JUDGMENT: R. M. CHHAYA, J. By way of these appeals, the appellant has challenged the judgment and award passed by Principal Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana in Land Reference Case Nos. 3751 to 3754 of 2003 dated 11-10-2005 under Sec. 35(3) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the sake of brevity). 2. The short facts arising out of these appeals can be summarised as under : 3. That the appellant-acquiring body temporarily acquired the land belonging to respondent No.1-original claimants in each appeal situated at village Telavi, Taluka Detroj, District Mehsana for the purpose of drilling. It further reveals from the record that the lands belonging to the respondents-original claimants were acquired as aforesaid and the possession of the lands in question was taken over by the appellant-acquiring body on 7-4-1984 and by an award dated 4-5-1984, the Land Acquisition Officer fixed yearly rental compensation at 48 ps. per sq.mtr. It is an admitted position that being dissatisfied by the said award dated 4-5-1984, the respondent No.1-original claimants preferred application as contemplated under Sec.35(3) of the Act for enhancement of the rental compensation before the Land Acquisition Officer on 9-7-2001. The Land Acquisition Officer on receipt of the said application, referred the same for its adjudication to the Reference Court at Mehsana and the same came to be registered as Land Reference Case Nos. 3751 to 3754 of 2003. 4. Before the Land Reference Court, the respondents-original claimants adduced oral evidence in form of oral deposition of the original claimants of Land Reference Case No. 3754 of 2003, Shri Vajuji Kuvarji Chauhan, who came to be examined at Exh.13. The claimants also relied upon the previous award passed in another Land Reference Case No.3886 of 2003 Exh.8/1 as well as award passed in Land Reference Case No.3765 of 2003 by the very Reference Court Exh.8/2 and also the judgment of this Court rendered in First Appeal No. 3658 of 2001 dated 6-11-2001 and the order passed by the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4599 of 2002. The Land Acquisition Officer was also examined at Exh.16. The Land Acquisition Officer was also examined at Exh.16. Respondent No.2-Land Acquisition Officer as well as the appellant-acquiring body raised various contentions before the Reference Court and more particularly pointed out the fact that References in question are barred by limitation as the same are filed after a period of almost 17 years after passing of the award under Sec. 35. The Reference Court by the impugned common judgment and award allowed the said References and came to the conclusion that the possession of the appellant-acquiring body is illegal and enhanced yearly rental compensation not only in relation to the award dated 7-4-1984 but till 2004 and fixed rental compensation @ Rs.15/-per sq.mtr. from 1-1-2005 and also awarded interest @ 12% from the date on which it becomes due till 31-12-1999 and thereafter @ 9 % till the amount is realized. The Reference Court further inter alia held in the judgment and award impugned that there shall be increased of yearly rental compensation @ 15 % at every interval of three years commencing from 1-1-2005. The Reference Court came to the conclusion that the References are not barred by limitation. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and award the present appeals are preferred by the acquiring body. 5. We have heard Mr. Kunal Nayak, learned Counsel for M/s. Trivedi & Gupta for the appellant and Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.2 in all the appeals. Even though the original claimants have been served no one appears for the original claimants. We have also perused original Record & Proceedings of the Reference Court. 6. Mr. Nayak, learned Counsel for the appellant at the outset has submitted that the Reference Court has committed an error in law as well as in fact in not appreciating the evidence produced by the appellant to the effect that, by the Reference Application, the original claimants had raised dispute of compensation pertaining to the award dated 4-5-1984 on 9-7-2001 i.e. after a period of about 17 years. Mr. Nayak further submitted that even though Sec.35(3) of the Act does not provide for any period of limitation, the References in question were hopelessly barred by limitation as the provisions of Limitation Act would apply. Mr. Mr. Nayak further submitted that even though Sec.35(3) of the Act does not provide for any period of limitation, the References in question were hopelessly barred by limitation as the provisions of Limitation Act would apply. Mr. Nayak further submitted that the Reference Court has exercised the jurisdiction which was not vested in it under Sec.35 of the Act, and therefore, the impugned judgment and award is bad and illegal both on law and fact. Mr. Nayak further submitted that the finding arrived at by the Reference Court is even beyond the issues which were framed by it in the said References. Mr. Nayak further submitted that the Reference Court has no jurisdiction to decide and hold that the possession of the land under temporary acquisition was illegal and the finding arrived at by the Reference Court that the appellants are trespassers is beyond the scope and ambit of Sec. 35. Mr. Nayak relying upon the ratio laid down by this Court in case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Sankarji Hemaji, reported in 2008(2) GLR 1226 pointed out that this Court in a similarly situated case of the very appellant arising from the very Reference Court has allowed the appeals with cost. Mr. Nayak submitted that the Reference Court could not have entertained the Reference and in fact, the Land Acquisition Officer or in any case the Reference Court should not have referred the application filed by the original claimants after a lapse of more than 17 years under Sec. 35(3) of the Act. Mr. Nayak submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed. 7. Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned A.G.P. for State has not been able to point out that the References were properly made and that the findings arrived at by the Reference Court are legal and proper and not beyond the jurisdiction as contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 8. Upon perusing the applications for Reference filed by the original claimants in each appeal under Sec. 35(3) of the Act, we find that all the applications are dated 9-7-2001. We also find that by the said application filed under Sec. 35(3) of the Act, the Original claimants have stated that the award passed on.4-5-1984 is not acceptable to them. 8. Upon perusing the applications for Reference filed by the original claimants in each appeal under Sec. 35(3) of the Act, we find that all the applications are dated 9-7-2001. We also find that by the said application filed under Sec. 35(3) of the Act, the Original claimants have stated that the award passed on.4-5-1984 is not acceptable to them. We have further noticed that all the applications are printed applications wherein it is mentioned that the lands of the claimants have been acquired by the appellants temporarily for the purpose of drilling and possession of the lands is taken over on 7-4-1994. We further noticed that in the said printed applications in the title of the same it is mentioned "Special Land Acquisition Officer, O.N.G.C., Unit 2 at Mehsana/ Ahmedabad" and we also find that word 'Ahmedabad' has been scored off. However, in paragraph No.1 of the said application, the original claimants have mentioned that agricultural lands belonging to and in possession of the claimants situated at village Telavi, Taluka Viramgam, District Ahmedabad along with survey number and area, have been acquired temporarily for the public purpose of O.N.G.C. drilling and possession of the same has been taken over on 7-4-1984. At the outset, therefore, we find that even if the Reference Applications were filed within reasonable time, the Reference Court at Mehsana had no jurisdiction to entertain the said References. We find that in the written arguments filed by the appellants at Exh.17 it was clearly pointed out that the lands are situated at village Telavi, Taluka Detroj, which is part of Ahmedabad district. This vital fact has been totally ignored by the Reference Court. We, therefore, hold that the Reference Court at Mehsana had no jurisdiction to entertain the said References. We are at pains to notice that the Land Acquisition Officer, who is fully aware about the geographical location of the lands acquired has in a mechanical manner referred the applications filed by the original claimants before the Reference Court at Mehsana. On perusal of the Reference so made at Exh.4, we find that the Land Acquisition Officer himself has recorded that the lands under Reference are of village Telavi, Taluka Viramgam, (as it existing then) District Ahmedabad. Only because the Special Land Acquisition Officer of the appellant was at Mehsana, the Reference Court at Mehsana had no jurisdiction to entertain such References. 9. Only because the Special Land Acquisition Officer of the appellant was at Mehsana, the Reference Court at Mehsana had no jurisdiction to entertain such References. 9. Section 35 of the Land Acquisition Act reads as under : "35. Temporary occupation of waste or arable land, procedure when difference as to compensation exists :- (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, whenever it appears to the (appropriate Government) that the temporary occupation and use of any waste or arable land are needed for any public purpose, or for a company, the appropriate Government may direct the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the same for such terms as it shall think fit, not exceeding three years from commencement of such occupation. (2) The Collector shall thereupon give notice in writing to the persons interested in such land of the purpose for which the same is needed, and shall, for the occupation and use thereof, for such term as aforesaid, and for the materials (if any) to be taken therefrom, pay to them such compensation, either in a gross sum of money, or by monthly or other periodical payments, as shall be agreed upon in writing between him and such persons respectively. (3) In case the Collector and the persons interested differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or apportionment thereof, the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court." 10. It would be evident from the provision that it is a substantial provision under the Act for temporary acquisition of land. Under Sec. 35, the persons interested who are dissatisfied with the award passed under Sec. 35(2) can file a reference in regard to insufficiency of compensation or apportionment thereof except that Reference Court has no other jurisdiction or authority to decide. We find considerable force in the arguments advanced by Mr. Nayak that the judgment and award impugned in the present group of appeals is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (supra). We find considerable force in the arguments advanced by Mr. Nayak that the judgment and award impugned in the present group of appeals is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (supra). Incidentally, we may record that in similar fact situation wherein References were preferred after a period of 21 years from the date of award and relying upon the same set of evidence as substantial in the case of present appellant including oral deposition on behalf of one of the claimants, this Court was pleased to allow the appeal with costs and observed as under (at page No. 1237 of GLR) : "23. At the outset, it is required to be noted that acquisition of the land in question was temporary acquisition for O.N.G.C. under Sec. 35 of the Act. The award came to be declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer as back as on 11-8-1980 determining the compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. The reference applications under Sec. 35(3) of the Act were submitted by the claimants on 16-7-2001 i.e. after