Judgment D.H. Waghela, J.—This appeal is preferred by the workman, who is original respondent in SCA No. 11767 of 2004 which is pending and wherein award of the Labour Court ordering reinstatement of the appellant is under challenge. Papers of the said pending petition and the civil application in which the impugned order was made were called for for perusal by this Court in view of the submissions made and the controversies raised at the bar. By the order dated 20.8.2010, which is impugned herein, application of the appellant for wages from the date of award till 14.9.2004 and wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act”) is rejected with cost of Rs. 500/-. Learned Single Judge of this Court has, in the impugned order, noted the fact that the impugned award was not stayed and, prima facie, it appeared that the appellant had not gone to resume his duties; and, therefore, it was clear that he was not willing to work, though the respondent had offered work. The affidavit filed by the appellant was held to be ‘bogus’ inasmuch as he possessed a bungalow and an Indigo car. 2. Being aggrieved by the above order and proceeding, the appellant has re-agitated his claim for wages under Section 17-B of the Act on the grounds that learned Single Judge has not followed the legal propositions settled by the co-ordinate benches of this Court in A.P.M.C. vs. P.B. Dave, [ 2008 (1) GLR 568 ] and Bhanulal Khimjibhai Solanki vs. Deputy Executive Engineer, [ 2004 (3) GLH 375 ]. Learned Counsel M.P.H. Pathak vehemently argued that the findings to the effect that the appellant was not willing to work, though the respondent had offered work, were perverse and not supported by any material on record. In fact, the appellant had repeatedly averred in his affidavits before learned Single Judge that he was willing to resume his duties and the respondent were not complying with the order of Labour Court. It was also argued that the appellant possessing and plying a car or living in a joint family in a bungalow were irrelevant facts; whereas his statements on oath that he was unemployed and simply sitting in the office of organizer of a housing society were relevant but disregarded in the impugned judgment. As against that, learned Counsel Mr. It was also argued that the appellant possessing and plying a car or living in a joint family in a bungalow were irrelevant facts; whereas his statements on oath that he was unemployed and simply sitting in the office of organizer of a housing society were relevant but disregarded in the impugned judgment. As against that, learned Counsel Mr. Dagli, appearing for the respondent, submitted that the averments and claim of the appellant were not bona fide, that the appellant had never reported for duty, that he was earning more than adequate remuneration by his construction and political activities and the litigation was carried on with an ulterior motive. 3. Even as the affidavits and counter-affidavits filed by the parties in the original proceeding before learned Single Judge as also herein are not accurate and specific, the facts which could be gathered there from are that the appellant is ordered to be reinstated by the award dated 22.4.2004 of Labour Court. The petition of the respondent challenging that award is admitted and entertained in September, 2004 and the application for 17-B was filed in September, 2005, but it was not pressed or decided till August, 2010. The original application only asserted that the appellant was not gainfully employed in any establishment and that he was ready and willing to resume his duties, but the respondent were not complying with the award. That was replied by the respondent’s affidavit stating that the appellant was employed for about two years on monthly salary of Rs. 700/- before termination of his service on 30.11.1990. It is stated that the appellant is in fact a well-known builder and partner in a number of schemes. Recently, one huge park was being organized by him with one Mr. Vasoya, in the name of “Kausar Park”, that he possesses an Indigo car and resides in a huge bungalow with luxurious facilities and has also contested election and he is elected as a member of Amod Gram Panchayat. The respondent have produced with the affidavit photocopies of newspaper report of the appellant’s election as Sarpanch in December 2006 and photographs of hording board of “Kausar Park” wherein the appellant and Mr. Vasoya are shown as ‘contact persons’ with their mobile telephone numbers. The respondent have produced with the affidavit photocopies of newspaper report of the appellant’s election as Sarpanch in December 2006 and photographs of hording board of “Kausar Park” wherein the appellant and Mr. Vasoya are shown as ‘contact persons’ with their mobile telephone numbers. Other photographs of the housing society and the appellant’s car parked at the office of the society as also of the residence of the appellant have been annexed with additional affidavit of the respondent. Therefore, it could not be disputed that the appellant was engaged in construction and political activities and leading a luxurious life in which the last drawn salary of Rs. 700/- could hardly make a difference. However, the appellant has averred in his reply to the additional affidavit of the respondent that: “. . . . . . I am neither an organizer nor investor” and “. . . . . . I am being unemployed, known to Mr. Vasoya, sitting in his office, without any payment of from him . . . . . .” That he is unemployed, ready to resume duties, doing nothing to enforce the award of reinstatement and at the same time sitting in the office of his acquaintenance without being employed and without any payment is too self-contradictory to be believed or to inspire any confidence. The obvious inference from the admitted facts is that the appellant is so employed with such remuneration that he cannot afford to resume his duties with the respondent even at the current much higher rate of wages. 