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Andhra High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 820 (AP)

K. Vijaya v. Ashok Kumar Agarwal

2011-09-27

B.CHANDRA KUMAR

body2011
Judgment : Since the parties and the facts are common in all these appeals, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. C.C.C.A.Nos.276 and 323 of 2003 are directed against the judgment dated 08.05.2003 passed in O.S.No.1482 of 1984 by the IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (‘the Court below’, for brevity); Tr.C.C.C.A.No.6 of 2008 is directed against the judgment dated 20.08.2004 passed in O.S.No.518 of 1986 by the Court below. 3. The appellant in C.C.C.A.No.323 of 2003 and Tr.C.C.C.A.No.6 of 2008 is the defendant and the appellants in C.C.C.A.No.276 of 2003 are the plaintiffs’ in O.S.No.1482 of 1984 before the Court below. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed before the Court below in O.S.No.1482 of 1984. 4. The brief facts of the case are as follows:- The plaintiffs are the owners of the plots bearing Nos.33,34 and 35 in Survey Nos.2, 3 and 4 situated at Sri Krishna Colony, Musheerabad, Hyderabad (suit schedule property). They purchased the same under different sale deeds in the year 1979 from M/s. Cine Guild Cooperative Housing Society Limited (‘the Society’, for brevity) and others. The husband of the first plaintiff – Krishna Rao Keshav was the President of the Society. It appears that the plaintiffs were also the members of the said Society and the Society obtained permission and sanction for construction of apartments in the name of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’ on behalf of the plaintiffs. The Society and the defendant entered into an agreement on 28.11.1980 for construction of the apartments whereunder, the defendant had undertaken to construct the apartments. It appears that subsequently, the Society did not evince interest in the construction of the apartments. Consequently, the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into an agreement and constituted themselves into a partnership firm in the name and style of ‘M/s.United Builders’ on 15.05.1981. They agreed to share the profits equally after excluding the expenditure incurred by the defendant for the construction of the apartments. Subsequently, the said partnership deed was superseded by another unregistered partnership deed dated 14.11.1981, whereunder the plaintiffs agreed to take two flats and parking portion both RCC frame structure in the ground floor and one flat in the first floor towards northern side admeasuring 1044 square feet including common services in lieu of their profits in the business. Subsequently, the said partnership deed was superseded by another unregistered partnership deed dated 14.11.1981, whereunder the plaintiffs agreed to take two flats and parking portion both RCC frame structure in the ground floor and one flat in the first floor towards northern side admeasuring 1044 square feet including common services in lieu of their profits in the business. The said agreement also shows that the defendant had already invested Rs.3,55,560/- by the date of said agreement and also agreed to invest the capital till the completion of construction from his own sources and with the funds realized from the sale of the apartments. The clauses of the said agreement shows that the defendant alone was entitled to sell the apartments at any price and that the plaintiffs agreed to cooperate with the defendant to execute the sale deeds and that the defendant also agreed to make good to the plaintiffs if any defects are found in the construction of the apartments and that the partnership shall be determined after complete disposal of the flats of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’. In pursuance of the above referred agreement, the residential frame structure of two flats in the ground floor of the apartments was handed over to the plaintiffs on 25.11.1981. The defendant also agreed to give 14% of the cement permit allotted to ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’ to the plaintiffs till their construction of the residential portion of the ground floor is completed. 5. It appears that the defendant did not apply for electricity connection and constructed drainage. Then the plaintiffs themselves applied for electricity connection in their individual names and the defendant raised objection. Dispute also arose with regard to lifting of cement quota. When the plaintiffs constructed their residential portion in the ground floor, the defendant raised objection with regard to the opening of the doors and projection of chajjas. It appears that both the parties started claiming absolute rights in the firm and the building under construction. There was exchange of legal notices between the parties and allegations and counter allegations were made. 6. In the above circumstances, the defendant filed O.S.No.857 of 1982 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad seeking permanent injunction against the plaintiffs restraining them from interfering with his construction work. In the said suit, he filed an application in I.A.No.408 of 1982 and obtained interim injunction order. 6. In the above circumstances, the defendant filed O.S.No.857 of 1982 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad seeking permanent injunction against the plaintiffs restraining them from interfering with his construction work. In the said suit, he filed an application in I.A.No.408 of 1982 and obtained interim injunction order. The same was challenged in C.M.A.No.273 of 1982 and was confirmed and the matter was carried to this Court in C.R.P.No.1077 of 1983 and 1080 of 1983 and this Court modified the order and directed the plaintiffs to park their cars in the ground floor parking portion only. As far as laying of pipeline was concerned, it was observed that since the drainage pipeline was already laid, no further orders are required. As far as obtaining of electricity and water supply connection in the individual names of the plaintiffs is concerned, it was observed that the plaintiffs have already obtained electricity and water supply connections and, therefore, no injunction could be granted. As far as usage of water from the well is concerned, it was observed that the plaintiffs were restrained from interfering with the usage of water from the well by the defendant. The defendant had also obtained police aid to enforce the injunction order. 7. Then, the plaintiffs filed O.S.No.1482 of 1984 before the Court below alleging that the defendant failed to maintain the accounts and refused to produce and finalize the accounts and that the defendant carried out only skeleton structure of pillars and beams to the extent of the ground floor and the first floor and even the said construction was defective and that the material used in the construction was substandard and the workmanship was very poor and of inferior quality and that the defendant completely stopped doing further construction from January, 1982 and that the father of the defendant used to visit the site and abuse the plaintiffs and their GPA Holder in a vulgar language and threatened them with dire consequences. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed Rs.1,00,000/- for non delivery of the first floor portion of 1044 square feet, Rs.70,000/-towards probable rent for the above said portion calculating rent at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per month for 35 months and Rs.1,40,000/- towards probable rent for the parking portion in the entire ground floor portion calculating rent at the rate of Rs.4,000/-per month for 35 months. Contending so, the plaintiffs prayed to pass a decree dissolving the partnership firm ‘M/s.United Builders’ from the date of the suit; for declaration of partners respective shares from the commencement of the partnership till the date of dissolution; for a direction to the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.3,10,000/- as damages for non carrying on construction and delivery of first floor constructed portion and for non-delivery of the entire ground floor parking place; and for costs. Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought a direction to the defendant to receive back his invested money in the construction work together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum after finalization of the accounts and relinquish his right in the said partnership business. 8. On the other hand, the specific case of the defendant is that, in all, he had spent an amount of Rs.3,55,560/- for construction of the apartments and that the GPA holder of the plaintiffs – Krishna Rao Keshav had personally supervised the construction before they entered into the partnership agreement on 14.11.1981 and that there are no defects in the construction. The defendant further denied that the construction made by him is of substandard and is of poor and inferior quality. His further case is that after the parties have entered into a partnership agreement, the plaintiffs cannot ask for the accounts of the partnership firm and that the plaintiffs have nothing to do with the profits and losses of the partnership firm as they voluntarily offered to take one flat on the first floor facing towards northern side in lieu of their share in profits in the business and as such, they are only entitled to one flat in the first floor towards northern side. It is his further case that he became the sole responsible person for the completion of the venture and that he will be the absolute and sole administrator and is full in-charge of the work of the firm and that the plaintiffs’ have no right of any manner to ask for the dissolution of the firm or accounts of the firm and they are estopped to ask for the accounts and for dissolution. It is also his case that it is due to the conduct of the plaintiffs only he is unable to proceed with the construction work and that the plaintiffs started