JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—The dispute in this case relates to a sale-deed executed by one Kesho son of Sheo Gulam in favour of the petitioner Budhdan(since deceased) now represented through his legal heirs in the present writ petition. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are real brothers of the petitioner Budhdan who contend that the said holding was purchased out of joint family nucleus funds and hence the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were also entitled to their respective shares in the said holding. 2. Accordingly an objection under Section 9 of the U.P.C.H. Act, was filed by the said respondents contending that the name of the petitioner, which was entered as the sole Bhumidar of the disputed Khata No. 64, should be corrected by recording the names of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also alongwith the petitioner. 3. The petitioner filed a counter objection that he was living separately from the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 since the past one decade of the date of transaction, and if the names of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been wrongly recorded over some other plots the same would not militate against the partitioned status of the family. The property in dispute was claimed by the petitioner as a self-acquired property. The petitioner also contended that the sale consideration was of Rs. 1500/- and it was paid entirely by the petitioner out of his own personal earnings and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have no share in the property in dispute. 4. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 15.10.1973 allowed the petitioner’s claim and rejected the objections of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.Aggrieved the said respondents preferred an appeal which was also dismissed on 21.12.1973. They went up in revision against the said order and the Deputy Director of Consolidation reversed the orders of the authorities below on 15.2.1975 hence this writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that from a perusal of the copy of the sale-deed, which is Annexure 4, leaves no room for doubt that the property had been sold exclusively in favour of the petitioner and the same does not even remotely indicate a joint acquisition by the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is further contended that the sale-deed was executed on 29.3.1968 and the name of the petitioner was mutated. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is further contended that the sale-deed was executed on 29.3.1968 and the name of the petitioner was mutated. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had neither raised any plea nor did they challenge the recital and status of the deed. Not only this there was a clear presumption in favour of the petitioner as he had clearly led evidence that the family was living separately. The Deputy Director of Consolidation while reversing the judgment of the authorities below adopted the principles of Personal Hindu Law, and invoked the same for the purpose of construing that the land had been acquired jointly and is not the sole holding of the petitioner. One of the witnesses of the sale-deed had also been believed who made a statement that the corpus for the purchase of the property had been contributed jointly by the petitioner and the contesting the respondents as well as their father Ram Bahal. 6. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has further held that no documentary evidence has been filed by the petitioner to indicate that he was living separately and therefore according to Hindu Law the property having been acquired jointly the same deserves to be recorded in the name of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It has also been concluded that since they are real brothers, and another sale-deed had been executed two to 3 years earlier which was a joint acquisition, the same is an indicator that the property in dispute had been also acquired jointly. The Deputy Director of Consolidation further held that the names of all the members of the family have been shown in the Electoral Roll under one head, and further that the petitioner has not shown any clear evidence that he had any individual source of income. In effect the Deputy Director of Consolidation went on to hold that the acquisition under the sale-deed was jointly made by the family and hence the claim of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 deserves to be accepted. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that if the respondent Nos. In effect the Deputy Director of Consolidation went on to hold that the acquisition under the sale-deed was jointly made by the family and hence the claim of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 deserves to be accepted. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that if the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were trying to avoid the factum of recital contained in the sale-deed, then the document being voidable at their instance, they ought to have filed a declaratory suit and the consolidation authorities could not have sat over such a decision inasmuch as the documents could have been avoided only if it was void. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits on the own showing of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, they were challenging the factum of the acquisition of the property exclusively by the petitioner and therefore the consolidation Courts had no jurisdiction to enter into the said controversy. The Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation had therefore rightly rejected the objections of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and there was no occasion for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have upset the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision in the case of Gorakh Nath v. Hari Nath Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 to support his submission. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that when the property was purchased there was no severance of the joint status of the family. It is further contended that the petitioner surreptitiously got the sale-deed executed entirely in his name and therefore the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly after considering the evidence on record proceeded to set aside the orders of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties the document in dispute namely the sale-deed, clearly recites that it was being executed after negotiating with Budhdan son of Ram Bahal for a sum of Rs. 1500/- . The sale-deed no where recites any such indication that the property was purchased jointly for the benefit for all the sons of Ram Bahal or that the consideration had passed on with the contribution of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 11. The sale-deed has been executed of a bhumidhari land after receipt of the sale consideration. 