4. With the above backdrop of facts, learned Counsel Mr. Pathak harped upon the fact that the respondent cannot get away with non-compliance of the award which was not stayed, that the impugned award being stayed or not was immaterial for granting the benefit under Section 17-B of the Act and that any personal or political activity or self-employment of the appellant could not be set up as defence against the claim for statutory benefits flowing from the mandatory provisions of Section 17-B of the Act. In that context, the respondent relied upon following observations made by the Apex Court in North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda [2007 LLR 340]: “17. In that context, the respondent relied upon following observations made by the Apex Court in North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda [2007 LLR 340]: “17. On the said question, we are unable to accept the reasoning of the Labour Court that the income received by the respondent from agricultural pursuits could not be equated with income from gainful employment in any establishment. In our view, “gainful employment” would also include self-employment wherefrom income is generated. Income either from employment in an establishment or from self-employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same . . . . . . .” The above observations were made in the context of deciding the issue of back-wages, whereas the language of Section 17-B clearly stipulates as a condition for grant of the benefit that: “if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period”. 5. Therefore, the issue which crops up for consideration and decision is: whether, in the facts of the present case, the appellant had not been employed in any establishment and whether it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during such period. Since the application under Section 17-B of the Act is decided only on the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties and there is hardly any scope for further enquiry or cross-examination, the Court has to go by the averments made in the affidavits, the surrounding circumstances, the confidence that the averments inspire and the preponderance of probabilities within such framework of scrutiny. And, keeping in view the primary purpose and object of the provisions of Section 17-B, it has to be ensured that pendency of proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court do not completely nullify the relief of reinstatement obtained by the workman. Relevant part of the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending the Act in 1982 reads as under: “It is observed that when Labour Courts pass awards of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Courts. The delay in the implementation of the award causes hardship to the workmen concerned. Relevant part of the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending the Act in 1982 reads as under: “It is observed that when Labour Courts pass awards of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Courts. The delay in the implementation of the award causes hardship to the workmen concerned. It is, therefore, proposed to provide for payment of wages last drawn by the workmen concerned, under certain conditions, from the date of the award till the case is finally decided in the Supreme Court or the High Courts.” 6. In the facts of the present case, the appellant is certainly capable of enforcing the award which is not stayed, but he has rested with the repeated assertions that he is ready and willing to resume his duties and he has not been employed in any establishment. His application has survived on such assertions for five years during which he could have initiated the proceeding for contempt of the Court, breach of the award or implementation of the award; and not having done so clearly subtracts bona fide from his assertions. Therefore, he is only left with the technical argument that all his indisputable business and political activities were not employment in an establishment. The word “establishment” is not defined in the Industrial Disputes Act and the width of meaning of that word can certainly not be restricted to an “industrial establishment”. The phrase “commercial establishment” is defined in Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, as under: “Sec.2 Definitions.—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,— (4) ‘commercial establishment’ means an establishment which carried on any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with or incidental or ancillary to any business, trade or profession and includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and a charitable or other trust, whether registered or not, which carried on whether for purposes of gain or not, any business, trade or profession or work in connection with or incidental or ancillary thereto but does not include a factory, shop, residential hotel, restaurant, eating house, theatre or other places of public amusement or entertainment.” 7. Although the above definition cannot be adopted for the present purpose, obviously the word “establishment” has a wider connotation even for the sector of commerce and industry. Although the above definition cannot be adopted for the present purpose, obviously the word “establishment” has a wider connotation even for the sector of commerce and industry. While the workman is required to have “not been employed in any establishment” for the purpose of grant of benefits under Section 17-B, the proviso clearly excludes the workman who “had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration”. Thus, the express language of the provisions of Section 17-B of the Act excludes from its benefit such workmen who have been “employed” and “had been receiving adequate remuneration”. Accepting that the employment of the workman has to be in an “establishment” for application of the proviso, the words “employment” and “establishment” have to be given full scope and meaning to prevent abuse of the benevolent provision of Section 17-B. The phrase “receiving adequate remuneration” is also capable of throwing contentious issues of facts and values. But there again the Court must adopt a pragmatic approach to sub serve the original purpose and object of the provision which is to provide sustenance to the workman during pendency of proceedings before the higher Courts. In view of limited scope of enquiry under Section 17-B, the Court has to draw necessary inferences from the material available on record. Therefore, considering the material placed on record in the proceeding before learned Single Judge and before this Court, the conclusion which is inescapable, in spite of his denials, is that the appellant is employed, he is in receipt of more than adequate remuneration and his attempt at claiming the benefit of Section 17-B is not bona fide. In such facts and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, the appellant is not entitled to any relief, and hence the appeal as well as the application made therein are dismissed, with costs quantified at Rs. 5, 000/- which shall be paid by the appellant to the respondent within a period of one month. P P P P P