JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. The Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary School, Khajurbagan, Goalabasti, Agartala (hereinafter called 'the School'), has moved this contempt petition, under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for drawing up a contempt proceeding and awarding punishment to Sri Hiralal Chakraborty (since retired), Director of School Education ('Grant-in-Aid' Section), Govt. of Tripura, Agartala, West Tripura and Sri K.R. Majumder, Inspector of Schools, Sadar, Agartala, West Tripura, for their wilful disobedience of the order, dated 24.02.2009, passed by this Court in C.M. Appl.(W.P.) No. 25/2009, in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008. 2. On receipt of the said petition, this Court, by order, dated 08.05.2009, issued notice, calling upon the Respondents aforesaid to show cause as to why a contempt proceeding should not be initiated against them. Accordingly, the Respondents have submitted their written objections, denying the allegation of wilful disobedience of the order aforesaid. 3. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. R. Datta, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. N.C. Pal, learned Govt. Advocate, appearing for the Respondents. 4. By its order, dated 16.04.2007, the Govt. of Tripura, Education (School) Department, brought the said school under the 'Grant-in-Aid' Scheme under Education (School) Department w.e.f. 1st April, 2007. Consequent upon grant of 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the scheme of 'Mid-Day-Meal' was introduced in the said school. However, even after bringing the said school under the 'Grant-in-Aid' scheme, salaries in higher scale as well as arrear salary were not given to the teachers and the staff of the said school. Therefore, Sri Amiya Sinha and 28 others, being the members of the teaching and the non-teaching staff of the school, filed a writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 360/2008, before this Court, against the State of Tripura and the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, seeking a direction for payment of higher pay and arrear salary to the teaching as well as non-teaching staff of the said school w.e.f. 01.04.2007 i.e. the date from which the school was brought under the 'Grant-in-Aid' scheme. 5. During pendency of the said writ petition, the Govt. of Tripura, seeking a direction for payment of higher pay and arrear salary to the teaching as well as non-teaching staff of the said school w.e.f. 01.04.2007 i.e. the date from which the school was brought under the 'Grant-in-Aid' scheme. 5. During pendency of the said writ petition, the Govt. of Tripura, in the Directorate of School Education ('Grant-in-Aid' Section), by issuing notification, dated 17.12.2008, had withdrawn the 'Grant-in-Aid' status w.e.f. 1st April, 2007, on the ground that the management of the school had failed to comply with the standard conditions, stipulated in the notification and in the 'Grant-in-Aid' Rules, 2005 (hereinafter called 'the Rules, 2005') and, thus, the notification, dated 16.04.2007 aforesaid, was cancelled. 6. Aggrieved by the said cancellation, the writ Petitioners filed an application, being C.M. Appl.(W.P.) No. 25/2009, in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008, seeking stay of operation of the impugned notification, dated 17.12.2008. This Court, by order, dated 24.02.2009 aforesaid, granted stay in respect of the operation of the impugned order, dated 17.12.2008, till disposal of the writ petition. 7. After the said stay order, dated 24.02.2009, the Petitioner, who was the proforma Respondent in the writ petition, by his letter, dated 02.03.2009, requested the Respondent No. 2 to immediately start the operation of Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in the primary section of the said school, but the Respondent No. 2, without complying with the direction, made in the order, dated 24.02.2009, passed by this Court, issued a letter to the Petitioner, on 17.03.2009, informing that, though implementation of Mid-day-Meal was mandatory in every Government/Government aided school, in view of the cancellation of the ''Grant-in-Aid'' status of the school, it was not possible to execute the programme. Therefore, in view of the failure of the Respondents, to implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal Scheme', despite the stay order, dated 24.02.2009, passed by this Court, the Petitioner, alleging wilful disobedience of the said stay order, passed by this Court, has prayed for initiating a contempt proceeding and pass necessary orders against the Respondents. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, by filing separate written objections, have denied the allegation of violation of the Court's order aforesaid. In their written objections, the Respondents, while begging unconditional apology, contended that, this Court, by order, dated 24.02.2009, simply stayed the operation of the notification, dated 17.12.2008 and that no other direction or order was passed, requiring the Respondents to continue with the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme. In their written objections, the Respondents, while begging unconditional apology, contended that, this Court, by order, dated 24.02.2009, simply stayed the operation of the notification, dated 17.12.2008 and that no other direction or order was passed, requiring the Respondents to continue with the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme. The Respondents further contended that the present Petitioner, not being a Petitioner in the writ petition, can't be allowed to approach this Court alleging disobedience of Court's order and as such this contempt proceeding is not maintainable. The Respondent No. 2 further contended that, he, not being a party in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008, was not aware of the contents of the writ petition aforesaid and as such this proceeding is not maintainable against him. However, the Respondent No. 2 admitted that, in view of the cancellation of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme was not resumed. 8. The learned senior Counsel, appearing for the parties, apart from submitting written arguments, made oral arguments. 9. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has strenuously argued that, in view of the communication, dated 17.03.2009 (Annexure-5 to the petition), received from the Inspector of Schools, Sadar-A, Agartala, it was mandatory to implement the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in every Government/Government aided school by the Education Department and, therefore, consequent upon the stay of operation of the impugned order, dated 17.12.2008, the Respondent-authorities were bound to re-introduce the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, which was stopped following issuance of the order, dated 17.12.2008 i.e. the order by which the ''Grant-in-Aid'' status was withdrawn. Therefore, it is submitted, by the learned senior counsel, that failure of the Respondents to re-introduce the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, despite the stay order aforesaid, amounts to wilful disobedience of the order, passed by this Court, and as such the Respondents are liable to be punished for contempt of Court. 10. Refuting the said arguments, advanced by the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, raising the question of limitation, has contended that, as no notice, calling upon the Respondents, to show cause as to why they would not be punished for contempt, has been issued within the prescribed period i.e. within one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to be disobeyed i.e. the stay order, the present proceeding is hit by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called 'the Act, 1971'). The learned senior counsel has further submitted that, as the Respondent No. 1 retired, during the pendency of the proceeding, no action for contempt would lie against him. It is further submitted that, as the Respondent No. 2 was not a party to the writ petition, the order, passed in the writ petition is not binding on him and, therefore, this proceeding can't continue against him. It is also contended, on behalf of the Respondents, that in the absence of any specific direction for implementation of Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, there is no element of wilful and deliberate violation of the order, dated 24.02.2009. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, further contends that as contempt proceeding can't be used as an execution proceeding, the Respondents can't be compelled to implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme, which relief is not covered by the order/judgment aforesaid and as such non implementation of the said Scheme cannot be the subject matter of this contempt proceeding. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that, the present Petitioner, being the proforma Respondent in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008, has no locus standi to allege violation of the order, dated 24.02.2009, in as much as the Petitioner had neither sought for any relief, nor any relief was granted in its favour. 11. Referring to the decision in the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 535 and Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and Anr. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 171 , the learned senior counsel, for the Respondents, contended that the law, regarding limitation, under Section 20 of the Act, 1971, and its application, has been well settled holding that limitation starts from the date of the order, on which contempt is alleged to have been committed and ends on the date, on which the court issues a notice calling the alleged contemner to show cause as to why he should not be punished and not on the date of issuing notice as to why contempt proceeding should not be implemented. The learned senior counsel further contended that, in the subsequent decision, held in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors. The learned senior counsel further contended that, in the subsequent decision, held in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors. reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549 , though the Supreme Court, after considering the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) and Baradakanta Mishra(supra), observed that the Court in Om Prakash(supra) took too narrow a view of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, the decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) was not overruled. In support of his argument, the learned senior counsel has relied on the decisions held in the cases of: (1) Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors. reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549 (2) Niaz Mohammad and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332 , (3) R.N. Dey and Ors. v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Ors. reported in (2000) 4 SCC 400 , (4) Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Anr. v. Taraknath Ganguli and Ors. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 352 ; (5) Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court reported in (1975) 3 SCC 535 ; (6) Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and Anr. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 171 . (7) State of Orissa and Ors. v. Mohammad Illiyas reported in (2006) 1 SCC 275 ; (8) Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673 ; (9) State of Uttaranchal v. Sehnaz Mirza and Ors. reported in (2008) 6 SCC 726 . (10) Quinn v. Leathem reported in 1901 AC 495. (11) Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh reported in 1984 Cri. L.J. 301. (12) Government of Karnataka and Ors. v. Gowramma and Ors. reported in (2007) 13 SCC 482 . (13) Bihar School Examination Board v. Suresh Prasad Sinha reported in (2009) 8 SCC 483 . (14) Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi and Anr. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 496 . (15) Pradip Chandra Parija and Ors. v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and Ors. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 . (16) Indian Airports Employees' Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee and Anr. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 537 . (17) Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Ors. reported in (2001) 3 SCC 739 ; (18) V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Anr. v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and Ors. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 . (16) Indian Airports Employees' Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee and Anr. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 537 . (17) Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Ors. reported in (2001) 3 SCC 739 ; (18) V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Anr. reported in (2004) 13 SCC 610 ; (19) Anil Kumar Shahi (2) and Ors. v. Ram Sevak Yadav Ors. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 115. 12. The learned senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents, has further submitted that there is no material, on record, to show that the Respondents have wilfully violated or disobeyed any direction or order passed by this Court and as such the proceeding is liable to be closed. 13. In reply, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, referring to the case of Pallav Sheth(supra), has submitted that a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in the said case, considering the cases of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra), Baradakanta Mishra(supra), Manjit Singh(supra), and Quinn(supra) overruled the decision held in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) and distinguished the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra) with regard to Section 20of the Act, 1971 and thereby held that, issuance of notice, on the application, filed by a party or suo moto issuance of notice by the Court within a period of one year from the date of alleged violation of the order would be proper construction of Section 20 of the Act, 1971. Relying on the decision in Pallav Sheth(supra), Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, has submitted that, in view of filing of the present petition, alleging disobedience of the Court's order, within one year from the date of the order, which has been alleged to be violated, and as the court also issued show cause notices after perusing the petition, within the statutory period, this proceeding is not hit by Section20 of the Act. 14. The learned senior Counsel, has also submitted that, even though the Petitioner was the proforma Respondent in the writ petition, he is not debarred from bringing the matter regarding disobedience of the Court's order, to its Court's notice, for initiating appropriate proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, in as much as the Petitioner's school is the beneficiary of the Court's order aforesaid. It is also submitted that the Respondent No. 1, having filed the written objection, during the period when he was holding the post, can't get absolved from the liability of disobeying the order, which was passed and also brought to his notice for compliance, during the said period. It is further submitted that, as the Respondent No. 2 is the implementing authority of the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, he is also liable to be punished for disobedience of the Court's order. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, further submitted that the withdrawal of the ''Grant-in-Aid'' status with retrospective effect i.e. from 1st April, 2007 itself amounted to violation of the Court's order aforesaid. 15. Before adverting to other rival contentions, it would be appropriate, firstly, to examine the locus of the Petitioner. There is no dispute that the order, granting 'Grant-in-Aid' status, was withdrawn by the State authority, on the ground of non-fulfilment of certain directions and conditions by the school authority. It is also admitted position that the 'Grant-in-Aid' status was followed by implementation of Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in favour of the school of the present Petitioner, which was the proforma Respondent in the writ petition, filed by the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school. Certainly, due to withdrawal of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the Petitioner's school has been deprived. The allegation of disobedience of the Court's order, has not been brought in connection with any personal benefit of the Petitioner, which was the proforma Respondent in the writ petition. The Petitioner, being the Managing Committee of the school, is the authority to run the administration and affairs of the school. Under the provision of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a contempt proceeding is initiated/moved for punishing the alleged contemner for wilful violation/disobedience of the Court's order. A private party having interest in the subject matter of the contempt would certainly like to bring the matter to the notice of the Court by filing or presenting an application for initiating a proceeding for contempt. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction is a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner. Once the matter is brought to the notice of the Court, the role of the Petitioner, in a contempt proceeding, ends. 16. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction is a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner. Once the matter is brought to the notice of the Court, the role of the Petitioner, in a contempt proceeding, ends. 16. In the case Muthu Karuppan(supra), the Supreme Court observed that the role of a person/party filing an application for initiating contempt proceeding is that of an informer and his duty ends with the facts brought to the notice of the Court. 17. If the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme was implemented, consequent upon the stay order aforesaid, the Petitioner's School would have been beneficial. Therefore, the implementation of the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme, was necessary in the interest of the Petitioner. Now, the allegation is that the Respondents, by failing to implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme, have disobeyed the order, of 29 dated 24.02.2009, passed by this Court. The purpose of bringing the matter to the notice of the Court is to facilitate the Court to impose punishment for wilful flouting of Court's order/direction. Hence, the Petitioner, being one of the beneficiaries, of the Court's order, was the appropriate authority to bring the matter to the notice of the Court. Therefore, the Petitioner, which was the proforma Respondent in the writ petition, can't be said to have no locus standi to bring, the allegation of violation/disobedience of the Court's order, to the notice of the Court for passing appropriate order, under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In view of above, I find no force in the contention of the learned senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents regarding absence of locus standi of the Petitioner. 