trim Joint District School Board of Management v. Kelly, 1914 AC 676 as follows : I think that the context shows that in using the word "designed" Lord MacNaghten was referring to designed by the sufferers." It clearly refers to the fact that when an injury is caused there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co. (P). Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahammad Issak, AIR 1970 SC 1906 has observed": "5 To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words in the course of the employment mean in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it. The words arising out of employment are understood to mean that during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered. In other words, there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression arising out of employment is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be one which arises out of employment. To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act ". 15. To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act ". 15. Therefore, having regard to the aforesaid facts and the ratio and the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the present First Appeal cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed as it cannot be decided by pre-empting at this stage that it is not an accidental injury at all, meaning thereby, it would otherwise affect the recourse open to the respondent-workman if the complaint or injury persist to have further recourse before the medical authority including the Board. 16. It is in these circumstances, the present First Appeal cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed in limine. 17. Civil Application stands disposed of accordingly. Appeal dismissed.