JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. The Managing Committee of the New Hindi Secondary school, Khejur Bagan, Goalabasti, Agartala (hereinafter called, 'the school' has moved this contempt petition, under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for drawing up a contempt proceeding and awarding appropriate punishment to Sri Banamali Sinha, IAS, Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Education Department and Sri Sahadeb Das, Director of School Education, Government of Tripura, Agartala, for willful disobedience of the impugned judgment and order (common), dated 5-3-10, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (C) No. 360 of 2008 and W.P.(C) No. 235 of 2009, which has been affirmed by a common judgment and order, dated 4-5-2010, passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. Nos. 18 of 2010 and 19 of 2010. After receipt of the said petition, this Court by order dated 27-8-10 issued notice to the Respondents to show cause, if any, as to why a contempt proceeding under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts' Act read with relevant rules of the High Court, should not be initiated for disobedience of the order aforesaid. Accordingly, the Respondents aforesaid, by filing separate written objections, have denied the allegation of willful disobedience of the court's order aforesaid. 2. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. R. Datta, learned Counsel, appearing for the Petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior counsel, assisted by Mr. N.C. Paul, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the Respondents. 3. By its order dated 16-4-07, the Government of Tripura in Education (School) Department brought the said school under the grant-in-aid scheme with effect from 1-4-07. Consequent upon the grant of the said status, the scheme of mid-day meal was introduced in the school. N.C. Paul, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the Respondents. 3. By its order dated 16-4-07, the Government of Tripura in Education (School) Department brought the said school under the grant-in-aid scheme with effect from 1-4-07. Consequent upon the grant of the said status, the scheme of mid-day meal was introduced in the school. As higher scale and arrear salary, as per the grant-in-aid scheme, were not given to the teachers and non-teachers of the said school, Sri Amiya Sinha and 20 others, being the members of teaching and non-teaching staff of the school, filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 360 of 2008 before this Court against the State of Tripura and Director of School Education, Government of Tripura, seeking a direction for payment of arrear pay and higher pay to the teaching as well as non-teaching staff of the school with effect from 1-4-07 i.e. the date on which the school was brought under the grant-in-aid scheme. The Petitioner was a proforma-respondent in the said W.P.(C) No. 360 of 2008. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the grant-in-aid status was withdrawn/cancelled by the Respondents by their notification dated 17-12-08 and the mid-day meal scheme was stopped. This Court by order, dated 20-4-09, passed in C.M. Application No. 25 of 2009 in W.P.(C) No. 360 of 2008, stayed the operation of the impugned order, dated 17-12-08. Despite the said stay order, as the mid-day meal scheme was not resumed, the Petitioner, alleging disobedience of the court's order aforesaid, moved a contempt petition being Contempt Case (C) No. 11 of 2009 against the then Director of the School Education and the Inspector of School. The said contempt proceeding has been separately dealt with. Subsequent to the filing of the W.P(C) No. 360 of 2008, the present Petitioner also filed a writ petition, being W.P(C) No. 235 of 2009 against the State of Tripura and the Director of School Education seeking a direction for quashing the impugned order dated 17-12-08 and for directing the Respondents to place funds for payment of salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school at the rate fixed for teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided school in State of Tripura. By a common judgment and order, dated 5-3-10, this Court, while disposing the writ petition, aforesaid quashed the impugned notification, dated 17-12-08, directing the Respondents to pass necessary orders regarding withdrawal/cancellation of the notification, dated 16-4-07 after giving reasonable opportunity in compliance with Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 (hereinafter called, the Rules, 2005) to the said school authority allowing them to file documents and their pleading. The court also observed that the school shall, at present, be under grant-in-aid scheme. However, it was left to the wisdom of the State Respondents to decide the quantum of arrear salary of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also the date of implementation of the mid-day meal scheme in primary school, within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment and order. The court further observed that the State Respondents should pass necessary order keeping in view the observation and finding of the court regarding the matters relating to grant-in-aid and that necessary fund should be made available for payment of salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff. After disposal of the said writ petitions with the above directions, the Petitioner by letter, dated 23-2-10, furnished a copy of the said judgment and order to the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Education Department as well as the Director of School Education along with statement of arrear salaries, payable to the teaching and non-teaching staff and requested to sanction the amount of Rs. 95,90,769/- towards the arrear salary, for the period from 1-4-07 to 20-2-10. The State Respondents were also requested to implement of the mid-day meal scheme. But the Respondents refused to comply with the said request and the Respondents challenged the said judgment and order, dated 5-3-10, by preferring Writ Appeal Nos. 18 of 2010 and 19 of 2010. However, on being prayed by the Respondents, a Division Bench of this Court by order, dated 4-5-10, passed in the said writ appeals allowed the Respondents-appellants to withdraw the appeals aforesaid with liberty to issue appropriate notices to the Petitioner and proceed under Rule 10 of the Rules, 2005 as per direction contained in paragraph 32 of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 360 of 2008 and W.P.