Surendra Prasad Son Of Late markandey Saw v. State Of Bihar
2011-01-13
NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGEMENT Navaniti Pd.Singh, J. 1. The parties agree that in view of the submissions being made, the records of the departmental proceedings may not be necessary. 2. Heard the parties. 3. The petitioner challenges the order as passed in a duly constituted departmental proceeding wherein, finding petitioner guilty, he has been dismissed from service which order has not been interfered with by the appellate authority that is the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar. The petitioner was an Assistant in the Home (Special) Department dealing with Swatantra Senani Pension. A departmental proceeding was initiated against him basically on four charges. Firstly, that the petitioner, though had received part payment towards his T.A. bill, he illegally put pressure on the Department so as to receive payment all over again. Secondly, the petitioner filed criminal complaint case against employees and officers of the Government without seeking prior permission of the Department. Thirdly, petitioner, in the file notings, made uncalled for and indisciplined remarks about his superior officer which is destructive of discipline. Fourthly, the petitioner, under orders of transfer, did not handover charge in due time. 4. The petitioner filed a show cause in the disciplinary proceeding and set up his defence in regard to the T.A. bill that when he came to know that his T.A. bill has been returned from the Home Department in which he was working to his earlier place of posting, he stopped pursuing the criminal complaint which ultimately was also dismissed for lack of sanction. He did not pursue the complaint. With regard to complaint against officers and employees of the Department is concerned, he clearly stated that when there was an inordinate delay in settlement of his T.A. bill, he was left frustrated and he filed that case. It may be noticed here that the Enquiry Officer has admitted that there was an inordinate delay in settling his T.A.bill but he holds that there was no cause to file a criminal case merely because of that. So far as indisciplined remarks in file notings are concerned, petitioner states that the language used may be wrong. It was neither unparliamentary and at best could be said to be inappropriate. In relation to not handing over charge, he clearly stated that he had challenged the transfer order before this Court and no sooner the writ petition was dismissed, he immediately handed over charge.
It was neither unparliamentary and at best could be said to be inappropriate. In relation to not handing over charge, he clearly stated that he had challenged the transfer order before this Court and no sooner the writ petition was dismissed, he immediately handed over charge. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that these basic facts are not disputed by disciplinary authority but still as the petitioner had challenged the very authority of officers, the authorities took this extreme vindictive action of his dismissal which was not interfered by the appellate authority, as noted above and petitioner was ordered to be dismissed from service. 5. In my view, petitioner may have a good cause but it is for the departmental authorities to consider the same and deal with that. This Court does not sit in appeal over the orders of the departmental authority. But, as noticed above, the nature of charges are not such that it calls for an extreme punishment by way of dismissal. Extreme punishment should be reserved for extreme cases. This surely is not one. The punishment is grossly excessive and disproportionate and shocks the conscience of this Court. Even though this Court does not interfere with the finding of the disciplinary authority of guilt against the petitioner, this Court is persuaded to set aside the order of dismissal being disproportionate to the delinquency, as alleged. !t is well established that punishment has to be proportionate to the delinquency. Authorities have a right to punishment but that does not mean that the punishment can be disproportionate. 6. Thus, the writ petition is allowed to the limited extent that the punishment of dismissal, as imposed by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate authority, is set aside. The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment and passing orders accordingly. It is, however, made clear that as petitioners dismissal order, which was passed way back on 18th February, 2002, has been set aside, petitioner, as natural corollary, would have to be reinstated in service.
The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment and passing orders accordingly. It is, however, made clear that as petitioners dismissal order, which was passed way back on 18th February, 2002, has been set aside, petitioner, as natural corollary, would have to be reinstated in service. As the petitioners own conduct invited the wrath of the disciplinary authority, it would be in fitness of things that the petitioner would not be entitled to wages for the period for which he has not worked but that period would be counted for continuity of service and pensionary benefits subject to such order of punishment that may be passed by the disciplinary authority. 7. With these observations and directions, the order of punishment dated 18th February, 2002 (Annexure-1) and the order of the appellate authority, as communicated to the petitioner by Memo dated 25th of June, 2003 (Annexure-2) are quashed and the matter is remanded as such.