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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 824 (MP)

Santosh Lodha v. State of M. P.

2011-07-27

G.D.SAXENA

body2011
ORDER 1. This revision petition under section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, preferred by the petitioner/accused is directed against an order dated 14th March 2011 in Special Case No. 2012011 passed by the Special Judge, (Atrocities) Guna, framing thereby the charge against the petitioner jar commission of offence punishable under section 325 of IPC read with section 3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 for short 'the Act'. 2. The facts in brief, are that on 14th January, 2011 at about 4.30 pm in Village Moria near Khedi reservoir (under construction), when the complainant Sadrilal was busy in performing his labour work, the accused-petitioner, who happened to be Suprevisor of that construction work, came to him and told to do work as per his accord and when the complainant refused, the accused abused him and caused injuries with a Spade. Accordingly, an FIR was lodged. During, investigation, the statement of complainant and other eyewitnesses were recorded. The witnesses in case-diary-statements, stated that the accused, who was Incharge of the work and belonging to a general category, with an intention to insult the complainant belonging to Scheduled Caste, hurdled him abuses denoting to his caste. Consequently, the offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act was added. After investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the criminal Court. On committal, the trial is under progress. The trial Judge framed the charge under section 3 (I) (x) of the Act along with other offences under the Indian Penal Code. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused is that the impugned order of charge is against the settled principles of law and without jurisdiction, hence, same is liable to be set aside. It is submitted that on perusal of the FIR and the statements recorded during investigation prima facie it clearly appears that the words uttered by the accused were under provocation without any intention to insult or humiliate the complainant by his caste. It is well settled law that mere utterance of words denoting caste of the complainant in a sudden provocation without intention to insult or humiliate does not give rise to constitute the offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act. It is well settled law that mere utterance of words denoting caste of the complainant in a sudden provocation without intention to insult or humiliate does not give rise to constitute the offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act. It is therefore prayed that by allowing the revision, the order of charge for commission of offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act be set aside. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in the case of Surendra Kaurav & others v. State of M.P. 2008 (1) MPHT 317 , Ram Chandra & others v. State of M.P. 2009 (I) MPWN 77 and Shankar Singh v. State of M.P. 2005 (II) MPWN 21 . 4. Learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent/State on the other hand, supported the impugned order framing charge against the petitioner and contended that no interference is warranted, at this stage. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Panel Lawyer on behalf of State/respondent. Perused the copies of charge-sheet papers and also the statements recorded under section 161 CrPC. 6. In all those cases referred to above by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments, it is held that merely because word "Chamar" has been used that would not mean that it was used in order to intentionally insult or humiliate the complainant, who is belonging to Scheduled Caste. 7. Further, in the case of Swam Singh v. State Through Standing Counsel and another [2008 MPLJ (4) Supreme Court 329]. the apex Court has observed as under: In our opinion, calling a member of the Scheduled Caste 'Chamar' with intent to insult or humiliate him in a place within public view is certainly an offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by using the word 'Chamar' will of course depend on the context in which it was used. A perusal of the FIR prima facie, shows that an offence is made out against the appellants 2 and 3. As already stated above, at this stage, we have not to see whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. We have only to see whether treating the FIR allegations as correct an offence is made out or not. As already stated above, at this stage, we have not to see whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. We have only to see whether treating the FIR allegations as correct an offence is made out or not. In our opinion, treating the allegations in the FIR to be correct an offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act is prima facie made out against appellants 2 and 3 because it prima facie seems that the intent of the appellants was to insult or humiliate the first informant, and this was done within the public view. Of course, it will be open to the appellants 2 and 3 to put up their defence at the trial, and the trial Court mayor may not accept the correctness of the allegations in the FIR. However, at this stage we cannot quash the FIR against them and the trial must proceed. 8. After examining the case in the light of the above and perusal of the FIR and the statements of the witnesses, it is gathered that the complainant had simply stated in the FIR recorded on 14th January 2011 that the accused-petitioner on account of his sitting idle, hurled abuses to him. It is nowhere mentioned by him that the accused with an intention to insult or humiliate abused him by uttering words "Chamru Hadda, I will kill you". During investigation, all the eyewitnesses mentioned in their statements regarding utterances of such abuses which were recorded on 27th January 2011 by the Investigation Officer. Thus, no intention on the part of the petitioner seems that his intent was to insult or humiliate the complainant and this was done within the public view, as observed by the apex Court in the case of Swam Singh (supra). Merely, because the petitioner has denoted the complainant by utterances "Chamru Hadda" that would not attract the requisites contained in the provisions of section 3 (1) (x) of the Act. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, the learned trial Court has absolutely fell in error in framing the charge against the petitioner for the said offence under the Act. No such ingredients for constitution of the offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act are found to be established. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, the learned trial Court has absolutely fell in error in framing the charge against the petitioner for the said offence under the Act. No such ingredients for constitution of the offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act are found to be established. Consequently, the charge framed for offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act is not sustainable as per provisions of law and the accused-petitioner deserves to be discharged. 9. In the result, the revision petition stands allowed only to the extent of framing of charge under section 3 (1) (x) of the said Act. The petitioner/accused accordingly stands discharged from the alleged offence under the Act. It is however, made clear that the trial against petitioner/accused shall continue for other charges except the charges under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act.