ORDER C.R. Sarma, J. 1. The Managing Committee of New Hindi Secondary School, Khajurbagan, Goalabasti, Agartala (hereinafter called 'the School'), has filed this contempt petition, under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called 'the Act, 1971'), for drawing up a contempt proceeding and awarding punishment to the Respondents, namely Sri Banamali Sinha, IAS, Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura, Education Department, Agartala, and Sri Sahadeb Das, Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, Agartala, for their wilful disobedience of the order, dated 26.08.2010, passed by this Court, in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010. 2. On receipt of the said petition, this Court, by order, dated 16.09.2010, issued notice, calling upon the Respondents aforesaid to show cause as to why a contempt proceeding should not be initiated against them. Accordingly, the Respondents have submitted their written objections, denying the allegation of wilful disobedience of the order aforesaid. 3. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. R. Datta, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. N.C. Pal, learned Govt. Advocate, appearing for the Respondents. 4. By order, dated 16.04.2007, the Govt. of Tripura, Education (School) Department, brought the said school under the 'Grant-in-Aid' Scheme under Education (School) Department w.e.f. 1st April, 2007. Consequent upon the grant of 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the scheme of 'Mid-Day-Meal' was introduced in the said school. However, even after bringing the said school under the 'Grant-in-Aid' scheme, salaries in higher scale as well as arrear salary were not given to the teachers and the staff of the said school. Therefore, Sri Amiya Sinha and 28 others, being the members of the teaching and the non-teaching staff of the school, filed a writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 360/2008, before this Court, against the State of Tripura and the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, seeking a direction for payment of higher pay and arrear salary to the teaching as well as non-teaching staff of the said school w.e.f. 01.04.2007 i.e. the date from which the school was brought under the 'Grant-in-Aid' scheme. 5. During pendency of the said writ petition, the Govt. of Tripura, seeking a direction for payment of higher pay and arrear salary to the teaching as well as non-teaching staff of the said school w.e.f. 01.04.2007 i.e. the date from which the school was brought under the 'Grant-in-Aid' scheme. 5. During pendency of the said writ petition, the Govt. of Tripura, in the Directorate of School Education ('Grant-in-Aid' Section), by issuing notification, dated 17.12.2008, had withdrawn the 'Grant-in-Aid' status w.e.f. 1st April, 2007, on the ground that the management of the school failed to comply with the standard conditions, stipulated in the notification and in the 'Grant-in-Aid' Rules, 2005 (hereinafter called 'the Rules, 2005') and, thus, the earlier notification, dated 16.04.2007 aforesaid, was cancelled. 6. Aggrieved by the said cancellation order, the writ Petitioners filed an application, being C.M. Appl.(W.P.) No. 25/2009, in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008, seeking stay of operation of the impugned notification, dated 17.12.2008 and this Court, by order, dated 24.02.2009, granted stay in respect of the operation of the impugned order, dated 17.12.2008, till disposal of the writ petition. 7. After the said stay order, dated 24.02.2009, the Petitioner, who was the proforma Respondent in the writ petition, by his letter, dated 02.03.2009, requested the Respondent No. 2 to immediately start the operation of 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme in the primary section of the said school, but the Respondent No. 2, without complying with the said direction, made in the order, dated 24.02.2009, passed by this Court, issued a letter to the Petitioner, on 17.03.2009, informing that, though implementation of 'Mid-Day-Meal' was mandatory in every Government/Government aided school, in view of the cancellation of the ''Grant-in-Aid'' status of the school, it was not possible to execute the programme. Therefore, in view of the failure of the Respondents, to implement the ''Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme', despite the stay order, dated 24.02.2009, passed by this Court, the Petitioner, alleging wilful disobedience of the said stay order, passed by this Court, has prayed for initiating a contempt proceeding and pass necessary orders against the Respondents. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, by filing separate written objections, have denied the allegation of violation of the Court's order aforesaid. In their written objections, the Respondents, while begging unconditional apology, contended that, this Court, by order, dated 24.02.2009, simply stayed the operation of the notification, dated 17.12.2008 and that no other direction or order was passed, requiring the Respondents to continue with the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. In their written objections, the Respondents, while begging unconditional apology, contended that, this Court, by order, dated 24.02.2009, simply stayed the operation of the notification, dated 17.12.2008 and that no other direction or order was passed, requiring the Respondents to continue with the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. The Respondents further contended that the Petitioner, not being a Petitioner in the writ petition, can't approach this Court alleging disobedience of Court's order. The Respondent No. 2 further contended that, he was not a party in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008 and as such he was not aware of the contents of the writ petition aforesaid. The Respondent No. 2 admitted that in view of the cancellation of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme was not resumed. The said contempt petition, being registered as Cont. Cas(C) No. 11/2009, has been separately disposed of. 8. During pendency of W.P.