1500/- . The sale-deed no where recites any such indication that the property was purchased jointly for the benefit for all the sons of Ram Bahal or that the consideration had passed on with the contribution of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 11. The sale-deed has been executed of a bhumidhari land after receipt of the sale consideration. The transaction of rights of land holdings in the State of U.P. is governed by the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The factum of purchase is not disputed . It was not an acquisition of any ancestral or coparcenary property. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in order to construe the nature of the transaction, resulting in the execution of the document, has in the opinion of the Court on an incorrect appreciation proceeded to avoid the sale-deed. In the instant case the objection of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is that the sale-deed is not void. Their objection is that the name of the petitioner which has been mentioned alone in the sale-deed was a surreptitious transaction and that even otherwise there being no partition between the brothers the acquisition should be presumed to be joint. 12. The decision in the case of Gorakh Nath (supra) has been further explained by a Full Bench decision in the case of Parag v. D.D.C., 1985 RD 1 . Where a document is sought to be avoided on the ground that it contains incorrect recital or that it has been obtained by practising deceit the same has to be challenged before the appropriate forum as it becomes voidable. The distinction between a void transaction and a voidable one is succinctly explained in the case of Dharundhar Prasad v. Jai Prakash, 2001(6) SCC 534 . Para 22 of the said decision is gainfully reproduced hereunder : “22. Thus the expressions “void and voidable”have been the subject matter of consideration on innumerable occasions by Court. The expression ‘void’ has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions , decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The other type of void act, e.g., may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. The other type of void act, e.g., may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is a good transaction against the whole world. So far as the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void Act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made. Voidable Act is that which is a good Act unless avoided, e.g., if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs and is party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given, a transaction which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day prior to it. In cases where legal effect of a document cannot be, taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would be obviously voidable.” 13. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has relied on the alleged statement of one of the witnesses to the sale-deed and also the absence of any documentary evidence establishing partition between the brothers. In the opinion of the Court this was a negative approach inasmuch as the allegation set up in the counter objection of the petitioner was to the effect that he was living separately for the past 10 years. In such a situation by invoking the principles of personal law the Deputy Director of Consolidation has committed a manifest error by upturning the judgments of the authorities below which were based on findings of fact and on the admitted position in law. 14. From a perusal of the document namely the sale-deed there is nothing to indicate that all the brothers or the father of the petitioner had jointly approached the vendor to negotiate the sale. The transaction being a contract the respondents had to further prove that they had jointly approached the vendor and negotiated the same. 14. From a perusal of the document namely the sale-deed there is nothing to indicate that all the brothers or the father of the petitioner had jointly approached the vendor to negotiate the sale. The transaction being a contract the respondents had to further prove that they had jointly approached the vendor and negotiated the same. The offer and acceptance has to be established between the parties before the contract becomes complete. This evidence was not led by the contesting respondents. The mere allegation of simply contributing financially towards the sale consideration would not establish an agreement between the vendor and the contesting respondents. Thus in my opinion there being no contract established, the mere passing on of some money to the petitioner for purchasing the property by the respondents would at the best entitle the respondents for their claim of money but the same cannot be an evidence of the contract of purchase or sale of the land in dispute in their favour. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has overlooked this elementary principle of contract before concluding that the witnesses on behalf of the respondents had alleged that the contribution was made by the respondents as well. 15. The Deputy Director of Consolidation was swayed away by the entries in the electoral roll. This is a settled proposition of law that entries in an electoral roll are proof only for the purpose of the persons mentioned therein to have an entitlement to exercise the right of franchise. It is no proof, unless corroborated by any further evidence, to indicate conclusively about the joint status of the family. The same is equally true for other documents. 16. So far as the contribution of the petitioner is concerned, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has recorded a finding that he has not been able to establish any separate source of income. The petitioner has through out relied on the recital contained in the sale-deed. The execution of the sale-deed is not disputed. What is disputed is that the petitioner got it executed in his sole name which according to the respondents was a surreptitious act. The burden therefore lay on the respondents to disbelieve the said recital in the sale-deed which they had failed to disprove and therefore the Deputy Director of Consolidation by erroneously shifting the onus on the petitioner has arrived at a wrong conclusion. The burden therefore lay on the respondents to disbelieve the said recital in the sale-deed which they had failed to disprove and therefore the Deputy Director of Consolidation by erroneously shifting the onus on the petitioner has arrived at a wrong conclusion. The sale-deed itself was sufficient proof of the individual contribution of the petitioner. 17. Accordingly the impugned order proceeds on a construction which was impermissible and on a perverse reasoning adopted by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Hence the same deserves to be set aside. This Court had admitted the writ petition on 10.7.1975 and had also granted an interim order protecting the possession of the petitioner. 18. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 15.2.1975 is quashed and the orders of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation are upheld. 19. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. —————