Judgment :- 1. Jurisdiction is a vexed legal question which has haunted courts not merely at the lower tiers, but has not spared even highest court in the land and instances of even the Supreme Court going back on its views in the context of the subject matter being within the purview of the jurisdiction of a particular forum or as to whether the forum has jurisdiction or not, being not uncommon, even when in judicial parlance, the legal question of jurisdiction has given rise to endless litigation and innumerable decisions not necessarily uniform, but many a times conflicting decisions have come into existence and expecting the revenue authorities like the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner to have a clear perception of the concept of jurisdiction is nothing short of aspiring for the Moon itself! 2. On the other hand, the tendency on the part of the executive and administrative authorities is to grab jurisdiction, clutch at jurisdiction as these authorities are accustomed to exercising power and interfere with the decisions of the authorities in the lower rank because of their superior position, acting more like an administrative authority whether or not the statute has expressly conferred such jurisdiction on a higher authority. 3. The dividing line between the administrative function and quasi judicial function is too fine and too blurred and such uncertainty is more often taken advantage of by the revenue authorities to exercise jurisdiction than to be wary and to confine within their power and authority as conferred by the statute! 4. The present writ petition though in terms of subject matter is a trivial one and more often than not, such matters are not worthy of examination in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, has nevertheless, thrown up question of some significance and importance, particularly, one of the question of the scope of revisional jurisdiction, which can be exercised by a Deputy Commissioner while functioning under section 136[3] of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 [for short ‘the Act’] and as to the scope and width of this statutory provision. 5. 5. The brief facts of the case are that the writ petitioner claims right, title and interest in respect of an extent of 2 acres 30 guntas in land in Sy.No.204 of Kemboothagere Village, Kasaba Hobli, Malavalli Taluk, claiming as a successor in interest of one Devegowda and on the premise that said Devegowda had acquired interest in this parcel of agricultural land as per sale deed dated 11.01.1980 in respect of an extent of 1 acre of land, another extent of 1 acre in the same survey number under re-grant order of the year 1947 and yet another extent of 30 guntas of land as per order passed by the Land Tribunal, Malavalli, in LRF.PR.196, 197/1975-76 dated 18.02.1981. 6. It is the version of the writ petitioner that the revenue records did show the name of the petitioner to this extent till the extent of 30 guntas of land was mutated in favour of the first respondent in MR No.26/2009-10, in RRT No.178/2003-04 as per order dated 28.10.2009 passed by the Tahsildar, Malavalli [copy at Annexure-A]. 7. Writ petitioner aggrieved by this order, had preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner under section 136[2] of the Act and met with success as the Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for fresh round of inquiry etc., as per order dated 26.10.2010 [copy at Annexure-B]. 8. However, the first respondent preferred a revision to the Deputy Commissioner invoking section 136[3] of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner entertained the revision petition and passed the interim order in the revision petition, permitting the revision petitioner i.e., the first respondent in this writ petition to harvest the standing sugarcane crop and it is this interim order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in the pending revision petition before him that has given cause to the writ petitioner to present this writ petition. 9. This court while issued emergent notice to the respondents on the petition on 25.03.2011, also stayed operation of the interim order dated 21.03.2011 passed by the Deputy Commissioner [copy at Annexure-F] where under the application filed by the writ petitioner for injunction against the respondent while was refused, the respondent was expressly permitted to harvest the standing crop and writ petition is for quashing of this order. 10. First respondent has entered appearance through counsel Sri. 10. First respondent has entered appearance through counsel Sri. T P Vivekananda, third respondent-Sugar factory is represented by counsel Sri. Santosh, appearing for M/s. Kesvy & Co., Advocates and Sri. R. Omkumar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for second respondent-Deputy Commissioner. 11. The matter has come up for orders before the court on the application IA No.2 of 2011 for issue of directions to return the revision petition papers which had been secured from this court by the Deputy Commissioner as it is submitted by Ms. Renukamba, learned counsel for the petitioner that non-availability of the revision petition files before the Deputy Commissioner has hampered the progress of the revision petition and it is to the detriment of the writ petitioner. 12. This court normally does not entertain a writ petition against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner purporting to exercise revisional jurisdiction whether in a proper manner or improper manner, leave alone examining the correctness or otherwise of an interim order passed in such pending revision petition. 