(C) No. 360/2008, the Petitioner filed a writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 235/2009, against the State of Tripura and the Director of School Education, praying for quashing the impugned order, dated 17.12.2008 and for directing the Respondents to place funds for payment of salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff of the school at the rate fixed for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided School in the State of Tripura. Both the aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment and order, dated 05.03.2010. The operative part of the said judgment, reads as follows: 32. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned Notification dated 17.12.2008 is hereby quashed. The State Respondents are directed to give reasonable opportunity in compliance of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 to the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan through the Principal or School Managing Committee or/authorized representative by allowing them to file the documents and their pleadings, if necessary by hearing them in person before passing any orders for withdrawal/cancellation of the said Notification dated 16.04.2007 and the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan at present shall be under Grant-in-aid scheme. However, it is left to the wisdom of the State Respondents to decide the quantum of the arrear of pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the School and also the date of implementation of the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme in the Primary Section of the School within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order. It is also made clear that the State Respondents shall keep in view of the observations and findings of this Court in the present judgment and order in passing order regarding the matters relating to the Grant-in-aid to the New Hindi Secondary School and that the State Respondents shall make the funds available for payment of the salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the School at the rate fixed for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided Schools in the State of Tripura. 9. In view of the said direction, Petitioner, by his letter, dated 22.03.2010, while making available a copy of the judgment of the said order to the Respondents, i.e. the Director of School Education (Grant-in Aid Section), Govt. of Tripura, as well as to the Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura, Department of Education, Agartala, requested them to release Rs. 95, 90, 769/- towards the payment of arrear salaries w.e.f. 01.04.2007 to 28.02.2010 and start the functioning of the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme of the School. 10. The Respondents challenged the aforesaid order, dated 05.03.2010, by filing two writ appeals, being W.A. No. 18/2010 and W.A. No. 19/2010 and both the writ appeals, upon withdrawal by the Appellants, were disposed of by a Cont. Cas(C) No. 20 of 2010 Page 5 of 22 common order, dated 04.05.2010, granting three months more time to comply with the direction, made by the learned Single Judge, especially relating to issue of notice to show cause regarding withdrawal of 'Grant-in-Aid' status. 11. The Respondents, however, without granting the benefit of 'Grant-in-Aid' status, issued a notice under the hand and seal of the Director of School Education, on 12.05.2010, under Rule 10 of the Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005 (hereinafter called 'the Rules, 2005'), asking the Petitioner to show cause as to why the 'Grant-in-Aid' status should not be withdrawn. Accordingly, the Petitioner, submitted their reply, on 07.06.2010 and the Director of School Education, by his letter, dated 30.07.2010, passed an order, withdrawing the 'Grant-in-Aid' status of the school with retrospective effect i.e. w.e.f. 1st April, 2007. 12. In view of above, alleging wilful disobedience of the order, dated 05.03.2010 aforesaid, the Petitioner filed another contempt proceeding, being Cont. Cas(C) No. 18/2010. The said contempt proceeding has been disposed of separately. 13. 12. In view of above, alleging wilful disobedience of the order, dated 05.03.2010 aforesaid, the Petitioner filed another contempt proceeding, being Cont. Cas(C) No. 18/2010. The said contempt proceeding has been disposed of separately. 