JUDGMENT : Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. By this Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ-petitioner has prayed for a declaration that the provisions contained in Section 7-O of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (“Act”) are ultra vires the Constitution of India and has also prayed for quashing of the order dated 17th August 2011 passed by the Employees' Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (“Tribunal”) in ATA No.578(5) of 2011 by which the Tribunal directed the writ-petitioner to deposit 30% of the amount assessed by the respondent No.2 as condition precedent for entertaining the appeal. 2. The following facts are not in dispute : (a) The writ-petitioner is the Director of a Company named M/s. Vajra Bearings Ltd., registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The said company has Bearing Code No.GJ/21247 and is an establishment under the provisions of the Act. (b) Pursuant to the inquiry to determine the amount of provident fund dues for the period of evasion as alleged, upon a notice under Section 7-A of the Act issued to the company, it was decided by the respondent No.2 by its order dated 23rd September 2008 that a liability of Rs.19,00,787/- should be imposed on the establishment. (c) Being dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Tribunal under the provisions of Section 7-I of the Act. (d) By the order impugned herein, the Tribunal admitted the appeal on condition of depositing 30% of the amount assessed by the respondent No.2 within two months and also directed the respondent No.2 not to take any coercive action against the appellant till the disposal of the appeal. (e) Being dissatisfied, the present writ-application has been filed by which the writ-petitioner challenges the validity of Section 7-O of the Act on the ground that the same is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (f) The writ-petitioner has also challenged the legality of the order impugned on the ground that in the facts of the present case, the petitioner having proved prima facie merit in the appeal, the Tribunal below should have dispensed with the necessity of giving any security whatsoever as a condition precedent for entertaining the said appeal. 3. (f) The writ-petitioner has also challenged the legality of the order impugned on the ground that in the facts of the present case, the petitioner having proved prima facie merit in the appeal, the Tribunal below should have dispensed with the necessity of giving any security whatsoever as a condition precedent for entertaining the said appeal. 3. We, therefore, first propose to deal with the contention of the writ-petitioner that the provision of Section 7-O of the Act is violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. 4. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the writ-petitioner has strenuously contended before us that the said provision is violative of principles of natural justice as by imposing the condition of deposit of seventy-five percent of the amount which is the subject-matter of appeal, the right of the writ-petitioner to prefer appeal is unreasonably curtailed and moreover there is no provision in the Act for realisation of the dues by forfeiting the security. 5. On merit also, the learned advocate contends that there was no justification of imposing condition of deposit of 30% of the amount assessed when the Tribunal decided to admit the appeal being prima facie satisfied with the merit. He, therefore, prays for not only setting aside the order but also for a declaration that the provisions contained in Section 7-O of the Act for imposing condition precedent of pre-deposit of 75% of the amount was unreasonable and arbitrary and hence, ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 6. In order to appreciate the question of legality of the said provision, it will be profitable to refer to the provision contained in Section 7-O of the Act, which is quoted below:- “7-O. Deposit of amount due, on filing appeal.- No appeal by the employer shall be entertained by a Tribunal unless he has deposit with it seventy-five per cent of the amount due from him as determined by an officer referred to in section 7A: Provided that the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under this section.” 7. Similar question in connection with different other statutes containing similar provisions as involved in this writ-application has already been answered and is well settled by the Apex Court by this time. Similar question in connection with different other statutes containing similar provisions as involved in this writ-application has already been answered and is well settled by the Apex Court by this time. The Supreme Court had in the past occasions to consider similar provision of pre-deposit contained in different statutes and it was held that such restriction is not violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8. In this connection, we may profitably refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi reported in AIR 2008 SC 1640 where the Apex Court while a considering similar provision contained in Section 47A of the Stamp Act requiring pre-deposit of amount as condition of preferring appeal considered various other earlier decisions of the said court dealing with similar provisions. The following observations in that case are relevant and quoted below : “23. In Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmadabad and Ors., 1999 (4) SCC 468 , this Court referred to its earlier decision in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), 1968(4) SCC 402 wherein this Court observed : "The right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant." 24. In Anant Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 1975(2) SCC 175 this Court held that the right of appeal is a creature of the statute and it is for the Legislature to decide whether the right of appeal should be unconditionally given to an aggrieved party or it should be conditionally given. The right to appeal which is a statutory right can be conditional or qualified. 25. In M/s. Elora Construction Company v. The Municipal Corporation of Gr. Bombay and Ors. AIR 1980 Bombay 162, the question before the Bombay High Court was as to the validity of Section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Act which required pre-deposit of the disputed tax for the entertainment of the appeal. The Bombay High Court upheld the said provision and its judgment has been referred to with approval in the decision of this Court in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. The Bombay High Court upheld the said provision and its judgment has been referred to with approval in the decision of this Court in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and Ors. (supra). This Court has also referred to its decision in Shyam Kishore and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ann, 1993 (1) SCC 22 in which a similar provision was upheld. 26. It may be noted that in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and Ors. (supra) the appellant had challenged the constitutional validity of Section 406(e) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act which required the deposit of the tax as a precondition for entertaining the appeal. The proviso to that provision permitted waiver of only 25% of the tax. In other words a minimum of 75% of the tax had to be deposited before the appeal could be entertained. The Supreme Court held that the provision did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. 27. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act as amended by A.P. Act 8 of 1998 is constitutionally valid and the judgment of the High Court declaring it unconstitutional is not correct.” (Emphasis supplied by us.) 9. In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, there is, in our opinion, hardly any further scope of argument that the provisions of pre-deposit as condition precedent for maintaining an appeal is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution of India. 10. We now propose to deal with the decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the writ-petitioner. 11. In the case of Kothamasu Venkata Subbayya v. Udatha Pitchayya reported in AIR 1960 AP 349 , a learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering a question as to where an amount is deposited in Court as security under Order 41, Rule 5(3) (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appeal is dismissed, whether it can only be withdrawn if the decree-holder applies to the Court for executing his decree by the payment to him of the decretal amount out of the amount in deposit. In that context, the learned judge held that the security deposit in court does not 'ipso facto' without an order of the Court become the property of the decree-holder. We do not for a moment dispute the aforesaid proposition of law. The said provision being one of security, after disposal of the appeal, specific order should be obtained by the decree holder from the court for adjustment of the amount depending upon the fate of the appeal on merit. We fail to appreciate how the said decision can be of any help to the writ-petitioner in support of his contention that the provision of pre-deposit is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution of India. 12. In the case of Pratibha Singh and another v. Shanti Devi Prasad and another reported in AIR 2003 SC 643 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case arising out of a suit for specific performance of contract. The first appellate court in that case directed the defendant/appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 5000/- by way of interim order in exercise of the power conferred by R. 6 of O. 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure and simultaneously allowed the plaintiff/respondent to withdraw the amount before decision on merit. The amount was consequently withdrawn. When the appeal was finally disposed of, the High Court did not make any order as to the forfeiture of the security in favour of the plaintiff-decree-holders or as to the amount of costs or mesne profits being taxed and recovered out of the amount of security deposit. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any further and final order having been made, the amount of security demanded by the High Court through its interim order should have remained as security liable to be released in favour of the person who had deposited the amount of security. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any further and final order having been made, the amount of security demanded by the High Court through its interim order should have remained as security liable to be released in favour of the person who had deposited the amount of security. According to the Supreme court, in the absence of any specific judicial order having been made, the amount of security demanded by the High Court through its interim order should have remained as security and liable to be released in favour of the person who had deposited the amount of security and the amount of Rs.5,000/- which was deposited by defendant-judgment-debtors by way of security could not be appropriated by the plaintiff-decree-holders and the same would be returned to the defendant-judgment-debtors as the said amount had nothing to do with the amount of sale consideration. We are unable to appreciate how the said decision can be of any help to the writ-petitioner in support of his contention made herein. 13. Various other decisions of the Supreme Court, such as, the cases of (1) State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Roshan Singh and others ( (2008) 2 SCC 4888), (2) M/S Ram Chand and sons Sugar Mills Private Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava and others ( AIR 1966 SC 1899 ), (3) Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others ( AIR 1964 SC 993 ), (4) P. A. Ahmed Ibrahim v. Food Corporation of India ( (1999) 7 SCC 39 ) and (5) Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank Limited and others ( (1983) 4 SCC 625 ) have been cited in support of the proposition of law that when there is specific provision dealing with a situation contemplated by the Statute, the court cannot exercise inherent power in those situations. In our view, the aforesaid proposition of law, which is too well-settled, cannot come in aid of the writ-petitioner in resolving the above question of legality of the provisions of Section 7-O of the Act in the light of the Constitution of India or other provisions of the Act. The learned counsel for the writ-petitioner could not draw our attention to any of the provisions of the Act which is in conflict with any other provisions of the Act so as to declare such provisions as illegal. 14. The learned counsel for the writ-petitioner could not draw our attention to any of the provisions of the Act which is in conflict with any other provisions of the Act so as to declare such provisions as illegal. 14. Thus, the first point taken by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is bereft of any substance. We are also not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the security-deposit cannot be appropriated towards realisation of the dues because the object of the provision demanding security is to avoid delay of execution of the order impugned in the frivolous appeals filed by the employer and for that reason, the legislature made provision for deposit of the amount within the grip of the appellate court enabling it to adjust the amount of pre-deposit towards the dues in the event the appeal fails. 15. On merit, we find that the Tribunal on consideration of the materials on record came to the conclusion that it was a fit case where the writ-petitioner should be directed to deposit only 30% as security by exercising discretion in favour of the writ-petitioner. Such exercise of discretion does not, in our opinion, call for any interference in this writ-application at the instance of the writ-petitioners as the same is neither illegal nor unreasonable. It appears that the Tribunal has rather liberally exercised discretion in favour of the writ-petitioner by reducing the security deposit from 75% prescribed in the statute to 30%. No case has been made out to reduce the said security any further. It appears that the writ-petitioner during the proceedings before the original authority did not care to appear and co-operate and the order impugned was an ex parte one in spite of service of notice. 16. Both the points raised by the writ-petitioner having failed, we find no merit in this application and the same is consequently dismissed. 17. We, however, extend the time for giving security pursuant to the order impugned by a week from this date and if such security is given within the aforesaid period the Tribunal will treat the same as if the same has been deposited pursuant to the order impugned. 18. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.