13. However, this writ petition, as it has thrown up questions of considerable importance regarding the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner as indicated earlier, the matter is admitted by issue of rule and learned counsel for the parties are heard on the merits of the main matter itself. 14. The question of jurisdiction assumes importance, particularly, as the Deputy Commissioner has entertained the revision petition in respect of an order which had gone through the stage of an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner under section 136[2] of the Act. 15. To appreciate this question, one has to look into the scheme of section 136 of the Act figuring in chapter-XI of the Act. Section 136 of the Act reads as under: “136. Appeal and Revision.- (1) The provisions of Chapter V shall not apply to any decision or order under this Chapter. (2) Any person affected by an order made under sub-section (4) or an entry certified under sub-section (6) of Section 129 may, within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the order or the knowledge of the entry certified, appeal to such Officer as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf and his decision shall be final. (3) The Deputy Commissioner may, on his own motion or on application of a party, call for and examine any records made under Section 127 and Section 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit: Provided that no orders shall be passed except after hearing the party who would be adversely affected by such order.” 16. The opening sub-section of section 136 of the Act indicates that the provisions of Chapter-V of the Act which is a chapter relating to appeals and revision petitions in general are excluded from its applicability to any decision or order taken or passed under chapter-XI of the Act. Section 136[2] of the Act indicates that an appeal can be preferred within the permitted time before the appellate authority prescribed by the State Government in respect of orders made under sub-section [4] of section 129 of the Act or entry certified under sub-section [6] of section 129 of the Act. 17. Section 129 of the Act reads as under: “129. Registration of Mutations and Register of Disputed Cases.-(1) The Prescribed Officer shall enter in the Register of Mutations every report made to him under subsection (1) of Section 128 or received by him under sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) of the said section. (2) Whenever a Prescribed Officer makes an entry in the Register of Mutations, he shall at the same time post up a complete copy of the entry in a conspicuous place in the chavadi and shall give written intimation to all persons appearing from the Record of Rights or Register of Mutations to be interested in the mutation, and to any other person whom he has reason to believe to be interested therein. (3) Should any objection to any entry made under sub-section (1) in the Register of Mutations be made either orally or in writing to the Prescribed Officer, it shall be the duty of the Prescribed Officer to enter the particulars of the objection in a Register of Disputed Cases. (4) The objections entered in the Register of Disputed Cases and such other objections as may be made during the enquiry shall be enquired into and disposed of by such Officer and in such manner as may be prescribed. Orders disposing of such objections shall be recorded in the Register of Mutations by such Officer. (4) The objections entered in the Register of Disputed Cases and such other objections as may be made during the enquiry shall be enquired into and disposed of by such Officer and in such manner as may be prescribed. Orders disposing of such objections shall be recorded in the Register of Mutations by such Officer. (5) The Officer holding an enquiry under sub-section (4) shall have al the powers under Chapter III, that a Revenue Officer has in making a formal or summary enquiry under this Act. (6) Entries in the Register of Mutations shall be tested and if found correct or after correction, as the case may be, shall be certified by such Officer as may be prescribed. (7) The transfer of entries from the Registers of Mutations to the Record of Rights shall be effected in the prescribed manner, provided that an entry in the Register of Mutations shall not be transferred to the Record of Rights until such entry has been duly certified.” 18. The powers under sections 129[4] and 129[6] of the Act are normally exercised by the Tahsildar or Deputy or Special Tahsildar, the next higher authority as per prescribed rules is the Assistant Commissioner and this is the reason why the writ petitioner had preferred an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner who had set aside the change of entries in the revenue records to bring in the name of the first respondent in respect of an extent of 30 guntas of land in the survey number on the premise that the extent of holding in favour of the petitioner as indicated in the revenue records was actually found to be excess, to the extent of 30 guntas etc. 19. The Assistant Commissioner on examination of appeal, remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for a fresh round of examination and against this order, the first respondent preferred revision petition and the impugned interim order passed in the pending revision petition. 20. 19. The Assistant Commissioner on examination of appeal, remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for a fresh round of examination and against this order, the first respondent preferred revision petition and the impugned interim order passed in the pending revision petition. 