13. Upon issuance of the order, dated 30.07.2010, thereby withdrawing the 'Grant-in-Aid' status of the school, the Petitioner challenged the said withdrawal order by filing a writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 372/2010. This Court, while entertaining the said writ petition, by its following order, dated 26.08.2010, stayed the operation of the impugned order, dated 30.07.2010 until further orders and directed the State-respondents to take up follow up action, consequent upon suspension of the operation of the impugned order 26.08.2010. Heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. NC Pal, learned G.A. appearing for the Respondents. Issue Rule calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why a Writ as prayed for should not be issued; or why such further or other orders should not be passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper. The Rule is made returnable within four weeks. Since the Respondents have entered appearance through the learned the learned G.A., no formal notice is called for. There is prayer for interim order. This writ petition has chequered history. This court also perused the earlier order dated 18.12.08 passed in Misc. Application No. 332/08 (WP(C)360/08), the judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 11.02.09 passed in Writ Appeal No. 1 of 2009, subsequent order of the learned Single Judge dated 24.2.09 passed in CM Application (WP) No. 25/09 (Ref. WP(C) No. 360/08) and the final judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 29.1.10 passed in W.P(C) No. 360 of 2008, W.P(C) No. 235/09 and also the Division Bench order dated 4.5.10 passed in W.A. No. 18 of 2010 & W.A. No. 19 of 2010 and also heard the rival contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. This Court is of the view that there is prima facie case for passing an interim order. In the interim, it is provided that operation of the impugned order dated 30.7.10 shall remain suspended until further orders. The State Respondents shall take up follow up action consequent upon the suspension of the operation of the impugned order. This Court is of the view that there is prima facie case for passing an interim order. In the interim, it is provided that operation of the impugned order dated 30.7.10 shall remain suspended until further orders. The State Respondents shall take up follow up action consequent upon the suspension of the operation of the impugned order. However, liberty is granted to the Respondents to file application for modification of this interim order. By the said order, the Court also granted liberty to the Respondents to file application for modification of the interim order, if any. After the said order, dated 26.08.2010, the Petitioner, by its notice, dated 30.08.2010 (served on 30.09.2010), made a request to the Respondents for placing funds for payment of salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also to start operation of the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme within seven days, but the Respondents did not respond to the said request. According to the Petitioner, despite the fact that, in view of the orders, dated 05.03.2010 and 26.08.2010 aforesaid, the school was having the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the Respondents did not release necessary fund for payment of salary and withheld the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme w.e.f. January, 2009. The Petitioner also contended that, the Respondents wilfully refused to release the salaries to the teaching and non-teaching staff and implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme and thereby wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order/direction contained in the order, dated 26.08.2010, passed in W.P.(C) 372/2010, and therefore, they are liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. Hence, this contempt petition. 14. Both the parties, apart from advancing oral submissions, have submitted their written arguments. 15. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, has submitted that this Court, while granting the stay, by order, dated 26.08.2010, suspending the order, dated 30.07.2010 until further orders, with further direction upon the Respondents to take up follow up action, consequent upon suspension of operation of the impugned order, dated 30.07.2010, made no positive direction for compliance. Therefore, contending that the Respondents committed no Contempt of Court, the learned senior counsel submits that the Respondents tender unconditional apology, if they are found to be guilty of contempt. 15. Therefore, contending that the Respondents committed no Contempt of Court, the learned senior counsel submits that the Respondents tender unconditional apology, if they are found to be guilty of contempt. 15. A. Referring to the difference between execution of a decree and a contempt proceeding, the learned senior counsel, has submitted that, as there was no specific direction in the order, dated 26.08.2010, it can't be held that any contempt was committed by the Respondents. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, further contended that, before a contemnor is punished for non compliance of any direction of a Court, the Court must be satisfied that the disobedience was wilful and intentional. The learned senior counsel, has also submitted that a contempt court can't pass any order supplementary. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel has relied on the following decisions: (1) Niaz Mohammad and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332 , (2) Indian Airports Employees' Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee and Anr., reported in (1999) 2 SCC 537 , (3) Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Ors., reported in (2001) 3 SCC 739 ; (4) V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Anr., reported in (2004) 13 SCC 610 ; (5) Anil Kumar Shahi (2) and Ors. v. Ram Sevak Yadav Ors., reported in (2008) 14 SCC 115. 16. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, appearing for the Petitioner, has submitted that, in view of the stay order, dated 26.08.2010, granted in W.P.(C) No. 2010 aforesaid, the Respondents are under legal obligation to comply with the direction made in paragraph-32 of the judgment and order, dated 05.03.2010, passed in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008 and W.P.(C) No. 325/2009. It is submitted that, though the Respondent No. 2 had passed the order dated 30.07.2010, thereby withdrawing the 'Grant-in-Aid' status of the school w.e.f. 01.04.2007, in view of the stay order, dated 26.08.2010 and the direction made in paragraph-32 of the judgment and order, dated 05.03.2010, the Respondents were required to make payment of arrears and current salaries to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also to operate the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the impugned order, dated 26.08.2010, passed in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010, was sought to be vacated by the Respondents, by filing C.M. Appl. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the impugned order, dated 26.08.2010, passed in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010, was sought to be vacated by the Respondents, by filing C.M. Appl. No. 374/2010, in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010, but this Court, by order, dated 15.12.2010, refused to vacate the stay order aforesaid and directed the Respondents to sanction the required fund and also to extend the facility of 'Mid-Day-Meal'. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, further contends that though the said order, dated 15.12.2010, was challenged by the Respondents by preferring a writ appeal, being W.A. No. 05/2011, the Division Bench, by its order, dated 08.06.2011, passed in the said writ appeal, refused to vacate the said stay order. The copies of the orders, dated 15.12.2010 and 08.06.2011 have been enclosed with the written argument. Therefore, it is submitted, that the Respondents, despite specific direction to take up follow up action consequent upon the stay order aforesaid, i.e. to pay the salary and operate the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme, to which the school was entitled under the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the Respondents in most obstinate and arrogant manner, refused to comply with the directions contained in the said order, dated 26.08.2010, read with directions made in para-32 of the judgment and order, dated 05.03.2010 and, thus, wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Court. Therefore, it is submitted that the Respondents are liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. 17. In Contempt Cas(C) No. 11/2009 and Contempt Cas(C) No. 18/2010, which are based on almost identical sets of facts, involving similar question of law, the question of limitation under Section 20 of the Act, 1971, was raised on behalf of the Respondents. 18. While considering the question of limitation under Section 20 of the Act, 1971, the Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549 , referred to the following observations made in Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh, reported in 1984 Cri.L.J. 301 . 19. To finally conclude it must be held that the terminus a quo for limitation begins under Section 20 of the Act on the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The terminus ad quem in case of criminal contempt would necessarily vary and be related to the modes of taking cognizance thereof provided for in Section 15. The terminus ad quem in case of criminal contempt would necessarily vary and be related to the modes of taking cognizance thereof provided for in Section 15. In cases where it is initiated on the court's own motion it would necessarily be from the issuance of the notice for contempt by the court. In case of a motion by the Advocate General under Section 15(1)(a), the proceedings would initiate from the date of the filing of such a motion in the High Court. Where any other person moves the Advocate General for his consent in writing as prescribed in Section 15(1)(b), the initiation of proceedings would be with effect from the date of such application. Lastly, in cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate court on a reference made by it the proceedings must be deemed to be initiated from the date when such reference is made. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 19. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), accepted the view, given in Manjit Singh(supra), that the initiation of contempt proceedings otherwise than on court's own motion would include within its sweep a motion by the Advocate General, a reference by a subordinate court to the High Court to take action for contempt and an application before the Advocate General seeking his consent by any other person under Section 15 and lastly in cases of civil contempt the motion by a private litigant directly in the court. 20. 20. In the Case of N. Venkata Swamy Naidu v. M/s Sri Sri Surya Teja Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., reported in 2008 CRI.L.J. 227, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while interpreting the term 'initiation of contempt' within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, referred to the decisions in the cases of A.V. Koteswara Rao and S.J.G.M. High School (1996 Cri.LJ 699), Pallav Sheth(supra) and Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra). The learned Judges of the Division Bench, in the said case, at paragraph-43, observed as follows: 43. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ), it must be held that if an application to initiate contempt proceedings is filed within one year, from the date on which contempt is committed, it would amount to initiation of contempt proceedings within limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The limitation under Section 20 has to be computed with reference to the date of filing of the application for initiation of contempt and since in the present case, such an application was filed on 21.11.2005, well within the period of one year from the order of status quo dated 18.7.2005, violation of which is said to be in contempt, the contempt case as filed cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 21. In the said contempt proceedings, which have been disposed of, relying on the decisions held in the Case of Pallav Sheth(supra), it has been held that, if show cause notice is issued within one year from the date, on which contempt is alleged to be committed, then the proceeding will not be hit by Section 20 of the Act, 1971. In view of the above, in the case at hand also, the notice being issued within one year from the date of the order, which has been alleged to be disobeyed, the present proceeding is not barred by law of limitation. 22. In view of the above, in the case at hand also, the notice being issued within one year from the date of the order, which has been alleged to be disobeyed, the present proceeding is not barred by law of limitation. 22. In the case of Niaz Mohammad (supra), the Supreme Court, referring to Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971, while laying down the difference between an execution proceeding under the Code of Civil Procedure and a proceeding under the Act, 1971, has made it clear that, in a contempt proceeding it must be established to the satisfaction of the court that the alleged contemner has wilfully and intentionally disobeyed the Court's order. The Supreme Court, in Niaz Mohammad (supra), observed: The court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied with and carried out the direction of the court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. In the above referred case, the Supreme Court further observed: Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequence thereof. But, while examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the court has to record a finding that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the court is satisfied that although there was been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the court may not punish the alleged contemner. 23. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the court is satisfied that although there was been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the court may not punish the alleged contemner. 23. In the above referred case, the Petitioners, who were working as instructors under the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme, under the Education Department of Haryana, filed a writ petition, claiming that they were also performing the same nature of duties as performed by the squad teachers as such they were also entitled to pay scales of the squad teachers under the Education Department along with other benefits from the date they were initially appointed. The writ court held that the Petitioners were entitled to the same pay scale as sanctioned to the squad teachers and a direction was given to fix the scale of pay of the instructors with effect from the date of their initial appointments. The order/direction aforesaid, not being complied with, the Petitioners filed a contempt proceeding. The total liability was about 28 crores. On behalf of the State of Haryana, it was stated that the Court was not conscious, when the aforesaid writ petition was allowed, about the nature of financial burden and it was categorically stated, that unless the Union of India contributed and borne a part of the burden aforesaid, it was not possible to comply with the direction given in the said judgment. It was also contended that, with great difficulties, in order to comply with the direction of the Court, Rs. 20 crores had been arranged and paid to the different instructors under the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme, which was a temporary scheme. The learned senior counsel, appearing for the State, expressed the predicament of the State of Haryana in releasing any further fund, beyond what has already been paid, and sought a direction to the Union of India to contribute the balance of the amount. The learned senior counsel, appearing for the State, expressed the predicament of the State of Haryana in releasing any further fund, beyond what has already been paid, and sought a direction to the Union of India to contribute the balance of the amount. In dismissing the petition, filed for initiating the proceeding for contempt, the Supreme Court, at paragraph-11 of the judgment in Niaz Mohammad (supra), observed as follows: Taking all facts and circumstances into consideration, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no wilful disobedience on the part of the Respondents in complying with the direction given by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. It cannot be disputed that when the aforesaid direction was given, this Court was not conscious that the direction had created a liability for payment of about 28 crores of rupees, as arrears to the instructors in the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme under the Education Department in the State of Haryana. Out of that amount about 20 crores of rupees have already been disbursed for different periods to the instructors. In this background, it is not possible to hold that Respondents have committed contempt of this Court, for which they ought to be punished by this Court. Accordingly, all the petitions including WP(C) Nos. 401 and 784 of 1989 are dismissed. 