Judgment :- B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. As the challenge pertains to Land acquisition and interim orders are operating against the respondents, the matter has been heard finally by making Rule returnable forthwith at the request of Shri Parchure, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mrs. Dangre, learned Additional Government Pleader for respondents No. 1 & 2 and Shri Dhatrak, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 – Public Trust for which the lands of the petitioners are being acquired. 2. Shri Parchure, learned counsel has pointed out that in earlier Writ Petition No. 650 of 2001 filed by these petitioners challenging Notification dated 04.05.2000 under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the subsequent notification dated 01.02.2001 under Section 6 thereof and notices under Section 9 were also questioned. That writ petition was disposed of on 20.08.2009 by Division Bench of this Court after noticing that Section 5A of Land Acquisition Act is in two parts and the later part which required proper application of mind by Government/ Commissioner was not fulfilled. The Court noted that Commissioner simply made report on the basis of the report submitted by Land Acquisition Officer without considering all objections raised by the petitioners. The objections like acquisition being malafide under the pressure of Respondent No. 3 or then availability of sufficient nonagricultural land which could have been acquired in preference to their agricultural land were found ignored by Land Acquisition Officer and also by the Commissioner. The matter was, therefore, sent not back to the Commissioner with a direction to consider the objections and report submitted by Land Acquisition Officer. 3. Shri Parchure, learned counsel contends that even after remand, consideration by Land Acquisition Officer or by the Commissioner again suffers from very same error and notification under Section 6 has been published mechanically. He contends that as acquisition is under pressure of President of Respondent No. 3 – Trust, the objections raised by the petitioners, though relevant, have not been looked into. He has invited our attention to those objections also. In this background, our attention is also invited to consideration thereof from records of land acquisition matter made available by learned Additional Government Pleader. 4. In the alternative and without prejudice, our attention has been invited to the fact that writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 20.08.2009 and Section 6 notification thereafter has been published on 16.09.2010. In this background, our attention is also invited to consideration thereof from records of land acquisition matter made available by learned Additional Government Pleader. 4. In the alternative and without prejudice, our attention has been invited to the fact that writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 20.08.2009 and Section 6 notification thereafter has been published on 16.09.2010. It is pointed out that earlier notification under Section 4 relevant for the purposes of computing period of one year is dated 04.05.2000. Hence, ignoring the period of pendency of Writ Petition No. 650 of 2001, the learned counsel states that as notification under Section 6 is beyond the period of one year, the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed. 5. Mrs. Dangre, learned Additional Government Pleader, on the other hand, points out that the Land Acquisition Officer got knowledge of the judgment dated 20.08.2009 on 14.09.2009 and hence the notification under Section 6 as made on 16.09.2010 is within one year thereafter. It is further contended that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Venkataswamappavs. Special Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), reported at 1997(9) SCC 128 , the date of receipt of copy and knowledge of High Court judgment is, therefore, irrelevant. It is further urged that on 20.08.2009, when this Court permitted fresh inquiry under Section 5A, Respondents No. 1 & 2 accordingly proceeded further. The petitioner ought to have pressed for quashing of Section 4 notification when Writ Petition No. 650 of 2001 came to be decided. He, however, participated in fresh inquiry and, therefore, waived the right to challenge notification under Section 6 issued after the expiry of one year. Support is being taken from the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Henriquetavs. State of Goa, reported at 2008 (4) Mh. L.J. 908. 6. Shri Dhatrak, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 has adopted the arguments of learned Additional GP and contended that all objections raised by the petitioners have been looked into not only by Land Acquisition Officer but also by the Commissioner and hence contention that there is non application of mind is, therefore, not made out. 7. Shri Parchure, learned counsel, in reply has contended that the arguments based upon waiver or estoppel is misconceived in present facts as the petitioners were all the while trying to redress their grievance. 7. Shri Parchure, learned counsel, in reply has contended that the arguments based upon waiver or estoppel is misconceived in present facts as the petitioners were all the while trying to redress their grievance. He points out that in Henriquetavs. State of Goa, (supra), the challenge before the Division Bench was belated i.e. after delivery of award under Section 11 of the Act and hence that judgment has no application in present facts. In the alternative and without prejudice, he contends that even if period of one year is to be counted from the date of delivery of judgment by this Court i.e. from 20.08.2009, still declaration under Section 6 made on 16.09.2010 is beyond time and hence land acquisition proceedings are liable to be dropped. He contends that State of Maharashtra and Land Acquisition Officer were parties to writ petition and hence date 14.09.2009 put forth as date of knowledge of High Court judgment by Land Acquisition Officer, is irrelevant. 