JUDGMENT I.P. MUKERJI, J. 1. THE company British India Steels Limited was wound up by an order of this Court on 16th July, 1997, on the recommendation of the Board For Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. This is an application made by the respondent No. 2 being Rajaram Dalmia, in misfeasance proceedings started by the Official Liquidator. 2. THIS applicant is a certificate debtor along with the company-in-liquidation in proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Amhedabad which is numbered as Original Application No. 288 of 1997. In connection with the above liquidation proceedings misfeasance proceedings inter-alia against the applicant are pending before this Court. It is submitted before me that before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Amhedabad, the applicant is a guarantor. 3. THE certificate is for about Rs. 15.60 crores. This debt was adjudicated as payable long ago on 21st March, 2005. THE certificate was obtained by IFCI Limited. Attempt to set aside the ex-parte order failed. THE records say that on 29th July, 2010 recovery proceedings were started before the Recovery Officer of the said Tribunal being marked as R.P. No. 2256 (A), initiated by IFCI. It is stated that three properties are sought to be attached in these recovery proceedings, namely, (i) 56-A, Sainik Farm, New Delhi, (ii) B-11, Chirag Enclave, New Delhi 110048, (iii) 60 A, Ashok Avenue, Kolkata -47. 4. THE applicant submits that the first two properties in New Delhi do not belong to the applicant and the third property in Kolkata belongs to his Advocate-on- Record, Mr. K. R. Das. Further, in these misfeasance proceedings pending before this Court, it ought to decide the above question as to whom these properties belong and that till it decides this question the Debts Recovery Tribunal should not adjudicate the issue at all. The foundation for making this argument is in Section 543 of the Companies Act 1956. In misfeasance proceedings the Court has the power to inter alia assess the damage caused to the company by any director. The applicant was the director of the company-in-liquidation. Therefore, if the court finds that this director had caused loss to the company he would be asked to compensate the company-in-liquidation for such loss. In the event an order is passed against him and he is unable to so compensate, his property is liable to be attached. What are his properties has to be decided by this Court. Therefore, if the court finds that this director had caused loss to the company he would be asked to compensate the company-in-liquidation for such loss. In the event an order is passed against him and he is unable to so compensate, his property is liable to be attached. What are his properties has to be decided by this Court. if in the above certificate proceedings the Debt Recovery Tribunal proceeds to attach the above three properties, the applicant will have to show that these properties do not belong to him. His lawyer Mr. K.R. Das would also have to show that the third property belongs to him, so as to release them from attachment. Now, if such a plea is raised, the Tribunal has to adjudicate it. In the misfeasance proceedings this Court has to adjudicate the selfsame issues. Therefore, the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal should be stayed to enable this Court determine this issue. This determination by the Debt Recovery Tribunal would amount to interference with this Courts jurisdiction. 5. THE learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that in any event the Debts Recovery Tribunal can determine this issue by giving notice to the Official Liquidator and hearing him under paragraph 18 (i) of the judgment in Rajasthan State Financial Corporation and another - v - Official Liquidator and another, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 190 . 6. THE learned counsel for IFCI seriously disputes this submission. He places reliance on paragraph 24 and 50 of the judgment in Allahabad Bank v Canara Bank and another reported in (2000) 4 SCC 406 . He says on the basis of the above judgment that the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal to adjudicate debts payable to banks and financial institutions is exclusive and the Company Court should not interfere. Discussion and conclusion this case raises very interesting questions. The applicant as well as the Company-in-liquidation are debtors before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Before it the applicant is liable as a guarantor. The same applicant is a respondent Director in the misfeasance proceedings started in connection with the liquidation proceedings. He is respondent No. 2 there. If the Official Liquidator succeeds there is likely to be an order against him for payment of money. If he defaults, the same type of execution proceedings can be levied by the Company Court. The same applicant is a respondent Director in the misfeasance proceedings started in connection with the liquidation proceedings. He is respondent No. 2 there. If the Official Liquidator succeeds there is likely to be an order against him for payment of money. If he defaults, the same type of execution proceedings can be levied by the Company Court. The execution before the Tribunal and the Company Court will be satisfied out of the assets of the debtor there and the applicant here. He, however, denies that the said properties sought to be attached by the Tribunal is his property. Therefore, the questions regarding his right over these properties have to be adjudicated. 7. THIS has a direct bearing on the misfeasance proceedings, because if this adjudication is made wrongly by holding that these properties do not belong to him when actually they do, the loser will be the Company-in-liquidation. If the converse is decided wrongly then the Company Court in misfeasance proceedings will realise monies out of properties which do not belong to the said respondent/applicant, which will be a most unjust state of affairs. 