24. From the above decision, it appears that the total liability stood at Rs. 28 crores and this was neither known to the Court nor to the parties to that proceeding. The State i.e. the Respondents pleaded its predicament to comply with the direction made in the writ petition on the ground of non-availability of sufficient funds. Therefore, the Supreme Court was pleased to dismiss the contempt proceeding on the ground of inability of the State-respondents to comply with the direction due to non-availability of sufficient fund. Therefore, it was held that there was no wilful disobedience on the part of the State-respondents. 25. In the present case, the State-respondents has not taken any plea that due to certain compelling circumstances, the Respondents are not in a position to comply with the direction made by the Court. The clear stand of the Respondents is that, as there is no specific direction, they are not required to pay salary and implement the 'Mid-day-Meal' Scheme, as available under the 'Grant-in-Aid' status. The clear stand of the Respondents is that, as there is no specific direction, they are not required to pay salary and implement the 'Mid-day-Meal' Scheme, as available under the 'Grant-in-Aid' status. Therefore, the fact of the above referred case and the fact of the case at hand not being identical, the decision rendered in the said case will not help the Respondents. 26. In the case of Anil Kumar Shahi(2)(supra), the Supreme Court observed that, while exercising its power under the Act, 1971, it is not open to the court to pass an order which will materially add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience of which contempt jurisdiction was invoked. The Court also observed that, when a court directs an authority to consider a matter in accordance with law, it means that the matter should be considered to the best of understanding by the authority and, therefore, mere error of judgment with regard to legal position cannot constitute contempt of court. 27. In the light of the above principles of law, laid down by the Supreme Court, we are required to examine, if the Respondents, by refusing to pay the regular as well as arrear salaries to the teaching and non-teaching staff and implement the ''Mid-Day-Meal'' Scheme, despite the said order dated 26.08.2010, which was subsequently upheld by order, dated 15.12.2010, passed in C.M. Appl. No. 374/2010, in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010 and Writ Appeal No. 05/2011, committed wilful disobedience of the directions made by this Court. 28. There is no dispute that the Respondent-authority, by its order, dated 16.04.2007, which reads as follows, brought the school under the purview of 'Grant-in-Aid' Scheme w.e.f. 1st April, 2007, one of the conditions (6th condition), of the said order, granting 'Grant-in-Aid' status was that, the teaching and non-teaching staff contained in Annexure-I would be paid fixed pay at the rate shown against each with effect from 1st April, 2007. NOTIFICATION Governor of Tripura has been pleased to undertake the New Hindi Secondary (Hindi and English Medium) School, Khejur Bagan, Agartala under the State Grant-in-Aid Scheme under Education (School) Department with effect from 1st April, 2007. All the existing 23 (twenty three) Nos. teaching staff and 7 (seven) Nos. NOTIFICATION Governor of Tripura has been pleased to undertake the New Hindi Secondary (Hindi and English Medium) School, Khejur Bagan, Agartala under the State Grant-in-Aid Scheme under Education (School) Department with effect from 1st April, 2007. All the existing 23 (twenty three) Nos. teaching staff and 7 (seven) Nos. non-teaching staff of the school as shown in Annexure-I on fixed pay at the rates as shown against each which come under purview of aforesaid Grant-in-Aid Scheme w.e.f. first day of April, 2007 with the following conditions: 1. The school should constitute an elected School Managing Committee with a permanent nominee of Education (School) Department, i.e., District Education Officer, West District Zonal Office, Agartala, Tripura(W). 2. "The Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Govt. Aided Schools) Rules, 2005" as notified in Tripura Gazette extra ordinary issue No. 147 dated 6th June, 2005 vide Notification No. F.10(1-53)-DSE/90 dated 31.05.2005 shall be applicable to the School in its Management. 3. Provident Fund and Retirement Benefits of the employees of the Govt. Aided Private Schools Rules, 1991 as Notified vide Memo No. F.10(9)-DSE/90 dated 07.04.1992 published in Tripura Gazette, extra ordinary issue dated 31.01, 1994 shall be applicable. 4. The service of teaching and non-teaching staff as per Annexure-I are approved w.e.f. 01.04.2007. 