JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Vinod Dwivedi, who has put in appearance on behalf of the substituted heirs of the sole petitioner, Sri D.P. Srivastava holding brief of Sri Swapnil Srivastava for the contesting respondent and learned Standing Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2. Affidavits have been exchanged between the parties and the matter has been posted in the category of old cases for final disposal. Accordingly, the matter is being disposed of finally under the Rules of the Court. 3. The dispute relates to Sirdari plots in the Khata in question namely Khata Nos. 99 and 144 situated in Village Nonha, Tappa Rudhauni, Pargana and Tehsil Bansi, District-Basti (now Siddarth Nagar). On the commencement of the consolidation proceedings, an objection was filed under Section 9-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by the petitioner claiming that she was entitled to 1/3rd share of the holding being daughter of Sampat, who admittedly had 1/3rd share in the Khata in question. 4. The respondents contested the claim of the petitioner on the ground of possession under an agreement-to-sale dated 17.5.1967. The said agreement stipulated that in the event the land is declared to be a Bhumidhari then upon issuance of the sanad, the land would be transferred as the petitioner had allegedly sold the same in favour of respondents for a sum of Rs. 1250/- out of which Rs. 1150/- had already been paid to her. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objection of the petitioner even though it was held that she was the daughter of Late Sampat. 5. The petitioner aggrieved, filed an appeal and the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 23.12.1970 held that the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act do not make any provision for co-option of Sirdari or surrender of rights by a co-tenant in relation to Sirdari land in the manner in which the contesting respondents have set up their claim. The order of the appellate authority being in English is being gainfully reproduced hereunder : “I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. My findings are as under : The Khata in dispute consists of sirdari plots. The contract of sale for sirdari plots is not admissible under the law. The learned counsel for the respondents has drawn my attention towards the contents of the contract of sale. My findings are as under : The Khata in dispute consists of sirdari plots. The contract of sale for sirdari plots is not admissible under the law. The learned counsel for the respondents has drawn my attention towards the contents of the contract of sale. He pressed that the contract of sale should be taken as surrender of Smt. Sudhra’s right in favour of Chhedi and others. The mode of surrender has been specified in under Section 183 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The Section provides surrender only in favour of G.S. after the notice to the Tehsildar. The present contract of sale cannot be taken to be the surrender of Smt. Sudhara. The contract of sale reveals that after the mutation of name of the appellants she would execute sale-deed of her share in favour of the respondents. The contract of sale further reveals that the appellant would acquire Bhumidhari right after depositing 10 times and thereafter she would execute a sale-deed of her share in favour of the respondent. Neither the name of appellant has been mutated nor 10 times has been deposited. The question of execution of sale-deed does not arise. My attention was drawn to the order of the Tahsildar dated 6.6.1962 passed in mutation proceedings. The Tahsildar dismissed the objection of Smt. Sudhara. She withdrew her objection. The S.K. has passed orders in favour of the respondents. He has ignored the title and possession of Smt. Sudhara. The orders of the S.K. as well as of the Tahsildar do not bear the appellant to bring a regular suit. The contract of sale is dated 17.5.1967. The Pradhan of the appellant over the plots in dispute after 1967 affords no right to them. The surrender of a sirdari in favour of a co-sirdar has not been permitted under the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. act. The contract of sale affords no right to the respondents. The learned C.O. has based his findings on the basis of this contract of sale which is not permitted under law.” 6. The surrender of a sirdari in favour of a co-sirdar has not been permitted under the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. act. The contract of sale affords no right to the respondents. The learned C.O. has based his findings on the basis of this contract of sale which is not permitted under law.” 6. The respondents aggrieved by the said order, preferred a revision which has been allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation who has mainly stressed on the point, that since there is no specific provision prohibiting such an agreement of sale or transfer as set up by the respondents, therefore, such a transaction would be permissible and the respondents had acquired their sirdari rights and, therefore, they are co-tenants. Accordingly, the order of the appellate authority was reversed by relying on certain decisions. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Dwivedi, submits that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is in teeth of the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act particularly Section 153, which bars any transfer of Sirdari rights. He contends that the transfer being impermissible, then any mode alleged to have been adopted as set up by the respondents shall be deemed to be prohibited and, therefore, the finding of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is perverse. He, therefore, contends that the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 8. Replying to the aforesaid submissions, Sri Srivastava contends that such a surrender is permissible and he has relied on the decision in the case of Mst. Jagdeiya v. Assistant Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1987 RD Page 7. He submits that a surrender of the nature as transacted between the parties in the instant case is permissible in law and accordingly the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly concluded that the transaction is valid and that the contesting respondents have acquired rights under the relevant provisions of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the case of the respondents is not that they have acquired co-tenancy rights by way of adverse possession. On the contrary, they claim to have entered as co-tenants permitted under the alleged agreement to sale dated 17.5.1967. The said claim is, therefore, of an alleged cooption by Sughara, who was admittedly a co-tenant with the contesting respondents in the same Khata. The tenure is admittedly Sirdari and not Bhumidhari. On the contrary, they claim to have entered as co-tenants permitted under the alleged agreement to sale dated 17.5.1967. The said claim is, therefore, of an alleged cooption by Sughara, who was admittedly a co-tenant with the contesting respondents in the same Khata. The tenure is admittedly Sirdari and not Bhumidhari. The contention, therefore, raised by the respondents that such a surrender was permissible in view of the law laid down in the case of Mst. Jagdeiya (supra) cannot be accepted as the said decision related to Bhumidhari tenure and is, therefore, not applicable to the present controversy. 10. In the opinion of the Court, the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed a manifest error by ignoring Section 153 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act which clearly prohibits any mode of transfer in relation to Sirdari plots. It is settled that what cannot be permitted directly cannot be permitted indirectly. The law clearly prohibits any transfer of Sirdari land. Even otherwise a co-option is not permissible as held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Budhlal and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1982 AWC 447. 11. One of the other issues that has been dealt with by the authorities is the applicability of Section 183 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The said provision is in relation to the right of a Sirdar to surrender his holding which can be done only in favour of the Gaon Sabha. The said provision, therefore, is no platform for negotiating a transaction or transfer by a Sirdar through a surrender in favour of another Sirdar. The Counter-Affidavit that has been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3, sets out a plea that the petitioner had already relinquished her claim in favour of respondents after the death of Smt. Sivraji without objection. It is during the mutation proceedings that the registered agreement dated 17.5.1967 was entered into and which indicated the manner in which respondents claim possession over the land in dispute. This relinquishment by the petitioner and the deed is being counted upon as the sheet-anchor of the argument on the foundation that there is nothing in the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act which militates against the rights of the respondents or is otherwise inconsistent with any other provisions of law. This relinquishment by the petitioner and the deed is being counted upon as the sheet-anchor of the argument on the foundation that there is nothing in the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act which militates against the rights of the respondents or is otherwise inconsistent with any other provisions of law. This relinquishment is being urged to Act as an estoppel against the petitioner and accordingly the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is being defended. In the opinion of the Court, there cannot be an estoppel against statute. As pointed out herein above, a Sirdar has no right to co-opt any body as Sirdar through any indirect method and no transfer is permissible. The respondents never set out a case of adverse possession. Accordingly, this argument also cannot be sustained and the writ petition has to be allowed. 12. In sum and substance the conclusions drawn by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are clearly against law and there was no occasion to upset the order of the appellate authority. 13. Accordingly, in the opinion of the Court, the impugned order is unsustainable. The respondents have been unable to establish any lawful acquisition of rights and, as such, the impugned order dated 6.3.1974 is quashed and the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 23.12.1970 is upheld. The writ petition is allowed. —————