18. With regard to the question of involvement of the Respondents, there is no dispute that the Respondent No. 1 was a party to the writ petition and the notice, in this proceeding, being issued, he filed written objection, denying the allegation of violation/disobedience of the impugned order. He retired from service after submission of his written objection aforesaid. Therefore, despite his retirement, as, he, during his tenure in office, categorically denied his obligation to implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme in the School, it can't be held that he is not a relevant party and that he is not liable to be punished, if found guilty of disobeying the Court's order aforesaid. Admittedly, the Respondent No. 2 was not a party to the writ petition. Admittedly, the Respondent No. 2 was not a party to the writ petition. Therefore, the order, dated 24.02.2009, not being passed in his presence, cannot be binding on him. Hence, this proceeding does not lie against the Respondent No. 2. 19. Now, the question is whether the present proceeding is hit by Section 20 of the Act, 1971. Section 20 of the Act, 1971, reads as follows: 20. Limitation for actions for contempt.- No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 20. Two different views have been expressed in the cases of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) and Pallav Sheth(supra). According to Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra), the notice to show case as to why punishment should not be imposed is to be issued within one year from the date of alleged violations of the order/direction. But, according to Pallav Sheth's case(supra), if the notice to show cause is issued, on receipt of an application, from a private party or suo moto, within one year from the date, on which the violation of the Court's order is alleged, then there is sufficient compliance of Section 20 of the Act. 21. For the purpose of appreciating the ratio in Pallav Sheth(supra), Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, referring to the decisions held in Quinn(supra), has submitted that a decision can't be considered ex-hypothesis the facts. The learned senior counsel, referring to the cases in Mohammad Illiyas(supra), Gowramma(supra), Bihar School Examination Board(supra), Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community(supra), has submitted that the decision in the Pallav Sheth's case(supra) is not a ratio in respect of Section 20 of the Act, 1971 and that the decision made in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra), with regard to the question of limitation, under Section 20of the Act, not being overruled by Pallav Sheth(supra), the law laid down in Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) would be applicable. Therefore, it has been submitted that, in view of non-issuance of a notice, within one year from the date, on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed, calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why they should not be punished, the present proceeding is barred by Section 20 of the Act, 1971. 22. Therefore, it has been submitted that, in view of non-issuance of a notice, within one year from the date, on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed, calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why they should not be punished, the present proceeding is barred by Section 20 of the Act, 1971. 22. In the case of Mohammad Illiyas(supra), the Supreme Court held that reliance on decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible and that a decision is a precedent on its own Acts. As held by the Supreme Court, the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation made in the judgment. 23. In the case of Gowramma(supra) also the Supreme Court relied on Mohammad Illiyas(supra) and held that a case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more and that Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. 24. In the case of Bihar School Examination Board(supra) also the cases in Gowramma(supra) and Mohammad Illiyas(supra) were relied on and the Supreme Court cautioned against the danger of mechanical application of an observation without ascertaining the context in which it was made. 25. In the case of Pradip Chandra Parija(supra), the Supreme Court has laid down the binding nature of the decision rendered by a larger Bench on a smaller Bench. The Supreme court held that, if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter, before it, to a Bench of three learned Judges, setting out the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment. It has also been held that, if a Bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, reference to a Bench of five learned Judges is justified. 26. It has also been held that, if a Bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, reference to a Bench of five learned Judges is justified. 26. In the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community(supra), the Supreme Court, following the decision in Pradip Chandra Parija(supra), a five Judges' Bench, summed up the legal position, regarding binding nature of decisions, in the following terms: (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 and Union of India v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273 . 27. In view of the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it stands clear that the decision rendered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on the Bench of a lesser strength, both on the fact situation and the context in which it is made. In Pallav Sheth's case(supra), the decision was rendered by a Bench of larger strength (three Judges Bench) and in Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra), it was a decision rendered by a Bench of lesser strength (two Judges Bench). In both the cases, the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra) (three Judges Bench) was considered. 