Judgment : 1. Rule, with the consent of the parties, made returnable forthwith and heard. 2. The above petitions involve identical facts and issues and therefore are being heard together and disposed of. By the above petition, the petitioners are challenging the orders passed by the School Tribunal on the ground that the Appeals are not maintainable. 3. Facts involved in the above petitions in brief can be stated thus 4. The petitioner no.1 herein is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and is also a Trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act. The petitioner – Society runs three schools and one Primary School in respect of which grant-in-aid is received from the State Government. The petitioner also runs three primary schools on nograntbasis. The respondent no.1 in each of the above petitions are working with the petitioner No.2 Primary school which is, admittedly, receiving grants from the State Government. On account of certain acts committed by the respondents in each of the above petitions, the petitioner – Society issued a show cause notice to them. In the said show cause notice, the charges against each of the respondents were mentioned. However, to safeguard the interest of the students, the petitioner – Society did not suspend the respondents though it wanted to proceed departmentally against the respondents. The petitioners were labouring under an impression that the respondents would show cause and file their replies to the said show cause notice. However, to the shock of the petitioners they were served with Appeal memos purported to be Appeals under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Services) Regulation Act, 1977 (for brevity sake referred to as ‘said Act’) along with the order granting ad interim stay dated 2/2/2011. 5. On receiving the said Appeal memo and the order dated 2/2/2011, the petitioners filed an application for dismissal of the Appeals being untenable in view of Section 9 of the said Act. The petitioner applied for setting aside of the order dated 2/2/2011 on the ground that the same has been passed without jurisdiction. It appears that after the said order dated 2/2/2011 was passed, the petitioner issued one more notice on 7/3/2011 by which the respondent in each of the above petitions was called upon to show cause as to why the disciplinary action should not be taken against him/her. It appears that after the said order dated 2/2/2011 was passed, the petitioner issued one more notice on 7/3/2011 by which the respondent in each of the above petitions was called upon to show cause as to why the disciplinary action should not be taken against him/her. This resulted in the respondents moving a Miscellaneous application being 5 of 2011 for continuation of the ad interim order, on 9/3/2011. The petitioners filed reply to the said application. The respondent no.2 considered the said application filed by the respondent no.1 in each of the above petitions and issued the following order. “Issue notice returnable within three weeks. Status quo regarding prayer clause (2).” 6. The petitioners have approached this court in view of the fact that the respondent no.2, who is incharge President of the School Tribunal, has sought to interdict in the departmental proceedings which were sought to be initiated by the petitioners, by passing orders in the Appeals filed by each of the respondents without considering whether the said Appeals were maintainable and whether he could exercise jurisdiction in that behalf. 7. The grievance of the petitioners is that though they have already filed their reply pursuant to the ad interim order passed on 2/2/2011, wherein they have taken objection to the tenability of the Appeals as well as the jurisdiction of the respondent no.2 to grant any relief, the same has been kept pending by the respondent no.2 and the illegal ad interim order dated 2/2/2011 is sought to be continued. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Sharma drew my attention to Section 9 of the said Act wherein the eventualities are mentioned in respect of which an Appeal would lie to the School Tribunal. The learned counsel further submitted that in the teeth of the said provision the Appeals filed by the respondent no.1 in each of the above petitions at the stage of issuance of show cause notice in respect of the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was not maintainable. 10. Per contra, it is submitted by Shri Kalariya, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 – teacher that since the application filed by the petitioners as regards the dismissal of the Appeals on the ground that they not tenable are pending, this court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction. 11. 10. Per contra, it is submitted by Shri Kalariya, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 – teacher that since the application filed by the petitioners as regards the dismissal of the Appeals on the ground that they not tenable are pending, this court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction. 11. In the instant case, the School Tribunal derives its jurisdiction from Section 9 of the said Act. The said provision is reproduced herein under 9. Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private school. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force [any employee in a private school, (a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the order passed by the Management; or (b) who is superseded by the Management while making an appointment to any post by promotion; and who is aggrieved, shall have a right to appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8:] Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any case where the matter has already been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such Court, on the appointed date or where the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed by the Management at any time before the 1st July, 1976. (2) Such appeal shall be made by the employee to the Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt by him of the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank, as the case may be: Provided that, where such order was made before the appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty days from the said date. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2), the Tribunal may entertain an appeal made to it after the expiry of the said period of thirty or sixty days, as the case may be, if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period. (4) Every appeal shall be accompanied by a fee of [Five hundred] rupees, which shall not be refunded and shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of the State. (4) Every appeal shall be accompanied by a fee of [Five hundred] rupees, which shall not be refunded and shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of the State. A reading of the said provision, therefore, makes it clear that only in case of dismissal, removal or otherwise termination of services or supersession, an Appeal would lie before the school Tribunal. 12. In the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that the respondent no.1 in each of the above petitions has approached the School Tribunal at the stage of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. In fact, at the stage when a show cause notice has been issued to each of the respondents as to why the disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated against him/her, in my view, considering the said factual position, the Appeal filed by the respondent no.1 in each of the above petitions was not maintainable. It seems that the Tribunal, for the reasons best known to it has, without considering the said legal position, decided to exercise jurisdiction in a matter where it had none. This is, in my view, is a gross abuse of the process of law. The proceedings, therefore, are hopelessly unsustainable. 13. The above writ petitions are, therefore, required to be allowed and accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clauses A, B and C. Rule is accordingly made absolute. It is made clear that it would be open for the petitioner – Society to proceed against the respondent no.1 in each of the above petitions in accordance with law.