5. The teaching and non-teaching staff as mentioned in Annexure-I will not get any benefit of their past services rendered prior to 01.04.2007. 6. The teaching and non-teaching staff contained in Annexure-I will be paid fixed pay at the rate shown against each with effect from 1st April, 2007. 7. The present Madhyamik level should continue for next 5(five) years and before this period it should not be considered for further upgradation. 8. Keeping future expansion, in view, a separate plot of land for the School including standard play ground should be identified by the School Managing Committee. By order of Governor Sd/- (Kumar Jamatia) Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura. 29. By order, dated 17.12.2008, the 'Grant-in-Aid' status was withdrawn. As admitted by the Respondents, in their written objection, consequent upon withdrawal/cancellation of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme implemented by the Director of School Education in respect of the said school was withdrawn, by order, dated 05.09.2007. Therefore, there is no dispute that the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme was withdrawn as a fall-out of the withdrawal order, dated 17.12.2008. As admitted by the Respondents, in their written objection, consequent upon withdrawal/cancellation of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme implemented by the Director of School Education in respect of the said school was withdrawn, by order, dated 05.09.2007. Therefore, there is no dispute that the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme was withdrawn as a fall-out of the withdrawal order, dated 17.12.2008. It is also admitted position that the order, dated 17.12.2008 aforesaid, was quashed by the judgment and order, dated 05.03.2010, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008 and W.P.(C) No. 235/2009. The Court, by the said order, at paragraph-32 aforesaid, while granting liberty to the Respondents to pass necessary order regarding withdrawal of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, after giving opportunity to the Petitioners, made the following observations: The New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan at present shall be under Grant-in-aid scheme. By the said observation, it was clarified that until the order, withdrawing the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, was passed under Rule 10 of the Rules, 2005, the school should be treated as under the 'Grant-in-Aid' Scheme. Therefore, in the absence of any such withdrawal order, the school was entitled to get the consequential benefit of 'Grant-in-Aid' status. In the said order, dated 05.03.2010, it was also made clear to pass new order within three months regarding fixation of the quantum of arrear pay and allowances and implementation of 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme and the Respondents was directed to make available the funds for payment of salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff at par with the Government aided schools. However, this order was challenged before a Division Bench and the Division Bench, by order, dated 04.05.2010, passed in Writ Appeal Nos. 18/2010 and 19/2010 respectively, while extending the period, provided by order, dated 05.03.2010, for another period of three months, directed the Respondents to comply with the direction made by the learned Single Judge. 30. Accordingly, after getting the extended time, the Respondents, within the prescribed period, passed the order, dated 30.07.2010, after complying with the requirement as prescribed by Rule 10 of the Rules, 2005, as indicated in the order, dated 05.03.2010, and, thus, had withdrawn the 'Grant-in-Aid' status. 30. Accordingly, after getting the extended time, the Respondents, within the prescribed period, passed the order, dated 30.07.2010, after complying with the requirement as prescribed by Rule 10 of the Rules, 2005, as indicated in the order, dated 05.03.2010, and, thus, had withdrawn the 'Grant-in-Aid' status. The said order, dated 30.07.2010, being challenged in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010, a learned Single Judge of this Court, by order, dated 26.08.2010, while granting stay in respect of the operation of the impugned order, directed to take follow up action consequent upon suspension of the impugned order. Therefore, there is no difficulty in understanding that, in view of stay of the said order, by which the 'Grant-in-Aid' status was withdrawn, the initial order, dated 16.04.2007, by which the 'Grant-in-Aid' status was granted, became effective, creating obligation on the Respondents to extend the benefits, consequently arising out of the continuance of 'Grant-in-Aid' status. It is admitted position that the benefit of salary and 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme were not extended due to withdrawal/cancellation of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status. The said stay order clearly implies that the school was under the 'Grant-in-Aid' status. The Respondent No. 1, in his written objection clearly stated that consequent upon issuance of Notification, dated 17.12.2008, thereby withdrawing/cancelling the 'Grant-in-Aid- status, the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme was discontinued. Therefore, in view of the stay of the said cancellation order, the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme should have been resumed. The Respondent No. 2, in his written statement admitted that the Petitioner, by communication dated 11.08.2010, referring to the order dated 05.03.2010, asked to pay salary and start the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. This Respondent while admitting that the Court, vide order, dated 26.08.2010 aforesaid, stayed the order, dated 30.07.2010, pleaded that as he took charge of the Office after 30.07.2010, he was not liable to be proceeded under Section 12 of the Act, 1971. From the above, it is clearly found that both the Respondents were aware of the orders aforesaid, passed by the Court, requiring them to extend the benefits, consequent upon the said stay order. Therefore, the Respondent No. 2 can't escape the liability by saying that he assumed charge of the Office after 30.07.2010, in as much as, the stay order was brought to his knowledge. 