(C) No. 235 of 2009. After disposal of the said writ appeals, on withdrawal, the Director of School Education, without complying with the judgment and order aforesaid issued a show cause notice on 12-5-10 purportedly under Rule 10 of the Rules, 2005 asking the Petitioner to show cause as to why the grant-in-aid status should not be withdrawn. Accordingly, the Petitioner also submitted reply to the show cause by his communication dated 7-6-10. Thereafter, the Director of School Education by order, dated 30-7-10, issued an order withdrawing the grant-in-aid status of the school with retrospective effect i.e. from 1-4-07. Thereafter, Petitioner, by his communication dated 11-8-10, informed the Respondents that they, by failing to pay the salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and not implementing the mid-day meal scheme and also by issuing the order dated 30-7-10, thereby withdrawing the grant-in-aid status of the school with retrospective effect from 1-4-07, committed gross violation and disobedience of the directions, made in para 32 of the judgment and order dated 5-3-10 aforesaid. According to the Petitioner, despite request made vide letter dated 11-8-10, the Respondents failed to comply with the directions made by this Court in its judgment and order, dated 5-3-10. Therefore, the Petitioner by preferring this petition, has prayed for initiating a contempt proceeding against the Respondents for willful disobedience of the directions made in the order, dated 5-3-10, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 360 of 2008 and W.P.(C) No. 235 of 2009, which was affirmed by a common judgment and order dated 4-5-10 passed by a Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 18 of 2010 and 19 of 2010. 4. Both the Respondents, in their written objection, categorically denied the allegation that they had willfully disobeyed the order, dated 5-3-10, passed by this Court, in W.P.(C) No. 360 of 2008 and W.P.(C) No. 235 of 2008. The contesting Respondents, in their written objections, stated that the court, by judgment and order, dated 5-3-10, aforesaid left it to the wisdom of the Respondents to decide within three months the matter relating to quantum of arrears of pay and allowances for teaching and non-teaching staff as well as the implementation of the mid-day meal scheme. The contesting Respondents, in their written objections, stated that the court, by judgment and order, dated 5-3-10, aforesaid left it to the wisdom of the Respondents to decide within three months the matter relating to quantum of arrears of pay and allowances for teaching and non-teaching staff as well as the implementation of the mid-day meal scheme. They have also contended that the order regarding making available of fund, for payment of salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff, was contingent upon the decision regarding fixation of quantum of arrear pay and allowances and that the court by, order dated 5-3-10, neither directed to pay arrear pay and allowances, nor made any direction for implementation of the mid-day meal scheme in the school. The Respondents further contended that, they, in compliance of the court's order, issued show cause notice, on 12-5-10, under Rule 10 of Rules, 2005 regarding withdrawal of grant-in-aid status and that after considering the reply, dated 7-6-10, submitted by the Petitioner, the Government had withdrawn the grant-in-aid status with effect from 1-4-07 by its order dated 30-7-10. In view of the above, the Respondents have denied the allegation that they had violated or disobeyed any direction or order passed by the orders dated 5-3-2010 and 4-5-2010 aforesaid. 5. Both the parties have filed written arguments. 6. Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, raising the question of limitation has submitted that the contempt proceeding, not being initiated within one year, from the date of the order, which has been alleged to be disobeyed, is barred by Section 20 of the Act and the same is liable to be closed. 7. Referring to the decision in the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. 7. Referring to the decision in the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 535 and Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and Anr., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 171 , the learned senior counsel, for the Respondents, contended that the law, regarding limitation, under Section 20 of the Act, 1971, and its application, has been well settled holding that limitation starts from the date of the order, on which contempt is alleged to have been committed and ends on the date, on which the court issues a notice calling the alleged contemner to show cause as to why he should not be punished and not on the date of issuing notice as to why contempt proceeding should not be implemented. The learned senior counsel further contended that, in the subsequent decision, held in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549 , though the Supreme Court, after considering the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) and Baradakanta Mishra(supra), observed that the Court in Om Prakash(supra) took too narrow a view of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, the decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) was not overruled. In support of his argument, the learned senior counsel has relied on the decisions held in the cases of: (1) Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549 (2) Niaz Mohammad and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332 , (3) R.N. Dey and Ors. v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Ors., reported in (2000) 4 SCC 400 , (4) Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Anr. v. Taraknath Ganguli and Ors., reported in (2002) 5 SCC 352 ; (5) Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 535 ; (6) Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and Anr., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 171 . (7) State of Orissa and Ors. v. Mohammad Illiyas, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 275 ; (8) Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr.Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673 ; (9) State of Uttaranchal v. Sehnaz Mirza and Ors., reported in (2008) 6 SCC 726 . (10) Quinn v. Leathem, reported in 1901 AC 495. v. Mohammad Illiyas, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 275 ; (8) Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr.Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673 ; (9) State of Uttaranchal v. Sehnaz Mirza and Ors., reported in (2008) 6 SCC 726 . (10) Quinn v. Leathem, reported in 1901 AC 495. (11) Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh, reported in 1984 Cri.L.J. 301. (12) Government of Karnataka and Ors. v. Gowramma and Ors., reported in (2007) 13 SCC 482 . (13) Bihar School Examination Board v. Suresh Prasad Sinha, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 483 . (14) Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai Vs. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi and Anr., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 496 . (15) Pradip Chandra Parija and Ors. v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 . (16) Indian Airports Employees' Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee and Anr., reported in (1999) 2 SCC 537 , (17) Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors., reported in (2001) 3 SCC 739 ; (18) V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Anr., reported in (2004) 13 SCC 610 ; (19) Anil Kumar Shahi (2) and Ors. v. Ram Sevak Yadav Ors., reported in (2008) 14 SCC 115. 8. Referring to paragraph 32 i.e. the operative part of the judgment and order, dated 5-3-10, aforesaid, the learned Senior counsel has submitted that the learned Single Judge, while setting aside the order, dated 17-12-10, gave liberty to the Respondent to decide the question regarding withdrawal of grant-in-aid status, under Rule 10 of the Rules, 2005, after giving opportunities to the managing committee of the school and accordingly, the managing committee was given opportunity to answer the show cause notice, dated 12-5-10, and therefore, the order, dated 30-7-10, withdrawing the grant-in-aid status, was passed, after giving opportunity to answer the show cause notice aforesaid. The learned Senior counsel has also submitted that as the grant-in-aid status was withdrawn, there was no requirement to pay salary and implement the mid-day meal scheme, under the grant-in-aid scheme, which did not exist in favour of the school. 9. The learned Senior counsel has also submitted that as the grant-in-aid status was withdrawn, there was no requirement to pay salary and implement the mid-day meal scheme, under the grant-in-aid scheme, which did not exist in favour of the school. 9. Referring to the Section 12 of the Act, the learned Senior counsel has submitted that as the grant-in-aid status was withdrawn, after following due procedure as prescribed by Rule 10 of Rules, 2005, as per direction of the court, there was no willful and deliberate violation of the order of the court. 10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents, has further submitted that there is no material, on record, to show that the Respondents have wilfully violated or disobeyed any direction or order passed by this Court and as such the proceeding is liable to be closed. 11. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner referring to the Court's direction made in paragraph 32 of the judgment and order, dated 5-3-10, aforesaid has submitted that by the said judgment and order, the court, while quashing the order dated 17-2-08, by which the grant-in-aid status was withdrawn, categorically declared that the school was on grant-in-aid status and as such the Respondents, by failing to pay the arrear salaries and to implement the mid-day meal scheme, willfully disobeyed the court's order and therefore, they are liable to be punished under the Act. The learned Senior counsel further submitted that by order, dated 30-7-10, while withdrawing the grant-in-aid status of the school with retrospective effect from 1-4-2007 the Respondents disobeyed the direction, contained in the judgment and order, dated 5-3-2010. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner referring to the paragraph 32 of the judgment and order dated 5-3-2010 has submitted that the court, while granting liberty to the Respondents to pass necessary order regarding withdrawal of the grant-in-aid status (i.e. the order dated 16-4-07), after complying with the requirements under Rule 10 of Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005, observed "that the school shall be under grant-in-aid scheme and that the Respondents should decide the quantum of arrear pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff and also the date of implementation of the midday meal scheme within three months from the date of judgment. It is also submitted that by the said order that the court directed that the State Respondents shall make the fund available for payment of salaries for the teaching and non-teaching staff. In view of the above, it is submitted that the Respondents by failing to implement the mid-day meal scheme and pay arrear salaries willfully disobeyed the order of the court. 12. Regarding the question of limitation, the learned Senior counsel referring to the case of Pallav Seth(supra) has submitted that as the application for initiating contempt has been filed within one year from the date of the order, which has been alleged to be violated the present proceeding is well within time and as such not hit by Section 20 of the Act. 13. In view of the above, the points for determination are whether the proceeding is hit by Section20 of the Act and if the Respondents by failing to pay the regular and arrear salaries to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and implement the mid-day meal scheme, despite the court's order dated 5-3-10 aforesaid willfully committed contempt of court. 14. The question as to whether the present proceeding is hit by Section 20 of the Act, 1971, is taken up as below. Section 20 of the Act, 1971, reads as follows: 20. Limitation for actions for contempt.- No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 15. Two different views have been expressed in the cases of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) and Pallav Sheth(supra). According to Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra), the notice to show case as to why punishment should not be imposed is to be issued within one year from the date of alleged violations of the order/direction. But, according to Pallav Sheth's case(supra), if the notice to show cause is issued, on receipt of an application, from a private party or suo moto, within one year from the date, on which the violation of the Court's order is alleged, then there is sufficient compliance of Section 20 of the Act. 16. For the purpose of appreciating the ratio in Pallav Sheth(supra), Mr. 16. For the purpose of appreciating the ratio in Pallav Sheth(supra), Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, referring to the decisions held in Quinn(supra), has submitted that a decision can't be considered ex-hypothesis the facts. The learned senior counsel, referring to the cases in Mohammad Illiyas(supra), Gowramma(supra), Bihar School Examination Board(supra), Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community(supra), has submitted that the decision in the Pallav Sheth's case(supra) is not a ratio in respect of Section 20 of the Act, 1971 and that the decision made in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra), with regard to the question of limitation, under Section 20of the Act, not being overruled by Pallav Sheth(supra), the law laid down in Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) would be applicable. Therefore, it has been submitted, that in view of non-issuance of a notice, within one year from the date, on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed, calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why they should not be punished, the present proceeding is barred by Section 20 of the Act, 1971. 