28. In the case of Sehnaz Mirza(supra), the Supreme Court took notice of the following observation, made in the case of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram 1989 Supp (2) SCC 418: (SCC p. 423, para 7) 7. Another point was taken about limitation of this application under Section 20 of the Act. Section 20 states that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3-11-1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt consisted, inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Narnaul dated 3-11-1988 (sic 12-2-1988). Therefore, the application was well within the period of one year. Failure to give possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of Section 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court, at paragraph 12 of Sehnaz Mirza(supra) referred to paragraph-48 of the Pallav Sheth's case(supra), which reads as follows: 48. The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the Appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware of the fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6-1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. The fraud perpetuated by the Appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware of the fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6-1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on this application that the Special Court by its order of 9-4-1999 directed the application to be treated as a show-cause notice to the Appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the abovestated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action taken by the Special Court to punish the Appellant for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the circumstances, to examine the finding of the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was not barred by Section 20. 29. In the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra), the Supreme Court considered the provision of Section 19(1) and in order to arrive at a true interpretation, the Supreme Court also looked at Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the Act, 1971. In Baradakanta Mishra(supra), the Supreme Court observed: Section 20 prescribes a period of limitation by saying that no court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It will be seen from these provisions that the scheme adopted by the Legislature is that the Court may initiate a proceeding for contempt suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on a reference made by a subordinate court. Where the Court initiates a proceeding for contempt suo motu, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and takes the first step in exercise of it. But what happens when a motion is made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or a reference is made by a subordinate court. Where the Court initiates a proceeding for contempt suo motu, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and takes the first step in exercise of it. But what happens when a motion is made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or a reference is made by a subordinate court. Does the Court enter upon the jurisdiction to punish for contempt and act in exercise of it when it considers such motion or reference for the purpose of deciding whether it should initiate a proceeding for contempt? We do not think so. The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference, to decide, in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. 30. The case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra) was considered by a Bench of coequal strength in Pallav Sheth(supra) and distinguished the decision in Baradakanta Mishra(supra) with regard to Section 20 of the Act, 1971. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), observed: In Baradakanta Mishra case: (1975) 2 SCC 535, the Appellant had filed an application before the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings against the Chief Justice and other Judges in their personal capacity. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), observed: In Baradakanta Mishra case: (1975) 2 SCC 535, the Appellant had filed an application before the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings against the Chief Justice and other Judges in their personal capacity. A Full Bench of three Judges was of the opinion that no contempt of court had been committed and the application was rejected. The Appellant then purported to avail the right of appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act and filed an appeal in this Court. A preliminary objection was taken by the State against the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that where the High Court had not initiated proceedings and had refused to take action, no appeal as of right would lie under Section 19(1). This was the only issue which arose for consideration of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra's case and this Court upheld the preliminary objection and held that no appeal under Section 19(1) was maintainable. It is no doubt true that during the course of discussion, reference was made to Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 but this Court was in that case not called upon to consider the effect of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act vis-a-vis inherent powers of the High Court to punish for contempt. No reference is made in the judgment to Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution. Furthermore interpretation of Section 20 was not an issue and no question of limitation arose therein. Under the circumstances, we hold that the observations made by this Court with reference to Section 20 were in the nature of obiter dicta and not binding on this Court in the present case. In any case, Baradakanta Mishra's case decision does not specifically deal with the question as to when or how proceedings for contempt are initiated for the purposes of Section 20 and nor has it considered the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, to which we shall presently refer. 