a period of 21 years with regard to adequacy of the rent determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 11-8-1980. On behalf of all the claimants, claimant of L.A.R. No. 3780 of 2003 Thakor Shivaji Hemaji came to be examined at Exh.11 for and on behalf of all the claimants. Nothing is on record to show that there was any difference/dispute raised by the original land owners at the time of acquisition in the year 1980 and at the time when the Special Land Acquisition Officer declared the award on 11-8-1980 determining the compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum. On the contrary in the cross-examination the said witness-claimant of L.A.R. No. 3780 of 2003 has admitted that he is not aware with regard to acquisition of the land in question. He has stated that the possession was handed over by his father and he was not present. Translation of the cross-examination of the said witness reads as under : "Cross-examination by Shri D. R. Trivedi for the State :- I do not know about the land acquisition of my survey number. I do not know as to the possession of much my land is handed over. My father had handed over the possession of the land. Translation of the cross-examination of the said witness reads as under : "Cross-examination by Shri D. R. Trivedi for the State :- I do not know about the land acquisition of my survey number. I do not know as to the possession of much my land is handed over. My father had handed over the possession of the land. The possession of the land was handed over about 25 years ago. I do not know as to how much rent was fixed at that time. My father had taken the rent which was fixed. My father had expired before 14 years. My father did not make any application for increasing the rent during his life-time. An application was made 11 years after the demise of my father. I do not know as to why did my father make an application. "Cross-examination by Shri I. K. Shah for the respondent No.2 : It is true that the rent was fixed on the basis of rate prevailing at the relevant time. At present the O.N.G.C. pay me Rs.20,000/- (in words Rupees Twenty Thousand) per annum for my land. At present I do not have any land for cultivation. It is true that my father was knowing as to how much produce was available from this land prior to the land acquisition. I did not carry any cultivation after the death of my father because my entire land is acquired by the O. N.G.C. I am doing agriculture labour work. I have never gone to sell the agriculture produce. It is true that we buy grain for consumption and so we know the price otherwise we do not know the price of other items. I cannot assume the rent. I have no specific demand. I do not know as to what is written in my application and I do not know as to how much demand is there. An Advocate approached me for making this application. I have not given any details to the Advocate for making an application. I do not know as to what is written in my examination-in-chief by my Advocate. I do not know as to what is stated in my affidavit before the Court. At present the O.N.G.C. is paying me the rent which is sufficient. No re-examination. " 24. No other witness has been examined on behalf of the claimants. I do not know as to what is written in my examination-in-chief by my Advocate. I do not know as to what is stated in my affidavit before the Court. At present the O.N.G.C. is paying me the rent which is sufficient. No re-examination. " 24. No other witness has been examined on behalf of the claimants. In the cross-examination, it is admitted by the aforesaid witness that the rent was fixed considering the price prevailing at the relevant time. There is no other evidence on record to suggest that at the relevant time when the rent was determined and the award was declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in the year 1980, there was any dispute with regard to sufficiency of the compensation/rent. Under Sec.35(3) of the Act, only 'in case the Collector and the persons interested differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or apportionment thereof, the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court. Under the circumstances, when there was no dispute raised on behalf of the claimants as to the sufficiency of the compensation at the time when the award was published by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in the year 1980 determining the compensation paid at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum, the Collector was not required to refer the dispute to the Court. Under the circumstances, the reference applications submitted by the claimants in the year 2001 with respect of sufficiency of the compensation/rent itself are not maintainable. At the relevant time, the claimants were satisfied with regard to adequacy of the compensation and nothing is on record that there was any dispute raised as to the sufficiency of the compensation/rent. It is also required to be noted at this stage that the original land owners have accepted the compensation/ rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum as per the award dated 11-8-1980 without raising any objection. Nothing is on record that the claimants have, at any point of time, objected to the compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum. per annum as per the award dated 11-8-1980 without raising any objection. Nothing is on record that the claimants have, at any point of time, objected to the compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum. Under the circumstances, the findings and observations of the Reference Court that it was the duty of the Collector to refer the dispute to the Reference Court and as the Collector has failed to perform his duty, the entire acquisition proceedings and the award are null and void, require to be quashed and set aside, as the same is contrary to the evidence on record and sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 of the Act. Even by raising subsequent dispute, reference applications under Sec. 35(3) of the Act are not maintainable. On fair reading of entire Sec. 35 of the Act, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 35 of the Act authorises the appropriate Government to direct the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the same for such terms as it shall think fit, not exceeding three years from the commencement of such occupation. As per sub-sec.