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Gujarat High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 833 (GUJ)

RAMKISHAN MANGILAL SONI PARTNER OF LAXMI TOLMAP v. STATE OF GUJARAT THROUGH SECRETARY

2011-12-16

ABHILASHA KUMARI

body2011
JUDGMENT 1. Rule. Mr.Bipin Bhatt, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of Rule for the respondents. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and with the consent of the learned counsel for the respective parties, the petition is being heard and finally decided, today. 2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed, inter-alia, with a prayer to issue an appropriate writ or direction to quash and set aside orders dated 20.08.2010, 04.12.2010 and 13.04.2011 issued by respondent No.3, whereby the licence of the petitioner has been suspended. 3. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner is that he had applied for a licence for repairing work of weight and measurement instruments, under the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976. The licence was issued on 24.11.1975, and was renewed from time to time. The last renewal took place on 31.12.2011. On 27.07.2010, a Show Cause Notice under Section-20(1) of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985 (“the Act”, for short) was issued by respondent No.3 on the ground that a complaint under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, has been registered against the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner filed his reply. However, respondent No.3 suspended the licence of the Firm, in which the petitioner is a partner, by order dated 20.08.2010, until the completion of the inquiry. The petitioner preferred an appeal before respondent No.2 against order dated 20.08.2010, which was rejected on 04.12.2010. 3.1 The specific case of the petitioner is that under the second proviso to Section 20(1) of the Act, the suspension of the licence ought to stand vacated, as the trial has not been completed within a period of three months from the date of suspension of the licence, but is still continuing. 3.2 The petitioner made an application for release of the licence on the ground that the judicial proceedings have not yet concluded, on 02.02.2011. A reminder was also sent on 10.03.2011. However, by order dated 13.04.2011, respondent No.3 rejected the application of the petitioner, giving rise to the filing of the present petition. 4. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed by respondent No.2, wherein it has been admitted that the period of three months, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section-20 (1) of the Act is over and the trial has not yet concluded. 4. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed by respondent No.2, wherein it has been admitted that the period of three months, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section-20 (1) of the Act is over and the trial has not yet concluded. However, it is stated that, looking to the seriousness of the case against the petitioner, the suspension of the licence cannot be revoked, in the interest of the public at large and should be continued, till the final decision of the case. 5. Mr.Jinesh H. Kapadia, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that where the inquiry or trial is not completed within a period of three months from the date of suspension of the licence, such suspension shall stand vacated on the expiry of the said period. As the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, the said provision of law, having already come into play after the expiry of three months should be given effect to by the respondents in the case of the petitioner, as the trial being faced by him is not complete, and the period of three months is already over. It is further submitted that the action of rejection of the application of the petitioner for revocation of the suspension of the licence by respondent No.3, is against the provisions of the Statute and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. Mr.Bipin Bhatt, learned Assistant Government Pleaderhas opposed the prayer made by the petitioner, and has taken a stand in consonance with that stated in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No.2. It is submitted that, though there cannot be any dispute regarding the mandate of the Statute, that if any trial or inquiry pending against the licence-holder is not completed within a period of three months from the date of suspension of the licence, such suspension shall stand vacated on the expiry of the aforesaid period; but at the same time the seriousness of the case against the petitioner deserves to be taken into consideration. If the suspension of the licence is set aside, it would set a bad precedent, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. If the suspension of the licence is set aside, it would set a bad precedent, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and upon perusal of the averments made in the petition, affidavit-in-reply and other documents on record, it would be fruitful to advert to the provisions of Section-20(1) of the Act, which are as follows : “Sec. 20. Suspension and cancellation of licence –(1) The Controller may, if he has any reasonable cause to believe that the holder of any licence issued, renewed or continued under this Act has made any statement in, or in relation to, any application for the issue, renewal or continuance of the licence, which is incorrect or false in any material particular or has contravened any provision of the Standards Act or any State Act or this Act or any rule or order made there under, suspend such licence, pending the completion of any inquiry or trial against the holder of such licence: Provided that no such licence shall be suspended unless the holder thereof has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action : Provided further that where the inquiry or trial referred to in this sub-section is not completed with in a period of three months from the date of suspension of a licence, such suspension shall, on the expiry of the period aforesaid, stand vacated. (Emphasis supplied) 8. The licence of the petitioner has been suspended on 20.08.2010, therefore, the period of three months was over on 20.11.2010. The petitioner is facing trial in a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act on a complaint that he has accepted an amount of Rs.5,000/-on behalf of a Government Officer. Admittedly, the trial is still going on, and was not complete upon expiry of three months from the date of suspension of the licence. The language of the second proviso to Section-20(1) is absolutely clear, unambiguous and couched in mandatory terms. The proviso takes into consideration not only the pendency of an inquiry but also that of a trial, and stipulates that, if such inquiry or trial is not completed within a period of three months from the date of suspension of the licence, such suspension shall, upon expiry of the period of three months, stand vacated. The proviso takes into consideration not only the pendency of an inquiry but also that of a trial, and stipulates that, if such inquiry or trial is not completed within a period of three months from the date of suspension of the licence, such suspension shall, upon expiry of the period of three months, stand vacated. Meaning thereby, that upon expiry of the period of three months from the date of suspension of the licence, such suspension would automatically stands vacated by operation of the proviso. The proviso does not take into consideration the seriousness, or otherwise, of the alleged offence for which the person concerned is facing trial. The reason advanced by the learned Assistant Government Pleader as well as that stated in the affidavit-in-reply for not revoking the suspension of the licence is, therefore, extraneous to the provisions of the Statute, and does not have any legal basis. 9. The petitioner has made an application for revocation of the suspension, after expiry of the period of three months, that has been rejected by order dated 13.04.2011. The order dated 13.04.2011 has been passed without considering the provisions of Section-20(1) and the second proviso thereto, and cannot be sustained in law. As per the express language of the second proviso, the suspension would stand vacated after expiry of a period of three months from the suspension. The suspension of the licence stood vacated on expiry of the period of three months. The rejection of the application by order dated 13.04.2011, is legally unsustainable, considering the above legal position. 10. Respondent No.2 has admitted, in no uncertain terms, in the affidavit-in-reply, that the suspension of the licence would come to an end after the expiry of three months. Having done so, the said respondent has attempted to go beyond the mandate of law by not giving effect to the second proviso to Section-20(1) on the ground of the so-called 'seriousness' of the offence. This is nothing but an attempt to read into the said proviso something that has not been stated by the Legislature, which cannot be done. The reason advanced by respondent No.2 does not hold good, therefore, the order dated 13.04.2011 passed by respondent No.3 cannot be permitted to stand. 11. This is nothing but an attempt to read into the said proviso something that has not been stated by the Legislature, which cannot be done. The reason advanced by respondent No.2 does not hold good, therefore, the order dated 13.04.2011 passed by respondent No.3 cannot be permitted to stand. 11. For reasons stated hereinabove, and as the period of three months from the date of suspension of the licence has expired on 20.11.2010, and the trial being faced by the petitioner has still not concluded, such suspension would automatically stand vacated, by operation of the second proviso to Section-20(1) of the Act, on expiry of the stipulated period of time. 12. For the aforestated reasons, the petition is partly-allowed. The impugned order dated 13.04.2011 is quashed and set aside. The suspension of the licence of the petitioner shall be deemed to have been revoked with effect from 20.11.2010. Rule is made absolute, to the above extent. There shall be no orders as to costs.