8. THE Hon’ble Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank v Canara Bank and another reported in (2000) 4 SCC 406 said the following : 24. There is one more reason as to why it must be held that the jurisdiction of the Recovery Officer is exclusive. The Tiwari Committee which recommended the constitution of a Special Tribunal in 1981 for recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions stated in its report that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal must relate not only in regard to the adjudication of the liability but also in regard to the execution proceedings. It stated in Annexure XI of its report that all execution proceedings must be taken up only by the Special Tribunal under the Act. In our opinion, in view of the special procedure for recovery prescribed in Chapter V of the Act, and Section 34, execution of the certificate is also within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Recovery Officer. 50. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that at the stage of adjudication under Section 17 and execution of the certificate under Section 25 etc. In our opinion, in view of the special procedure for recovery prescribed in Chapter V of the Act, and Section 34, execution of the certificate is also within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Recovery Officer. 50. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that at the stage of adjudication under Section 17 and execution of the certificate under Section 25 etc. the provisions of the RDB Act, 1993 confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal and the Recovery Officer in respect of debts payable to banks and financial institutions and there can be no interference by the Company Court under Section 442 read with Section 537 or under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. In respect of the monies realised under the RDB Act, the question of priorities among the banks and financial institutions and other creditors can be decided only by the Tribunal under the RDB Act and in accordance with Section 19 (19) read with Section 529-A of the Companies Act, and in no other manner. THE provisions of the RDB Act, 1993 are to the above extent inconsistent with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and the latter Act has to yield to the provisions of the former. This position holds good during the pendency of the winding-up petition against the debtor Company and also after a winding-up order is passed. No leave of the Company Court is necessary for initiating or continuing the proceedings under the RDB Act, 1993. Points 2 and 3 are decided accordingly in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. The inconsistency referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in that judgment was sought to be explained by the same Court in Rajasthan State Financial Corporation and another - v Official Liquidator and another, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 190 . The following proposition was laid down in paragraph 18 (i). It said as follows : 18. (i) A Debts Recovery Tribunal acting under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 would be entitled to order the sale and to sell the properties of the debtor, even if a company-in-liquidation, through its Recovery Officer but only after notice to the Official Liquidator or the Liquidator appointed by the Company Court and after hearing him. 19. 19. THE Hon’ble Supreme Court decision was concerned with sale and distribution of the assets of the company-in-liquidation, proceedings regarding which were also pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. THE distribution had to be made under section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956, while the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Company Court were empowered to sell the assets in their respective jurisdiction. But, the Court said that there should be consultation between the Official Liquidator and the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Although the basic principles have been formulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court those cases do not provide an answer to the issues here, as they were not before the said Court. 10. THE Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 says that the Recovery Officer will make recovery of the debts. There is no provision in the Chapter relating to recovery for adjudication of this kind of a claim. Section 30 of the Act provides for an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer to the Tribunal. I find some power in the Tribunal to adjudicate this kind of a question. Section 19 clothes the Tribunal with the power to decide an application before it like a suit. It has power to decide setoff and counter claims. Then in section 19 (13A), the Tribunal has the power to pass an order asking for security, attachment of property and the like. If the Tribunal has the power to order attachment of property, the power to decide the title to that property is incidental to it. I am of the opinion that the Recovery Officer does not have any such power. Further in my opinion, there is more substantial connection of the Debts 11. RECOVERY Tribunal with the properties of the guarantor/applicant. The debt has been adjudicated by it. The certificate has also been issued. Recovery is underway. Misfeasance proceedings have not reached that stage before this court. Therefore, I am of the opinion, that this Tribunal should decide the questions which are in dispute in this application. 12. IN the circumstances, I dispose of this application by directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Amhedabad to decide whether the three properties mentioned in the application before the Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Amhedabad in R. P. 2256 (A) belong to the applicant/respondent no. 12. IN the circumstances, I dispose of this application by directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Amhedabad to decide whether the three properties mentioned in the application before the Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Amhedabad in R. P. 2256 (A) belong to the applicant/respondent no. 2 or not strictly according to the principles in Order 21 Rule 97 to 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure after hearing the parties and the Official Liquidator. The recovery proceedings against the applicant/respondent No. 2 will remain suspended till determination of this question by the Tribunal. This order is conditional upon the applicant or his said Advocate making a proper application before the Tribunal within four weeks from the date of issuance of a copy of this order. For four weeks there will be unconditional stay of the recovery proceedings against the applicant. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, to be provided upon complying with all requisite formalities.