31. The Supreme Court, in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) (two Judges Bench), referring to the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra), observed: 14. In order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression "initiate any proceedings for contempt" we may notice several situations or stages which may arise before the court dealing with contempt proceedings. 31. The Supreme Court, in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) (two Judges Bench), referring to the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra), observed: 14. In order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression "initiate any proceedings for contempt" we may notice several situations or stages which may arise before the court dealing with contempt proceedings. These are: (i) (a) a private party may file or present an application or petition for initiating any proceedings for civil contempt; or (b) the court may receive a motion or reference from the Advocate General or with his consent in writing from any other person or a specified law officer or a court subordinate to High Court; (ii) (a) the court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against; or (b) the court may issue notice to the Respondent calling upon him to show cause why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated; (iii) the Court may issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against calling upon him to show cause why he be not punished for contempt. 15. In the cases contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. Filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by court. On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as "admit", "rule", "issue notice" or "issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated". In all such cases the notice is issued either in routine or because the court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore the court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating the proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the material placed before it the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the Court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the Respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is the result of a conscious application of the mind of the court to the facts and the material before it. Such initiation of proceedings for contempt based on application of mind by the Court to the facts of the case and the material before it must take place within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed failing which the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contempt is lost. The heading of Section 20 is "limitation for actions for contempt". Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court to initiate any proceedings for contempt. 32. In Pallav Seith(supra), the Supreme Court observed: 30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts are courts of record and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215is absolute, can there be any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution. 33. The Supreme Court in Pallav Seith(supra), further observed: Under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 power has been given to this Court and to the High Courts to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act providing for any matter relating to its procedure. Our attention has been drawn to Rules framed under Section23 by this Court as well as by the High Courts in India. All these Rules inter alia require, other than suo motu action being taken, petition or application being filed in Court it is then taken up for consideration. For example, the relevant part of Rule 2 of the Calcutta High Court Contempt of Courts Rules, 1975 reads as follows: 2.(1) Proceedings in connection with a Civil Contempt may be initiated- (a) by a petition presented by a party or parties aggrieved;or (b) by the High Court on its own motion; or (c) on a reference made to the High Court by the subordinate courts as in the case of "Criminal Contempt". (2) Proceedings in connection with a criminal contempt may be initiated- (a) on a motion of the High Court in respect of a contempt committed upon its own view under Section 14 of the Act; or (b) on its own motion by the High Court under Section 15(1) of the Act; or (c) on a motion founded on a petition presented by the Advocate-General under Section 15(1)(a) of the Act; or (d) on a motion founded on a petition presented by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act; or (e) on a reference made to the High Court by the subordinate courts under Section 15(2) of the Act, containing the following particulars: (a) a brief statement of the case; (b) the particulars of the contumacious acts; (c) name, address and other particulars of the Respondents along with the copies of the papers relating to contumacious acts. The Rules so framed by all the Courts in India do show that proceedings are initiated inter alia with the filing of an application or a petition in that behalf. If, however, proceedings are not initiated by filing of an application within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed then the Court shall not have jurisdiction to punish for contempt. If, on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by the filing of an application, in the case of civil contempt like the present before the Court within the period of limitation then the provisions of Section 20 will not stand in the way of the Court exercising its jurisdiction. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the Appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in case of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case, to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show-cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution. 34. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), referred to the following observations made by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Manjit Singh(supra). 