8. After hearing the respective counsel, we find that this Court is required to look into two questions. The first one is, whether there was proper inquiry under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act and second one is, whether declaration under Section 6 made on 16.09.2010 is within a period of one year. 9. After remand by this Court, the objection of the petitioners has been again looked into and they have been given an opportunity of hearing. The acquisition was at the behest of the president of Respondent No. 3 – Trust and after failure to purchase land from them. It is, therefore, stated to be malafide. It is further urged that Trust already had sufficient land and proposed developmental activities were already commenced elsewhere and, therefore, the petitioners land was not required. It is further contended that though High Court did not set aside notification under Section 4, as it was dated 04.05.2000, no notification under Section 6 could have been published on the strength of that 2000 notification as circumstances then prevailing had undergone change. They, therefore, contended that acquisition needed to be dropped. The consideration by Land Acquisition Officer reveals that the State Government has included the site/ temple of Respondent No. 3 – Trust as a tourist site in “C” category and hence lands of the petitioners were required for its development as a tourist spot for providing Dharamshala and garden. They, therefore, contended that acquisition needed to be dropped. The consideration by Land Acquisition Officer reveals that the State Government has included the site/ temple of Respondent No. 3 – Trust as a tourist site in “C” category and hence lands of the petitioners were required for its development as a tourist spot for providing Dharamshala and garden. The lands of the petitioners are admittedly situated in the vicinity with Survey Nos. 301 and 302 ad measuring 1.15 Hect are and 1.24 Hectare respectively. The petitioners state that their land is on main road, away from existing Gaothan of village Paradsinga at a distance of about one km. from village. The fact that Respondent No. 3 attempted to purchase lands amicably from the petitioners is not in dispute. Though the name of President has been mentioned, it has not been pleaded or argued that said President wanted to purchase land personally. The pleadings show that Respondent No. 3 made efforts to purchase land for trust activities and having failed therein, the proposal for acquisition was submitted. The fact of said temple/ establishment being a tourist spot and need for its development is also not in dispute. 10. Being public trust, it is apparent that all developmental activities undertaken by the petitioners are subject to control and supervision of authorities under Bombay Public Trust Act. Even interested persons can raise suitable objections in this respect at appropriate stage. We, therefore, find the contention of the petitioners, that acquisition as initiated is malafide, misconceived. Their contention that there exists no need also has not been substantiated. They have not pointed out any nonagricultural lands available in the vicinity and there is no effort to demonstrate how those lands are more suitable than the lands of the petitioners. On the contrary, looking to the location of lands of the petitioners on main road, it is apparent that lands are more suited for construction of Dharamshala and garden etc. The burden in this respect was upon the petitioners and they have not discharged it. Their contention has been appropriately dealt with by the authorities and we, therefore, do not find any substance in violation of Section 5A or any denial of appropriate consideration. 11. The facts show that this Court allowed Writ Petition No. 650 of 2001 on 20.08.2009 and at that time Land Acquisition Officer was party respondent along with State Government. Their contention has been appropriately dealt with by the authorities and we, therefore, do not find any substance in violation of Section 5A or any denial of appropriate consideration. 11. The facts show that this Court allowed Writ Petition No. 650 of 2001 on 20.08.2009 and at that time Land Acquisition Officer was party respondent along with State Government. The declaration under Section 6 thereafter has been made on 16.09.2010 i.e. after more than one year of the judgment of this Court. Even if one ignores the period taken by the petitioners to approach this Court after earlier Section 6 notification dated 01.02.2001, it is apparent that declaration as made cannot be accepted as within one year from Section 4 notification. For the purposes of present controversy, though actual date of Section 4 notification is 04.05.2000, the said date can be presumed to be 21.08.2009 i.e. the day immediately after the judgment was pronounced by this Court in earlier writ petition when interim orders ceased to be operative. 12. This brings us to consideration of contention about the waiver of their right by the petitioners. The said contention is based upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Henriquetavs. State of Goa, (supra). There the facts show that in earlier petition there was express prayer to quash and set aside notification under Section 4 on the ground that fresh notification under Section 6 could not have been made on its strength as period of one year had already expired. The earlier writ petition was disposed of without touching this aspect and that disposal was not questioned before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The land owners participated in further proceedings without any reservation. It further appears that after remand, fresh notification under Section 6 was made on 30.09.2004 and award under Section 11A was made on 22.09.2006. Thereafter the High Court was approached. It is in this background, the Division Bench found acquiescence on the part of the petitioners and a waiver of their right to object to Section 6 notification on the ground that it was beyond period of one year. Thus view taken is basically on facts. 13. In this connection, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narayan Thatte vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1952, needs to be looked into. Thus view taken is basically on facts. 