simultaneous construction of the ground floor residential portion contrary to the sanction plan and making encroachments of the passage preventing the free flow of labourers and vehicles, wasting the limited water available. It is also alleged that the plaintiffs withheld the permit of 25 tonnes of cement before 16.02.1982 and that he is unable to get electricity connection due to non-cooperation of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs leased out the residential flat and land to Kirloskar Tractors Limited who started parking their vehicles and making repairing and assembling works preventing the free flow of labourers. His further case is that the plaintiffs started digging and excavating the passage on the eastern side and that he was forced to file O.S.No.857 of 1982 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad for injunction and obtained status quo orders and that in spite of the status quo orders, the plaintiffs violated the same and committed the acts of contempt of Court and that the plaintiffs obtained electricity connection in their individual names claiming that they are the owners of the suit schedule property and fixed electric wires and boards making it impossible for him to proceed further with the construction. Contending so, the defendant made a counter claim to a tune of Rs.3,93,516.20 ps alleging that he had invested a sum of Rs.3,75,030.40/- and the said amount would come back to him from March, 1983 and, therefore, he is entitled to compensation and damages at the rate of 18% per annum from 01.06.1983 till the date of filing of the suit on the said amount which comes to Rs.2,02,516.20 ps. The defendant also estimated that he would have got minimum profit of Rs.3,00,000/- and claimed interest at the rate of 12% on Rs.3,00,000/-, which according to him, comes to Rs.1,62,000/-. The defendant also claimed an amount of Rs.5,000/- towards damages to the water tank alleging that the plaintiffs damaged the said water tank. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiffs broke open the lock of the pump house – cum – store room and removed the goods from the godown and estimated the damages at Rs.5,000/- and the loss of material at Rs.1,000/-. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiffs broke open the lock of the pump house – cum – store room and removed the goods from the godown and estimated the damages at Rs.5,000/- and the loss of material at Rs.1,000/-. The defendant also claimed an amount of Rs.5,000/- towards rent alleging that the plaintiffs were unauthorizedly using the open land in the ground floor which was in his possession and claimed an amount of Rs.18,000/- at the rate of Rs.500/- per month from April, 1983 to March, 1986. Thus, the defendant made a counter claim to a tune of Rs.3,93,516.20 ps. 9. The defendant sought the following reliefs in his counter claim:- 1. Grant decree in favour of the defendant declaring the defendant alone entitled to sell and execute and register the sale deeds under his signature and with respect to the apartment, flats of M/s.United Builders, namely, Sri Krishna Apartments; 2. grant a decree for Rs.3,93,516.20 ps towards the damages against the plaintiff with interest at 18% per annum from the date of suit till realization and also grant a decree for the future damages at the rate of Rs.10,125.65 ps per month along with interest at 18% per annum on the monthly amount till the realization of the said amount; 3. grant a mandatory injunction against the plaintiffs for demolition of all unauthorized, illegal constructions made in the ground floor, 1st floor, residential portion by the plaintiff against the sanction plan and respect of the encroachments on the passage and open land and all removal of the drainage line illegally made and for disconnection of the electricity; 4. Issue a perpetual injunction against the plaintiffs restraining the plaintiffs from making unauthorized and illegal constructions and preventing defendants from proceedings further construction of the apartments and also preventing the plaintiffs from encroaching on the passage and open land. 10. The plaintiffs filed a rejoinder and denied the allegations made by the defendant. The defendant had also subsequently amended his written statement. In the amended written statement, the defendant inter alia alleged that the plaintiffs indulged in the acts of mischief and caused wrongful loss to him and that the plaintiffs, with the help of their henchmen, have taken away the material worth about Rs.25,000/- to Rs.30,000/- which was stored in the storeroom. 11. In the amended written statement, the defendant inter alia alleged that the plaintiffs indulged in the acts of mischief and caused wrongful loss to him and that the plaintiffs, with the help of their henchmen, have taken away the material worth about Rs.25,000/- to Rs.30,000/- which was stored in the storeroom. 11. The important subsequent developments that require a mention is that during the pendency of the proceedings, the parties filed a joint memo into the Court on 09.03.1989 and as per the settlement, the defendant made further construction and completed three flats in the first floor. As admitted by both the parties, the defendant occupied the said three flats and now has been residing with his family members. The subsequent developments also reveal that the title deeds deposited in the bank were taken away by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ allegation is that since the defendant did not pay the locker charges to the bank, the locker was closed by the bank officials. 12. Basing on the aforesaid pleadings in the claim and the counter claim, the trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues for trial:- Issues dated 05.09.1986:- i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree dissolving the firm M/s.United Builders from the date of filing of the suit; ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for rendition of accounts as prayed for; iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for damages of Rs.3,10,000/- as prayed for; iv) Whether the plaintiffs can ask the defendant to take back the money invested by him together with interest @ 6% per annum, as prayed for; v) Whether the defendant is entitled to counter claims for Rs.3,93,516.20 ps towards damages with interest at 18% per annum prayed for in the written statement; vi) Whether the defendant is entitled for the declaration prayed for in his written statement; vii) Whether the defendant is entitled to mandatory and perpetual injunction as prayed for; viii) To what relief? Additional Issues dated 13.12.1996:- i) Whether the defendants are entitled for Rs.2,12,506.88 ps and for Rs.1,72,000/-against the plaintiff with the future interest @ 18% p.a.? ii) Whether the defendants are entitled for future damages at the rate of Rs.6,200/- per month? iii) Whether the counter-claim as claimed by the defendant is maintainable? iv) To what relief? Additional Issues dated 13.12.1996:- i) Whether the defendants are entitled for Rs.2,12,506.88 ps and for Rs.1,72,000/-against the plaintiff with the future interest @ 18% p.a.? ii) Whether the defendants are entitled for future damages at the rate of Rs.6,200/- per month? iii) Whether the counter-claim as claimed by the defendant is maintainable? iv) To what relief? Additional issues dated 16.03.1998:- i) Whether the defendant is entitled for future damages at the rate of Rs.10,125.45 ps per month along with interest @ 18% p.a. on monthly amount till the date of realization? ii) To what relief? 13. Evidence was let in. On behalf of the plaintiffs, their GPA Holder – Krishna Rao Keshav was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A.1 to A.81 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, the GPA Holder and the father of the defendant – Hari Kishan Agarwal was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.B.1 to B.147 were marked. Exs.C.1 to C.23 were also marked through Court. 14. The trial Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, partly decreed and partly dismissed the suit and the operative portion of the impugned judgment reads as under:- “IN THE RESULT, the court is do and hereby dismissed the suit with costs for the reliefs of dissolution of partnership firm M/s.United Builders and rendition of accounts and damages except as granted by this Court herein and making the defendant to take back the money invested by him together with 6% interest. The suit is partly decreed with costs awarding damages at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per month for non-delivery of the northern side flat in the first floor from July, 1990 till the date of realization. Similarly, the Court is do and hereby partly decreed the counter claim declaring the defendant alone entitlement to sell the flats except the flats in ground floor and northern flat in the first floor in Sri Krishna Apartments awarding damages to the extent of Rs.5,000/-. The counter claim is dismissed for the rest of the reliefs.” 15. Similarly, the Court is do and hereby partly decreed the counter claim declaring the defendant alone entitlement to sell the flats except the flats in ground floor and northern flat in the first floor in Sri Krishna Apartments awarding damages to the extent of Rs.5,000/-. The counter claim is dismissed for the rest of the reliefs.” 