(2) of Sec.35, the Collector is required to give notice in writing to the persons interested in such land of the purpose for which the same is needed, and shall, for the occupation and use thereof, for such term as aforesaid, and for the material, (if any), to be taken therefrom, pay to them such compensation, either in a gross sum of money, or by monthly or other periodical payments, as shall be agreed upon in writing between him and such persons respectively. Subsection (2) of Sec.35 will be attracted when there is an agreement with respect to the compensation between the Collector and the land owner and/ or a person interested in the land. If the Collector and the persons interested do not agree and there is difference as to the sufficiency of the compensation in that case the Collector is required to refer such difference to the decision of the Court. Therefore, even when the Collector is required to refer the dispute to the Reference Court under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 of the Act, the same will be only in respect to such difference as to the sufficiency of the compensation between the Collector and the persons interested. Therefore, even when the Collector is required to refer the dispute to the Reference Court under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 of the Act, the same will be only in respect to such difference as to the sufficiency of the compensation between the Collector and the persons interested. Only such difference as to the sufficiency of the compensation, the Collector is required to refer the dispute to the decision of the Court. Even considering sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35, there is nothing provided that the land owner can submit the application for referring the dispute to the Reference Court as so provided under Sec.18 of the Act in case of permanent acquisition. In the present case as stated above, no such dispute has been raised by the original land owners as to the sufficiency of the compensation and claimants have accepted the compensation/rent as per the award dated 11-8-1980 without raising any objection, and therefore, the reference applications submitted by the original claimants are not maintainable. 25. Even otherwise as stated above, the Special Land Acquisition Officer declared the award under Sec.35 of the Act as back as on 11-8-1980 determining the compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum which was never objected to by the original land owners/interested persons, but the same came to be accepted without raising any objection and still the respondents herein-original claimants submitted the applications for making reference to the Reference Court under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 i.e. after a period of 21 years raising the dispute as to sufficiency of the compensation which was determined while declaring award on 11-8-1980. It is the contention on behalf of the original claimants that as under sub sec.(3) of Sec.58 of the Act on 11-8-2008, no time limit is prescribed and as it is the duty of the Collector to refer the dispute to the Reference Court and as the Collector has failed to perform the duty cast upon him, the application submitted by the claimants are within the period of limitation and/or not barred by delay and laches. It is the contention on behalf of the appellants and the Special Land Acquisition Officer that when there is no limitation prescribed, Art.137 of the Limitation Act would come in picture and within three years from the date of cause of action the applications could have been made. It is the contention on behalf of the appellants and the Special Land Acquisition Officer that when there is no limitation prescribed, Art.137 of the Limitation Act would come in picture and within three years from the date of cause of action the applications could have been made. It is true that under sub-sec.(3) of Sec. 35 of the Act, no limitation is prescribed. However, that does not mean that the application for Reference can be made at any time. Article 137 of the Limitation Act provides that when there is no limitation prescribed or provided, three years would be the limitation and from the date of cause of action within three years, an aggrieved person can initiate proceedings. The Reference Court has misinterpreted the provisions of Sec. 35 of the Act. While considering the submissions with regard to the limitation, the Reference Court has held that as the entire land acquisition proceedings and the award are null and void, Art.137 of the Limitation Act (Reference Court has considered Sec.137 of the Limitation Act wrongly) would not be applicable, more particularly when the Collector has failed to perform the duty cast upon him, making the Reference to the Reference Court as provided under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 of the Act. As stated above, such findings and the observations of the Reference Court are perverse and illegal. As held by us, there was no dispute with regard to sufficiency of the possession raised by the claimants at the relevant time when the award was declared, therefore, there was no occasion for the Collector to refer the dispute to the Reference Court and we have also held that the reference applications are not maintainable. Even otherwise, assuming that it was the duty of the Collector to refer the dispute to the Reference Court and when the Collector failed to perform his duty, in that case also, the claimants are required to initiate appropriate proceedings within reasonable time, as there is no time limit prescribed under the Act. Certainly the claimants cannot submit the applications and/or raise the dispute after a period of 21 years. Thus, on the ground of delay and laches the Reference applications were not maintainable. Certainly the claimants cannot submit the applications and/or raise the dispute after a period of 21 years. Thus, on the ground of delay and laches the Reference applications were not maintainable. As such when the applications were submitted after a period of 21 years raising dispute with regard to adequacy of the compensation awarded in the year 1980, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, ought not to have referred the dispute to the Reference Court. As such the Special Land Acquisition Officer himself has committed an error and/or acted arbitrarily in referring the dispute to the Reference Court after a period of 21 years. 