17. In the case of Mohammad Illiyas(supra), the Supreme Court held that reliance on decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible and that a decision is a precedent on its own Acts. As held by the Supreme Court, the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation made in the judgment. 18. In the case of Gowramma(supra) also the Supreme Court relied on Mohammad Illiyas(supra) and held that a case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more and that Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. 19. In the case of Bihar School Examination Board(supra) also the cases in Gowramma(supra) and Mohammad Illiyas(supra) were relied on and the Supreme Court cautioned against the danger of mechanical application of an observation without ascertaining the context in which it was made. 20. In the case of Pradip Chandra Parija(supra), the Supreme Court has laid down the binding nature of the decision rendered by a larger Bench on a smaller Bench. 20. In the case of Pradip Chandra Parija(supra), the Supreme Court has laid down the binding nature of the decision rendered by a larger Bench on a smaller Bench. The Supreme court held that, if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter, before it, to a Bench of three learned Judges, setting out the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment. It has also been held that, if a Bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, reference to a Bench of five learned Judges is justified. 21. In the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community(supra), the Supreme Court, following the decision in Pradip Chandra Parija(supra), a five Judges' Bench, summed up the legal position, regarding binding nature of decisions, in the following terms: (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. Incase of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh: (1989) 2 SCC 754 and Union of India v. Hansoli Devi: (2002) 7 SCC 273 . 22. In view of the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it stands clear that the decision rendered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on the Bench of a lesser strength, both on the fact situation and the context in which it is made. In Pallav Sheth's case(supra), the decision was rendered by a Bench of larger strength (three Judges Bench) and in Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra), it was a decision rendered by a Bench of lesser strength (two Judges Bench). In both the cases, the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra) (three Judges Bench) was considered. 23. In the case of Sehnaz Mirza(supra), the Supreme Court took notice of the following observation, made in the case of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram: 1989 Supp (2) SCC 418: (SCC p. 423, para 7) 7. Another point was taken about limitation of this application under Section 20 of the Act. Section 20 states that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3-11-1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3-11-1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt consisted, inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Narnaul dated 3-11-1988 (sic 12-2-1988). Therefore, the application was well within the period of one year. Failure to give possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of Section 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court, at paragraph 12 of Sehnaz Mirza(supra) referred to paragraph-48 of the Pallav Sheth's case(supra), which reads as follows: 48. The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the Appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware of the fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6-1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on this application that the Special Court by its order of 9-4-1999 directed the application to be treated as a show-cause notice to the Appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the above stated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action taken by the Special Court to punish the Appellant for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the circumstances, to examine the finding of the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was not barred by Section 20. 24. In the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra), the Supreme Court considered the provision of Section 19(1) and in order to arrive at a true interpretation, the Supreme Court also looked at Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the Act, 1971. 24. In the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra), the Supreme Court considered the provision of Section 19(1) and in order to arrive at a true interpretation, the Supreme Court also looked at Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the Act, 1971. In Baradakanta Mishra(supra), the Supreme Court observed: Section 20 prescribes a period of limitation by saying that no court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It will be seen from these provisions that the scheme adopted by the Legislature is that the Court may initiate a proceeding for contempt suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on a reference made by a subordinate court. Where the Court initiates a proceeding for contempt suo motu, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and takes the first step in exercise of it. But what happens when a motion is made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or a reference is made by a subordinate court. Does the Court enter upon the jurisdiction to punish for contempt and act in exercise of it when it considers such motion or reference for the purpose of deciding whether it should initiate a proceeding for contempt? We do not think so. The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference, to decide, in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. 