31. Therefore, the Respondent No. 2 can't escape the liability by saying that he assumed charge of the Office after 30.07.2010, in as much as, the stay order was brought to his knowledge. 31. That apart, while granting stay, by the order, dated 26.08.2010, passed in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010 aforesaid, liberty was also granted to the Respondents to approach the Court for modification of the said order. Accordingly, by filing C.M. Appl. No. 374/2010, in W.P.(C) No. 372/2010, the State of Tripura, prayed for vacating the said stay order, dated 26.08.2010 aforesaid, but the learned Single Judge, by order, dated 15.12.2010 aforesaid, while refusing to interfere with the said stay order, directed the applicants-State to sanction the required amount, to which the school authority was entitled under the 'Grant-in-Aid' Scheme and also to extend the facility of ''Mid-Day-Meal'' Scheme. This order being challenged in Writ Appeal No. 05/2011, a Division Bench, while declining to interfere with the impugned order aforesaid, observed: The matter only involves some financial expenditure by the State which we think, under the circumstances, can be afforded. The Division Bench, in the appeal aforesaid, also observed: That apart, if the order dated 30.07.10 is not stayed it would virtually mean the closure of the school and all its students would be left without any education and all its employees would be left without employment. In view of the above orders, there could be no dispute or confusion to understand that the Court required the Respondents to release necessary fund for payment of salary and implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. 32. In this proceeding, the Petitioner has categorically stated that, after the order passed in W.P.(C) No. 360/2008 and W.P.(C) No. 235/2009, the Petitioner approached the Respondents for granting an amount of Rs. 95,90,769/- towards payment of arrear salaries and for implementing the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. It has also been contended that, even after passing of the stay order, dated 26.08.2010 aforesaid, the Petitioner, by its letter, dated 30.08.2010, requested the Respondents to place the fund for payment of salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff of the said school and to make the ''Mid-Day-Meal'' Scheme operational. Admittedly, neither the fund towards payment of salaries has been granted nor the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme has been introduced. 33. Admittedly, neither the fund towards payment of salaries has been granted nor the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme has been introduced. 33. From the above discussion, it is found that the Respondents, in the above facts and circumstances, without canvassing any other compelling predicament or circumstances, for which the Respondents are not in a position to make available the fund necessary for payment of salaries and implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme, have simply denied their obligation to pay salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme. of course, the Respondents have stated that they did not receive the letter, dated 30.09.2010 (30.08.2010), containing request for placing fund and making the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme operational. Even if the Respondents did not receive such request, they were aware of the directions made in the said orders. Their categorical statements that they are not under any obligation to pay the salaries and implement the 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme, indicates their refusal to comply with the said requirement, without being prevented by any compelling circumstances or impediment. 34. In view of above discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that it has been prima facie established that the Respondents wilfully and intentionally disobeyed the Court's order/direction dated 26.08.2010 aforesaid, by refusing to extend the consequential benefits i.e. fund for payment of salary and implementation of 'Mid-Day-Meal' Scheme i.e. the benefits, which arose out of the 'Grant-in-Aid' status, made available to the Petitioner's school. Therefore, I find sufficient materials for drawing up a contempt proceeding against the Respondents on the said charge. Accordingly, a contempt proceeding is initiated against the said Respondents. 35. Issue notice to the Respondents to show cause, if any, as to why action, under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shall not be taken and appropriate punishment for contempt of Court shall not be awarded. The notice is made returnable on 29.11.2011.