20. While interim order in consonance and for the purpose of sustaining the relief sought for in the main matter can always be granted and can be read as incidental to the appeal or revisional power, more basic question is as to whether the Deputy Commissioner could have entertained or exercised his revisional jurisdiction under section 136[3] of the Act, in respect of an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner as in the present case, the subject matter of the order or proceeding either under section 129 of the Act had already gone through the appellate stage before the Assistant Commissioner. 21. Submission of Ms. Renukamba, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Deputy Commissioner lacked jurisdiction even to entertain the revision petition and granting interim order in such an untenable revision petition to the detriment of the petitioner has vitiated the entire proceedings and order is not sustainable in law etc. 22. On this question, there is some legal literature under the earlier decided cases and Sri. R. Omkumar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for second respondent has brought to the notice of the court a recent decision of learned single Judge of this court in the case of ‘B MAHADEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & OTHERS’ reported in 2006 [5] AIR KAR. R 69, dwelling upon the scope of Section 136 (3) of the Act in the background of earlier decisions of this Court on the subject. 23. It is the submission of Sri. R 69, dwelling upon the scope of Section 136 (3) of the Act in the background of earlier decisions of this Court on the subject. 23. It is the submission of Sri. R. Omkumar, learned Additional Government Advocate that in this decision, the learned single Judge of this court had an occasion to examine the full Bench decision of this court in the case of ‘GURURAJ GURUNATH GOVIND RAO MUTALIK DESAI v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA’ reported in AIR 1995 KAR 267 [FB], a decision rendered in the context of the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal under section 118-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 in juxtaposition with section 118[2] of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, providing for an appeal whereas section 118-A of this Act provided for a revision to the Regional Commissioner as of now, and earlier the Divisional Commissioner and even earlier to the Tribunal etc. 24. The learned Judges of the full Bench of this court while examining the reference before them had characterized the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under section 118-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 by drawing inspiration or sustenance from an earlier division Bench decision of this court in the case of ‘SRIMANMAHARAJA NIRANJANA JAGADGURU MALLIKARJUNA MURUGARAJENDRA MAHASWAMY v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER’ reported in ILR 1986 [2] KAR 1059 [DB] and had made a distinction of the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, particularly, the scope of revisional jurisdiction as indicated in section 118-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, vis-à-vis scope of revisional jurisdiction as it occurs under section 136[3] of the Act. The learned Judges of the full Bench opined that the phrase ‘decision shall be final’ is always to be understood and read in the context of the scheme of a particular enactment and it can assume different connotations in different enactments and there cannot be a generalization of the meaning to be attributed to the word ‘final’ as interpreted and understood in one enactment for the purpose of understanding the provisions occurring in another enactment, particularly, as opined in MUTALIK DESAI’s case [supra] as indicated in paragraphs 2 & 16 of this Judgment reading as under: 2. The petition out of which this reference arises is directed against an order made by the Divisional Commissioner in exercise of the powers under Section 118A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (‘the Act’, for brevity). The said revision petition was filed before the Divisional Commissioner against an order made by the Assistant Commissioner in an appeal confirming an order made by the Tahsildar granting resumption to the petitioner under Section 15 of the Act. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that an order under Section 118(2b) of the Act is ‘final’ as provided in the Section itself. Relying upon a decision of this Court in ILR 1986 KAR 1059 Srimanmaharaja Niranjan Jagadguru Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Mahaswamy v. Deputy Commissioner it is urged that Section 118(2b) of the Act having used the expression ‘final’ in respect of an order made by the Assistant Commissioner in an appeal and in the absence of express words in that Section or in Section 118A of the Act which affects that finality, it is submitted that the Divisional Commissioner has no power or jurisdiction to interfere with such an order. 16. In Srimanmaharaja Niranjan Jagadguru Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Mahaswamy v. Deputy Commissioner, ILR 1986 Karnataka 1059, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the scope of provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. It was held therein that in exercise of his powers under S.136 of the Land Revenue Act, the Deputy Commissioner has no power to revise the appellate order under sub-sec.