25. The case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra) was considered by a Bench of coequal strength in Pallav Sheth(supra) and distinguished the decision in Baradakanta Mishra(supra) with regard to Section 20 of the Act, 1971. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), observed: In Baradakanta Mishra case: (1975) 2 SCC 535, the Appellant had filed an application before the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings against the Chief Justice and other Judges in their personal capacity. A Full Bench of three Judges was of the opinion that no contempt of court had been committed and the application was rejected. The Appellant then purported to avail the right of appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act and filed an appeal in this Court. A preliminary objection was taken by the State against the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that where the High Court had not initiated proceedings and had refused to take action, no appeal as of right would lie under Section 19(1). This was the only issue which arose for consideration of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra's case and this Court upheld the preliminary objection and held that no appeal under Section 19(1) was maintainable. It is no doubt true that during the course of discussion, reference was made to Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 but this Court was in that case not called upon to consider the effect of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act vis-a-vis inherent powers of the High Court to punish for contempt. No reference is made in the judgment to Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution. No reference is made in the judgment to Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution. Furthermore interpretation of Section 20 was not an issue and no question of limitation arose therein. Under the circumstances, we hold that the observations made by this Court with reference to Section 20 were in the nature of obiter dicta and not binding on this Court in the present case. In any case, Baradakanta Mishra's case decision does not specifically deal with the question as to when or how proceedings for contempt are initiated for the purposes of Section 20 and nor has it considered the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, to which we shall presently refer. 26. The Supreme Court, in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra) (two Judges Bench), referring to the case of Baradakanta Mishra(supra), observed: 14. In order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression "initiate any proceedings for contempt" we may notice several situations or stages which may arise before the court dealing with contempt proceedings. These are: (i) (a) a private party may file or present an application or petition for initiating any proceedings for civil contempt; or (b) the court may receive a motion or reference from the Advocate General or with his consent in writing from any other person or a specified law officer or a court subordinate to High Court; (ii) (a) the court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against; or (b) the court may issue notice to the Respondent calling upon him to show cause why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated; (iii) the Court may issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against calling upon him to show cause why he be not punished for contempt. 15. In the cases contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. Filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by court. On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as "admit", "rule", "issue notice" or "issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated". On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as "admit", "rule", "issue notice" or "issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated". In all such cases the notice is issued either in routine or because the court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore the court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating the proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the material placed before it the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the Court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the Respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is the result of a conscious application of the mind of the court to the facts and the material before it. Such initiation of proceedings for contempt based on application of mind by the Court to the facts of the case and the material before it must take place within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed failing which the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contempt is lost. The heading of Section 20 is "limitation for actions for contempt". Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court to initiate any proceedings for contempt. 27. In Pallav Seith(supra), the Supreme Court observed: 30. Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court to initiate any proceedings for contempt. 27. In Pallav Seith(supra), the Supreme Court observed: 30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts are courts of record and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215is absolute, can there be any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution. 28. The Supreme Court in Pallav Seith(supra), further observed: Under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 power has been given to this Court and to the High Courts to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act providing for any matter relating to its procedure. Our attention has been drawn to Rules framed under Section23 by this Court as well as by the High Courts in India. All these Rules inter alia require, other than suo motu action being taken, petition or application being filed in Court it is then taken up for consideration. For example, the relevant part of Rule 2 of the Calcutta High Court Contempt of Courts Rules, 1975 reads as follows: 2.