19. To finally conclude it must be held that the terminus a quo for limitation begins under Section 20 of the Act on the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The terminus ad quem in case of criminal contempt would necessarily vary and be related to the modes of taking cognizance thereof provided for in Section 15. In cases where it is initiated on the court's own motion it would necessarily be from the issuance of the notice for contempt by the court. In case of a motion by the Advocate General under Section 15(1)(a), the proceedings would initiate from the date of the filing of such a motion in the High Court. Where any other person moves the Advocate General for his consent in writing as prescribed in Section 15(1)(b), the initiation of proceedings would be with effect from the date of such application. Lastly, in cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate court on a reference made by it the proceedings must be deemed to be initiated from the date when such reference is made. Lastly, in cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate court on a reference made by it the proceedings must be deemed to be initiated from the date when such reference is made. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 35. From the above it transpires that the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth(supra), clearly indicated that in Baradakanta Mishra's case(supra), the issue was maintainability of an appeal under Section19(1) of the Act, 1971 and that, though reference was made to Section 20 also, interpretation of Section 20 was not an issue and no question of limitation arose therein. The Supreme Court also held that, the observations made in Baradakanta Mishra(supra), regarding Section 20 were in the nature of obiter dicta and not binding on the Court in that case [Pallav Sheth(supra)]. Taking into consideration various decisions, more particularly the decisions in Baradakanta Mishra(supra) and Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra), the Supreme Court opined that the proper construction of Section 20must be that action must be initiated, either by filing an application or by the Court issuing notice suo moto, within a period of one year from the date of violation of the Court's order. 36. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), accepted the view, given in Manjit Singh(supra), that the initiation of contempt proceedings otherwise than on court's own motion would include within its sweep a motion by the Advocate General, a reference by a subordinate court to the High Court to take action for contempt and an application before the Advocate General seeking his consent by any other person under Section 15 and lastly in cases of civil contempt the motion by a private litigant directly in the court. 37. 37. In the Case of N. Venkata Swamy Naidu v. M/s Sri Sri Surya Teja Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in 2008 CRI. L.J. 227, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while interpreting the term 'initiation of contempt' within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, referred to the decisions in the cases of A.V. Koteswara Rao and S.J.G.M. High School (1996 Cri. LJ 699), Pallav Sheth (supra) and Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra). The learned Judges of the Division Bench, in the said case, at paragraph-43, observed as follows: 43. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ), it must be held that if an application to initiate contempt proceedings is filed within one year, from the date on which contempt is committed, it would amount to initiation of contempt proceedings within limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The limitation under Section 20 has to be computed with reference to the date of filing of the application for initiation of contempt and since in the present case, such an application was filed on 21.11.2005, well within the period of one year from the order of status quo dated 18.7.2005, violation of which is said to be in contempt, the contempt case as filed cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 38. In view of the above decision, rendered by the Supreme Court, in the case of Pallav Sheth(supra), there is no difficulty in understanding that, as the show cause notice, in the case at hand, was issued within one year from the date of the order, which has been alleged to be violated, after receipt of the application, alleging violation of the Court's order, the present proceeding is well within time and not hit by the provision of Section 20 of the Act, 1971. 39. Now, the question that falls for examination is whether the Respondents aforesaid, by failing to implement the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, wilfully disobeyed the Court's order. The operative portion of the order, dated 24.09.2009, which has been alleged to be disobeyed, reads as follows: For all the aforesaid reasons, I am inclined to stay the operation of the impugned order. 39. Now, the question that falls for examination is whether the Respondents aforesaid, by failing to implement the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, wilfully disobeyed the Court's order. The operative portion of the order, dated 24.09.2009, which has been alleged to be disobeyed, reads as follows: For all the aforesaid reasons, I am inclined to stay the operation of the impugned order. Accordingly, the effect and operation of the impugned order dated, 17.12.2008 (Annexure 21 to the Writ Petition) shall remain stayed till disposal of the Writ Petition. 40. In the case of Indian Airports Employees' Union(supra), the Supreme Court observed: It is well settled that disobedience of orders of the court, in order to amount to "civil contempt" under Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 must be "wilful" and proof of mere disobedience is not sufficient (S.S. Roy v. State of Orissa AIR 1960 SC 190 ). Where there is no deliberate flouting of orders of the court but a mere misinterpretation of the executive instructions, it would not be a case of civil contempt (Ashok Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1992) 1 SCC 152 ). 41. In the case Muthu Karuppan(supra), the Supreme Court observed that in a contempt proceeding, to hold a person guilty of contempt, there must be distinct evidence of commission of an offence and not mere suspicion. 