Judgment :- RAVIMALIMATH, J. 1. This petition is by the State being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal allowing the appeal by granting the benefit of reduction at 2% in the rate of CST to the assessee. 2. The assessee is engaged in the operation of a solvent extraction plant in Challakere and carries on the business of manufacture and sale of solvent extracted oil. By-products of de-oiled cake and de-oiled rice bran are obtained in the manufacturing process. The assessee sold sunflower de-oiled cake in course of inter state trade and produced C-Forms obtained from buying dealers in other States and claimed benefit of reduction in the rate of CST at 2% in terms of the Notification No.FD 119 CSL 2002 (2) dated 31.05.2002. Initially the Assessing Authority passed the assessment order admitting the claim and levied CST at 2% on the turnover relating to inter state sales of sunflower de-oiled cake and thereafter, by the reassessment order, the same was modified by levying CST at 4%. The assessee contested the reassessment order in the appeal filed before the first Appellate Authority. The first Appellate Authority confined his decision only to the ground urged that the reassessment order passed by the Assessing Authority by change of opinion was not permissible in law and therefore, the reassessment order was liable to be set aside. The other two grounds on merits were not examined. Consequently, the first Appellate Authority set aside the reassessment order. Aggrieved by the same, the assessee preferred a second appeal before the tribunal, wherein by the impugned order, the appeal was allowed modifying the order passed by the authorities and holding that the assessee is liable to 2% tax in terms of notification dated 31.05.2002. Aggrieved by the same, the revenue has filed the present appeal. 3. By the order dated 07-12-2009, the appeal was admitted to consider the following the substantial questions of law: i) Whether, on the facts and in circumstances of the case, can it be held that the order dated 12.7.2007 passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in STA 425/2006 allowing the appeal is correct and in accordance with law? 3. By the order dated 07-12-2009, the appeal was admitted to consider the following the substantial questions of law: i) Whether, on the facts and in circumstances of the case, can it be held that the order dated 12.7.2007 passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in STA 425/2006 allowing the appeal is correct and in accordance with law? ii) Whether on the fact and in circumstances of the case, can it be held that the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in ignoring that under the KST Act in the Second Schedule in serial No.1 of Part O, oil cake and de-oiled cake are listed under two separate sub-headings as two different commodities? 4. The Government of Karnataka in exercise of powers conferred by Section 8(5) of CST Act, 1956 issued Notification No.FD 119 CSL 2002 (2) dated 31.05.2002 granting reduction in the rate of CST payable on inter-State sales to 2% on the goods specified, subject to conditions. The goods mentioned therein was de-oiled cake, which earlier attracted 4% tax. The assessee had sold oiled cake also in the course of interstate trade and commerce. Hence, he claimed the benefit of reduction of CST from 4% to 2% in terms of the Notification dated 31.05.2002 for oiled cake on the ground that oil cake and de-oiled cake are one and the same. 5. In terms of the Notification dated 31.05.2002, the rate of tax on de-oiled cake was reduced from 4% to 2%. The said schedule contains oil-cake as well as de-oiled cake. In terms of notification dated 31.05.2002, it is only de-oiled cake wherein the rate of tax has been reduced from 4% to 2%. But the sale of oiled cake is not covered under the Notification. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent contends that the oil cake and de-oiled cake are one and the same and therefore, he pleads that the oil cake and de-oiled cake should be understood in a common parlance as understood by a common man. But the sale of oiled cake is not covered under the Notification. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent contends that the oil cake and de-oiled cake are one and the same and therefore, he pleads that the oil cake and de-oiled cake should be understood in a common parlance as understood by a common man. In support of his contention, he relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Habeeb Proteins and Fats Extracts, Hiriyur, Chitradurga District vs. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore and another reported in 2005 (58) Kar.L.J. 155 (HC) (DB), wherein it was held that “where de-oiled cake remaining after extraction of oil from oil cake purchased, does not lose its identity as oil cake, it cannot be held that oil purchased has been consumed or has ceased to exist as oil cake.” Consequently, purchase tax was not leviable on purchase of oil cake. The facts, circumstances and law declared in the said case are totally alien to the facts of the present case. The Court was dealing with the levy of purchase tax and as an obiter a passing reference was made. There is no finding recorded in the said judgment that oil cake and de-oiled cake constitutes the same commodity. That oil cake contains a certain percentage of oil and several other ingredients. When these commodities are subjected to processing of extraction of oil, some quantum of oil is removed but they continue to remain as oil cakes with lesser content of oil. The judgment relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent is not applicable to the case on hand and we are unable to accept the said contention. The facts and circumstances of the case involved in the above referred judgment are totally different compared to the facts and circumstance of the present case. The said case has no bearing on the case on hand. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in the case of Sterling Foods vs. The State of Karnataka and another reported in STC 1986 Vol. 63 239 to contend that the nature of the commodity is to be determined in the same way as in the eyes of the person dealing in it. The said case was with reference to frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters. The facts therein are not in consonance with the facts of the present case. 7. 63 239 to contend that the nature of the commodity is to be determined in the same way as in the eyes of the person dealing in it. The said case was with reference to frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters. The facts therein are not in consonance with the facts of the present case. 7. In the instant case, the distinction is between the oil cake and de-oiled cake and they are the two different commodities and they are not the one and the same. The oil cake contains a certain percentage of oil and other ingredients and when these commodities are subjected to processing of extraction of oil, some quantum of oil is removed but they continue to remain as oil cakes with lesser content of oil. Therefore, to contend that both commodities are the same commodities and are to be taxed in the same bracket cannot be accepted. 8. The contention that the commodities will have to be understood in common parlance as understood by a common man is even harder to accept. What a common man understands need not necessarily mean what is understood in accordance with law. In the instant case, the framers of the schedule were aware of the distinction between oil cake and de-oiled cake. Accordingly, they have treated it as two different commodities. Therefore, to hold that the view of a common man has to necessarily over ride the view of the Legislature is difficult to accept. The distinction in law has been made which requires to be followed. Oil cake and de-oiled cake are two different commodities. The benefit granted to oil-cake cannot stand extended to de-oiled cake. The impact of the notification reducing the tax impact was very well known when the benefit was granted. A notification has to be strictly construed. The Court cannot read into the notification what is not there. The notification is clear and unambiguous. Any attempt to read it otherwise is not only uncalled for but would amount to redrafting the notification. 9. A notification has to be strictly construed. The Court cannot read into the notification what is not there. The notification is clear and unambiguous. Any attempt to read it otherwise is not only uncalled for but would amount to redrafting the notification. 9. An identical issue came up for consideration in the case of State of Karnataka vs. M/s. N.K. Agro Oils (P) Ltd. The Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 29.06.2011 came to the conclusion that by the very Notification dated 31.05.2002 the rate of tax was reduced from 4% to 2% in only so far as oiled cake is concerned and no other interpretation can be imported into it. The same is applicable to the present case also. Hence, on this ground also, the tribunal committed an error in allowing the benefit and extending the benefit of the notification to the assessee in so far as de-oiled cake is concerned. Hence, we are of the view that the order passed by the Tribunal requires to be set aside. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the questions of law are answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Consequently, the order dated 12.07.2007 passed by the Tribunal in STA No.369/2006 is set aside and the order passed by the Assessing Authority imposing tax at the rate of 4% in terms of notification dated 31.05.2002 is restored.