15. The defendant also filed a suit in O.S.No.518 of 1986 before the Court below against the plaintiffs’ with the following reliefs:- a) restraining the defendants 1 to 3 from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff in the covered parking portion and around ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’ in plots 33, 34 and 35 in Survey Nos.2, 3 and 4 at Musheerabad as shown in yellow colour except residential portion ABCD and entrance “E” shown in the plan of “Sri Krishna Apartments” through the gate; b) Restraining the defendants No.1 to 3 perpetually from independently laying any drainage pipe lines through the open area (yellow colour) of “Sri Krishna Apartments”; c) Restraining the defendants 1 to 3 from independently obtaining any electricity and water supply connection in their individual names in the ground floor by passing through the open area (yellow colour) of “Sri Krishna Apartments”; d) Restraining the defendants 1 to 3 from using water from the well “W” (blue colour) constructed by the plaintiff for the purpose of construction work only in “Sri Krishna Apartments”; e) Granting mandatory injunction against the defendants 1 to 3 to close the three doors and to remove five projections (shown in red colour) which are in violation of the municipal sanctioned plan; f) Awarding the cost of the suit and grant relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff will be found entitled.” 16. While the above appeals are pending before this Court, the plaintiffs’ executed registered sale deed dated 23.06.2004 bearing Document No.1760 of 2004 whereunder, they sold all the premises bearing municipal No.1-5-6/33 constructed on the plot bearing Nos.33, 34 and 35 totally admeasuring 808.59 square yards at Musheerabad, Hyderabad to one Sri B.Balraj Goud and Sri A.M.Raja. On coming to know about the same, the defendant filed the following applications with the following reliefs:- 17. On coming to know about the same, the defendant filed the following applications with the following reliefs:- 17. The sum and substance of the arguments advanced by Sri J.Prabhakar, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant is that having entered into a partnership firm, the plaintiffs cannot claim that they are the owners of the suit schedule property as the same vests with the firm and that no individual partner can alienate the property in a partnership firm and that the plaintiffs, with utter disregard to the terms and conditions of the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981, claimed the suit schedule property as if the same exclusively belongs to them and that P.W.1 himself, in his evidence, claimed that the plaintiffs’ are the owners of the suit schedule property. In support of his contention that a partner in a partnership firm cannot sell his share, he has relied upon the judgment in the case between ChamparanCane Concern (dissolved) Vs. State of Bihar and another ( AIR 1963 SC 1737 ). It is also one of his main submissions that though the defendant was inclined to proceed with the construction and had already invested a huge amount for constructing, laying slabs and raising pillars, but it is the plaintiffs who caused obstruction and prevented the defendant from making further construction. It is also his submission that the plaintiffs opened doors in the ground floor against the sanctioned plan and they also laid drainage pipelines and also constructed chajjas causing obstruction to the construction work. It is also his submission that the plaintiffs, with ulterior motive, did not handover the cement permit which is in their name to the defendant and thereby prevented the defendant from proceeding with the construction. It is also his submission that even if the partnership firm is dissolved, Section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (‘Partnership Act’, for brevity) will govern the field. While referring to the partnership deed and placing reliance on the judgment in the case between Bay Berry Apartments (P) Ltd., Vs. Shobha and others (2006) 13 Supreme Court Cases 737), learned counsel submitted that in construing a document, the Court cannot assail any other meaning when a document is not unascertained or does not contain any ambiguous expression and it should be given its liberal meaning. Placing reliance on the judgment in the case between Rachakonda Narayana Vs. Shobha and others (2006) 13 Supreme Court Cases 737), learned counsel submitted that in construing a document, the Court cannot assail any other meaning when a document is not unascertained or does not contain any ambiguous expression and it should be given its liberal meaning. Placing reliance on the judgment in the case between Rachakonda Narayana Vs. Ponthala Parvathamma and another (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 173) it is submitted that even at the appellate stage, a direction to the defaulting party to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform can be pleaded and that when an appellate Court hears the appeal, the whole matter is at large. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on the judgment in the case between BinaMuralidhar Hemdev and others Vs. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev and others (1999) 5 Supreme Court Cases 222) and submitted that a partner, though under the terms of the partnership agreement is entitled to deal with the property, cannot transfer the land in the absence of the conferment of any express power to that effect. 18. Per contra, the sum and substance of the arguments advanced by Sri M.A.K.Mukheed, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs is that the construction has to be carried out by the defendant in accordance with the specifications given by the plaintiffs as per the terms and conditions of the partnership deed and that the both the parties have equal share the profits, but the defendant, with a view to grab the entire suit schedule property, refused to furnish the accounts of the partnership firm and also refused to give share in the profits of the business and by misinterpreting the clauses of the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981, started saying that the plaintiffs are entitled to only one flat in the first floor towards northern side when he is constructing sixteen flats. It is also his submission that at that time, the rate of construction was only at Rs.80/-per square feet and that in view of the attitude of the defendant, differences arose between the parties. It is also his submission that the defendant has raised only framed structure of the ground floor and the first floor and did not maintain the quality of construction as a result of which, the intending purchasers did not come forward to purchase the flats. It is also his submission that the defendant has raised only framed structure of the ground floor and the first floor and did not maintain the quality of construction as a result of which, the intending purchasers did not come forward to purchase the flats. It is also his submission that the defendant, who ought to have obtained electricity connection in his name and constructed the drainage, failed to do so as a result of which, the plaintiffs, though took over the possession of the framed structure in the ground floor and though constructed residential flats with their own money, could not enjoy the same and consequently, they were forced to obtain electricity connection in their individual names and when the plaintiffs obtained electricity connection in their individual names, the defendant lodged complaint with the electricity department and even went to the extent of denying the right of the plaintiffs in the ground floor residential flats which is contrary to the clauses of the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981 and also filed a civil suit against the plaintiffs and thereby, the defendant is responsible for not completing the construction of the apartments as per the agreed terms. It is also his submission that though the defendant made allegations that the plaintiffs caused obstructions to him, but having obtained the injunction order from the Court, the defendant ought to have completed the construction of the apartments. It is also his submission that subsequently, the parties have entered into a settlement and filed a joint memo into the Court on 09.03.1989 and thereafter the defendant constructed three flats but deliberately did not construct the flat which has to be given to the plaintiffs as per the agreed terms. It is also his submission that there is no truth in the allegation of the defendant that the plaintiffs have not supplied the allotted cement permit to the defendant to obtain the control cement and that it is the defendant who filed to pay the required amount though the GPA of the plaintiffs have informed him about receiving the cement permit. Relying on the judgments in the cases between A.GopalaReddi Vs. E.Jayarmi Reddi (died) by LRs. ( 2003 (2) ALD 112 ), GanjiSubbarayudu Vs. K.Sudharshana Rao ( 2009 (3) ALD 175 ) and N.Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. Relying on the judgments in the cases between A.GopalaReddi Vs. E.Jayarmi Reddi (died) by LRs. ( 2003 (2) ALD 112 ), GanjiSubbarayudu Vs. K.Sudharshana Rao ( 2009 (3) ALD 175 ) and N.Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. M.Venkata Bala Krishnamurthy ( AIR 1989 AP 167 ), learned counsel submitted that if one of the partner fails to furnish the accounts of the firm to the other partner, the other partner can sue for dissolution of the partnership firm for lock of confidence. It is also his submission that no partnership business can run when there is no sharing of profits and the accounts are not furnished. Learned counsel had taken me through the evidence and the documents on record and submitted that it is due to the attitude of the defendant that the construction work could not be carried on. It is also his submission that since it has become impossible to carry on the partnership business now, there is no other course except to dissolve the partnership firm and that the plaintiffs may be permitted to construct their own flats and that whatever amount has been invested by the defendant in the construction may be ordered to be returned to him. 19. I have considered the above rival contentions. The points that arise for consideration in these appeals are (1) What is the effect of non-registration of the partnership firm and whether a partner can enforce his rights arising out of an unregistered partnership firm; (2) Which party is at fault in not complying with the terms and conditions of the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981 and who is mainly responsible for not carrying out the construction of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’; and (3) To what relief the parties are entitled to. Point No.1:- 20. It has to be seen that admittedly, the partnership deed is an unregistered one. Section 69 of the Partnership Act reads as follows:- “69. Effect of non-registration:-(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person sing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.” 21. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that when the partnership deed is not registered, a partner will be unable to enforce his rights either against the third party or against his fellow partners. The only exception is that he may sue for dissolution of the firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or for any right or power to realize the property of a dissolved firm. 22. Thus, the clear position is that in case of an un-registered partnership firm, its partners will be unable to enforce their claims either against the third parties or against their fellow partners. The only exception is a suit for dissolution of the firm. Therefore, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can enforce their rights since the firm is an unregistered one and sub-section 2 of Section 69 of the Partnership Act bars the suit to enforce a right arising from the terms and conditions of an un-registered firm. It is not in dispute that the suit is based on the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981 and we are not concerned with the earlier partnership deeds between the parties, since they are superseded by the unregistered partnership deed dated 14.11.1981. Consequently, the plaintiffs cannot seek any reliefs except the dissolution of the partnership firm. Similarly, the defendant also cannot claim any right or damages arising out of the partnership between the parties in view of the clear prohibition under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Point No.2:- 23. The allegation of the defendant is that cement was not available in the open market for purchase and as there was control, authorization letters were required for purchasing the same in quota and that the allotment of cement was in the name of the Society and that P.W.1 had withhold authorization letters of cement issued by the Civil Supplies Department. However, the defendant admitted that except the last permit of 25 tonnes of cement, all other authorization letters were handed over to him. Thus, it is clear that except last permit of 25 tonnes of cement, all other permits were handed over to D.W.1. Moreover, a suggestion was given to D.W.1 that cement was decontrolled from 28.02.1982. Therefore, it is clear that there was no problem to purchase cement from 28.02.1982 and the contention of the defendant that for non-supply of cement permit he stopped further construction has no basis. Moreover, a suggestion was given to D.W.1 that cement was decontrolled from 28.02.1982. Therefore, it is clear that there was no problem to purchase cement from 28.02.1982 and the contention of the defendant that for non-supply of cement permit he stopped further construction has no basis. In Ex.A.27 – reply to the legal notice issued by the defendant, the plaintiffs asserted that they intimated the defendant about the receipt of permit for lifting 25 tonnes of cement on 17.03.1982 i.e., on the very same day of their receiving permit and that it is the defendant who failed to deposit the requisite amount by way of Demand Draft with M/s. Raasi Cements, Hyderabad, and lift the cement. 24. Though the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant did not give 14 percent cement for completing the construction of two ground floor flats, but it appears that the plaintiffs have not taken this plea in their plaint. Therefore, there is no need to consider the same, though there is some evidence on this aspect. 25. The next allegation of the defendant is that the plaintiffs obtained electricity connection in their individual names to their residential flats in the ground floor. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiffs obtained electricity connection in their individual names. It is also an admitted fact that the defendant raised objection and lodged a complaint with the electrical department authorities and also to the Chairman of APSEB. As seen from the clauses of the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981, it is not clear as to whether the builder should obtain electricity connection or the individual flat owners should obtain the electricity connection in their individual names. Anyhow, the version of the defendant is that he could not obtain electricity connection due to non-cooperation of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the progress of the construction work hampered for want of electricity connection. It has to be seen that the defendant had already raised structures up to the first floor and RCC columns and slabs were also raised. It is an admitted case that the plaintiffs are entitled for two flats in the ground floor and they were handed over the skeleton structure of two flats in the ground floor. It is also an admitted case that it is the plaintiffs who had completed the construction of two flats in the ground floor. It is an admitted case that the plaintiffs are entitled for two flats in the ground floor and they were handed over the skeleton structure of two flats in the ground floor. It is also an admitted case that it is the plaintiffs who had completed the construction of two flats in the ground floor. It appears that P.W.1 started living there and also wanted to open his office. In the above circumstances, he seems to have applied for electricity connection. It is not the case of the defendant that he had applied for electricity connection even before P.W.1 had applied for the same and at that time, P.W.1 did not co-operate with him. Admittedly, the defendant did not apply for electricity connection. Being a builder, the defendant ought to have applied for electricity connection. Without obtaining electricity connection, he had constructed RCC frame structure of the ground floor and first floor. When he had completed RCC frame structure of ground floor and first floor without electricity connection, the version of the defendant that he could not proceed further for want of electricity cannot be accepted. There is nothing on record to show that when the defendant applied for electricity connection, P.W.1 did not cooperate with him. Yet, there is another aspect. As seen from Ex.A.1 letter, the defendant had handed over framed structure of the residential flats on the ground floor to the plaintiffs on 25.11.1981. However, in Ex.A.21 – letter dated 13.02.1982 addressed to the Chairman, APSEB, by the defendant, he alleged that the plaintiffs have not yet got possession of the residential flats in the ground floor, which is contrary to his version in Ex.A.1. Therefore, even if it is an admitted fact that the plaintiffs obtained electricity connection in their individual names, there is nothing to say that, that itself caused any obstruction to the defendant in carrying out the construction work. 26. The other allegation of the defendant is that the plaintiffs opened two doors on the western side and one door on the northern side and also 2 feet width chajjas on the northern and western sides of the ground floor and projections over windows on eastern side hampering the free flow of ingress and egress. The plaintiffs denied that their construction of residential portion is not in accordance with the sanctioned plan nor it caused any obstruction to anyone. The plaintiffs denied that their construction of residential portion is not in accordance with the sanctioned plan nor it caused any obstruction to anyone. Under Ex.B.31, the plaintiffs informed that the projections of the residential portion of the ground floor were constructed as per the advice of the defendant. According to D.W.1, chajjas of 2 feet width on northern and western side were constructed by the plaintiffs. It was suggested to D.W.1 that chajjas did not cause any inconvenience to the passers by, including the residents. Of course, D.W.1 denied the same. Ex.A.29 is the copy of the sanctioned plan. It has to be seen that the defendant had handed over only framed structure to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs themselves constructed their two residential flats in the ground floor. Even if the plaintiffs opened doors contra to the sanctioned plan or constructed 2 feet width chajjas, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the doors opened by the plaintiffs cause any obstruction to the defendant in carrying out the construction work. It is not the case of the defendant that the municipal officials raised any objection for opening the doors by the plaintiffs on their western and northern sides or stopped construction on that ground. 