42. In the case of Mritunjoy Das(supra), the Supreme Court, while laying down the standard of proof, observed that, a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court, referring to the following observations of Lord Denning in Bramblevale Ltd. Re: (1969) 3 AII ER 1062 (CA) stated: A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time-honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies. There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence.... It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies. There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence.... Where there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the court, it is not right to hold that the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 43. In V.M. Manohar Prasad(supra), the Supreme Court observed that, in a contempt proceedings no further directions could be issued by the court. In case it is found that there is violation of the order passed by the court the court may punish the contemner otherwise notice of contempt is to be discharged. The Court further observed that, an order passed in the contempt petition, could not be a supplemental order to the main order granting relief. 44. There is no dispute that all disobedience at all can't be considered as contempt. In the case of Anil Kumar Shahi(supra), the Supreme Court observed: In other words, while exercising its power under the Act, it is not open to the Court to pass an order, which will materially add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience of which contempt jurisdiction was invoked. When the Court directs the authority to consider a matter in accordance with law, it means that the matter should be considered to the best of understanding by the authority and, therefore, a mere error of judgment with regard to the legal position cannot constitute contempt of Court. There is no wilful disobedience if best efforts are made to comply with the order. 45. In the case of Jhareswar Prasad Paul (supra), the Supreme Court observed: It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. 46. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. 46. In the case of Niaz Mohammad(supra), the Supreme Court observed that a Contempt Court is not an Executing Court and the Court dealing with a contempt proceeding must be satisfied that the disobedience was wilful and intentional and if the court is satisfied that although there has been disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it is not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the court may not punish the alleged contemner. 47. In the case of R.N. Dey (supra), the Supreme Court observed that normally contempt can't be used as a weapon for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. 48. In view of the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court, there is no difficulty in understanding that a Court dealing with a contempt proceeding can't play the role of the executing court. All disobedience of Courts' order/direction can't be construed as contempt of Court, simply on the ground that the Court's order/direction has not been complied with. To hold a person guilty of contempt of Court, it must be proved that the order of the Court was wilfully flouted/disobeyed. Therefore, in a contempt proceeding, Court is required to examine, if the alleged contemner wilfully or intentionally and without being prevented by any compelling circumstances refused to comply with the Court's order. If it is found that the alleged contemner wilfully disobeyed the Court's order/direction, then only such contemner may be punished for such disobedience. 49. A plain reading of the said order, dated 24.09.2009, passed by this Court, transpires that no direction was made requiring the Respondents to implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. By the said order, this Court simply stayed the operation of the order, dated 17.12.2008. In the impugned order, dated 17.12.2008, there was no mention regarding withdrawal/discontinuance of the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. Even, in the order, dated 16.04.2007, by which the 'Grant-in-Aid' status was given to the Petitioner-school, there was no mention regarding implementation of the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme. By the said order, this Court simply stayed the operation of the order, dated 17.12.2008. In the impugned order, dated 17.12.2008, there was no mention regarding withdrawal/discontinuance of the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. Even, in the order, dated 16.04.2007, by which the 'Grant-in-Aid' status was given to the Petitioner-school, there was no mention regarding implementation of the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme. Therefore, stay of the operation of the order, dated 17.12.2008 automatically did not mean that the Court wanted that the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme should be implemented. of course, in its letter, dated 17.03.2009, the Respondent No. 2, while addressing the Secretary, New Hindi Secondary School, informed that it was mandatory to operate the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in all Government/Government aided school by the Education Department. But, in the Court's order, dated 24.09.2009, no mention was made about such mandatory requirement. A contempt court can't hold a person guilty of not doing something, which is not directed by the Court to be done. As observed in the above cited cases, more particularly, in the case of Anil Kumar Sahi(2)(supra), the alleged contemner can't be compelled to do an act, in respect of which no relief has been granted by the Court. Therefore, failure of the Respondents to implement the said Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, in the absence of any specific direction from this Court in this regard, can't be treated as wilful disobedience or violation of the order, dated 24.02.2009 aforesaid. 50. In view of the above discussion, I find no prima facie case for satisfaction that the Respondents, by refusing to operate the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, in the school of the Petitioner, wilfully disobeyed/violated the Court's order. 51. Consequently, this contempt proceeding is closed.