(2) thereof. Section 136(2) uses the expression ‘final’ as regards the order of the appellate authority made under that provision and there are no express words in any other provision enabling a revision and when the appellate authority makes an order under S.136(2) of the Land Revenue Act, the order made by the original authority under S.129 of the Act merges with the latter and therefore the Deputy Commissioner has no power to interfere with the order made under S.129 of the said Act when it has been a subject matter in appeal. That decision stood on the scheme and scope of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. It was pointed out therein that the expression rendering an appellate authority as final would be rendered otiose, if it were a subject-matter for revision. That decision stood on the scheme and scope of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. It was pointed out therein that the expression rendering an appellate authority as final would be rendered otiose, if it were a subject-matter for revision. But, we cannot subscribe to that rationale, with respect, because where an order of authority is rendered final whether the same is subject to further revision should be understood in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to earlier wherein it is explained that the meaning to be attributed to expression ‘final’ will depend upon the scheme of the provisions of the Act and cannot be read in isolation. Merely because an expression ‘final’ is used, it cannot be said that a revision would not lie against such an order. 25. However, insofar as the present controversy is concerned, is whether this opinion and ruling of the full Bench of this court which is expressed to haven applied and followed into two subsequent single Bench decisions of this court firstly in SMT. MARAMMA v. THE TAHSILDAR SIRGUPPA reported in ILR 1999 KAR 1203 rendered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice B Padmaraj, and followed by another learned Judge of this court i.e., Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.G. Sabhahit, in MAHADEVAIAH’s case [supra], purporting to follow or apply the principle laid down in the full Bench decision of this court in MUTALIK DEASAI’s case [supra] is on the contrary, contended as an incorrect understanding and application in the above referred two single Bench decisions of this Court. 26. The two learned single Judges of this court have opined that a revision petition can be entertained by a Deputy Commissioner under section 136[3] of the Act even after the decision of the original authority has gone through the appellate stage and decision rendered by the appellate authority under section 136[2] of the Act. 27. With great respect, I am unable to subscribe to the views expressed by the two learned single Judges of this court in the two single Bench decisions referred to above for the following reasons. 28. Firstly, these decisions are not in consonance with the view expressed by the full Bench of this court in MUTALIK DEASAI’s case [supra]. 27. With great respect, I am unable to subscribe to the views expressed by the two learned single Judges of this court in the two single Bench decisions referred to above for the following reasons. 28. Firstly, these decisions are not in consonance with the view expressed by the full Bench of this court in MUTALIK DEASAI’s case [supra]. In fact, the full Bench of this court has not overruled the division Bench ruling of this court in MURUGARAJENDRA MAHASWAMY’s case [supra] as is the impression gathered by the learned single Judges as is revealed by reading of these two Judgments of the learned single Judges in MARAMMA’s case & MAHADEVAIAH’s case supra]. In fact, the full Bench has only clarified that the word ‘attained finality’ has to be understood in the context of the particular statutory scheme and cannot be generalized and made a clear distinction of the phrase as it occurs in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and as it occurs in the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. 29. The full Bench was examining only the question that arose under the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and not any question or any difference of opinion that had arisen under the provisions of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, and on the other hand, the concept of finality as indicated in section 57 of the Act was examined vis-à-vis this concept, as it occurs in section 118[2] read with section 118-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. 30. Secondly, these decisions are per incuriam the provisions of section 136[1] of the Act as it is very expressly indicated that the provisions of chapter-XI will have an overriding effect on the provisions of chapter-V and in fact this will prevail notwithstanding the provisions of chapter-V of the Act. 31. That means chapter-XI is a scheme and a Code in itself, insofar as the provisions relating to entries in the revenue record to be made insofar as the appeals and revisions are to be examined in respect of the orders passed by the original authority while making entries in the revenue records and particularly, as per chapter-XI of the Act and that appeal and revision petitions do not fit into the general scheme of appeals and revisions as it occurs in the chapter-V of the Act. 32. 32. When the scope of section 136[3] of the Act is examined in this background and in the light of the view taken by the full Bench of this court, it becomes very clear that the scheme of the chapter-XI is to provide for one appeal or one revision and not an appeal and a further revision. This view also derives support not only on a reading of the statutory provisions in section 136 of the Act itself but also from the proviso to section 135 of the Act. Section 135 of the Act reads as follows: “135. Bar of suits.