(1) Proceedings in connection with a Civil Contempt may be initiated- (a) by a petition presented by a party or parties aggrieved; or (b) by the High Court on its own motion; or (c) on a reference made to the High Court by the subordinate courts as in the case of "Criminal Contempt. (2) Proceedings in connection with a criminal contempt may be initiated- (a) on a motion of the High Court in respect of a contempt committed upon its own view under Section 14 of the Act; or (b) on its own motion by the High Court under Section 15(1) of the Act; or (c) on a motion founded on a petition presented by the Advocate-General under section 15(1)(a) of the Act; or (d) on a motion founded on a petition presented by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act; or (e) on a reference made to the High Court by the subordinate courts under Section 15(2) of the Act, containing the following particulars: (a) a brief statement of the case; (b) the particulars of the contumacious acts; (c) name, address and other particulars of the Respondents along with the copies of the papers relating to contumacious acts. The Rules so framed by all the Courts in India do show that proceedings are initiated inter alia with the filing of an application or a petition in that behalf. If, however, proceedings are not initiated by filing of an application within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed then the Court shall not have jurisdiction to punish for contempt. If, on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by the filing of an application, in the case of civil contempt like the present before the Court within the period of limitation then the provisions of Section 20 will not stand in the way of the Court exercising its jurisdiction. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the Appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in case of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case, to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show-cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution. 29. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), referred to the following observations made by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Manjit Singh(supra). 19. To finally conclude it must be held that the terminus a quo for limitation begins under Section 20 of the Act on the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The terminus ad quem in case of criminal contempt would necessarily vary and be related to the modes of taking cognizance thereof provided for in Section 15. In cases where it is initiated on the court's own motion it would necessarily be from the issuance of the notice for contempt by the court. In case of a motion by the Advocate General under Section 15(1)(a), the proceedings would initiate from the date of the filing of such a motion in the High Court. Where any other person moves the Advocate General for his consent in writing as prescribed in Section 15(1)(b), the initiation of proceedings would be with effect from the date of such application. Lastly, in cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate court on a reference made by it the proceedings must be deemed to be initiated from the date when such reference is made. Lastly, in cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate court on a reference made by it the proceedings must be deemed to be initiated from the date when such reference is made. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 30. From the above it transpires that the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth(supra), clearly indicated that in Baradakanta Mishra's case(supra), the issue was maintainability of an appeal under Section19(1) of the Act, 1971 and that, though reference was made to Section 20 also, interpretation of Section 20 was not an issue and no question of limitation arose therein. The Supreme Court also held that, the observations made in Baradakanta Mishra(supra), regarding Section 20 were in the nature of obiter dicta and not binding on the Court in that case [Pallav Sheth(supra)]. Taking into consideration various decisions, more particularly the decisions in Baradakanta Mishra(supra) and Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra), the Supreme Court opined that the proper construction of Section 20must be that action must be initiated, either by filing an application or by the Court issuing notice suo moto, within a period of one year from the date of violation of the Court's order. 31. The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth(supra), accepted the view, given in Manjit Singh(supra), that the initiation of contempt proceedings otherwise than on court's own motion would include within its sweep a motion by the Advocate General, a reference by a subordinate court to the High Court to take action for contempt and an application before the Advocate General seeking his consent by any other person under Section 15 and lastly in cases of civil contempt the motion by a private litigant directly in the court. 32. 32. In the Case of N. Venkata Swamy Naidu v. M/s Sri Sri Surya Teja Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., reported in 2008 CRI.L.J. 227, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while interpreting the term 'initiation of contempt' within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act, 1971, referred to the decisions in the cases of A.V. Koteswara Rao and S.J.G.M. High School (1996 Cri.LJ 699), Pallav Sheth(supra) and Om Prakash Jaiswal(supra). The learned Judges of the Division Bench, in the said case, at paragraph-43, observed as follows: 43. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ), it must be held that if an application to initiate contempt proceedings is filed within one year, from the date on which contempt is committed, it would amount to initiation of contempt proceedings within limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The limitation under Section 20 has to be computed with reference to the date of filing of the application for initiation of contempt and since in the present case, such an application was filed on 21.11.2005, well within the period of one year from the order of status quo dated 18.7.2005, violation of which is said to be in contempt, the contempt case as filed cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 33.In view of the above decision, rendered by the Supreme Court, in the case of Pallav Sheth(supra), there is no difficulty in understanding that, as the show cause notice, in the case at hand, was issued within one year from the date of the order, which has been alleged to be violated, after receipt of the application, alleging violation of the Court's order, the present proceeding is well within time and not hit by the provision of Section 20 of the Act, 1971. 34. In order to appreciate rival contentions of the parties regarding contempt, it would be appropriate to carefully peruse the operative part of the judgment and order dated 5-3-10 reads as follows: 32. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned notification dated 17-12-2008 is hereby quashed. 