26. In the case of Laxuman, [ 2005 (8) SCC 709 ] while dealing with Sec.18(3) of the Act which also does not provide any time limit, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that since the application is to the Court, though under a special enactment, Art. 137, the residuary Article of the Limitation Act, 1963, is attracted and the application has to be made within three years of the expiry of 90 days from the date of application under Sec. 18(1) of the Act made by the claimant. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, reported in 1997 (11) SCC 412 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed in the said decision that the right undisputedly available to a litigant becomes unenforceable if the litigant does not approach the Court within the time prescribed and the law is for the diligent. It is also further observed that the law expects a litigant to seek the enforcement of a right available to him within a reasonable time of the arising of the cause of action. 27. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Bayer Aktiengesellschft of Leverkusen Federal Republic of Germany v. Controller of Patents, Government of India, reported in AIR 1982 Cal. 30 , while dealing with Sec.71 of the Patents Act, 1970 and Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has also held that if any special or local law does not prescribe any time for application to be made to Court such application would be governed by Art. 137. 28. 30 , while dealing with Sec.71 of the Patents Act, 1970 and Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has also held that if any special or local law does not prescribe any time for application to be made to Court such application would be governed by Art. 137. 28. Considering above, the findings of the Reference Court that the applications submitted by the claimants for making Reference under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 of the Act were within the period of limitation and/or were not barred by Limitation and/or were not required to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, are perverse, illegal and contrary to the evidence on record and Sec. 35 of the Act and Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, which require to be quashed and set aside. Thus, it is held that the reference applications submitted by the claimants under Sec. 35(3) of the Act were not maintainable and could not have been entertained by the Reference Court as the same were barred by the, limitation and/or in the alternative barred by delay and laches. It is also held that the reference applications under sub-sec. (3) of Sec.35 of the Act were not maintainable at all, as there was no dispute raised by the claimants/ original owners at the time when the award was declared and/or there was no difference as to the sufficiency of compensation at the relevant time. 29. Now, that takes us to some of the findings and observations recorded by the Reference Court which are as under : (i) That the entire land acquisition proceedings and the award declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer are illegal and null and void. (ii) The competent authority has not followed the mandatory provisions under Sec. 35 of the Act. (iii) "Reference Court" under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, have exclusive jurisdiction, and hence, the said jurisdiction includes jurisdiction to determine whether a particular proceeding falls within its jurisdiction or not. The Reference Court has jurisdiction to decide each and every fact whether it exists or not, it is not the proposition of law that the Reference Court has no jurisdiction to decide any question or dispute, except the question or dispute of compensation. "Reference Court" has all rights, powers and authority to adjudicate every question falling under the ambit of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. "Reference Court" has all rights, powers and authority to adjudicate every question falling under the ambit of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The Reference Court has not only the jurisdiction to decide the question of quantum of compensation but Reference Court has also jurisdiction to decide all questions and disputes relating to and ancillary to the acquired land and compensation. (iv) Reference Court can order to surrender the land to the owner or occupier or interested person by mandatory order against the Government or acquiring body as per the circumstances of each case. (v) The question of compensation is residuary clause which arises out of provisions of Sec.35 of the Act. The Court as a "Reference Court" has ample powers to restore the possession after the maximum period of temporary occupation and use exceeding three years period to the owner or occupier or to the interested person as the case may be. (vi) The Special Land Acquisition Officer who has carried out the said proceedings under Sec. 35 of the Act and passed the order, has no right, power or authority under the Act to declare and pass such award under Sec.35 of the Act under the head of Compensation Case No.38 of 1980 and the same is without jurisdiction, illegal, arbitrary, null and void and consequently no right over the land of the claimants or interested person or occupier has been accrued in favour of the Corporation i.e. O.N.G.C. and the compensation for the land by acquiring body and it stands in the category of trespasser and the possession for the land by acquiring body and it stands in the category of trespasser. The possession of the acquiring body is illegal and unauthorised right from the inception and they are trespassers. (vii) The Reference Court has jurisdiction to award compensation by way of mesne profit. Now so far as the aforesaid observations and findings of the Reference Court in references arising out of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 of the Act are per se perverse, illegal, without jurisdiction and without authority under the law. It is required to be noted that the Special Land Acquisition Officer declared the award under Sec.