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2011 DIGILAW 827 (GUJ)

Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Nandaben Wd/o Maganbhai Ranchhodbhai

2011-12-13

K.M.THAKER

body2011
JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. The heirs/legal representatives of the original respondent have taken out application being Civil Application No. 11893 of 2011 seeking below mentioned relief/s:- "5 (A) Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to pass an appropriate order for vacating the interim relief granted earlier on 28.2.2007 by this Hon'ble Court at annexure-A in the interest of justice. (B) Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to pass an appropriate order for fixing the date of early hearing of Special Civil Application No.5396 of 2007 in the interest of justice. (C)...... (D)......" 2. Heard Mr. Songara, learned advocate for the applicants. 3. It has emerged from the record that the original petitioner has, in the parent petition being Special Civil Application No.5396 of 2007 challenged the award dated 19.10.2006 passed by the labour Court, Nadiad in reference (LCN) No.99 of 1999 where by the labour Court directed the original petitioner corporation to reinstate the original respondent with continuity of service, however without any backwages. Learned labour Court also modified the original order of penalty imposed by the Corporation and converted the order into order of stoppage of two increments with permanent effect. 4. The petitioner felt aggrieved by the said direction viz. to reinstate the respondent with continuity of service and the direction modifying the order of dismissal into order of stoppage of two increments with permanent/future effect and that therefore the petitioner Corporation preferred petition being Special Civil Application No.5396 of 2007. 5. It also emerges from the record that when the petition was taken up for hearing on 28.2.2007, the Court passed below mentioned order:- "Heard the learned advocate. RULE. Notice as to interim relief returnable on 25th April, 2007. Pending this petition, there shall be ad-interim stay in terms of paragraph 8(C)." 6. Subsequently another order was passed in October 2007 i.e. 17.10.2007 when the Court observed that:- "Though served, none appears for the respondent. The interim relief granted earlier shall continue till further orders. It would be open for the respondent to approach the Court for vacating the same after making appropriate application with a copy to the other side." 7. Subsequently another order was passed in October 2007 i.e. 17.10.2007 when the Court observed that:- "Though served, none appears for the respondent. The interim relief granted earlier shall continue till further orders. It would be open for the respondent to approach the Court for vacating the same after making appropriate application with a copy to the other side." 7. It is in pursuance of and on the strength of the said order dated 17.10.2007 and more particularly in light of the fact that the original respondent has since expired, that the heirs / legal representatives of the original respondent have taken out the civil application requesting that the interim relief granted vide order dated 28.2.2007 may be vacated. The main reason, as mentioned above, for taking out present application is the sad demise of original respondent. 8. In view of the said unfortunate event i.e. death of original respondent, Mr. Raval, learned advocate for present opponent i.e. original respondent fairly agreed and gave consent qua the request by present applicants that the original petition itself may be taken up for hearing instead of merely considering request for vacating interim relief. Therefore, in view of the consent of the learned advocate for the opponent i.e. original petitioner Corporation and at the request of the applicant, the petition is taken up for hearing and decision today. 9. I have heard Mr. Raval learned advocate and Mr. Songara, learned advocate for the contesting parties on merits of the case involved in the petition. 10. In view of the unfortunate event i.e. sad demise of the respondent, direction passed by the labour Court requiring the petitioner to reinstate the respondent has lost the purpose and effect. The question of reinstatement of the original respondent now does not survive. However, for the purpose of determining the liability from the date of award until the date of the death of the respondent, the direction regarding reinstatement and its justifiability is required to be examined. 11. Therefore, before proceeding further, it is necessary to take into account certain relevant dates (a) the service of the respondent came to be terminated by the petitioner vide its order dated 8.3.1999. (b) the appropriate Government, vide its order dated 20.5.1999 referred the dispute about respondent's termination, for adjudication to the labour Court and the said order of reference culminated into reference No.99 of 1999. 12. (b) the appropriate Government, vide its order dated 20.5.1999 referred the dispute about respondent's termination, for adjudication to the labour Court and the said order of reference culminated into reference No.99 of 1999. 