27. The other allegation of the defendant is that the plaintiffs laid drainage line on the eastern side of the property which caused hindrance to him to lay the required drainage line connecting the main drainage line. According to D.W.1, he requested P.W.1 to remove the drainage connection and in turn P.W.1 promised to give permission for laying required drainage line. According to P.W.1, there is sufficient space for laying two drainage lines and that a drainage line of 6” diameter can be laid in the available space. According to him, he had only connected the drainage to the main line laid down by the Society. It is also the case of P.W.1 that the defendant did not pay the betterment charges. All the circumstances have to be taken into consideration. The defendant is a builder. Admittedly, the responsibility of making entire construction rests on him. He has handed over RCC frame structure of two residential flats to the plaintiffs and admittedly he did not construct required drainage or obtained electricity by that time. The plaintiffs cannot use the residential flats in the ground floor without those basic facilities. The defendant is a builder. Admittedly, the responsibility of making entire construction rests on him. He has handed over RCC frame structure of two residential flats to the plaintiffs and admittedly he did not construct required drainage or obtained electricity by that time. The plaintiffs cannot use the residential flats in the ground floor without those basic facilities. It is not the case of the defendant that when he wanted to lay a drainage line, the plaintiffs caused any obstruction to him. Having not laid the drainage pipeline, the defendant is not justified in saying that the drainage line laid by the plaintiffs caused obstruction to him in making further construction or laying a new drainage line with bigger size. He would have laid a bigger drainage line and connected the plaintiffs drain and other drains of the flats to the said drainage line. Moreover, as seen from the record, the parties filed a joint memo on 09.03.1989 and subsequently the defendant constructed three flats in the first floor and according to the plaintiffs, the defendant himself constructed his drainage line to the drain already constructed by the plaintiffs. It has to be seen that all the permissions such as municipal permission, permission for laying drainage line and electricity connection were obtained by the Society on behalf of the plaintiffs. It is not in dispute that when the plaintiffs and the defendant constituted a firm in the name and style of ‘M/s.United Builders’, they have not obtained any fresh sanction plan from the Municipal Corporation for construction or for laying drainage line. Therefore, it appears that there is no force in the stand of the defendant on this aspect. 28. The other allegation of the defendant is that P.W.1 had driven away the intending purchasers. Except the self-serving statement of D.W.1, there is no other evidence on this aspect. Moreover, D.W.1 himself admitted that P.W.1 brought a customer by name Vidya Ranga Rao to purchase a flat. It is suggested to D.W.1 that the said Vidya Ranga Rao paid a sum of Rs.10,000/- to him and subsequently said Vidya Ranga Rao filed a suit against D.W.1 for recovery of money. According to D.W.1, an appeal is pending before the High Court. Thus, the admission made by D.W.1 himself shows that P.W.1 was also bringing customers to purchase the flats and cooperating with the defendant. 29. According to D.W.1, an appeal is pending before the High Court. Thus, the admission made by D.W.1 himself shows that P.W.1 was also bringing customers to purchase the flats and cooperating with the defendant. 29. It is also alleged that P.W.1 obstructed the defendant in digging bore well. P.W.1 himself admitted that he obstructed the defendant in March 1994 when the defendant tried to dig a bore well. He has also admitted that he did not point out the place to dig bore well. However, D.W.1 subsequently admitted that a bore well was dug on the eastern side of the premises in the middle of March 1994. 30. Coming to the allegations made by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant failed to maintain and furnish the accounts. As seen from the Clauses of the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981, the parties became partners in the business of construction of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’ and the sale of the apartments. Clause 9 of the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981 is as follows. “9. The partners of the 1st and the 2nd party are entitled to equal half share in the profits of the business after excluding the expenditure incurred by the 2nd party for the construction of the apartments. The 1st party has voluntarily offered to take one flat on the 1st floor facing towards northern side admeasuring approximately 1044 square feet including common services in lieu of his profits in the business. The 2nd party has accepted this offer and hereby undertakes to give the flat of the 1st floor along with other flats in the 1st floor. The first accounting year of the firm will be closed on 30th June, 1981.” 31. As seen from the above, it is clear that the partners of the first party (plaintiffs) and the second party (defendant) are entitled to equal share in the profits of the business after excluding the expenses incurred by the second party for the construction of the apartments. The next sentence is that the first party has voluntarily offered to take one flat admeasuring approximately 1044 square feet in lieu of their profits in business and the second party has accepted this offer and undertakes to give one flat on the northern side of the first floor along with the other flats in the first floor. The next sentence is that the first party has voluntarily offered to take one flat admeasuring approximately 1044 square feet in lieu of their profits in business and the second party has accepted this offer and undertakes to give one flat on the northern side of the first floor along with the other flats in the first floor. In this clause itself, it is specifically mentioned that the second party shall make good the losses to the first party to any defects in the construction of the apartments. In Clause 12 of the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981, it is specifically mentioned that the second party alone shall be responsible for any defective construction of the apartments to the buyers. Thus, it is clear that if there are any defects in the construction of the apartments, the second party, i.e., the defendant is responsible for the same. Though there is some confusion in Clause No.9 of the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981 with regard to the sharing of the profits, one thing is clear that the defendant is responsible for any defects in the construction of the apartments. It is also mentioned in said Partnership Deed that the accounting year of the firm will be closed on 30.06.1982. When the above referred clauses of the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981 are clear, the defendant, in his written statement, as referred in the above paragraphs, had categorically taken a stand that he is not obliged to furnish the accounts to the plaintiffs. The defendant’s specific case is that the plaintiffs are entitled to only ground floor residential portion i.e., two flats and parking portion, both RCC framed structure and one flat in the first floor towards northern side and except that, they have no right of any manner over ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’. In paragraph No.6 of his written statement, the defendant stated “it is denied that as per the terms and conditions of the partnership deed dated 14-11-1981, there is any liability or condition imposed on the defendant to maintain the accounts or produce or finalize the same or show any account to the plaintiffs”. It has to be seen that the quality of construction and the material used in the construction cannot be ascertained unless the accounts and the receipts showing the purchase of the material used in construction have been verified. It has to be seen that the quality of construction and the material used in the construction cannot be ascertained unless the accounts and the receipts showing the purchase of the material used in construction have been verified. Therefore, it is clear that it was obligatory on the part of the defendant to show the accounts to the plaintiffs to satisfy them that the construction work was being carried out as per the agreed specifications and that there are no defects in the construction. Thus, it appears that the whole trouble seems to have started when the defendant asserted that he is not responsible to show the accounts to the plaintiffs and failed to produce the same. Yet, there is another circumstance. When the matter was pending before the Courts, the parties filed a joint memo before the Court below and the defendant agreed to proceed with the construction and the plaintiffs agreed to cooperate with the defendant. Then, admittedly, that the defendant had constructed three flats in the first floor and admittedly residing in those flats, but admittedly, he had not constructed the flat on the northern side which is to be given to the plaintiffs as per the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981. Thus, it is crystal clear that it is the defendant who appears to be mainly responsible for breaking the relationship between the parties and terms and conditions of the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981. 32. Therefore, a reading of the entire evidence gives an impression that though the defendant was under an obligation to furnish the accounts, but he failed to furnish the accounts and more over asserted that he need not furnish the accounts and thereby the plaintiffs have lost an opportunity to verify the quality of the construction. 