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2011 DIGILAW 799 (GAU)

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sitra Kyrsian

2011-09-23

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2011
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. Aggrieved by the common judgment and award dated 5th December, 2008 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong in MAC Cases No. 12 to 14 of 2006 awarding compensations of varying amounts in favour of the three claimant-respondent the appellant-insurer is preferring this batch of appeals, which were taken up together for hearing and are now being disposed off by this common judgment. 2. The common facts giving rise to this appeal may be noticed at the outset. On 28th April, 2005 the deceased was travelling in a truck bearing registration number ML-05-C-8947 driven by one Suberline Kyrsian alongwith three occupants and the same was proceeding from Lahuleng to Umraleng on the way to Mawiong village. Unfortunately, on the way, the truck went off the road and fell into gorge resulting in the death of the said driver and two of the occupants, namely, Marwet Kurbah and What Kyrsian, while the third occupant, namely, Adding Kurbah sustained injuries and managed to survive. The injured filed a claim petition being MAC Case No. 12 of 2006, while the legal heirs of the deceased occupants, Mrs. Nazareth Khyliat, w/o late Marwet Kurbah and Mrs. Sitra Kyrsian, sister of the late Watphrangbor Kyrsian also filed separate claim petitions, which were registered as MAC No. 13 of 2006 and MAC No. 14 of 2006 respectively. Both the owner of the offending truck and the insurer-appellant contested the claim petitions and filed their respective written statements. The Tribunal took up the three claim petitions jointly. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues for determination : ISSUES 1. Whether this claim application is maintainable? 2. Whether the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending truck? 3. Whether the driver of the said truck No. ML-05-C-8974 has a valid license at the time of the accident? 4. Whether the OP/New India Assurance Co. Ltd. is liable to pay compensation to the claimant and indemnify the OP/Owner of the Truck No. ML-05-C-8974? 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation, if so, to what extent? In MAC No. 12/06, the following additional issues were framed: ADDITIONAL ISSUES 1. Whether claimant was the handyman in Truck No. ML-05-C-8974 and was travelling in that capacity in Truck on the date of the accident? 2. 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation, if so, to what extent? In MAC No. 12/06, the following additional issues were framed: ADDITIONAL ISSUES 1. Whether claimant was the handyman in Truck No. ML-05-C-8974 and was travelling in that capacity in Truck on the date of the accident? 2. Whether the claimant sustained injuries in the accident, if so, what was the extent and effect of the injuries? In MAC No. 13 of 2006, the following additional issue was framed : 1. Whether the deceased Late Marwat Kurbah was a labourer/helper employed in Truck No. ML-05-C-8974? 3. The claimants examined themselves as their own witnesses and have also examined the I.O. of the case as their common witness to substantiate their respective cases. The claimant in MAC No. 13 of 2006 also examined one Rolet Nongsiej as CW 3, while the claimant in MAC No. 14 of 2006, the claimant examined one Loska Kyrsian as CW 3. The owner of the offending vehicle also examined himself as OPW 1, being the common witness in all the three cases, but no evidence was led by the appellant-insurer. At the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal by the impugned judgment awarded (a) sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the claimant respondent in MAC No. 12 of 2006; (b) a sum of Rs. 3,72,500/- to the claimant in MAC No. 13 of 2006, and (c) ? 12,12,500/- to the claimant in MAC No. 14 of 2006. In so far as the award of ? 10,000/- made in MAC No. 12 of 2006, which is the subject-matter of MAC Appeal No. 3(SH) of 2009, I am at a loss to understand the rationality in preferring the appeal at all when there is a finding to the effect that the claimant therein sustained injuries and when the amount awarded is nominal in nature. Appeal just for the sake of appeal cannot be entertained by this Court: the precious time of this Court cannot be wasted for trivial matters. The MAC Appeal No. 3(SH) of 2009 is accordingly dismissed at the very threshold with cost. 4. As for MAC No. 13 of 2006, which is the subject-matter of MAC Appeal No. 2(SH) of 2009, Ms. The MAC Appeal No. 3(SH) of 2009 is accordingly dismissed at the very threshold with cost. 4. As for MAC No. 13 of 2006, which is the subject-matter of MAC Appeal No. 2(SH) of 2009, Ms. A. Paul, the learned Counsel for the appellant-insurer, submits that the Tribunal grossly erred in law in holding that neither the claimant nor the owner of the truck could produce the driving license of the driver, who himself died in the accident: the burden of proof lying upon the claimant and/or the owner of the offending vehicle could not be discharged by them. In the absence of proof that the driver had a driving license at the time of the accident, there was breach of policy conditions engrafted in Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("the Act") thereby absolving the insurer from any liability to indemnify the insured. According to her, the question as to whether the driver had a driving license or not is a matter which can be proved only by the claimant or the owner of the truck by producing documentary evidence from the jurisdictional Transport Office and not by the insurer, who cannot be expected, or is not required, to prove the negative: such onerous burden cannot be thrust upon the insurer. She also questions the quantum of compensation awarded to the claimant-respondent and submits that a multiplier of 15 on the facts of this case is on the high side, which cannot be sustained in law. In support (sic to) her various contentions, she relies on the following decisions: (a) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kitbokson War AIR 2008 Gau 77 : 2008 (3) T.A.C. 89, (b) Santosh Kumar & Anr. v. Jagdish Prasad & Ors. AIR 2007 NOC 1865 : 2007 (3) T.A.C. 529 (M.P.); (c) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indrasnni Devi 2007 ACJ 1192 and (d) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Amar Chand AIR 2006 HP 49 : 2004 (3) T.A.C. 680. On the other hand, Mrs. P. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the claimant-respondent, supports the impugned judgment and award and submits that no infirmity of substantial nature could be pointed out by the learned Counsel for the insurer warranting the interference of this Court. To fortify her submissions, she cites the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicoletta Rohatgi and Ors. 2002 ACJ 1950 : 2003 (3) T.A.C. 293. Mrs. To fortify her submissions, she cites the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicoletta Rohatgi and Ors. 2002 ACJ 1950 : 2003 (3) T.A.C. 293. Mrs. VGK Kynta, the learned Counsel for the owner of the offending truck also supports the impugned judgment and award and submits that there was no breach of policy conditions inasmuch as there are sufficient evidence to hold that the driver had a valid driving license at the time of the accident: the finding to that effect by the Tribunal is correct and cannot be reasonably assailed. He heavily relies on (a) Lal Chand v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 2006 ACJ 2161 : 2006 (3) T.A.C. 321; (b) Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravan & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 654 : 1987 (1) T.A.C. 471; (b) Suresh Mohan Chopra v. Lakhi Prabhu Dayal & ors., 1990 Supp SCC 696 : 1990 (2) T.A.C. 632; (c) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 (1) T.A.C. 321; (d) Punam Devi and ors. v. Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 386 : 2004 (2) T.A.C. 313 and (e) Traders Syndicate v. Union of India AIR 1983 Cal 337 , to support his contentions. 5. The first point for determination in MAC Appeal No. 2(SH) of 2009 is, whether there was rash and negligent driving by the driver, which resulted in the vehicular accident? Ltd. Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 386 : 2004 (2) T.A.C. 313 and (e) Traders Syndicate v. Union of India AIR 1983 Cal 337 , to support his contentions. 5. The first point for determination in MAC Appeal No. 2(SH) of 2009 is, whether there was rash and negligent driving by the driver, which resulted in the vehicular accident? The findings recorded by the Tribunal on this issue are that the accident had occurred when the truck went off the road and fell into the deep gorge; that the claimant in MAC No. 12 of 2006 had deposed in his evidence that the driver was driving at a high speed and on reaching the place of occurrence, the driver could not control the truck and it fell into the deep gorge; that this piece of evidence was not contradicted by the owner of the truck in his cross-examination nor was any evidence adduced by him to prove to the contrary; that the driver of the truck also died as a result of the accident and his wife and legal heir had been awarded compensation by the Commissioner of Workmen under the Workmen's Compensation Act and that the best evidence in a vehicular accident is that of the eye-witness, whose testimony, in the absence of adequate rebuttal by the owner, could not be disbelieved. The Tribunal, therefore, concluded that the vehicular accident had been caused by the rash and negligent driving of the deceased driver. In my judgment, the findings of the Tribunal so recorded are based on evidence and cannot be held to be improbable or perverse and do not, therefore, call for interference of this Court. 6. On the question of whether the driver was holding a valid driving license at the time of accident, the Tribunal duly noted that neither the claimant nor the owner of the vehicle could produce the driving license and that the Investigating Officer of the case, who was examined as CW 2 had confirmed that he could not find the driving license of the driver at the place of accident. It, however, noted that the same claimant (Adding Kurbah), who was the helper/handyman of the truck, in his evidence deposed that he had seen the driving license of the deceased driver, but the license could not be traced out after the vehicular accident. It, however, noted that the same claimant (Adding Kurbah), who was the helper/handyman of the truck, in his evidence deposed that he had seen the driving license of the deceased driver, but the license could not be traced out after the vehicular accident. This was reiterated by him in his cross-examination by stating that the deceased driver was holding a valid driving license and he had seen it with his own eyes. The Tribunal also noticed that the appellant-insurer did not care to cross-examine this witness on this point. The Tribunal also referred to the deposition of the owner of the truck, who examined himself as OPW 1, in which he had testified that the driver was employed by him two-three years before the accident and that before deploying him, he had taken his driving license and checked the same and found the same to be in order and that the license had always been kept with the driver; that he could not remember the number of the driving license nor the place of issue, which could be either from Nongpoh or Nonstoin. The Tribunal also took note of the case of the insurer that the burden of proving that the deceased had a driving license at the time of accident is upon the claimant and/or the owner of the truck and neither of them is able to discharge this burden. However, the Tribunal was of the view that once the claimant-handyman as well as the owner of the truck categorically stated that they saw the driving license of the deceased driver before the accident, the ratio in Indrasani Devi Case (supra) cannot apply: that was a case where no such statement had been made by the witnesses. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the deceased driver was in possession of a valid driving license at the time of the accident. 7. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the deceased driver was in possession of a valid driving license at the time of the accident. 7. What are the yardsticks to be applied for assessing evidence in a case of this nature are pointed out by the Apex Court in Kokilaben Chandravan Case (supra) when it observed that the exclusion clause in the contract of insurance has to be 'read down' in order that it is not in conflict with the 'main purpose' of the provisions enacted for the protection of victims of accidents so that the insured owner of the vehicle is exculpated when he does everything in his power to keep the promise that the vehicle will be driven by a licensed driver. It also observed at paragraph 14 of the judgment, which reads thus: 14. Section 96(2)(b)(ii) extends immunity to the Insurance Company if a breach is committed of the condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not fully licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving license during the period of disqualification. The expression 'breach' is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of 'breach' is 'infringement or violation of a promise or obligation". It is therefore abundantly clear that the insurer will have to establish that the insured is guilty of an infringement or violation of a promise that a person who is duly licensed will have to be in charge of the vehicle. The very concept of infringement or violation of the promise that the expression 'breach' carries within itself induces an inference that the violation or infringement on the part of the promisor must be a wilful infringement or violation. If the insured is not at all at fault and has not done anything he should not have done or is not amiss in any respect how it can be conscientiously posited that he has committed a breach? It is only when the insured himself places the vehicle in charge of a person who does not hold a driving license, that it can be said that he is 'guilty' of the breach of the promise that the vehicle will be driven by a licensed driver. It is only when the insured himself places the vehicle in charge of a person who does not hold a driving license, that it can be said that he is 'guilty' of the breach of the promise that the vehicle will be driven by a licensed driver. It must be established by the Insurance Company that the breach was on the part of the insured and that it was the insured who was guilty of violating the promise or infringement of the contract. Unless the insured is at fault and is guilty of a breach the insurer cannot escape from the obligations to indemnify the insured and successfully contend that he is exonerated having regard to the fact that the promisor (the insured) committed a breach of his promise. Not when some mishap occurs by some mischance. When the insured has done everything within his power inasmuch as he has engaged a licensed driver and has placed the vehicle in charge of a licensed driver, with the express or implied mandate to drive himself it cannot be said that the insured is guilty of any breach. And it is only in case of a breach or violation of the promise on the part of the insured that the insurer can hide under the umbrella of the exclusion clause. In a way the question is as to whether the promise made by the insured is an absolute promise or whether he is exculpated on the basis of some legal doctrine.......................It needs to be emphasised that it is not the contract of insurance, which is being interpreted. It is the statutory provision defining the conditions of exemption which is being interpreted. These must be interpreted in the spirit in which the same have been enacted accompanied by an anxiety to ensure that the protection is not nullified by the backward looking interpretation which serves to defeat the provision rather than to fulfil its life-aim. To do otherwise would amount to nullifying the benevolent provision by reading it with non-benevolent eye and with a mind not tuned to the purpose and philosophy of the legislation without being informed of the true goals sought to be achieved. What the legislature has given, the Court cannot deprive of by way of an exercise in interpretation when the view which renders the provision potent is equally plausible as the one which renders the provision impotent. What the legislature has given, the Court cannot deprive of by way of an exercise in interpretation when the view which renders the provision potent is equally plausible as the one which renders the provision impotent. In fact it appears that the former view is more plausible apart from the fact that it is more desirable. When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependents on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view......... The findings recorded by the Tribunal are in consonance with the principles laid down in the paragraph extracted above, and the same need not be interfered with. The admitted position of the parties is that the deceased driver had been under the employment of the owner of the truck for over two years before the date of the accident. The owner of the truck, as a prudent owner, would not or could not have entrusted his vehicle at the hand of a driver who did not possess a valid driving license. In this context, the following summary of the findings of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 (1) T.A.C. 321 at paragraph 110(iii) and (vi) of the judgment are relevant: (iii) The terms of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving license of the driver, as contained in sub-Section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid license or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid license by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving license is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunal in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (Italicised for emphasis) 8. I need say no more on this issue. On the quantum of compensation, it is seen that the appellant-insurer did not file an application under Section 170 of the Act for allowing it to contest the claim petition on any ground and cannot, therefore, be allowed to question amount of the compensation so awarded. Moreover, the deceased was only 33 years old at the time of the accident and left behind him his wife, the claimant, with four minor children. The fact that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs. 3,000/- per month at the time of his death has been convincingly proved. Under the circumstances, the amount of Rs. 3,72,000/- awarded to his wife and his minor children cannot be said to be highly excessive or disproportionate. Therefore, MAC Appeal No. 2(SH) of 2009, which is bereft of merits, stands dismissed. This takes me now to MAC Appeal No. 1(SH) of 2009. My findings in MAC Appeal No. 2(SH) of 2009 in respect of the issues relating to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and the absence of driving license shall also govern these issues in MAC Appeal No. 1 of 2009. 9. Ms. This takes me now to MAC Appeal No. 1(SH) of 2009. My findings in MAC Appeal No. 2(SH) of 2009 in respect of the issues relating to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and the absence of driving license shall also govern these issues in MAC Appeal No. 1 of 2009. 9. Ms. A. Paul, the learned Counsel for the appellant-insurer, contends that the deceased was travelling in the truck as a gratuitous passenger and was not even a charcoal dealer or owner of the goods carried in the truck and was merely firewood seller and the insurer has, therefore, no liability to indemnify his legal heir, much less his sister. She further argues that the claimant-respondent is merely the sister of the deceased and is not even his dependent and is, therefore, not entitled to any compensation. In my judgment, the finding of the Tribunal on the issue that the deceased Watphrangbor Kyrsian was a gratuitous passenger, does not suffer from any infirmity. The statement of the claimant-respondent that her brother was inside the truck alongwith his goods has been corroborated by the owner of the truck. The Tribunal also found from the evidence of CW 3 that the deceased was a charcoal dealer. No rebuttal evidence was adduced by the insurer to demolish the case of the claimant-respondent. Nor was the evidence of the claimant-respondent or CW 3 shaken in any manner in their cross-examination. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal on this aspect of the matter cannot be faulted with. On the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the claimant-respondent to the order of Rs. 12,12,500/-, the contention of the learned Counsel for the insurer is that the same is absolutely unwarranted and grossly disproportionate and excessive: this is not just a compensation but a bonanza and unjust enrichment to the claimant. In any case, she vehemently submits that the claimant-respondent is not the dependent of the deceased and is not entitled to any compensation. She relies on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Golendra Muchahari 2003 (3) GLT 199(DB) and the decision of Kerala High Court in P.N. Unni v. Baby John AIR 2008 Ker 157 (DB) to fortify her submissions. Mrs. She relies on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Golendra Muchahari 2003 (3) GLT 199(DB) and the decision of Kerala High Court in P.N. Unni v. Baby John AIR 2008 Ker 157 (DB) to fortify her submissions. Mrs. P. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the claimant, however, refutes the contention of the learned Counsel for the insurer and submits that her case is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 2007 (55) AIC 268 : 2007 (2) T.A.C. 431. 10. The term "legal representatives of the deceased" appearing at Section 166(1)(c) and (d) of the Act has not been defined anywhere in the Act. It is these legal representatives who can file a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act. The decision of the Apex Court in Manjuri case (supra), a case cited by the learned Counsel for the claimant, was rendered in the context of Section 140 of the Act and not in the context of Section 166 of the Act. This is amply made clear by the concurring judgment of Justice S.H. Kapadia, who, at the end of the judgment, observed that "My opinion is confined only to the "No fault liability" under Section 140 of the said Act. That section is a Code by itself within the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988." However, the issue directly came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbai A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1690 : 1987 (2) T.A.C. 1 which related to the case of a claim petition filed by brothers of a minor child who died in a motor vehicle accident, on the basis that they were the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. The Apex Court observed therein that in Indian families, brothers, sisters and brother's children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread winner of the family and if the bread winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny compensation to them. The Apex Court held that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act, if he is a legal representative of the deceased. The Apex Court held that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act, if he is a legal representative of the deceased. This decision was relied on by the Division Bench of this Court in Golenchadra Muchahari case (supra) and the Kerala High Court in P.N. Unni case (supra). With due respect, the correct legal position is succinctly explained by the Kerala High Court in P.N. Unni case (supra), which reads thus: 8. A reading of Section 166 of the M.V. Act read