13. In this connection, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narayan Thatte vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1952, needs to be looked into. There, the matter went to the Hon'ble Apex Court from judgment of this Court only and consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 21 shows that language of Section 6 is very specific and clear, insisting application of literal rule of interpretation. Therefore, there was no scope for consideration like equity, public interest or then attempt to find out intention of legislature. There could not be any estoppel against a Statute and as the proviso prescribing period of limitation in clause (ii) of proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that it has to operate with all its rigour. The concession by counsel, therefore, was found not of any help to other side. The counsel for the petitioners there had made a statement that objection with respect to period within which section 6 notification has to be issued, from the date of section 4 notification, would not be raised by the petitioners, if the petitioners were finally aggrieved by fresh Section 5A report and subsequent declaration under Section 6. The Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that no statement or concession of advocate can override mandatory statutory provision. 14. In view of this judgment, it is apparent that the question of waiver or estoppel as sought to be urged by the learned Additional Government Pleader does not arise for consideration and findings recorded by Division Bench in Henriquetavs. State of Goa, (supra) must be restricted to the facts and circumstances of that case. 15. In the case of Venkataswamappavs. Special Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), (supra) on which learned Additional GP has placed reliance, observations in para 7 employ words viz. receipt of copy of order of Court. However, that reference cannot be viewed as laying down any law that period of one year needs to be counted from receipt of such copy. Contention advanced that as Land Acquisition Officer got knowledge of High Court order on 14.09.2009, period of one year must be computed therefrom, therefore, cannot be accepted. In any case, declaration under Section 6 in present facts is made on 16.09.2010 and it is beyond the period even from 14.09.2009. Contention advanced that as Land Acquisition Officer got knowledge of High Court order on 14.09.2009, period of one year must be computed therefrom, therefore, cannot be accepted. In any case, declaration under Section 6 in present facts is made on 16.09.2010 and it is beyond the period even from 14.09.2009. Again judgment of Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of PadmasundaraRao vs. State of T.N., reported at AIR 2002 SC 1334 , can be conveniently looked into in this respect. There the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered this controversy in para 9 and found in para 11 that Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. In para 13, the Hon'ble Apex Court has found that there was no scope for reading something into language of Section 6 and period of limitation could not have been stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of High Court order. Such a view taken in earlier two judgments i.e. in the case of N. Narasimhaiah vs. State of Karnataka, reported at (1996) 3 SCC 88 and State of Karnataka vs. D.C. Nanjudaiah, reported at (1996) 10 SCC 619 , was found to be unsustainable and contrary to legislative intent. These two judgments and view taken therein are found to be not in accordance with language of Section 6(1) and hence these judgments have been overruled. It is, therefore, apparent that line appearing in para 7 of judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Venkataswamappavs. Special Deputy Commissioner(Revenue), (supra), cannot be interpreted to support the view which runs contrary to the view of Constitution Bench. 16. In AshokKumar vs. State of Haryana, reported at AIR 2007 SC 1411 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has found that bonafide belief that injunction would continue till the final disposal of suit unless expressly vacated, was not tenable when injunction order clearly and expressly mentioned time up to which it was to operate. The declaration made beyond one year of expiry of stay/ injunction was held illegal. In para 17, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that proviso appended to subsection (1) of section 6 is in negative term and mandatory in nature. The declaration made after expiry of one year from the date of publication of notification under subsection (1) of section 4 is held to be void and of no effect. In para 17, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that proviso appended to subsection (1) of section 6 is in negative term and mandatory in nature. The declaration made after expiry of one year from the date of publication of notification under subsection (1) of section 4 is held to be void and of no effect. The purpose of enabling provision made in Section 6(1) is only to extend the period of limitation and not for any other purpose and said provision has been inserted for the benefit of owners of land. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that such a statutory benefit cannot be taken away by purported construction of an order of the Court when that order was absolutely clear and explicit. The judgment of the High Court was, therefore, set aside and appeal filed by land owner came to be allowed. 17. Here, as already noted above, even if period of limitation is computed from next day after High Court delivered its judgment on 20.08.2009, still declaration under Section 6 dated 16.09.2010 is not within the period of one year as required by proviso to Section 6 (1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Even as per dates given by learned Additional GP, it is beyond one year. The said declaration is, therefore, void and bad. It is obvious that land acquisition proceedings, therefore, cannot proceed further. 18. Accordingly, we quash and set aside the notification dated 04.05.2000 under Section 4 of the Act and all further consequential steps taken and notification under section 6 dated 16.09.2010 in pursuance thereof. Said acquisition has lapsed and is quashed. Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute in above terms. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.