34. In order to appreciate rival contentions of the parties regarding contempt, it would be appropriate to carefully peruse the operative part of the judgment and order dated 5-3-10 reads as follows: 32. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned notification dated 17-12-2008 is hereby quashed. The State Respondents are directed to give reasonable opportunity in compliance of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-Aid Rules, 2005 to the New Hindi Secondary School, Khejurbagan through the Principal or/School Managing Committee or/authorized representative by allowing them to file the documents and their pleadings, if necessary by hearing them in person before passing any orders for withdrawal/cancellation of the said Notification dated 16-4-2007 and the New Hindu Secondary School, Khejurbagan at present shall be under Grant-in-aid scheme. However, it is left to the wisdom of the State Respondents to decide the quantum of the arrear of pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also the date of implementation of the Mid-Day-Meal Scheme in the Primary Section of the School within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order. It is also made clear that the State Respondents shall keep in view of the observations and findings of this Court in the present judgment and order in passing order regarding the matters relating to the Grant-in-Aid to the New Hindi Secondary School and that the State Respondents shall make the funds available for payment of the salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school at the rate fixed for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided Schools in the State of Tripura. 35. Challenging the common judgment and order dated 5-3-2010, passed in W.P.(C) No. 860 of 2008 and W.p.(C) No. 235 of 2009, the respondents preferred W.A. No. 18 of 2010 and W.A. No. 19 of 2010. 35. Challenging the common judgment and order dated 5-3-2010, passed in W.P.(C) No. 860 of 2008 and W.p.(C) No. 235 of 2009, the respondents preferred W.A. No. 18 of 2010 and W.A. No. 19 of 2010. A Division Bench of this court disposed of the said writ appeals by the following order, dated 4-5-10: After making submission at length when the learned Counsel for the Appellant was confronted with the language of Rule 10 of Tripura Grant-in-Aid (Government Aided Schools) Rules, 2005, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that they may be allowed to withdraw the appeals with liberty in their favour to issue appropriate notices to the Respondent/managing committee to show cause as to why an action under Rule 10 would not be taken against them for non-implementation of the mandatory requirements of the law and the order granting grant-in-aid in their favour. It is submitted by them that the Appellant would observe the order passed by the learned Single Judge especially as contained in paragraph 32 of the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel for the Respondents/original writ Petitioners, however, submitted that on one side the State Government is providing mid-day meal facility to the students studying in different schools, but to the Respondent/managing committee they are not providing any facility which is not only illegal and unconstitutional but is also inhuman. It is submitted that assuming the school for one reason or the other as thought by the Appellant was not entitled to the grant-in-aid, the children studying in the school ought to have been provided family of mid-day meal. In our considered opinion, this aspect of the matter will have to be considered by the Appellant-State. We piously hope that the State Government shall look after the policy of the mid-day meal and would look into the laudable object behind the scheme. It is expected of the Appellant that they would comply with the direction issued by the learned Single Judge especially in relation to the issue of notice to show cause in completion of the enquiry preferably within three months from today. Both the appeals are disposed of. The interim order, if any, stand vacated. 36. It is expected of the Appellant that they would comply with the direction issued by the learned Single Judge especially in relation to the issue of notice to show cause in completion of the enquiry preferably within three months from today. Both the appeals are disposed of. The interim order, if any, stand vacated. 36. A careful reading of the paragraph 32 of the said judgment and order leads to understand that the court, while quashing the order, dated 17-12-08, gave liberty to the State Respondents to pass necessary orders regarding withdrawal/cancellation of the grant-in-aid status, which was granted vide notification dated 16-4-07, after giving reasonable opportunity in compliance with Rule 10 of the Grant-in-aid Rules, 2005. Therefore, it is clear that though the notification dated 17-12-08 was quashed, the court also allowed the Respondents to pass necessary orders regarding withdrawal of the grant-in-aid status, after complying with the due procedure of law. While passing the said order, the court observed, "the New Hindi Secondary school, Khejurbagan at present shall be under grant-in-aid scheme." The court also left it to the wisdom of the State Respondents to decide the quantum of arrear pay and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also the date of implementation of the mid-day meal scheme in the primary section of the school within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment and order. The court further observed that the State shall keep in view the observation and the findings of the court, made in the judgment and order in matters relating to grant-in-aid to the school and that the State shall make the fund available for payment of salaries to teaching and non-teaching staff of the school at the rate fixed for teaching and non-teaching staff of the Government aided school. The learned Senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, submitted that in view of the granting liberty to pass necessary orders regarding cancellation/withdrawal of grant-in-aid status, the payment of regular pay and allowances and implementation of mid-day meal scheme was contingent upon the decision regarding continuance of grant-in-aid status. The learned Senior counsel has also submitted that there was no specific direction to pay salary, including arrear salary and for implementing the mid-day meal scheme within a particular period. The learned Senior counsel has also submitted that there was no specific direction to pay salary, including arrear salary and for implementing the mid-day meal scheme within a particular