12. The award initially passed by the labour Court vide order dated 4.9.2001 was set aside by this Court (Coram:- Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.K. Rathod, as his lordships then was), vide order dated 30.1.2006 passed in Special Civil Application No.472 of 2003 which was filed by the Corporation and the case was remanded to the labour Court for fresh decision. 13. Thereafter, the labour Court passed another award dated 19.10.2006 which is impugned in present petition. Thus, the service of the respondent came to be terminated in March 1999 and reference came to be made in May 1999 and the award has been rendered in October 2006. 14. In the interregnum in March 2008 the respondent died. Therefore, question of reinstatement and petitioner's challenge against direction to reinstate would survive until the date of respondent's death i.e. 6.3.2008. Likewise, the question of backwages/consequential wages from the date of award until the date of respondent's death would survive. Therefore, I have examined the said aspect on the basis of the material on record of Special Civil Application No.5393 of 2007. 15. On examining the award dated 19.10.2006 it comes out that the petitioner corporation had terminated service of the respondent by way of disciplinary action after departmental inquiry in connection with the charge of misconduct of not issuing tickets even after recovering fare of Rs. 105/- and of reissuing used/issued tickets and also the charge of not recovering fare and not issuing tickets from two groups of passengers travelling from Udaipur to Nathdwara. The respondent was also charged for the misconduct of shortage of cash on hand at the time of checking and of overwriting in the way bill. 16. The respondent was aggrieved by the order of termination and he preferred departmental appeals. However the departmental appeals were also rejected. Therefore respondent had raised industrial disputes which was referred for adjudication to the labour Court Nadiad and culminated in to reference no. 99 of 1999. 17. 16. The respondent was aggrieved by the order of termination and he preferred departmental appeals. However the departmental appeals were also rejected. Therefore respondent had raised industrial disputes which was referred for adjudication to the labour Court Nadiad and culminated in to reference no. 99 of 1999. 17. The reference was resisted by the petitioner by filing written statement wherein the details of the charges levelled vide chargesheet and the details about the inquiry proceedings, findings of the inquiry officer the decision of the disciplinary authority and outcome of the appeals were mentioned and placed before the Court. 18. After considering the material on record and the evidence placed by the contesting parties the Court came to the conclusion that the departmental inquiry conducted against the respondent was legal and proper however as regards the findings of the inquiry officer the Court came to the conclusion that the inquiry officer had not considered the evidence on record and the findings were held to be perverse. The labour Court therefore considered it appropriate to direct the petitioner to reinstate the respondent. However while the labour Court recorded that the findings of the inquiry officer were perverse the Court also recorded that it was so because the inquiry officer did not consider that the lapses caused by the respondent in reissuing the used tickets and not issuing tickets and also in not recovering fare were caused because of respondent's ill-health and because the respondent was not granted leave and was required to report for duty. The labour Court also recorded that despite the said conclusion the loss caused to the corporation because of respondent's conduct cannot be ignored or overlooked and therefore the labour Court considered it appropriate to impose punishment of stoppage of two increments with permanent effect in substitution of the order of penalty passed by the employer. 19. Aggrieved by the said conclusions and decision by the labour Court the corporation preferred the petition which came to be admitted, as aforesaid, vide order 28.2.2007 and then by order dated 17.10.2007 the interim relief granted earlier came to be confirmed. In pursuance of the said two orders the above mentioned application has been taken out by the original respondent. 20. In pursuance of the said two orders the above mentioned application has been taken out by the original respondent. 20. On careful examination of the award by the labour Court it comes out that the labour Court has recorded conflicting and self contradicting conclusions inasmuch as on one hand the findings of the inquiry officer (that the workman was guilty of the charges and that he had committed the defaults) are held to be baseless whereas in the same breath the Court has also held that the inquiry officer did not consider that the workman committed the defaults without any intention and then the Court also imposed punishment for respondent's conduct. Such self-contradicting conclusions cannot be sustained. If the findings (that the charges were proved and the workman had committed the default) were perverse then there was no scope to hold that the default were committed without intention and then there was no scope to also impose penalty by converting the penalty order passed by the employer. 