(3) of the Act on 11-8-1980 being Land Acquisition Case No. 38 of 1980 determining compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum. It is required to be noted that the Special Land Acquisition Officer declared the award under Sec.(3) of the Act on 11-8-1980 being Land Acquisition Case No. 38 of 1980 determining compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq.mtr. per annum. All the claimants submitted the reference applications before the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 16-7-2001 under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.35 of the Act, raising objections for the first time with regard to adequacy of the compensation/rent determined in 1980 by submitting that the compensation/rent determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer vide award dated 11-8-1980 is inadequate and requested for enhancement of the compensation/rent and the Special Land Acquisition Officer referred the said dispute to the Reference Court. Thus, what was referred by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was the dispute with regard to adequacy, of quantum of compensation and nothing beyond that. Even it was not the case of the claimants that the entire acquisition proceedings and the award are illegal and/or null and void and that O.N.G.C. is in illegal and unauthorised occupation and possession of the land in question. Still the Reference Court has given the aforesaid findings. 30. In the case of Salaram Chandra, [ 1995 (3) SCC 723 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with and considering the scope, duties and powers of the Reference Court under Sec.18 of the Act, has held that the District Court (Reference Court) has no jurisdiction to declare notification under Secs.4(1) and 6 to be null and void and/or illegal and he is required to make award with reference to the objections raised by the claimants in respect of area of land or amount of compensation or persons entitled to receive compensation and his duties are confined to the provisions contained in Secs.11, 18 and 20 to 23. It is also further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision that the Reference Court cannot go beyond the Reference and give a declaration that the notifications under Secs.4(1) and 6 are illegal or null and void. It is also held that the Reference Court would not traverse beyond his powers. 31. It is also further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision that the Reference Court cannot go beyond the Reference and give a declaration that the notifications under Secs.4(1) and 6 are illegal or null and void. It is also held that the Reference Court would not traverse beyond his powers. 31. While taking a similar view, the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. K. Sreekantan, [ AIR 2007 SC 516 ], considering the decision of the Privy Council and earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Para 14 has observed as under : "14. Every Tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such Tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a Tribunal deserves its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the Tribunal can function, it goes without saying that before that Tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in Nusservwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan, LR [1955 (6) M.I.A. 134 (PC)], whether jurisdiction is given to a Court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that Act, it is a universal picture that these terms must be complied with the jurisdiction does not arise [See : Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, 1979 (2) SCC 572 ]." 32. In an another decision in the case of Prayag Upnivesh Avas Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., [ 2003 (5) SCC 561 ] the Supreme Court has observed and held that a Reference Court has no jurisdiction to decide a matter not referred to it. 33. In an another decision in the case of Prayag Upnivesh Avas Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., [ 2003 (5) SCC 561 ] the Supreme Court has observed and held that a Reference Court has no jurisdiction to decide a matter not referred to it. 33. Considering the above decisions and the Reference made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the findings of the Reference Court which are reproduced hereinabove with regard to acquisition proceedings and award being null and void and illegal and O.N.G.C. - acquiring body is in unauthorised and illegal possession and are trespassers, all such findings are wholly without jurisdiction and perverse and without authority under the law and even beyond the Reference and/or the dispute referred to the Reference Court. In a reference under Sec. 35 of the Act, Reference Court has no jurisdiction and/or authority under the law to decide any other dispute/question other than the dispute as to the sufficiency of the compensation and that too with respect to only such difference as to the sufficiency of compensation which has arisen between the Collector and the persons interested at the relevant time. The Reference Court is not vested with any other powers to declare the acquisition proceedings and/or award null and void and/or illegal and/or give a finding whether the acquiring body is in illegal