period. It is submitted, on behalf of the Respondents that the court by making the said observations, directed the Respondents to take a decision in this regard within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment and order. The learned Senior counsel referring to the order, dated 4-5-2010, passed by the Division Bench, has submitted that the Division Bench also, without making any direction, hoped that the State Government would look after the policy of mid-day meal and look into the laudable object behind the scheme. It is also contended on behalf of the Respondents that the Division Bench observed that the Respondents would comply with the direction issued by the learned Single Judge especially in relation to issue of notice to show cause in completion of the enquiry preferably within three months from the date of the order. Therefore, it is submitted that the Respondents were given three months more time i.e. upto 4-8-2010 for passing necessary orders regarding grant-in-aid status. According to the learned Senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, as the order, dated 30-7-10, withdrawing the grant-in-aid status was passed under the provision of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-aid rules, 2005, the Respondents were not required to pay the benefits arising out of the grant-in-aid status. Therefore, it is submitted that the failure to pay salary including arrears and implement mid-day meal scheme does not amount to willful disobedience of the court's order, in as much as, there was no specific direction or order to pay the pay and allowances and implement the mid-day meal scheme within a prescribed period. Carefully, perusing the judgment and order, dated 4-5-2010, passed by the Division Bench, I find sufficient force in the contention of the learned Senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, that there was no specific direction to pay salary, including arrears and to implement the mid-day meal scheme, within a particular date. 37. Carefully, perusing the judgment and order, dated 4-5-2010, passed by the Division Bench, I find sufficient force in the contention of the learned Senior counsel, appearing for the Respondents, that there was no specific direction to pay salary, including arrears and to implement the mid-day meal scheme, within a particular date. 37. As held in the case of Niaj Mohammad(supra), a court dealing with a contempt proceeding must be satisfied that the disobedience was willful and intentional and if the court is satisfied that the disobedience or the non-compliance of the court's order is the result of some compelling circumstances, under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the court may not punish the alleged contemnor. 38. In the present case, admittedly, there was no direction to pay salary and implement the mid-day meal scheme within a prescribed period or before passing the order regarding withdrawal of grant-in-aid status. The Respondents by their order, dated 17-12-08, had withdrawn the grant-in-aid status without giving any opportunity as required by Rule 10 of the Grant-in-aid Rules, 2005. The grant-in-aid status was provided by notification dated 16-4-07 with retrospective effect from 1-4-07. Though, mid-day meal scheme was implemented after the said grant-in-aid status, no pay and salary, under the said scheme, was ever paid to the teaching and non-teaching staff. Consequent upon the withdrawal of the grant-in-aid status, the mid-day meal scheme was also stopped. The said notification, dated 17-12-08, by which the grant-in-aid status was cancelled was set aside, on the ground that the same was made without complying with the requirement of Rule 10 of the Grant-in-aid Rules, 2005. Therefore, while setting aside the notification dated, 17-12-2008, this Court directed the Respondents to pass necessary order regarding grant-in-aid status, after giving opportunities to the Petitioner under Rule 10 of Rules, 2005. Accordingly, the Respondents compliance with the judgment and order dated 4-5-05 aforesaid, the Respondents by their order, dated 30-7-10, had finally withdrawn the grant-in-aid status after complying with the requirement of Rule 10 aforesaid. Therefore, as the grant-in-aid status was withdrawn, the Respondents were not liable to pay the benefits i.e. pay and allowances and to implement of mid-day meal scheme. Therefore, in absence of any specific direction, non-payment of salary and non-implementation of mid-day meal scheme cannot be construed as willful disobedience of the order aforesaid. Therefore, as the grant-in-aid status was withdrawn, the Respondents were not liable to pay the benefits i.e. pay and allowances and to implement of mid-day meal scheme. Therefore, in absence of any specific direction, non-payment of salary and non-implementation of mid-day meal scheme cannot be construed as willful disobedience of the order aforesaid. The court's observation "the New Hindi Secondary school, Khejurbagan at present shall be under grant-in-aid scheme. However, it is left to the wisdom of the State Respondents to decide the quantum of arrear pay and allowances of teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and also the date of implementation of mid-day meal for the primary section of the school within three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order" does not indicate that the Respondents were required to pay the salary including arrear salary and implement the mid-day meal scheme within a particular date i.e. prior to passing the order regarding cancellation of grant-in-aid status. A plain reading of the said observation indicates that the court directed to take a decision within three months from the date of the receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order. By the judgment and order, dated 4-52010, passed in the writ appeals aforesaid, the court extended the said period for another three months i.e. till 4-8-2010. Admittedly, before expiry of the said date, the Respondents issued the notification dated 30-7-2010 thereby cancelling the grant-in-aid status from the date with effect from which, the same was granted. 39. In view of the above discussion, in the absence of any specific direction to pay the salary and implement the mid-day meal scheme, before passing the order regarding cancellation of grant-in-aid status, I do not find sufficient reason to hold that the Respondents had willfully disobeyed the court's direction by failing to implement mid-day meal scheme and pay salary etc. Therefore, I find no prima facie case to proceed with this contempt proceeding. Accordingly, this contempt proceeding is closed.