with the decisions cited supra, we are of the view that the legal position is that claim in the case of fatal accident under Section 166 of the M.V. Act can be made by the legal representatives of the deceased and right is not confined for the benefit of the spouse, parent or child of the deceased who alone can claim compensation under Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act. The scope of Section 166 of the M.V. Act is wider and more comprehensive. Under this provision, the legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband parent and child and claim can be made by or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. In the case of Fatal Accidents Act, such claim can be made only for the benefit of spouse, parents and child of the deceased. A brother of the deceased may be a legal representative of the deceased in the absence of preferential heirs under the personal law governing the parties and if so, he can claim compensation. But, he cannot do so if he is not a legal representative of the deceased entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased........... 11. What can be understood from the principles enunciated above is that there is no rule of thumb that right to compensation is confined only for the benefit of the spouse, parent or child of the deceased and even a brother of the deceased may be a legal representative of the deceased in the absence of preferential heirs and if so, he can claim compensation. The expression "legal representative" has not been defined in the Act. Definition of the expression "legal representative" has been incorporated in Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The expression "legal representative" has not been defined in the Act. Definition of the expression "legal representative" has been incorporated in Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to this definition, "legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes a person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is issued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves or the party so suing or sued. This definition does not in terms apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure and, as such, this definition must govern cases before the Claims Tribunal. The question to be determined then is, whether the claimant-respondent, who is admittedly the sister of the deceased, can be said to be the legal representative of the deceased? The case of the claimant-respondent is that the deceased and she belong to Khasi Tribal community and that she is, ipso facto, entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. Their is no denial of this assertion by the appellant. Therefore, I hold that the claimant-respondent is the legal representative of the deceased and is, therefore, has the right to claim compensation. But, then, the right to claim compensation is one thing and the quantum of compensation payable is an entirely another matter. The payment of compensation and the quantum of compensation payable is always determined by the dependency of the claimant upon the deceased. If there is no dependency, unlike Section 140 of the Act, the question of payment of compensation under Section 166 will not arise. 12. In the instant case, the deceased, is admittedly survived by the claimant-respondent and his father, namely, Shri Drek Kurbah, who was about 45 years old on the date of filing the claim petition. The claim petition is filed by the claimant-respondent on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased as evident from the claim petition itself. No case is set up by the insurer that the claimant and the father of the deceased are not the dependents of the deceased. Under the circumstances, their is no reason to deny compensation to the claimant-respondent and her father. No case is set up by the insurer that the claimant and the father of the deceased are not the dependents of the deceased. Under the circumstances, their is no reason to deny compensation to the claimant-respondent and her father. As for the quantum of compensation, the evidence of the claimant-respondent, who examined herself as CW 1, that the income of the deceased was Rs. 20,000/- per month was not denied by the insurer in her cross-examination. The evidence of CW 1 is corroborated by CW 3. The Tribunal was not, however, convinced, in the absence of concrete evidence, that the income of the deceased was Rs. 20,000/- per month and was inclined to believe that he must have been earning only Rs. 10,000/- per month or Rs. 1,20,000/ - per annum and after one-third deduction, he could contribute only Rs. 80,000/-. The Tribunal, keeping in view the age of the deceased i.e., 25 years and of the claimant-respondent i.e. 26 years, applied the multiplier of 15 and determined the compensation at Rs. 12,00,000/- plus funeral expenses of Rs. 2,500/- and Rs. 10,000/- for loss of love and affection. It must be noted that the insurer, in the absence of leave to contest under Section 170 of the Act, is not permitted to question the quantum of compensation. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that no infirmity of grave nature can be pointed out by the appellant-insurer in the impugned judgment and award calling for the interference of this Court. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. The appellant-insurer shall now deposit the entire compensation amounts together with the interests awarded by the Tribunal minus the amounts already deposited/disbursed, if any, for the three claim petitions with the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shillong for payment to each of the claimant-respondents within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment. On receipt of the compensation amounts, they shall be released forthwith to each of the claimant-respondents on completing the usual formalities without further reference from this Court. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. Transmit the L.C. records without any loss of time.