possession and/or trespasser. Similarly, the Reference Court also has no jurisdiction and/ or authority under the law to restore possession of the land to the original land owners in a Reference under Sec.35(3) of the Act. On going through the entire judgment and award of the Reference Court, It appears that the entire judgment and award runs into approximately 82 pages and considering the same, it appears that the Reference Court has tried to show his knowledge without proper application of mind to the issues and without appreciating the fact that he has no jurisdiction to decide any other dispute other than the dispute as to the sufficiency of compensation and that he is dealing with the Reference under Sec.35(3) of the Act. The Reference Court has tried to show his knowledge by referring to various judgments unnecessarily and has given findings without any jurisdiction. The Reference Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and has decided the questions not referred to it and/or which have not arisen at all. 34. The Reference Court has tried to show his knowledge by referring to various judgments unnecessarily and has given findings without any jurisdiction. The Reference Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and has decided the questions not referred to it and/or which have not arisen at all. 34. It is also required to be noted at this stage that even the issues which are framed by the Reference Court are : "(i) Whether the applicant proves that the compensation awarded is inadequate? (ii) What additional compensation, if any, he is entitled to? (iii) What award and decree? No other issues have been framed by the Reference Court. No issue, whether the acquisition proceedings and the award declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under Sec.35(3) of the Act are illegal and/or non-est, has been framed by the Reference Court. No issue, whether the acquiring body is a trespasser and/or they are in illegal and unauthorised occupation and possession of the land in question, has been framed by the Reference Court. The Reference Court has not framed issue with regard to limitation, though in the written statement specific contention has been raised that the reference applications are time barred and/or they are required to be dismissed on the ground of delay. As per Sec.53 of the Act, save insofar as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Act. No decision and/or finding can be given without framing any issue and drawing attention of the parties to the proceedings to the said issues. Thus, even on this ground also, the findings of the Reference Court that the entire acquisition proceedings and the award declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer are illegal and non-est and that the acquiring body - O. N.G.C. is in illegal and unauthorised occupation and possession of the land in question and that they are trespasser, also cannot be sustained without framing any proper issue. 35. 35. It has come on record that not only the claimants have accepted the amount of compensation/rent determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer while declaring the award on 11-8-1980, but even thereafter, the O.N.G.C. has enhanced the amount of compensation/rent at the interval of every three years from time to time and the said enhanced compensation/rent has been accepted by the claimants without raising any objection. In such circumstances, the Reference Court could not have declared O.N.G.C. as trespassers. It is also required to be noted at this stage that even the findings of the Reference Court with regard to possession of the acquiring body are also self-contradictory. The Reference Court in Para 31 has observed that "this is simple case of assumption of quantum of compensation on the ground of mesne profit as the opponent No.2-O.N.G.C. are permissive user and occupier of the land specifically stated in Compensation Case No.38 of 2080." Even after Para 31(iii), the Reference Court has observed as under: "The opponent No. 2-O.N.G.C. is in possession of the land which has been acquired under the provision of Sec.35 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Competent Authority under the said Act and till then, they are in possession of the land, and hence, their possession can be called permissive possession." 36. Inspite of the above, the Reference Court has held that the O.N.G.C. - acquiring body is in illegal and unauthorised possession of the land in question and they are trespasser. Even otherwise, as stated above, O. N. G. C. - acquiring body has increased quantum of compensation/rent at the interval of every three years substantially, which have been accepted by the claimants without any objections, and therefore, it can be said that the claimants have impliedly and/or by necessary conduct have agreed with the possession and occupation of the land by O.N.G.C. and continue to occupy the possession by the O.N.G.C. As such all these questions and the disputes are not required to be dealt with and considered in a Reference under Sec.35(3) of the Act. Whether there is any implied extension of contract etc. all are questions which are required to be decided and dealt with in appropriate proceedings when a suit is filed before the Civil Court. 37. Whether there is any implied extension of contract etc. all are questions which are required to be decided and dealt with in appropriate proceedings when a suit is filed before the Civil Court. 