21. On examination of the award it is noticed that before the inquiry officer there was sufficient evidence to lead the inquiry officer to the conclusion that the charges levelled against him were duly established and his conclusions are neither ipse dixit nor perverse inasmuch as before the inquiry officer the reporter was examined who was even subjected to cross examination by the respondent's representative. The statement of the respondent was also recorded who admitted the defaults but attributed the ground of his alleged illness as the cause for the defaults the way bill which contained the overwriting was also produced before the inquiry officer, the details of the cash on hand as compared to the sale of tickets were produced on record before the inquiry officer and the reissued tickets were also produced before the inquiry officer. The inquiry officer based his findings on such evidence, however only on the ground that the inquiry officer did not accept respondent's submission that the defaults occurred because of ill-health, the labour Court came to the conclusion that findings are perverse because the inquiry officer did not consider that the defaults did not occur because of respondent's intention but because of his ill-health and the inquiry officer failed to consider the same explanation and the medical certificate. 22. The reason on which the labour Court found fault with inquiry officer's findings is unsustainable. 22. The reason on which the labour Court found fault with inquiry officer's findings is unsustainable. Not only there was sufficient material before the inquiry officer to reach to the conclusion which recorded but the fact and the settled position that if the inquiry officer accepted one of the two possible views then his findings, so long as they were based on evidence on record, could not have been faulted, is lost site of by the learned labour Court. 23. The Court also overlooked the position that in departmental inquiry the relevant criteria is preponderance of possibility and not the concept or doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" and that in the departmental inquiry mens ria is not necessary and / or relevant consideration to set aside the findings of the inquiry officer in disciplinary proceedings, though in given case the disciplinary authority may take the said aspect into account while deciding the quantum of punishment. 24. Thus, on overall consideration the conclusion of the learned labour Court with regard to the inquiry officer's findings is not sustainable and therefore, it is hereby set aside. Once it is found that the departmental inquiry was conducted in legal and proper manner and was not defective and when the findings of the inquiry officer are found to be based on evidence and they are possible view or one of the two available and possible views then, ordinarily, the Court would not interfere with the management's decision regarding penalty. 25. However in present case the labour Court has also substituted its decision for that of management's decision related to penalty. Having regard to the total length of respondent's service, his past record, gravity of the charges levelled against him in present case and the fact that unfortunately the respondent has expired during the proceedings, it appears appropriate that the decision of the labour Court to set aside the termination order may not be disturbed in view of the peculiar facts of present case however the substituted penalty needs to be enhanced and that therefore it is considered appropriate to direct, in the facts of the case, that the respondent be visited with punishment of stoppage of four increments with permanent/future effect while the order of termination stands set aside as per the decision of labour Court. Therefore, the petitioner shall calculate and pay wages to the respondent from 19.10.2006 (i.e. date of award) until 6.3.2008 (i.e. the date of respondent's death) and make the payment of wages for the said period accordingly. Any question of payment of backwages for the period from date of termination till the date of award does not arise since the labour Court has denied the said benefit. The other retiral benefits, if any, shall be paid to the applicants after giving effect to the order directing reinstatement and order imposing punishment of stoppage of four increment with permanent effect and order granting continuity of service. The benefits, if any, shall be paid within six weeks from the date of receipt of present order. With the aforesaid clarifications and directions the petition beings SCA 5396 of 2007 is partly allowed and it is accordingly disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 26. In view of the order passed on the main petition being SCA No.5396 of 2007 any separate order on Civil Application No.11893 of 2011 is not required, however the said civil application stands disposed of in light of the order on main petition. Petition partly allowed.