33. As far as the quality of construction is concerned, of course the version of the defendant that P.W.1 did not point out any defects when the possession of framed structures of two residential flats was handed over to him appears to be correct. However, the defendant in Ex.B.23 – Notice dated 14.04.1982, admitted that the plaintiffs stated that the construction was defective. P.W.1 has categorically deposed that the defendant reduced the size of columns in the first floor. According to him, in the ground floor it was 18” and in the first floor 18”, but in the second floor it was reduced to 12”. P.W.1 has categorically deposed that the defendant reduced the size of columns in the first floor. According to him, in the ground floor it was 18” and in the first floor 18”, but in the second floor it was reduced to 12”. P.W.1 has categorically deposed that the defendant used sub-standard and very poor quality material and did not use special quality of cement and the roof was leaking and that columns at the roof were not properly laid. According to him, the size of steel and number of rods were also reduced. It is also the case of P.W.1 that the defendant had shown two more stories and reduced the parking area and the open area shown in front of it is not as per the original sanctioned plan. It is also his case that as per the sanctioned plan, the defendant was supposed to use roof with 5 ½”, but the roof is only 4” and as a result of which, the ground floor roof, according to him, is weak. Admittedly, no engineer has been examined on behalf of the parties. P.W.1 is not an expertise engineer. P.W.1 is unable to say the number of rods that were required to be used and actually used. However, being a builder, DW.1 must satisfy the other partners. Partnership business cannot run unless the partners believe one another. It is the duty of the managing partner/builder to satisfy the other partners about the material used by him and about the quality of the construction. It has to be seen that though P.W.1 may be entitled for only one flat in the first floor, but he would expect a better quality in constructing his flat and therefore the defendant is guilty of not furnishing accounts to the plaintiffs. 34. Admittedly, the Court below came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs did not find out the quality of construction till a legal notice is issued to them by the defendant under Ex.B.23 – notice dated 14.04.1982. However, the Court below seems to have not considered Ex.B.24 – reply notice issued by the plaintiffs on 20.04.1982. 35. 34. Admittedly, the Court below came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs did not find out the quality of construction till a legal notice is issued to them by the defendant under Ex.B.23 – notice dated 14.04.1982. However, the Court below seems to have not considered Ex.B.24 – reply notice issued by the plaintiffs on 20.04.1982. 35. As can be seen from the contents of Ex.B.40 – notice issued by the plaintiffs dated 30.03.1982 to the defendant, the plaintiffs categorically alleged that the defendant failed to give 14% of the cement as agreed upon for using the same for construction of the residential portion of the ground floor and they had specifically alleged as follows:- “10. The incomplete flats constructed by your client could not be said for the simple reason that they were found defective in construction by the architects and Engineers brought by the intending purchasers. In order to suppress the said lapse on the part of your client, and as a retaliatory measure, your client is falsely alleging that the flats could not be sold due to non-production of the title deeds.” 36. Even in the notice issued on behalf of the plaintiffs dated 18.09.1984 under Ex.B.93, the plaintiffs specifically alleged that the construction of pillars and beams to the extent of the ground floor and the first floor were found defective. It is also alleged that the material used in the said incomplete construction were of inferior quality and the workmanship is of substandard. Even in the notice dated 11.04.1983 in Ex.B.92, the plaintiffs categorically stated that on account of the defective construction in the existing structures of RCC, no person is coming forward to purchase the proposed flats to be constructed. In view of the above documentary evidence, the Court below is not justified in holding that the plaintiffs kept quiet for nearly three years till the date of issuance of Ex.A.4 and did not complain about the defects and the standard of the work of the defendant. As discussed above, to verify the quality of the material used in construction, it was obligatory on the part of the defendant to produce the receipts and the accounts which admittedly, he has not done. 37. The whole trouble seems to have started when the defendant started and asserting his exclusive right over the entire building of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’. As discussed above, to verify the quality of the material used in construction, it was obligatory on the part of the defendant to produce the receipts and the accounts which admittedly, he has not done. 37. The whole trouble seems to have started when the defendant started and asserting his exclusive right over the entire building of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’. In Ex.A.30 letter, the defendant had styled himself as Financier and Managing Partner of M/s. United Builders. This was objected by the plaintiffs in their reply Ex.B.8, dated 02.03.1982, wherein they objected the action of the defendant in referring himself as Managing Partner of M/s. United Builders. In Ex.A.26 legal notice dated 17.03.1982, the defendant had categorically stated that the plaintiffs are entitled only to the ground floor portion consisting of two residential flats and parking portion, both RCC frame structure and one flat in the first floor towards northern side in lieu of half share in the profits of the business and that the plaintiffs have no rights in ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’. To this notice, the plaintiffs issued reply notice in Ex.B.40 dated 30.03.1982 contending that they are entitled to half share in the profits derived after the sale of flats of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’. Then, the defendant issued another notice in Ex.B.23 dated 14.04.1982, wherein he had stated that the plaintiffs are entitled to only the ground floor consisting of residential portion, i.e., two flats and parking portion, both RCC frame structure only and one flat in the first floor of the apartments towards northern side in lieu of half share in the profits. In the above circumstances, the defendant filed O.S. No.857 of 1982 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking permanent injunction against the plaintiffs from interfering with his construction work and obtained interim injunction order in I.A. No.408 of 1982 against the plaintiffs. 38. Sri Prabhakar, learned counsel for the defendant, submitted that the recitals of the partnership deed cannot be assigned any other meaning and in support of the said contention he has relied on Bay Berry Apartments’s case (2 supra), wherein it was held as follows. “When a document is not uncertain or does not contain an ambiguous expression it should be given its literal meaning. Only when the contents are not clear the application of principles of construction of a document have to be applied. “When a document is not uncertain or does not contain an ambiguous expression it should be given its literal meaning. Only when the contents are not clear the application of principles of construction of a document have to be applied. It is also not a case where there exists any inconsistency between an earlier and later part of the document. What is necessary for a true, proper and effective construction of the will in question is to give effect to the intention of the propounder of the Will.” 39. Here, it is apt to extract clauses 9 to 14 of the Partnership Deed Dated 14.11.1981 which are as under:- 9. The partners of the 1st and the 2nd party are entitled to equal half share in the profits of the business after excluding the expenditure incurred by the 2nd party for the construction of the apartments. The 1st party has voluntarily offered to take one flat on the 1st floor facing towards northern side admeasuring approximately 1044 square feet including common services in lieu of his profits in the business. The 2nd party has accepted this offer and hereby undertakes to give the flat of the 1st floor along with other flats in the 1st floor. The first accounting year of the firm will be closed on 30th June, 1981. 10. The 1st party has agreed to cooperate with the 2nd party ad undertake to sign on agreements of sale, Documents of sale deed or any other papers or applications etc., to carry out the partnership business and to execute the sale deeds of the Apartments before registration authority or any officer. 11. The 1st party has agreed and hereby undertakes to compensate the loss to the 2nd party if sustained to the 2nd party due to any defect in the titles of the plots of the land and/or in the permit No.193/43 of 1980 of construction issued by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. The 2nd party shall make good the losses to the 1st party to any defects in the construction of the apartments. 12. The 2nd party alone shall be responsible for any defective construction of Apartments to the buyers. 13. The 2nd party alone shall be entitled to operate the Bank Accounts. 14. The Partnership Firm shall be determined after the complete disposal of the flats of “Sri Krishna Apartments”. 12. The 2nd party alone shall be responsible for any defective construction of Apartments to the buyers. 13. The 2nd party alone shall be entitled to operate the Bank Accounts. 14. The Partnership Firm shall be determined after the complete disposal of the flats of “Sri Krishna Apartments”. The assets and liabilities of the partnership firm shall be determined as per the above clauses and the partnership Act, 1932. 40. Though Clause 9 of the partnership deed dated 14.11.1981 is not clear, but it appears that the plaintiffs have agreed to take one flat in the first floor towards northern side admeasuring 1044 sq. ft., including common areas in lieu of their profits in the business. Of course, the subsequent sentence i.e., the second party has accepted this flat and hereby undertakes to give the flat of the first floor along with other flats in the first floor is creating some confusion. Similarly, the first part of the clause also is not clear. Anyhow, since the partnership deed is an unregistered one, the settled legal position is that a partner of an unregistered firm cannot enforce his right arising out of the said contract. Therefore, no useful purpose will be served by interpreting the partnership deed in either way. 41. As seen from the record, it is true that the plaintiffs have also asserted their title when they applied for electricity connection and also obstructed the defendant when he wanted to dig a bore well. P.W.1 has also gone to the extent of stating in his evidence that he is not ready to cooperate with the defendant to complete the project as the defendant had spoiled the whole atmosphere and he has not with the cordial terms with them.Sri J. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the defendant, is right in saying that once any asset is brought into the firm, it becomes an asset of the firm and it is not open for a party to assert exclusive, separate right and title in that property. He has also referred to the written statement filed by the plaintiffs in O.S. No.518 of 1986 in support of his contention and also the evidence of P.W.1. He has also referred to the written statement filed by the plaintiffs in O.S. No.518 of 1986 in support of his contention and also the evidence of P.W.1. P.W.1 denied that the property belongs to the firm and he has admitted that he was making complaints to the police styling himself as owner of the property and P.W.1 also stated that the suit property was never transferred in the name of the firm. However, what is required to be seen is that who is mainly responsible for not completing the project and who has violated the clauses of the partnership deed. It has to be seen that subsequently the parties have filed a joint memo before the Court and in pursuance of the said joint memo the defendant had constructed three flats in the first floor. It is not in dispute that now the defendant has been residing with his family members in these three flats. It is not clear whether the parties have subsequently obtained municipal sanction plan for raising constructions in 1989. Thus, it is clear that the defendant was allowed to make further construction after filing the joint memo. Admittedly, when the defendant had constructed three flats in the first floor, nothing prevented him to construct another flat which is to be given to the plaintiffs as per the clauses of the partnership deed. Admittedly, the defendant did not construct the flat towards northern side in the first floor and thus acted against the spirit of the clauses of the partnership deed and violated the clauses of partnership deed. Thus, it is the defendant who is mainly responsible and guilty of violating the clauses of the partnership deed. Subsequently also there are number of complaints lodged by the defendant against the plaintiffs and of course the plaintiffs have also lodged complaints against the defendant to various authorities. 42. The defendant filed C.C.No.96 of 1994 alleging that the plaintiffs have flouted the orders of the Court in C.R.P.No.1077 and 1080 of 1983 and this Court directed the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, to go into the allegations of the respective parties and to submit his report. Accordingly, the learned VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, submitted his report dated 15.10.1992 to this Court. Accordingly, the learned VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, submitted his report dated 15.10.1992 to this Court. In the said report, it was observed that the defendant admitted that right from November, 1981, he was doing construction work and that he even stopped going to the suit schedule property after filing of the suit in O.S.No.857 of 1982 (re-numbered as O.S.No.518 of 1986) and he resumed the work only after filing of the joint memo. It was also observed that at the time when the defendant filed the contempt case in the year 1994, the defendant was not doing any construction work at all and that he failed to give the dates on which he gathered men and material and further failed to establish how and in what manner the plaintiffs interfered with his construction work. It was further observed that the GPA Holder of the plaintiffs was parking his car as per the orders of this Court and mere parking of the car by the GPA Holder of the plaintiffs will not cause any obstruction to the construction work, if any, undertaken by the defendant. With regard to the allegation that the plaintiffs placed number of flowerpots in a manner obstructing the defendant from carrying on construction work, it was observed that no evidence was adduced to show as to how the flowerpots caused inconvenience to the defendant in carrying on the construction work. It was also observed that the plaintiffs have obtained water connection from the municipality and that they were not using the water from the well as alleged by the defendant. It was also observed that the defendant himself took up construction of three more flats in the first floor of the suit schedule property and completed construction of the same without any hindrances and these circumstances go to show that water was sufficient for the defendant to take up the construction work even in the year 1989. Then, this Court, by an order dated 16.03.1993, having considered the entire record and the report submitted by the IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad referred supra, held that the findings recorded by the learned IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, were correct and upholding the same, closed the contempt case in C.C.No.96 of 1994. 43. Then, this Court, by an order dated 16.03.1993, having considered the entire record and the report submitted by the IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad referred supra, held that the findings recorded by the learned IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, were correct and upholding the same, closed the contempt case in C.C.No.96 of 1994. 43. No partnership business can be run without cooperation of the partners, particularly, when there are only two persons as partners as in this case. The construction work requires joint efforts and cooperation among them. Now, since the earlier sanction plan granted by Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad seems to have elapsed long back and in view of the failure on the part of the defendant to proceed with further construction though commenced in the year 1980 – 81 and partly constructed in 1988 – 89 and in spite of the orders in his favour enabling him to proceed with the construction, I am of the view that there is no possibility of the defendant completing the construction. Even otherwise, as discussed above, the defendant cannot enforce the terms and conditions of the unregistered partnership deed dated 14.11.1981. 44. In view of my above finding that the defendant himself is guilty of laches, the defendant is not entitled for any reliefs prayed for in the suit filed before the Court below. For the same reason, the counter-claim of the defendant is also liable to be dismissed. Since now the defendant cannot be directed to carry on the construction work of ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’, the plaintiffs claim seeking a direction to the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.3,10,000/- towards damages also cannot be granted. 45. It is settled law that a partner cannot transfer his share without the consent of the other, as observed in Champaran Cane Concern (dissolved)’s case (1 supra), but a defendant cannot agitate or enforce his right even if the plaintiffs have violated the terms and conditions of the partnership deed. Admittedly, no suit is maintainable against any firm or any member of the firm when the firm is not registered. Admittedly, no suit is maintainable against any firm or any member of the firm when the firm is not registered. Thus, except the suit for enforcement or any right to sue for dissolution of the firm or for accounts of the dissolved firm or any right or power to realize the property of a dissolved firm, no suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract shall be instituted in any Court on behalf of the firm or against any third party or by one partner against another. Therefore, a suit for dissolution and for accounts is maintainable. 46. Learned counsel for the respondents had relied upon the judgment in GanjiSubbarayudu’s case (6 supra), wherein, in a joint venture, merely for sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by reasons of holding a joint or common interest in that property was not treated as a partnership firm. In that case, respondents 1 and 2, who were brothers, started joint venture agreeing to share profits equally. They never intended to constitute any firm. There was no agreement between them to that effect. The suit was not on behalf of the firm and they filed suit in their individual capacity. The business was not started on any firm name. However, in a scheme, the brother stated that his brother and himself were partners in the said scheme. In the above circumstances, this Court held as follows:- “....sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from the property for the reasons of holding a joint or common interest in that property does not of itself make such persons partners.” 47. Therefore, in the instant case, though the defendant’s contention is that if at all the plaintiffs’ are not entitled to the profits as per the terms and conditions of the partnership deed, the same cannot be treated a partnership firm. 48. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment in N.Satyanarayana Murthy’s case (7 supra). Therefore, in the instant case, though the defendant’s contention is that if at all the plaintiffs’ are not entitled to the profits as per the terms and conditions of the partnership deed, the same cannot be treated a partnership firm. 48. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment in N.Satyanarayana Murthy’s case (7 supra). In that case, referring to Section 44 of the Partnership Act, this Court held as follows:- “…….a firm may be dissolved either by the consent of the parties or in accordance with the terms of the contract or happening of certain events or by one of the partners giving a notice of dissolution, if it is a partnership at will or by the Court if the circumstances enumerated in Cls (a) to (g) are attracted” 49. In the same judgment, the phrase “Just and equitable” came up for consideration. Referring to the judgment of the Privy Council in Re: Yendiji Tobacco Co. Ltd., (1916 2 Ch D 426), it was held as follows:- “……when a complete deadlock had arisen on the account of the conduct of the two partners who constituted a company, the substratum of the company was gone and that it was ‘just and reasonable’ within S.129 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, to wind up the business.” 50. Thus, it appears that whenever there is no longer possibility to carry on a partnership business, according to the true intent and meaning of the terms and conditions of the partnership but or to carryout essential purpose of the firm, it will be ‘just and equitable’ for the Court to determine the partnership. The Court has to consider the circumstance whether it would warrant dissolution or without dissolution whether the firm can be allowed to subsist in the interest of the remaining partners without jeopardizing the right of retiring a partner. The Court would be circumspect and would mould the relief on the exigencies available on the facts in a given case. 51. Here, it is apt to extract Section 44 of the Partnership Act, which reads as follows:- 44. The Court would be circumspect and would mould the relief on the exigencies available on the facts in a given case. 51. Here, it is apt to extract Section 44 of the Partnership Act, which reads as follows:- 44. Dissolution by the Court:-At the suit of a partner, the Court may dissolve a firm on any of the following grounds, namely: (c) that a partner, other than the partner suing, is guilty of conduct which is likely to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business, regard being had to the nature of the business; (d) that a partner, other than the partner suing, willfully or persistently commits breach of agreements relating to the management of the affairs of the firm or the conduct of its business, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the business that it is not reasonably practicable for the other partners to carry on the business in partnership with him; (e) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has in any way transferred the whole of his interest in the firm to a third party, or has allowed his share to be charged under the provisions of rule 49 of Order XXI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or has allowed it to be sold in the recovery of arrears of land revenue or of any dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue due by the partner; (g) on any other ground which renders it just and equitable that the firm should be dissolved. 52. As discussed in the above paragraphs, the conduct of the defendant in not maintaining the accounts and furnishing the accounts to the plaintiffs, in my considered view, effect prejudicially the carrying on of the partnership business and, therefore, the partnership firm is liable to be dissolved under Section 44 (c) of the Partnership Act. Even, the Partnership firm is also liable to be dissolved under 44(d) of the Partnership Act, since the defendant has committed breach of agreement by not constructing the flat on the first floor towards northern side, which is ought to be delivered to the plaintiffs though he had constructed three flats for his own residence on the first floor. In view of this circumstance also, the partnership firm has to be dissolved. In view of this circumstance also, the partnership firm has to be dissolved. It has to be seen that the parties have entered into agreement in the year 1981. Now we are in the year 2011. Of course, the suit was filed in the year 1984 and since then, it has been pending either before the Courts below or before this Court. In view of this changed circumstance also, it will be ‘just and reasonable’ if the partnership is dissolved. 53. Since the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981 is an unregistered one and the parties cannot enforce their rights except to seek for dissolution of the firm or for rendition of the accounts, the facts and circumstances of the case go to show that there is remote possibility of the parties working together or obtaining sanctions from the Municipal Authorities or other statutory permissions required for carrying out the project. On this ground also, the partnership firm has to be dissolved. 54. As far as the appeal in Tr.C.C.C.A.No.6 of 2008 is concerned, the defendant is the appellant and he filed a suit for injunction against the plaintiffs restraining them from interfering with his possession of the covered parking portion around ‘Sri Krishna Apartments’ in Pot Nos.33, 34 and 35 shown in yellow colour in the plaint plan, restraining them from independently laying any drainage pipeline through the open area and obtaining any electricity and water connections in their individual names in the ground floor passing through the open area shown in yellow colour in the plaint plan of the said apartments and from using water from the well constructed by the plaintiffs and to direct them to close the three doors and remove the five projections shown in red colour which were made in violation of the Municipal Sanction Plan and for the costs of the suit. 55. The defendant, in that suit, is claiming his rights arising out of the Partnership Deed dated 14.11.1981 which is an unregistered one. Therefore, the suit itself is not maintainable under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. Point No.3:- 56. In view of the above discussion and for the foregoing reasons, C.C.C.A.No.276 of 2003 is allowed in part. Therefore, the suit itself is not maintainable under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. Point No.3:- 56. In view of the above discussion and for the foregoing reasons, C.C.C.A.No.276 of 2003 is allowed in part. Consequently, the suit in O.S.No.1482 of 1984 stands decreed in part only to the extent of dissolving the partnership firm – ‘M/s.United Builders’ from the date of the filing of the suit before the Court below. The suit in respect of other reliefs stands dismissed. The defendant is directed to furnish the accounts of the dissolved partnership firm. However, the parties are at liberty to work out their remedies before the Court below. 57. C.C.C.A.No.323 of 2003 and Tr.C.C.C.A.No.6 of 2008 filed by the defendant against the plaintiffs are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 58. As a sequel to the disposal of the main appeals, the Miscellaneous Petitions filed along with these appeals are disposed of in the following manner:- 59. CCCAMP No.237 of 2005 has been filed to receive and mark the CC of sale deed dated 23.06.2004 as Ex.B.148 by way of additional evidence. Since the subsequent purchasers have already been impleaded, no prejudice will be caused by receiving and marking this document. Accordingly, this petition is ordered. CCCAMP No.241 of 2005 has been filed to declare the registered sale deed dated To declare the registered sale deed dated 23.06.2004 vide Document no.1760 of 2004 executed by the first respondent and on behalf of respondent Nos.2 and 3 by their GPA Holder in favour of respondent Nos.4 and 5 as illegal, void, unenforceable and cancel the same. Mr. J.Prabhakar, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant is right in saying that a partner cannot alienate the property and sale by a partner is illegal. But however, the fact remains that a partnership deed dated 14.11.1981 is an unregistered one and thus, no partner can institute a suit to enforce his right arising out of the said partnership agreement. In view of the same, it appears that the defendant since cannot enforce his right basing on the said partnership deed, the prayer of the defendant cannot be accepted. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. CCCAMP No.234 of 2007 is filed seeking permission to amend the written statement in O.S.No.1482 of 1994. In view of the same, it appears that the defendant since cannot enforce his right basing on the said partnership deed, the prayer of the defendant cannot be accepted. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. CCCAMP No.234 of 2007 is filed seeking permission to amend the written statement in O.S.No.1482 of 1994. Since all the pleas raised by the parties are already considered, no prejudice will be caused to the plaintiffs if the permission is accorded to the defendant to amend his written statement. Accordingly, this petition is ordered. CCCAMP No.167 of 2010 is filed for a direction to respondents 4 and 5 to produce the original sale deed dated 23.06.2004 bearing Document No.1760 of 2004 and the original title deeds referred to in clause-7 of the said sale deed. In view of the orders passed in CCCAMP No.241 of 2005, no separate order need be passed in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. CCCAMP No.166 of 2010 is filed seeking leave of this Court to file notice dated 15.06.2009 to produce the document and mark the same as Ex.149. In view of the orders passed in CCCAMP No.241 of 2005, no separate order need be passed in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. CCCAMP No.775 of 2010 is filed Seeking leave of the Hon’ble Court to file the CC of the memo of deposit of title deeds dated 18.07.2008 and mark as Ex.150. In view of the orders passed in CCCAMP No.241 of 2005, no separate order need be passed in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. As CCCAMP No.236 of 2005 and CCCAMP No.776 of 2010 are already ordered by this Court on 23.06.2006 and 24.01.2011 respectively, no further orders are required in these petitions. In view of the disposal of the main appeals itself, no orders need be passed in CCCAMP No.240 of 2005, CCCAMP No.11696 of 2004, CCCAMP No.11697 of 2004, CCCAMP No.99 of 2011, CMP No.23124 of 2003 and CCCAMP No.242 of 2005, which are accordingly dismissed.