37. Now so far as the amount of compensation awarded by the Reference Court and the operative portion of the order which is reproduced hereinabove in Para 1 of the judgment, the Reference Court has awarded the compensation even for the period beyond three years i.e. till date and even for future also. As held by this Court in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Pandya Prahladbhai Manilal, reported in 2006 (3) GLH 662 and in the case of Patel Shambhubhai Bhaichanddas v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2007 (2) GLH 272 , the Reference Court, in temporary acquisition under Sec.35 of the Act, has no jurisdiction to determine sufficiency of compensation for retention of the land beyond the period of three years. In other way, the Collector in a Reference under Sec.35 has power to determine sufficiency of compensation only for retention of land up to a maximum period of three years and recourse to possession after the stipulated period can be sought only by remedy provided under common law. This Court is in complete agreement with the aforesaid two decisions. Thus, even the order passed by the Reference Court awarding compensation beyond the period of three years in a Reference under Sec. 35 of the Act, is wholly without jurisdiction. In the present case, even the question may arise whether in view of the periodical rise given by O.N.G.C. at the interval of every three years, which have been accepted by the claimants without raising any objection, whether the claimants are entitled to raise dispute with regard to sufficiency of compensation/rent. 38. Even while determining the quantum of compensation, the Reference Court has misinterpreted the evidence and the cross-examination of the claimant who has been examined on behalf of all the claimant at Exh.11, which has been reproduced hereinabove. The claimant has specifically stated in his cross-examination that he has no knowledge about the income derived from the land in question; he has no personal knowledge what amount he has asked in the reference application; he does not know the contents of the reference application; he also does not know on what basis the amount of compensation/rent is sought to be increased. He has specifically admitted that he has not given any instructions to the Advocate and in fact, the Advocate himself has written everything. He has also admitted that he has no account and/or evidence to justify income of Rs.40,000/- as stated in the examination-in-chief. However, the Reference Court has held that the claimant has proved the income of Rs.40,000/- per annum derived from the land in question. It is also required to be noted that no documentary evidence has been produced with regard to the income derived from the land in question. In absence of any documentary evidence, the Reference Court could not have given any finding with regard to income of Rs.40,000/- derived from the land in question. Thus, even otherwise, the finding with respect to the income by the Reference Court is perverse and on misreading of the evidence and the same is on no evidence. The operative portion of the order awarding compensation to the claimants at the enhanced rate periodically is also without jurisdiction and based on no evidence. Even the amount of compensation/rent awarded by the Reference Court seems to be more than the compensation paid for permanent acquisition. The directions issued by the Reference Court in Paras 49 to 51 and operative portion of the judgment in Para 52, are all without jurisdiction and de hors the provisions of the Act. The Reference Court has issued certain directions with regard to interest, as if the Reference Court is dealing with the Reference with' regard to permanent acquisition. The Reference Court has failed to appreciate that it was dealing with the Reference with respect to temporary acquisition of land under Sec.35(3) of the Act. Thus, the impugned judgment and award require to be quashed and set aside. 39. At this stage it is required to be noted and it appears from the judgment and award that the Reference Court has awarded compensation/rent by way of mesne profit by giving contradictory findings with regard to possession and occupation of the O.N.G.C. As stated hereinabove, the Reference Court has no jurisdiction to decide any dispute de hors the dispute referred to it. It is also held that the Reference Court has no jurisdiction to restore the possession of the land owners. It is also held that the Reference Court has no jurisdiction to restore the possession of the land owners. The competent Civil Court can award mesne profit only in a suit for possession and when it is found that the occupier is in illegal possession and that the mesne profit can be awarded by that Court who can pass a decree for possession. In the present case as stated above, the Reference Court has no jurisdiction to restore the possession and consequently, pass a decree for possession in a Reference under Sec.35(3) of the Act. Under the circumstances also, the directions issued by the Reference Court in the award to pay mesne profit as compensation, are also required to be quashed and set aside as the same is without jurisdiction." 11. We find that in the instant case, the Reference Court has decided identical issues which are beyond the scope and ambit of Sec.35(3) of the Act. We find that as laid down by this Court in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (supra) the References were barred by limitation and the Reference Court could not have entertained the same. The manner in which the Land Acquisition Officer has referred the Reference Applications which were filed after 17 years from the date of passing of the award and the Reference Court having decided the issue which does not arise in the Reference Application as contemplated under Sec.35(3) requires to be deprecated. We do not think it fit to propound any further on the said aspect. In addition to this, we also find that as aforesaid, the lands in question were situated at village Telavi falling under Detroj Taluka are within the jurisdiction of Ahmedabad District, and therefore, the Reference Court at Mehsana had no jurisdiction to entertain the Reference Application. 12. In view of the foregoing reasons, all the appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 11-10-2005 passed by Principal Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana in Land Reference Case Nos. 3751 to 3754 of 2003 are hereby quashed and set aside. However, considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 13. Registry is directed to send back Record & Proceedings forthwith, (HSS) Appeals allowed. * * *