-No suit shall lie against the State Government or any Officer of the State Government in respect of a claim to have an entry made in any record or register that is maintained under this Chapter or to have any such entry omitted or amended: Provided that if any person is aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession, by an entry made in any record or register maintained under this Chapter, he may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title to such right, for a declaration of his right under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1877; and the entry in the record or register shall be amended in accordance with any such declaration. 33. If one were to read the provisions of section 136 in juxtaposition to proviso to section 135 of the Act, it becomes clear that after the stage of appeal under section 136 [2] of the Act, a person who is aggrieved with a decision rendered in exercise of power and jurisdiction of appeal, has to necessarily approach a civil court as the revenue authorities do not determine the rights of the parties, but is only a reflection of the rights of the parties in the entries maintained by the revenue authorities for the purpose of collection of land revenue from such person. 34. No doubt, such entries have a presumptive value under section 136[3] of the Act, but revisional jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner is only in respect of the proceedings or record as originally maintained by the authorities and not after it has been scrutinized by the appellate authority where after it is only a remedy by way of suit to the aggrieved person. 35. 35. In this view of the matter, I am of the clear opinion that the Deputy Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition under section 136[3] of the Act in respect of an order which was subject matter of appeal before the Assistant Commissioner under section 136[2] of the Act. 36. It is therefore that the entire proceedings in the revision petition before the Deputy Commissioner deserves to be quashed as one lacking jurisdiction and the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner left intact which means that insofar as the revenue entries are concerned, the parties are again before the Tahsildar in terms of the order of the Assistant Commissioner. 37. However, as per the interim direction issued by this court, with the third respondent-Sugar factory having deposited the proceeds of the sugarcane supplied by the first respondent to the factory, there is competition to claim this amount as between the petitioner and first respondent. 38. Submission of Ms. Renukamba, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the deposit may be transferred either to the Tahsildar or to any other party and to await the outcome of the decision before such authority. 39. On the other hand, Sri. Vivekananda, learned counsel for the first respondent submits that the first respondent has spent huge amount for cultivation and will be put to great hardship if the proceeds are not made over to the first respondent and it will be a proposition of loss to the first respondent if even the expenditure incurred is not reimbursed etc. 40. Prima facie, it appears that from the available pleadings on record, it was the first respondent who has raised the crop. Whether the land belonged to the first respondent or not, he had supplied the sugarcane to the factory. Therefore, it is just and proper that the first respondent receives the proceeds. However, as the petitioner was made to go through the process of a revision petition before the Deputy Commissioner and in turn a writ petition before this court to get over the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, it is proper that the first respondent meets cost of litigation in favour of the petitioner, quantified at a sum of `5,000/-. 41. Writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. 42. The proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner in R.P.No.161 of 2010 is quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari. 43. 41. Writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. 42. The proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner in R.P.No.161 of 2010 is quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari. 43. The Deputy Commissioner is restrained from proceeding ahead in the revision purporting to exercise his revisional jurisdiction. The matter may be examined by the Tahsildar as per the earlier order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. 44. It is also made clear that it is open to the parties to have their disputes resolved in a more meaningful and appropriate manner once and for all may approach a civil court, the competent forum and not before the revenue authorities before whom petty fights are enacted and revenue authorities are manipulated by one or the other party and manipulations being quite common and satisfactory resolution can only be before the civil court and not by manipulating the entries in the revenue records. 45. Registry is directed to permit learned counsel for the petitioner to withdraw `5,000/-from out of deposit and balance amount is directed to be released in favour of the first respondent to be drawn through his counsel. 46. The efforts of Sri. R. Omkumar, learned Additional Government Advocate who has ably assisted the court to answer the question of law for clarity and certainty by bringing to the notice of the court all relevant case laws, and has elaborated the finer legal aspects is appreciated. 47. Writ petition allowed.